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THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS A POLITICAL REVOLUTION

**NEW POLITICAL PARADIGMS
AND THE SHIFT TO POSTMODERN POLITICS
(1945 – 1996)**

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A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Political Science and Public Administration

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June 29, 2022

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AI	Amnesty International
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBO	Community-based organization
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CEPIA	Cidadania, Estudo, Pesquisa, Informação, Ação (Citizenship, Study, Research, Information, Action)
CGG	Commission on Global Governance
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CSO	Civil society organization
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ELC	Environment Liaison Centre
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCCC	Framework Convention on Climate Change
GCI	Green Cross International
GEF	Global Environment Facility
HDR	Human Development Report
HRC	Human Rights Commission
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICSU	International Council of Scientific Unions
IHRLG	International Human Rights Law Group
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organization
INSTRAW	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPO	Indigenous peoples' organization
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IULA	International Union of Local Authorities
IWHC	International Women's Health Coalition
LGBTQI	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer Intersex
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	Organization of the United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education Science and Communication Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNNGLs	United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WACLA	World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WCS	World Conservation Strategy
WEDO	Women's Environment and Development Organization
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHA	World Health Assembly
WHO	World Health Organization
WRI	World Resources Institute
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WPPA	World Population Plan of Action
WTUC	World Trade Union Conference
WWF	World Wide Fund

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Art.	Article
Decl.	Declaration
et seq.	et sequentes
Ib.	Ibidem
Op. cit.	Opus Citatum
p., pp.	Page, pages
par.	Paragraph
Platf. for Action	Platform for Action
Progr. of Action	Programme of Action
Res.	Resolution
Vol.	Volume

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Organization underwent a profound inner transformation from the time it was created in 1945 until the mid-1990s when, over the course of a series of major post-Cold War international conferences, UN cooperation with non-governmental actors became, as well-attested in academic studies and as anyone remotely familiar with the world body can easily observe, a practical principle governing its policies and activities. Ever since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the UN has considered a global partnership between state and non-state actors for the purposes of achieving sustainable development to be the framework for international cooperation in the 21st century. This global partnership for sustainable development, understood as an umbrella concept integrating the conferences' overall vision for the post-Cold War era, constitutes what we call *global governance*.

The purpose of our thesis is to investigate the extent to which the transformation of the UN into this global governance has been a revolution, a sudden, complete and radical change within the organization. To research this, we will be interested in uncovering, on the one hand, the process that has led to the constitution of the novel global conceptual platform, what the content of this platform is, the identity of its leading conceptualizers and what ideological objectives, if any, they have been pursuing (global governance as content) and on the other hand, how the novel partnerships politics was set to function and what challenges, if any, it represents for the international order (global governance as process).

In the aftermath of two devastating world wars, fifty-one sovereign governments instituted the United Nations in 1945 for the primary purpose of maintaining peace and security among nations. With the same concern, recognizing that "disregard and contempt for human rights" had "resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind", UN member states grounded the newly-created international organization in the recognition of "the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" as "the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world"¹ and adopted the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) in 1948. The UN's international nature juridically guaranteed that the organization would remain governed by sovereign governments alone, while the UN's grounding in universal human rights was supposed to keep the organization safe from ideological drifting.

No sooner was the UN created than the Cold War paralyzed the international organization in the fulfillment of its foremost mission. Between the 1960s and the late 1980s, against the backdrop of the Cold War, three widely-studied developments converged that profoundly impacted the evolution of the UN. First, the great decolonization wave of the 1960s resulted in a rapid swelling in UN membership. Secondly, the UN member states that have historically wielded the greatest political influence at the UN, namely the Western countries, then went through a violent cultural revolution (May 68, sexual revolution, second wave feminism, New Left, neo-Marxism...) that propelled large segments of the Western world into a counter-culture that some qualified as postmodern. And thirdly, as richly documented, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pursuing environmental, population, feminist and human rights interests were then born and started exercising their influence at the UN².

¹ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Preamble. 1948.

² The leading scholars of the UN-NGO interaction for the period this thesis covers and those of their publications directly relevant to our topic are listed in our references. There have been several waves of academic research on this interaction. The first dates back to the 1960s, with Borko D. Stosic's pioneering research. In the early 1980s, the work of Chiang Pei-heng is to be mentioned. The studies of Peter Willetts, Steve Charnovitz, Anne-Marie Slaughter,

At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations organized a series of international conferences (1990-96) with a view to establishing the agenda for 21st century international cooperation. The conferences built what they called a “global consensus” on a series of goals, norms, priorities and values vastly differing from the UN’s foundational purposes and spirit, if only by the terminology used to express them, their proclaimed “global” character and their anthropological perspective (most eloquently embodied in the conferences’ gender and sexual and reproductive health paradigms). The conferences also firmly set in place a new partnership politics foreign to the UN’s juridical nature as an international organization. Concomitantly, in circles closely connected to the UN, independent experts and politicians introduced the notion of *global governance* and sketched a vision for gearing the then necessary reform of the UN towards a transformation of the organization into global governance. Their vision matched the practical and normative perspective of the post-Cold War UN conferences and these conferences’ partnership politics. Also relevant to our purposes, although without a direct verifiable connection to the UN, Joseph Nye then elaborated a theory about alternative ways of exercising power and coined the *soft power* concept.

Over the course of our investigation, we will analyze the interconnections between the various developments we just evoked: between the transformation of the UN as textually reflected in the UN conferences’ documents and the conceptual birth of global governance; between the Western cultural shift to postmodernity and the ideological perspective of the conferences’ conceptual platform; between this ideological perspective and the agendas of the main non-state actors interacting with the UN; between the *soft power* concept and the way these non-state actors have exercised their influence in the UN conferences; and finally between global governance as systemic content (sustainable development as a holistic, integrated concept) and global governance as process (new global partnership regime, coopting, as the Earth Summit established it, state and non-state actors as well as “the people”). In interconnecting the dots we just identified, our thesis will fill a gap in existing academic literature. The interconnections we listed have, in their globality, so far remained largely unexplored.

This thesis proposes to trace the defining historical milestones in the advent of global governance from the drafting of the UN Charter to the last of the immediate post-Cold War UN conferences’ series. Our purpose is to highlight the thread connecting these milestones. We will see that a pattern will emerge, a remarkable unbroken continuum will appear, as well as a dramatic momentum in global governance’s forward movement, from setting the agenda of the political revolution to turning partnerships into an intergovernmentally-endorsed normative principle.

Our study will focus on the role of a few independent, influence-wielding experts, individuals and non-state actors and on that of the major UN conferences in the UN’s shift to globalism and to agendas discording with its foundational documents. In addition to this historical contribution, we will study, mainly on the basis on the post-Cold War UN conferences’ reports, the following questions: how the novel partnerships system, in other words global governance, was set to function and exercise its power; which political mechanisms it set in place; whether it had a “hard”, enforcing capacity; the extent to which it has redistributed political roles and responsibilities among states, non-state actors and “the people”; the extent to which its operational

Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, Ann Florini, Kathryn Sikkink, Shirin Sinnar, Gerard Clark, Sally Morphet, Anita Anand, John Foster, among a whole host of other scholars, belong to the swelling wave of the 1990s of predominantly normative and applied research, and to the emergence of theoretical research, a wave which was concomitant with the UN’s post-Cold War conferences and what this thesis calls *the revolution*. Another wave, rising in the 2000s, was uncontrollable in its volume and mainly theoretical.

mechanisms have transferred effective power from sovereign governments to non-state actors. Finally, we will try and determine what effects the emergence of global governance and of its postmodern political paradigms has had on the international order as established in 1945, on democracy, what kind of “regime” global governance was constructed to be, and whether or not it has been under the control of a transparent and legitimate authority, that of sovereign governments.

Let us now clarify the meaning we give to the key terms in this thesis’ title. We define *global governance* as the informal but operative political regime that would have “enlarged” the UN into a system of partnerships between states and transnational non-state actors, set in place after the fall of the Berlin wall for the exclusive purpose of achieving, “globally-to-locally”, a corpus of interdependent goals and paradigms largely absent from the UN foundational documents. We restrict our understanding of global governance to the political system historically built through the UN conference process. Our definition stipulates that any actor at any level actively advocating and implementing the global goals then set and endorsing their ideological perspective becomes a partner in global governance.

By *new political paradigms* we mean the new (absent from the UN’s foundational documents) normative concepts constituting the pillars of global governance’s framework, introduced in the reports of the UN’s international conferences. The new political paradigms globally spread at thunderlight speed during the revolution and in its wake.

We call *revolution* the very rapid intergovernmental adoption, as a matter of what the UN then called a “global consensus”, of the non-state actors’ integrated framework of novel political paradigms during the UN’s post-Cold War wave of international conferences (1990-96) – paradigms profoundly differing from - semantically, conceptually, anthropologically, politically and ideologically – or breaking with those of the international order established by the UN’s foundational documents. This thesis tries to demonstrate the scope, depth and transgressional character of the political changes produced through the advent of global governance.

By *postmodern politics*, we refer to the “liquid”, “soft” or ambivalent political paradigms (theory) and processes (practice) proper to global governance and which, we will find out, destabilize at once modernity’s fundamental political tenets and the anthropological vision underpinning the UDHR: national sovereignty and an international order based on respect for such sovereignty, government by the national people for the national people, representative and constitutional democracy, political hierarchies, the authority of law, universal human rights as rooted in human nature, natural law, trust in conscience and reason, marriage and the family, a spirit of brotherhood, the good common to all.

As our research will establish, the UN documents we will analyze have contended or assumed that the UN’s practical transformation into a global partnership for sustainable development has consisted in a mere organic evolution, in a not only justifiable, but desirable and qualitative “enlargement”. We will also find out how, surfing on the 1989 “end of ideology” mythical wave, the documents have equally assumed the global agendas to be innocuous, ideologically-free and self-evident, in a continuum with the UDHR, and the partnership politics, to enhance international cooperation and democracy. There is no dearth of academic studies, among which those belonging to our sources, that have indiscriminately grafted themselves onto these views. The mainstream media, other communication channels and the partnerships’ politics itself have also contributed to broadly propagate these prevailing assumptions for the past twenty-five years, thereby formatting governments and the peoples to walk the globalist path. This thesis will

challenge this school of thought and seek to prove that the transformation corresponded to a break from, or a transgression of the UN's foundational documents, and that it therefore deserves the qualification of a *revolution*. It matters to do so for several reasons.

First, there is a crucial necessity to bring to light how the fuzzy narrative and theoretical accounts about global governance connect to the UN's radical transformation during the conferences of the 1990s so as to apprehend global governance in its concreteness and to get a better grasp of how the global "regime" has effectively "governed" us for over two decades and a half. In their theorization of global governance, the American political scientist and international relations scholar James Rosenau (who coined the *governance* term in the 1960s)³, the American political scientist Lawrence S. Finkelstein (participant to the founding of the UN)⁴, as well as *Our Global Neighborhood*⁵, the report of the *Commission on Global Governance* on which Rosenau exercised his influence were all informed by the non-state actors-led processes, at their peak in 1995, unfolding through the UN's post-Cold War conferences. Our thesis, as opposed to them and many other accounts of global governance⁶, specifically and exclusively relates these very processes to the historical construction of global governance both as content and as new partnerships politics. Our contribution to research is to manifest global governance in its concrete, identifiable reality, in its political platform and political mechanisms, and to retrace the history of its constitution. It will hopefully counteract the irrationality of the conspiracy theories elaborated by a minority of opponents to global governance.

Secondly, becoming aware of the nexus we just evoked will hopefully help get over a profound malaise arising from the irremediable ambivalence of the global paradigms and ethics that govern us today⁷, by helping overcome widespread ignorance about the origin and development of these concepts. Any sociological observation would easily demonstrate the current dominance in a majority of societies of global governance's paradigms, conceptually forged and developed in a particular ideological breeding ground and subsequently vastly mainstreamed at all levels, from the UN to other international organizations all the way down to local communities.

Thirdly, manifesting global governance's *revolutionary* character will help discern the need to monitor the direction in which the global partnerships politics has continued to move forward, or into what kind of political system it has been evolving since 1996. The conceptual framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), set to govern international cooperation until 2030, evidence the endurance of the global governance regime as installed by 1996. The redefinition of democracy and its foundational values (liberty, equality, rights, human dignity)

³ See for instance: Rosenau, James N. *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*. Global Governance. Vol. 1, No. 1. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1995, pp. 13–43, p. 13. Winter 1995. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800099> (retrieved January 2, 2022).

Or: Rosenau, James N. *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*. Global Governance. Vol. 1. N° 1. Winter 1995, pp. 13-43.

⁴ See for instance: Finkelstein, Lawrence S. *What is Global Governance?* Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Sept.-Dec. 1995), pp. 367-372. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800120>.

⁵ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*. Oxford University Press. 1995.

⁶ As for example: Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G. *Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions*. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 16. Issue 3. 1995. Or: Kunugi, Tasuro. *Building Global Governance Partnerships Among Governments, Inter-Governmental Organizations and NGOs*. Sophia University. ADMP Series N° 35. 1999. Or: Trilateral Commission. *Global Governance. Enhancing Trilateral Cooperation*. The Trilateral Commission. 2003. Or: Whitman, Jim, Ed. *Global Governance*. Palgrave MacMillan. 2009. Or: *The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance. International Political Economy meets Foucault*. Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Iver B. Neumann. Palgrave MacMillan. 2012. Or: *Hybrid institutional complexes in global governance*. The Review of International Organizations. Kenneth W. Abbott. Benjamin Faude. April 28, 2021.

⁷ To give but a few examples: sustainable development, global governance, participatory democracy, good governance, quality of life for all, reproductive health, gender equality, non-discrimination, consensus, facilitation, diversity, inclusion...

that occurred during the revolution threw the seeds of intractable if not unsolvable conflicts even within the world's greatest democracies, opposing incompatible, irreconcilable views on what unites a society. Refoundation, revitalization or reset discourses⁸ (both of the “global order” and of liberal democracy) mark our day and clearly inscribe themselves in a continuum with the global governance revolution this thesis analyzes.

Lastly, those concerned about the revolutionary anthropological vision that has globally spread from the UN's hub for decades, destabilizing universal truths about human nature, and in particular marriage and the family, need a clearer notion of the specific *political mechanisms* through which the novel vision has managed to impose itself from global governance's epicenter as their analysis tends to focus more on content than on process. If humanity is to remain faithful to itself and to what it is capable of universally recognizing as good, it is to be governed by institutions honoring human nature.

We are by now able to articulate our main hypotheses. Our thesis contends that the emergence of global governance through the UN conference process has been a revolution, led by a minority of experts and non-state actors, transgressing the nature of international cooperation and that of universal human rights: it was a sudden and radical change in the way the UN institution functions, that operated impressive power transfers away from sovereign governments to a global non-state elite. Related hypotheses are that this revolution happened *within* the UN institution and through the UN conference process as its main battlefield; that the revolution had accomplished its major objectives by 1996 (the end of the UN's post-Cold War conference process); that its non-state agents were ideologically-driven; that their ideological drive sprang from the West's New Left and postmodern perspective; that they have used *soft power* to subdue the UN as an intergovernmentally-governed institution and to globally spread their new political paradigms; and that the revolution ushered, not in the institution of a global government, but in a coexistence regime that is dangerously transformative, ambivalent, destabilizing and weakening for the sovereignty of peoples and their governments, and could represent a stage in a great transition towards some kind of “global governance with teeth”, to use UN Secretary General António Guterres' expression.

Aside from the UN Charter, the UDHR and a few other major documents of juridical or historical weight, the primary sources for this thesis are the official UN reports of the main conferences of the Cold War (1968-1985) and immediate post-Cold War (1990-96) periods, related UN resolutions, speeches by UN Secretaries-General and other high-level UN officials, a few speeches or studies of other major players in global governance, as well as the reports of the independent commissions which had a direct impact on the development of global governance as content and as process (1972-1995)⁹. The conferences' reports embody what was proclaimed to be an intergovernmental consensus on the novel paradigms coined by the agents of global governance. Enjoying a significant amount of political weight, they are the body of texts reflecting global governance's core content.

⁸ Such as that launched by Klaus Schwab's *Covid 19: The Great Reset* 2020 book, or Emmanuel Macron's January 19, 2022 European Parliament speech.

⁹ The main ones being the following: Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*. 1972; The Brandt Commission. *North-South: A program for survival*. 1980; IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy. Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development*. 1980; The Brandt Commission. *Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery*. 1983; The Brundtland Commission. *Our Common Future*. 1987; The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common responsibility in the 1990s*. 1991; The Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*. 1995.

In its historical tracing of the defining milestones in the process that led to the emergence of global governance, this thesis relies on the scholarly findings of Ruth Russell¹⁰, Stanley Meisner¹¹ (UN Charter and UN history), Chiang Pei-heng¹², Peter Willetts et al¹³, Steve Charnovitz¹⁴, Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith¹⁵, Thomas R. Davies¹⁶, Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler¹⁷, John W. Foster et al¹⁸ (history of NGOs-UN collaboration), Jyoti Shankar Singh (NGO involvement in UN population conferences) among other academics who studied the conference process as it unfolded and could provide sound, verified, factual information useful to our tracking purposes. We will also refer to studies in this author's private archive¹⁹. In its analytical assessment of the new partnership or global governance politics, this thesis will refer to the work of scholars such as James N. Rosenau, Jessica Matthews, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Gustave Speth, Kristen Timothy, which corroborate the intent to "share" power between sovereign governments and what Rosenau called "sovereignty free"²⁰ non-state actors at the UN in the 1990s. Our purpose being to concretely connect global governance to the novel global synthesis built over the course of the UN conference process, we will restrict our references to the main authors who have studied this process and the UN conferences' outcome documents. We will not dive into the ocean of theoretical literature written since the 2000s about topics such as global governance, global civil society, global democracy or global law. Lastly, we will relate our analysis of the global governance revolution to the thought of political philosophers and thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Nicholas Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Derrida, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Zygmunt Bauman, Joseph Ratzinger, Marcel Gauchet, Chantal Delsol, Matthieu Bock-Côté, Patrick Deneen, Yannick Haenel, François Meyronnis and Valentin Retz.

Arguably this thesis addresses a broad and complex topic. It will be impossible to relate in detail every episode in the historical emergence of global governance as a political revolution, to present every agent of this process, to analyze all the paradigms making up global governance's integrated platform, to name all the actors coopted in the new global partnership and all the areas in which

¹⁰ Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*. The Brookings Institution. 1958.

¹¹ Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations. A History*. Grove Press. New-York. 1995. Revised Edition 2011.

¹² Pei-heng, Chiang. *Non-governmental Organizations at the United-Nations. Identity, Role, and Function*. Praeger Publishers. New-York, 1981.

¹³ In particular Willetts, Peter, Ed. *The Conscience of the World. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*. The Brookings Institution. 1996. This book includes contributions by Bill Seary, Richard Hoggart, Sally Morphet, Jane Connors. And Willetts, Peter. *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics. The Construction of Global Governance*. Routledge. 2011.

¹⁴ Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*. Michigan Journal of International Law. Vol. 18. Issue 2. 1997, pp. 183-286.

¹⁵ Sikkink, Kathryn and Smith, Jackie. *Infrastructures for Change: Transnational Organizations, 1953-1993*. In *Restructuring World Politics: The Power of Transnational Agency and Norms*. Ed. By S. Khagram, J. Riker and K. Sikkink. University of Minnesota Press. 2002.

¹⁶ Davies, Thomas Richard. *The Rise and Fall of Transnational Civil Society: The Evolution of International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1839*. City University London Centre for International Politics. Working Paper CUTP/003. April 2008.

¹⁷ Clark, Ann Marie, Friedman, Elisabeth J. and Hochstetler, Kathryn. *The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society. A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women*. World Politics 51. October 1998, pp. 1-35.

¹⁸ Foster, John W. et al. *Whose World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the Multilateral Future*. The United Nations Association in Canada. 1999.

¹⁹ I authored over 300 reports monitoring post-Cold War developments at the United Nations (the majority written between 1995 and 2002). These reports (*Interactive Information Services*) include a number of interviews conducted in the 1990s with some of the leading players in the global governance process.

²⁰ An expression coined by Rosenau in *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton University Press. 1990, p. 36.

they exercised their influence. We will limit ourselves to the defining moments in a process whose manifestations are now globally pervasive. Our purpose is to highlight the strategic and ideological *thread* connecting key episodes, actors and achievements. We will selectively focus on the *conceptual pillars* of global governance's *framework*.

Other limits we have set include the following. This thesis, observing that non-state actors historically gained their power and constituted global governance as we define it chiefly through the UN, not elsewhere, leaves out all accounts of global governance applying the concept to the G7, to the G20, to international trade and financial institutions, and/or to other international organizations such as the OECD and NATO. We note, however, that to the extent these groups or institutions did internalize the UN's post-Cold War global goals, language and conceptual framework, they themselves became partners in global governance. But our thesis does not integrate them in its analysis.

This thesis, having identified the two first major waves of UN conferences (Cold War wave and immediate post-Cold War wave) as the revolution's battleground, focusses exclusively, within the UN institution, on the UN Secretariat and the UN ECOSOC (including some of the UN specialized bodies respondent to ECOSOC). It leaves aside all other UN bodies, in particular the Security Council - which has traditionally been regarded as the UN's main organ, being the only one endowed with a hard enforcement capacity -, but also the Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice. It also will not investigate the non-state partners' influence on the UN's Treaty Monitoring Bodies. However, even while the conferences represent only a small part of the UN's overall activities, this thesis will allude to the normative impact that the global norms adopted at the conferences will have beyond ECOSOC, beyond the UN, beyond other international organizations, beyond governmental policies and laws.

Within the UN conference process, we will not get involved in analyzing the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the paradigms of global governance. We will exclusively focus on the non-state actors' leadership in forging these paradigms as textually present in intergovernmentally-endorsed documents, as well as on these actors' leadership in holistically interlinking the new paradigms into a systemic agenda for the 21st century.

The time boundaries for our study are 1945-1996: 1945 corresponding to the adoption of the UN Charter, in which, as we shall find out, were thrown the seeds of global governance, and 1996 marking the end of the immediate post-Cold War UN conference process, by which date, we shall contend, global governance was constituted as content and as process, the revolution thereafter entering its implementation phase.

As a significant part of our methodology and to demonstrate that a radical change occurred from what the UN was at the time of its creation to what it became after the fall of the Berlin wall, a historical approach will be needed, identifying the major historical steps along the emergence of global governance. Dealing with an institution, our research will imply a confrontation of the institutional nature of the United Nations, of how the UN was juridically set to operate, with the way global governance was formed and has operationally functioned. We will have to examine whether this global governance itself pursued institutional ambitions independently from the UN, or how it instrumentalized existing institutions. We will use a functional approach to determine how global governance distributes political roles to the different actors that constitute its partnerships' politics.

Our thesis will synthetically analyze the primary documents that we found our study upon to evaluate the measure in which the UN will have distanced itself from its foundational purposes by 1996 - an analytic-synthetic method that will be prevalent in this thesis' part three. We will use the evolution of language in the primary documents – and in particular, the historical appearance of terms that were absent from the UN Charter and UDHR - as an indicator of radical change. We will observe the interconnections of the novel terms so as to determine the extent to which they constitute a semantic system expressing a new synthesis. We will identify the authors of the new language's few key terms and how they define (or do not define) them. We will look at these authors' ideological perspective and examine whether they coined the new language in order to name reality as it is, or for postmodern deconstructionist or manipulative purposes. We will refer to the four charts in Appendix A, which allow us to observe the historical appearance (or disappearance) of two hundred terms, from the UN foundational documents all the way to the reports of the second wave UN conferences.

Our thesis will philosophically reflect on how global governance interprets political concepts such as power, legitimacy, democracy, the people, sovereignty, the values binding a society together, universality, human rights, human nature. In this analysis, it will, as already mentioned, refer to some of the main Western political philosophers. We will thus make use of historical, institutional, functional, analytic-synthetic, linguistic and philosophical methods all at once.

This thesis is divided into three parts. In the logic of our historical approach, part one, comprised of two chapters, addresses the seminal and gestational period of the global governance revolutionary process spanning between the 1945 UN foundation and the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall. It looks at the drafting of the UN Charter (chapter one), at the first wave UN conferences (1968-1985) and at the series of independent reports and commissions that importantly contributed to the UN's shift to globalism (chapter two), specifically in search of the seeds of the vision that would eventually lead to the emergence of global governance. It identifies the leading non-state proponents of internationalist, and subsequently of globalist agendas exercising their influence in the three processes we just named. It particularly focusses on how, in the shade of the Cold War, they successfully started integrating in international cooperation agendas that were discordant with the UN's international nature and with the spirit of the UDHR. Part one studies how, when major powers were mainly busy with hard security issues, a small number of non-state actors cultivated the global governance breeding ground. By 1989, we will find that they had a solidly established vision for the post-Cold War world order.

Always in line with our historical approach, part two, which is in three chapters, exposes and analyzes the fruit made, at a critical moment in history, by the non-governmentally-led process addressed in part one: the full outbreak of the global governance revolution in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall. It starts by setting the historical stage for this outbreak, examining the political role played by the end of ideology proclamation, defining the revolution's key concepts and clarifying the position of strength in which the non-state visionaries of nascent global governance found themselves in 1989 (chapter three). Rapidly unfolding over the course of the second wave UN conferences (1990-96), the revolution crystallized their new vision into an intergovernmentally-endorsed "global consensus" on mutually-integrated new paradigms, into global governance's *platform* and *systemic content*, into a *framework* for 21st century international cooperation. On the basis of concrete examples, part two focuses on highlighting the leadership of a few power-wielding non-state actors in establishing the major conceptual and ideological pillars of the global governance architecture, their specific "gains" at each of the nine conferences and the unbroken continuum in their ideologically-driven linkages process. Part two renders manifest the remarkable political, strategic and ideological thread connecting global governance's

seminal, gestational and revolutionary periods (chapter four). It ends by analyzing how the revolution hijacked humanity's universal aspirations as defined in the UDHR at the end of the Cold War, in particular the widespread desire to correct modernity's abuses (chapter five).

Part two having addressed the constitution of global governance as content, part three now analyzes the constitution of global governance as process. It exposes the historical development of the new partnerships' politics during the UN's post-Cold War conferences. It analyzes the conferences' rationale for partnerships, identifies the "partners" and the roles that the conferences assigned them according to what each does best at the service of the global goals. Chapter seven analyzes the hard character of global governance's "soft politics". Global governance, constituted through the use of soft power and informal processes by non-state actors, ends up ruling over institutions and enforcing its agendas on them while transgressing their mandates. Chapter eight demonstrates that the revolution ushered in an ambivalent global coexistence regime, destabilizing both modern democracy and the international order. It surfed on the post-Cold War pro-democracy wave, transferred democratic principles and values to the "global level" and blended democracy and the paradigms of the new partnerships' politics. The global governance revolution took place in the name of the UN Charter and the UDHR, not substituting the UN but overruling it from within. The postmodern "liquidity" of global governance's paradigms fundamentally destabilized an international order resting upon the will of sovereign governments.

PART I

THE ADVENT OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

*Defining historical milestones
from global governance's conceptual and juridical origins since the UN Charter until 1989*

CHAPTER 1

SEMINAL PERIOD

This chapter starts by addressing three interconnected fundamental determinants of the entire thesis: the identity of “we the peoples of the United Nations”; the original dialectical tension between the Western modern social contract and the Western modern freedom of association principle; the Western cultural backdrop for global governance’s political revolutionary process.

It then identifies the concrete individuals and organizations who played critical roles in throwing the seeds of global governance in the UN Charter, their internationalist mindset, the communist allegiance and the ideological intent of key players and some of their principal strategic achievements: the introduction of UN Charter Article 71, the inclusion of ECOSOC among the principal organs of the new international organization and the upgrading of soft socioeconomic issues.

1.1. Three fundamental determinants

1.1.1. Who are “We the peoples of the United Nations”?

A comparative study of the identity of “We the peoples of the United Nations”, the UN Charter’s opening words, as conceived by the organization’s main founders versus as interpreted by chief UN officials in the 1990s will determine whether a revolution did take place between 1945 and 1996.

A foundational equation between peoples and nations?

Determining was the leadership of the United States in the process leading up to the creation of the United Nations in 1945²¹. The very name of the new international organization was coined by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941²². It borrowed from the US President’s federal nation the qualifier *United* while replacing the substantive *States* by *Nations*. Similarly, the opening words of the UN Charter, signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 and ratified by the 51 founding member states on October 24 of the same year - “We the peoples of the United Nations” - replicate those of the US Constitution²³, the founding document of American constitutional democracy: “We the people of the United States”. Indeed, they were proposed by the US delegation²⁴.

²¹ See Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, op. cit., published by the *Brookings Institution*, which has historically strongly backed multilateralism and global governance. One of its directors (1969-78), Henry D. Owen, was a member of the *Trilateral Commission* and of the *Council on Foreign Relations*. Brookings has had ties with *Carnegie*, the *Ford Foundation* and the *Rockefeller Foundation*.

²² At the August 1941 *Atlantic Conference*, Roosevelt suggested to Churchill the name “United Nations” for the organization he thought needed to be established to maintain peace after World War II. Roosevelt’s proposed name was adopted in the 1942 *Declaration by United Nations*, the main treaty that formalized the Allies of World War II and became the basis of the United Nations. At the *San Francisco Conference*, the name “United Nations” was kept after a debate. Some argued that it “was too closely associated with the wartime alliance”, but much was made “of President Roosevelt’s preference for the title” (Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, op. cit., pp. 918-19).

²³ The US Constitution, written in 1787, went into effect on March 4, 1789, the year of the French revolution. It was ratified by the 13 original States between 1787 and 1790.

²⁴ The words “We the people” were suggested by US Representative Sol Bloom, member of the US delegation to San Francisco, a democrat, Orthodox Jew, Zionist, and supportive of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Virginia Gildersleeve, the only woman on the US delegation, drafted the opening words of the Charter “We the people of the United Nations...”. See Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States*

The people of the United States form a sovereign nation, constituted by what John Locke called a *contract of society* and a *contract of government*²⁵: on the one hand, by the values expressing who the American people want to be as a nation, the norms and objectives for which they establish, develop, and defend themselves; on the other hand, by the institutions that they, having formed themselves as a nation – as one people –, believe they need. The government distributes and separates one from the other the powers of the state, establishing checks and balances between its legislative, judiciary and executive branches. Institutions function democratically to the extent that they express and represent the will of the national people: modern representative, liberal or constitutional democracy is power or “government of the people, by the people, for the people” as Abraham Lincoln defined American democracy in his famous 1863 Gettysburg address²⁶. The notion of “nationhood” is a pillar of modern politics and indissolubly connects to that of national sovereignty²⁷.

Roosevelt’s *United Nations* phrase suggested that the new organization would respect individual nations and their sovereignty as a founding principle²⁸. To what extent, however, was the qualifier “united” intended to impact or shrink their sovereignty? What kind of values or “contract” would nations be united by? Self-evident truths²⁹ or universality (as interpreted, in slightly different ways, in 1948 by the drafters of the UDHR) were long assumed to have provided the UN’s binding moral component, even if eight UN founding members had abstained from signing the *Universal Declaration*³⁰. As the content of the UN’s unifying ingredient remained imprecise, so did the relationship between this ingredient and national social contracts, in the case of UN member states

²⁵ 1940-1945, op. cit., pp. 910-919. We note that, if Russell is correct, both proposals had the word “people” in the singular, not the plural retained in the final version of the Charter. The singular would imply an early globalist outlook. We also note that the interpretation US democrats have made of “the people” has ideologically differed from that made by US Republicans.

²⁶ The distinction comes from John Locke (1632-1704), the great architect of the 1688 English *Glorious Revolution*. Locke’s ideas, along with those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), substantially influenced Thomas Jefferson in the drafting of the US Constitution and *Bill of Rights*.

²⁷ In his November 19, 1863 Gettysburg speech during the civil war, Lincoln said: “Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal... It is ... for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us - ... that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom - and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

²⁸ Art. 3 of the French 1789 *Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen* stated: “Le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la nation.”

²⁹ UN Charter Art. 2, (7) stipulates that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” As Linda Fasulo, referring to Stephen Schlesinger of The Century Foundation, put it: “President Franklin Roosevelt and other world leaders decided that the UN would work best if it consisted of sovereign states and not elected representatives. ‘The UN is not a formal democracy or world government with elected representatives, but it’s a collection of individual nations, each with its own political structures and own appointed ambassadors,’ he explains.” Fasulo, Linda. *An Insider’s Guide to the UN*. Yale University Press. 2004/2005, p. 4. Fasulo’s book also contains a quote by international affairs specialist Jeffrey Laurenti explained the relation between the UN Charter and national sovereignty: “Sovereign entities have created a supra-association in which they have invested a small measure of sovereignty, at least for the purpose of preventing war. The UN Charter represents very small concessions of sovereignty to the global entity, the UN, but it was primarily to prevent a return to war.” Ib., p. 21.

³⁰ The 1776 US *Declaration of Independence* did not use the term universal but referred to self-evident truths: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

³¹ Among the abstaining countries were five other communist countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine SSR, Byelorussia SSR). The Soviet bloc countries abstention was due, *inter alia*, to Art. 13’s provision for the right of citizens to leave their countries and the UDHR’s request from governments not to violate civil and political rights. The two non-communist abstaining countries were Saudi Arabia (on the grounds that the UDHR violated Sharia law) and South Africa (apartheid policies).

that were liberal democracies. The creation of the United Nations implied a tacit original tension between the exercise of national sovereignty and some kind of new international order that could potentially diminish and jeopardize this exercise³¹.

Who are “we the peoples of the United Nations”? The UN is, by mandate, an inter-national and intergovernmental organization. As such, it is juridically bound to represent the will of its members: nation-states, sovereign individual governments, themselves bound by a contract, when they were democracies, to represent the will of their respective peoples. Logically then, *the peoples of the United Nations* were to mean what the phrase suggested, i.e., individual sovereign *nations*, peoples individually “professing solidarity on the basis of language, religion, history, or some other bonding element”³². The text of the UN Charter’s preamble unambiguously connected “we the peoples” to these peoples’ “respective Governments” and to the “international organization” that these Governments established, making it clear that the Charter’s unquestionable interpretation of “the peoples” was indeed “nations”.

Post-Cold War UN Secretaries-General identify “We the peoples” with transnational non-governmental organizations

In his video message marking the 75th anniversary of the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized the enduring and critical relevance of “We the peoples”: “Those first three words of our founding Charter, adopted 75 years ago today, give the United Nations its vision and its mission”³³. But since the end of the Cold War, UN Secretaries-General have openly identified “We the peoples of the United Nations” with the transnational NGOs and other non-state actors that had imposed themselves after the fall of the Berlin wall as, to use Kofi Annan’s expression, “the new global people-power”³⁴.

At a “We the Peoples” UN conference in 1994, for instance, Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked that the UN was no longer considered to be “a forum for sovereign States alone”, NGOs henceforth being seen as “full participants in international life”³⁵. Referring to what he himself

³¹ For instance, Otfried Höffe argued: “The United Nations has been founded by sovereign states. However, by the ratification of the Charter, they renounced part of their sovereignty and headed towards a federal world republic”. Höffe, Otfried. *A Subsidiary and Federal World Republic: Thoughts on Democracy in the Age of Globalization* (pp. 181-202). In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*. Edited by Volker Rittberger. United Nations University Press. Tokyo. New-York. Paris. 2001, p. 200. By contradistinction, Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker underlined the UN Charter’s intent to respect national sovereignty: “Although the San Francisco Conference claimed to speak in the name of ‘We, the peoples of the United Nations’, its participants acted on behalf of governments. In turn, those governments represented states – those legal and political abstractions for social structures within which people are governed... In treating with each other, most governments pretend that they rule in their states without the slightest responsibility to others unless they specifically undertake it. Each state is said to be sovereign and independent. The UN Charter faithfully reflected this view.” Baehr, Peter R. and Gordenker, L. *The United Nations at the End of the 1990s*. Third Edition. St. Martin’s Press. 1999, p. 1.

³² Weiss, Thomas et al. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Westview Press. 1994, p. 1.

³³ Guterres, António. *Secretary-General’s video message marking the 75th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Charter of the United Nations*. 26 June 2020. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-06-26/secretary-generals-video-message-marking-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-adoption-of-the-charter-of-the-united-nations-scroll-down-for-french-version> (retrieved January 30, 2022).

³⁴ Annan, Kofi. *Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks*. UN Press Release SG/SM/7318. February 29, 2000.

³⁵ Willetts, Peter, Ed. *The Conscience of the World. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*, op. cit., p. 311. Appendix C. Statement by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the UN Department of Public Information 47th annual conference on NGOs “We the peoples: building peace”, New-York, September 20, 1994. In this speech, the former Secretary-General invited NGOs to consider the UN as their “home” (Ib., p. 311). He proclaimed himself “convinced that NGOs have an important role to play in the achievement of the

named “the NGO revolution”, Kofi Annan called it “the best thing that has happened to our organization in a long time”³⁶. In his 2000 “We the Peoples” report, Annan declared:

“Today, global affairs are no longer the exclusive province of foreign ministries, nor are states the sole source of solutions for our small planet’s many problems. Many diverse and increasingly influential non-state actors have joined with national decision-makers to improvise new forms of global governance.”³⁷

It is noteworthy that Annan here explicitly connected the political engagement of influential non-state actors to *global governance*. As it turned out, both Boutros-Ghali and Annan proved pivotal agents in reforming the UN into global governance.

On the eve of the UN’s 75th anniversary, António Guterres expressed the view that in the 21st century, governments were “no longer the only political and power reality” and advocated what he called “an inclusive multilateralism, drawing on the indispensable contributions of civil society, business, cities, regions, and in particular, with greater weight given to the voices of youth”³⁸. This new multilateralism must in his view be “effective” and able to “function as an instrument of global governance where it is needed”³⁹. Its guide and goals must be “shared values, shared responsibility, shared sovereignty, shared progress”⁴⁰. Guterres, in the footsteps of his predecessors since Boutros-Ghali, explicitly connected the *global governance* concept to the political empowerment of “civil society”⁴¹ and non-state actors. This observation confirms this thesis’ definition of global governance as established in the introduction.

Dramatic change in the core content of “we the peoples”

ideal established by the Charter of the United Nations” (Ib., p. 312) and states to them “as clearly as possible – I need the mobilizing power of non-governmental organizations” (Ib., p. 314).

³⁶ Annan, Kofi. *Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks*, op. cit. The full quote read as follows: “Looking ahead, I see a world of opportunities for stronger ties between us. I see a United Nations keenly aware that if the global agenda is to be properly addressed, a partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity. I see a United Nations which recognizes that the NGO revolution - the new global people-power - is the best thing that has happened to our Organization in a long time”.

³⁷ Annan, Kofi. *We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. United Nations. 2000, p. 67. Annan added: “The more complex the problem at hand... the more likely we are to find non-governmental organizations, private sector institutions and multilateral agencies working with sovereign states to find consensus solutions... Sometimes international organizations are in the lead - the World Health Organization, for example, in the Roll Back Malaria campaign, or my own office in the case of the Global Compact with the private sector. In other instances a few national governments and non-governmental organizations are the driving force, as was the case with the campaign to ban landmines. In the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization the private sector and philanthropic foundations are the major players. In every case, these loose creative coalitions give new meaning to the phrase “we the peoples”, by showing that global governance is not a zero-sum game. All the partners in such a network see their influence increase” (Ib., p. 70). Annan urged the UN to “give full opportunities to non-governmental organizations and other nonstate actors to make their indispensable contribution to the Organization’s work” (Ib., p. 80).

³⁸ Guterres, António. *Press Conference by Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters*. June 25, 2020. SG/SM/20142.

³⁹ Ib.

⁴⁰ Ib.

⁴¹ In 1995, Cyril Ritchie and Andrew Rice defined the then reinterpreted civil society as follows: “INGOs are the transnational organizational manifestations of what is now increasingly called ‘civil society’ – which, in the words of UN Under-Secretary-General Nitin Desai, is ‘the sphere in which social movements organize themselves around objectives, constituencies, and thematic interests’.” Ritchie, Cyril and Rice, Andrew. *Changing Relationships Between International Non-Governmental Organizations and the United Nations*. Union of International Associations. 1995. <https://uia.org/archive/ingos-un> (retrieved July 30, 2020).

These sample quotes from some of the highest post-Cold War officials of the UN indicate that, by the 1990s, the core content of the Charter’s “we the peoples” had dramatically changed and consequently also that of sovereignty. It had supposedly been “enlarged” to include what the Commission on Global Governance synthetically called “global civil society” – a concept in which the commission included “a multitude of institutions, voluntary associations, and networks – women’s groups, trade unions, chambers of commerce, farming or housing co-operatives, neighbourhood watch associations, religion-based organizations, *and so on* [our emphasis]”⁴². This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that in practice, “global civil society” has meant all those transnational NGOs and other actors qualified as “non-governmental” or “non-state” that had been interacting with the United Nations and participating in its “new global agenda”, pursuing their interests and objectives independently from the sovereign nations juridically making up the United Nations. Hence the new global civil society paradigm radically altered the meaning of what had then far been called “civil society”.

A revolution had taken place: a decisive power shift challenging the basic tenets of constitutional and representative democracy and of international cooperation based on state sovereignty. In her widely-read 1997 *Foreign Affairs* article, Jessica Matthews⁴³, then a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, described the revolution in this way:

“The end of the Cold War has brought no mere adjustment among states but a novel *redistribution of power* [our emphasis] among states, markets, and civil society. National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are *sharing powers* [Ib.] – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while”⁴⁴.

This thesis’ part one will show that the novel redistribution of power, the power-sharing processes Matthews referred to started decades before the end of the Cold War. NGOs and other non-state actors started wielding influence at the UN as the Charter was being drafted: an influence that has rendered the interpretation of “We the peoples of the United Nations” ambivalent from the very foundation of the intergovernmental body. A second type of ambivalence derived from the socialist-internationalist interpretation of “the peoples” made by the Soviet and Ukrainian delegates in San Francisco. Their internationalism attacked the primacy of national sovereignty that the international nature of the UN guaranteed. These delegations strongly supported the US proposal, but for quite different motives⁴⁵.

1.1.2. Modern social contract vs. freedom of association

⁴² Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴³ It is worth mentioning that Matthews has been founding Vice President and Director of Research of the WRI (1982-1993), a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (1993-1997), President of the CEIP (1997-2015), which under her leadership aspired to be “the first global think tank”, and is a member of the Steering Committee of the Bilderberg Group. This thesis exposes the interconnectedness of these institutions and groups, and their central influence in the development of global governance.

⁴⁴ Matthews, Jessica. *Power Shift*. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 76 N°1. 1997, pp. 50-66. See <https://carnegieendowment.org/1997/02/01/power-shift-pub-15818?msclkid=e491f2eed11011ec98c2fbc355cc8aba> (retrieved April 20, 2022).

⁴⁵ See Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, op. cit., p. 915.

This thesis' second fundamental determinant relates the first ambivalence we just identified regarding the political content of “we the peoples of the United Nations” to a malaise inherent to modern democratic principles: a tension between, on the one hand, the social contract as defined by modern political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) or Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and national by nature⁴⁶ and, on the other, liberal democracy's freedom of association principle, which made possible the birth of private associations, hence eventually that of transnational non-governmental organizations, without which global governance as this thesis interprets it would not have come about. The former *unites* a nation – one “people” - through common values and has a constraining character, while the latter made possible the creation of groups of individuals defending *various, differing or even conflicting* ideas, interests and values (political and ideological pluralism) both within that nation and internationally⁴⁷.

The philosophers at the origin of modern political thought emphasized the cohesion of society. Replacing the culturally unifying role that the Catholic Church had played in European societies prior to the wars of religion, the Western modern social contract implied that the people of a nation agreed and adhered to commonly chosen values. Thomas Hobbes was no pluralist. He viewed social bodies - localities, churches, universities, guilds... - as subordinated systems, that were either created or tolerated by the sovereign. John Locke's contract of society bound a particular people together through values this nation had jointly chosen to adhere to. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the law, expression of what he called the “general will”⁴⁸, established a *direct* relationship between the individual and the nation. From the modern social contract perspective, private, special interest organizations, which could not claim to represent the will of individual nations, compromised the direct relationship between the sovereign people and its representatives.

The modern recognition of the value of individual liberty led to that of the freedom of association⁴⁹. The Chinese-born American scholar Chiang Pei-heng commented that one of the distinguishing features of the modern era begun with the 1789 French revolution was,

⁴⁶ The tension applied as well to nation-states not necessarily bound together by a social contract in the Western modern sense, but by a history, a culture, a religion. Beyond the modern social contract notion, which applied only to certain Western nation-states, there has been a tension between nations and modern ideologies.

⁴⁷ If, in an ideal world, the unifying element is the good that is common to all individuals, then there will be no contradiction between freedom and the “social contract”. The modern synthesis however put the two in a dialectical tension. Searching for a good common to all was not the primary driver of the modern social contract, but ambivalent concepts of freedom, equality and rights. This tension concerns all societies, beyond the modern Western one.

⁴⁸ *General will* is the English translation of *intérêt général*, a concept central to Rousseau's philosophy. It would be interesting to study the extent to which Rousseau's *intérêt général* relates to prevailing modern concepts such as the *national interest*, or to the *special interests* notion often describing NGOs, or to the globalist *collective interest* paradigm. Modernity and postmodernity have tended to replace the notion of *good*, of the good common to all, by that of *interest*.

⁴⁹ The freedom of association derived from the freedom of assembly - present in the US constitution's 1789 Bill of Rights and also established by the *French National Assembly* in 1790. The US Constitution's first amendment guarantees “the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. It does not explicitly mention the freedom of association. It is only in 1958 (in the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama* case) that the US Supreme Court would rule its protection of the freedom of association. The US Constitution's first amendment guarantees “the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. It does not explicitly mention the freedom of association. It is only in 1958 (in the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama* case) that the US Supreme Court would rule its protection of the freedom of association. During the French revolution, the National Assembly law of August 21, 1790 establishes the right “peaceably to assemble”. The March 1791 Allarde Decree, however, dissolved all religious communities and associations of various kinds (of inhabitants, guilds, colleges, hospitals, charities, congregations...). This Decree referred itself to Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Art. 122 of the June

“in contrast to the ancient régime... the fact that people are no longer arbitrarily and legally grouped by birth, family, class, wealth, trade, profession, or religion. Rather, the individual is free to choose the group with which he wishes to associate. Indeed, he is free to choose not to join any group at all”⁵⁰.

In *On Liberty* (1859), British economist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), one of the most influential philosophers of classical liberalism, promoted the “freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others”. The freedom of association has been a feature of Western liberal democracy, connecting to the freedom of speech, religion, conscience and opinion. The exercise of freedom as Western modernity interpreted the concept has however paradoxically challenged the modern social contract theory.

Over the course of modernity, private associations have kept on growing in size and multiplying in numbers. As we shall see it in this chapter, they quickly gained political traction at the international level. The modern freedom of association principle contained the seeds of global governance: this thesis will study how global governance historically emerged through the power transnational non-state actors defending particular interests across nations managed to grab from sovereign governments at the international level. Did these transnational actors advocate agendas conforming to UN member states’ national social contracts, to the values binding each individual nation together, to these nations’ history, identity, traditions, culture, religion, to what is genuinely humanly universal? How has the global governance revolutionary process, itself a fruit of the modern freedom of association principle, addressed the modern tension between freedom and the social contract? How did it resolve the competition between the democratic principle of power by the people-as-nation(s) and the post-democratic “new global people-power” that is largely uncontrolled by the checks and balances of representative democracies and only represents the interests of transnational-non-governmental-organizations? To what extent did the emergence of global governance contribute to the implosion of modern constitutional or representative democracy? This thesis will strive to answer these questions.

1.1.3. Western cultural backdrop for the global governance revolutionary process

While we have just observed the link between the modern freedom of association principle and global governance, we now also need to look at the Western cultural backdrop for the global governance revolutionary process. This process was historically concomitant with what commentators have named the post-World War II “cultural revolution”⁵¹ of the West, its cultural

24, 1793 French Constitution granted citizens the right to assemble in popular societies, but this law was never applied. The Tribunal condemned all associations suspected of opposition to the revolution. As for masonic lodges, they were allowed to proliferate at the time. This shows how ambivalent the right to assemble was at the time of the French revolution.

⁵⁰ Pei-heng, Chiang. *Non-governmental Organizations at the United-Nations. Identity, Role, and Function*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵¹ See for instance Mathieu Bock-Côté, quoting Edgar Morin: « Edgar Morin dira dans son Journal de Californie, de la contre-culture qu’elle est « ... aussi une révolution culturelle » (Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique*. Les Editions du Cerf. 2016, p. 98). Or Peeters, Marguerite A. *The Globalization of the Western Cultural Revolution*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2012.

“rupture”⁵², the advent of a “counter-culture”⁵³, the first major phase of its shift to postmodernity, the advent of what Herbert Marcuse appropriately called the *non-repressive civilization*⁵⁴, a regressive civilization whereby human sexual drives became cultural and political values.

Considering that the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian legacies have constituted the Western civilization, the historical process whereby the West turned away from these legacies spanned several centuries. But there is widespread agreement that it reached its climax in the 1960s and achieved its deconstructionist objectives⁵⁵ in the two decades following May 68. These two decades, which witnessed, as we shall now see, the rapid implosion of both Christianity and of modernity’s basic tenets within Western societies, smashing to pieces the classical, Judeo-Christian and modern pillars of the Western civilization, corresponded to global governance’s gestational phase. What then was the link between both the agendas and the agents of the Western cultural revolution and those of global governance? Did the latter outgrow from the former? Our thesis will explore the existence and nature of such a connection.

Modernity’s mixed matrix, moving away from Greek transcendentals and Christendom

The West’s long historical march towards modernity can roughly be traced back to the 16th century spread of Italian Renaissance humanism in many parts of Europe. It gradually shifted the focus of European nations away from communities organized according to social distinctions and under the dominance of the spiritual sphere towards the values of individual autonomy, liberty, equality, fraternity, rights, tolerance, the recognition of the equal dignity of every human being, the affirmation of the role of reason in development, trust in unlimited progress, the law of nature, the rule of law and democracy. A phenomenal scientific, technological, socioeconomic development has taken place in the West that can be attributed to the advent of modernity and its basic shift to man-centeredness and the recognition of the autonomy of human reason⁵⁶. Some scholars⁵⁷ grant these developments a Catholic matrix. They contend that the religion of the incarnation has had a determining influence in the modern separation of the temporal and spiritual spheres, and in the assertion of man’s capacity to create a human order endowed with its own, autonomous law.

In parallel, however, a definite and undisputed thrust away from the West’s Greek and Judeo-Christian legacies has also marked, in revolutionary proportions, the modern process⁵⁸. The

⁵² Mathieu Bock-Côté, quoting again Edgar Morin: « La rupture culturelle a donc été le jaillissement de ce qui était déjà présent, nourri, mais refoulé, désamorcé, dévié dans la culture même de la société. Et ce jaillissement s’accomplit dans et par la négation de ce qui refoulait et désamorçait » (Ib., p. 99).

⁵³ Bock-Côté, referring to Theodore Roszack, : « Dans un ouvrage programmatique qui a marqué toute une époque, *Vers une contre-culture*, Theodore Roszack a aisément démontré que la contre-culture se présente comme une remise en question des fondations de la civilisation occidentale » (Ib., p. 97).

⁵⁴ In 1952 Herbert Marcuse published *Eros and Civilization*, a title alluding to Freud’s *Civilization and its Discontents*. As opposed to Freud who pessimistically declared that happiness was no cultural value, Marcuse optimistically laid out the platform for the Western cultural revolution by affirming that a non-repressive society could come about through a social revolution.

⁵⁵ Bock-Côté underscored May 68’s destructive drive: « Pour reprendre un concept psychanalytique, la pulsion de 68 est anarchique, c’est la pulsion du désordre et du chaos ». Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., p. 102.

⁵⁶ See for instance Gauchet, Marcel. *La Révolution Moderne. L’Avènement de la Démocratie*, I. Essais Folio. Gallimard. 2007.

⁵⁷ Rémy Brague, for instance, highlights Christianity’s freedom message (Gal. 5, 1: “It is for freedom that Christ has set us free”).

⁵⁸ The French political philosopher Marcel Gauchet identified the specificity of modern democracy as follows: « La démocratie des temps modernes ne se comprend en dernier ressort que comme l’expression de la sortie de la religion, c'est-à-dire du passage d'une structuration hétéronome de l'établissement humain-social à une organisation

Protestantism of modern political philosophers⁵⁹ mixed itself with (in America), or altogether gave way to the *deism* (in France) of the founding fathers of American and French modern democracy⁶⁰. Deism killed the fatherhood in God. As Karl Marx rightly put it, deism proved to be “no more than a convenient and easy way of getting rid of religion”⁶¹. It is a sociological fact that atheism and secularism have spread in Europe as of the 19th century, and that modernity is known as the age of secularization.

Political science has perhaps insufficiently taken into account the fact that the 18th century foundational documents of modern democracy, the US *Constitution* and *Bill of Rights* and the 1789 French *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, made no explicit reference, neither to what is universally true, good and beautiful (Greek transcendentals)⁶² nor to the Judeo-Christian God and his law applicable to all human beings through the voice of their conscience⁶³. From the onset, the *ethos* (liberty, equality, fraternity and rights) and anthropology (the citizen as an absolute individual, cut from natural human bonds) underpinning the social contracts of modern democracies have emancipated themselves in various measures from the transcendental or divine source of universality⁶⁴. Yet having done so, they have claimed universality. To the extent their “emancipation” disconnected liberty and rights from what can be universally recognized as true and good, we contend that such “emancipation” is the core and the essence of the Western cultural revolution. The Western cultural revolution has happened within and in the name of modern democratic and “universal” values, in particular those of liberty, equality and rights. As Western modern democracies increasingly departed from the search for a good

autonome. Elle représente, pour être tout à fait précis, la mise en forme politique de l'autonomie de l'établissement humain-social ». Gauchet, Marcel. *La Démocratie d'une Crise à l'Autre*. Editions Cécile Defaut. 2007, p. 13.

⁵⁹ In particular that of Hobbes and Locke. But Charles Louis de Montesquieu had married a Protestant, and Rousseau praised the education level of Protestants: « Les protestants sont en général mieux instruits que les catholiques. Ce doit être : la doctrine des uns exige la discussion, celles des autres la soumission. Le catholique doit adopter la décision qu'on lui donne ; le protestant doit apprendre à décider. » (*Les Confessions* 1787-89).

⁶⁰ The philosophes who inspired the French revolution and America's founding fathers were deists: on the French side, Jean le Rond d'Alembert, co-editor with Denis Diderot (a materialistic atheist) of the *Encyclopédie* until 1759, Voltaire and Maximilien de Robespierre, leading actor in the Reign of Terror, not to mention Jean-Jacques Rousseau's deistic affinities; on the American side, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine. The deists broke with the Christian tradition of European absolute monarchies.

⁶¹ Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism*. 1844. Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow. 1956. What use is there in believing in a God who is not a Father and who is totally disinterested in the fate of his creatures?

⁶² Hobbes was critical of Plato's idealism and of the Greeks' “top-down” political philosophy. His starting point was “the state of nature”, of which he had an eminently negative view: “The life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” (*Leviathan: on the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*. Selected, and with an Introduction, by Richard S. Peters. Edited by Michael Oakeshott. Collier Classic in the History of Thought. New-York. 1962, p. 100). Man being radically selfish and corrupt, the citizen readily submitted to external laws and promised obedience to a sovereign authority ensuring order. Locke built on Hobbes. Protestant anthropological pessimism has underpinned modern democracy. His theory of natural law operated a distinction (or a break) from divine law.

⁶³ The 1789 French *Déclaration*'s preamble refers to the “Etre Suprême”, which the deists interpreted as the “Grand Architecte” or “Grand Horloger”.

⁶⁴ Benedict XVI, discussing the issue of the *ordo naturalis* in a September 29, 2014 letter to professor Marcello Pera, concluded that the human rights idea only kept its solidity insofar as it was rooted in faith in God the Creator: « En fin de compte, il me semble que tout revient en somme au concept de Dieu. Si Dieu existe, s'il y a un créateur, alors l'être peut aussi parler de lui et manifester à l'homme un devoir. S'il n'existe pas, alors l'*ethos* se réduit finalement au pragmatisme... L'idée des droits de l'homme ne conserve, en fin de compte, sa solidité que si elle est ancrée dans la foi au Dieu créateur. De là elle reçoit sa limitation et en même temps sa fondation. » Ratzinger, Joseph. *Libérer la Liberté. Foi et Politique*. Parole et Silence. 2018, p. 16. And : « Le concept de Dieu... fonde et limite... l'idée des droits de l'homme ». Ib., p. 17.

common to all, their social contracts became increasingly weak and fragmented, creating a vacuum to be filled.

Initially the modern interpretation of Western “universal values” depended on a culturally dominant belief in the law of nature and the capacity of human reason to attain reality. This belief, however, proved fragile. The law of nature had largely alienated itself from the God of Revelation by the end of the 18th century in the political culture of the French revolutionaries, which had rather connected it to an abstract *Great Architect* or *goddess Reason*. It would not survive the 19th century proclamation of the death of God. As the law of nature grew deprived even of a rational foundation, it eventually vanished as a concept from the political culture of liberal democracies over the course of the 20th century.

The progressive destabilization of “universal values”: towards a postmodern ethos

Separated from both their divine and rational sources⁶⁵, “universal values” have tended to absolutize themselves. Their content became increasingly unstable and subject to the free interpretation of individuals and groups according to their various and contradictory ideological choices. The proliferation of interpretative choices led to a fragmentation of the modern social contract and conducted the West towards a postmodern ethos which transformed the core content of universal values into a *text to be interpreted*. At the end of the day, what still has kept societies together have been the rule of law and a broad collective endorsement of “universal values” - a consensus reduced to the strict minimal basis that is necessary to keep societies functioning. The core content of liberty, equality, rights, fraternity, rights, human dignity... has become the object of fierce ideological polarization. The implosion of the modern social contract has fragilized nations and the nation-states born after the Peace of Westphalia.

The UN Charter’s modern values vs the postmodern ethos of transnational NGOs

Modern values - by and large, those of the American constitution - prevail in the UN Charter. They bind *the peoples of the United Nations* together⁶⁶. The preamble of the Charter mentions fundamental human rights, “the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”, “the dignity and worth of the human person”, freedom, justice, tolerance, social progress, peace, security as aims of the new organization. No more than the founding texts of modern democracy does the Charter refer these values to transcendentals or to the biblical notion of universality⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ As Joseph Ratzinger put it: « Dans la véritable raison humaine se trouve la morale, qui se nourrit des commandements de Dieu. Cette morale n'est pas une affaire privée, elle a une valeur et une dimension publique. Une bonne politique ne peut exister sans le bien qui se concrétise dans l'être et l'agir. Ce que l'Eglise persécutée prescrivait aux chrétiens comme noyau de son *ethos* politique doit aussi constituer l'essence d'une activité politique chrétienne : ce n'est que là où le bien se réalise et est reconnu comme bien que peut prospérer de même une heureuse coexistence entre les hommes. » Ib., p. 84. Mathieu Bock-Côté, referring to Roszack, established the following diagnosis of the West: « Pour Roszack, c'est l'Occident qui a fait existentiellement faillite et c'est dans ce qu'on a assimilé traditionnellement à ‘l’irrationalité’ que se trouveraient les ressources inédites de l’émancipation » (*Le Multilateralisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., pp. 97-98).

⁶⁶ Equality and tolerance are absent from both the US Bill of Rights and the preamble of the US Constitution, which reads: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” By contradistinction, equality is prominent in the 1789 French *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* and has always been a French value.

⁶⁷ The Charter makes two uses of the word *universal* - one related to peace (Art.1) and the other to “respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Art. 55 c). Both uses of the word are in the horizontal sense of *global*. In the Charter as opposed to the UDHR, *universal* is deprived of its transcendental dimension, whether it be philosophical or related to the biblical revelation.

This lack of explicit connection opened the door to diverging ideological interpretations of modern universal values by the UN system.

Intellectual gurus and movers and shakers trailblazed the cultural revolution of Western societies. This revolution spread through the social movements they initiated (feminism, gay rights, civil rights, women's rights, birth control, environmentalism, third-worldism, pacifism, secular humanism...) and dramatically impacted the content of education, health, human rights, women's rights, man's relationship to nature, marriage and the family. Gaining a critical momentum in the 1960s and 70s, it inspired the creation of numerous non-governmental organizations animated by an internationalist spirit that prompted them to seek UN ECOSOC consultative status. This thesis will investigate how, through this political partnership, the Western cultural revolution penetrated the perspective of the UN, informed the global governance revolutionary process and thereby ended up impacting all cultures.

Having identified the defining parameters of our thesis, let us now start identifying the key historical milestones in the genesis of global governance.

1.2. The global governance seeds in the UN Charter

1.2.1. Pre-UN period

The transfer of political power from modern nation-states to transnational non-state or non-governmental actors in a collaborative relationship with the UN⁶⁸, in other words the advent of what would be named *global governance* after 1989, has been a long historical process. Its origins can be traced back much prior to the foundation of the United Nations in 1945.

International private associations: the powerhouse of internationalism

Issue-oriented private organizations⁶⁹ timidly started emerging at the national level by the end of the 18th century⁷⁰, concomitantly with the birth of American and French democracies. By the mid-19th century, they had become international⁷¹. Though remaining relatively few in numbers until the last quarter of the 19th century⁷², these international associations had by then already experimented their capacity both to generate and to influence intergovernmental processes. An early scholar of NGOs went as far as suggesting that issue-oriented international private associations had historically been the powerhouse of internationalism: "Sometimes, it is true, governments did take the lead, but it is no exaggeration to say that in most aspects of 19th century

⁶⁸ To use phrases that will emerge much later in the global governance process.

⁶⁹ To be distinguished from forms of associations prevalent in the old regime, such as guilds and charities.

⁷⁰ See Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit.

⁷¹ *Anti-Slavery International* (1839) is for some scholars the first international private association. Others cite the *World Evangelical Alliance* (1846) and the *International Order of Good Templars* (1852). Others still, YMCA International (1855). Among the major international private associations created after 1855, let us name the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (1863), the *International Workingmen's Association* (1864), the *Institute of International Law* (1873), the *International Council of Women* (1888), the *Interparliamentary Union* (1889), the *International Peace Bureau* (1892), the *World Zionist Organization* (1897), the *International Bureau for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons* (1899), the *International Alliance of Women* (1902), *Rotary* (1917), *Save the Children International Union* (1920).

⁷² See Seary, Bill. *The Early History: From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 15. And: "According to one source, whereas up to 1854 only six INGOs [international non-governmental organizations] had been founded, by the turn of the century this figure had reached 163, and by 1945 over a thousand INGOs had been established." Davies, Thomas Richard. *The Rise and Fall of Transnational Civil Society: The Evolution of International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1839*. City University London Centre for International Politics. Working Paper CUTP/003. April 2008, p. 4.

internationalism they followed reluctantly and hesitantly a trail blazed by others”⁷³. Another, later commentator, confirmed: “NGO activism helped to engender international organizations”⁷⁴. Although the study of private associations’ role in pre-UN internationalism is not within this thesis’ remit, these assessments relating to their original and historical leadership matter to our purposes.

Twentieth century: the age of association

What will be known, as of the 1990s, as “transnational civil society” “rises and falls in waves”⁷⁵. In an article published in 1997, Steve Charnovitz showed that the growth of this “transnational civil society’s” involvement with “international governance... has not been continuous”⁷⁶. Discerning a “cyclical pattern” governing its relations with intergovernmental processes, he distinguished seven periods: emergence 1775-1918; engagement 1919-1934; disengagement 1935-1944; formalization 1945-1949; underachievement 1950-1971; intensification 1972-1991; empowerment 1992- ?⁷⁷. Overall, the 20th century has been a time of exponential growth for NGOs⁷⁸ in terms of numbers, size and political influence at the international level. In a pioneer study, Borko Stosic described the century as “le siècle de l’associationnisme” (“the age of association”)⁷⁹. The question our thesis addresses is whether the “intensification” and “empowerment” periods ushered in a structural political relationship with the UN - in global governance.

By 1910, international private associations had become sufficiently self-aware to organize a World Congress of International Organizations in Brussels. After World War I, they grew in numbers “at an unprecedented pace”⁸⁰. The issues they addressed expanded, as did their

⁷³ Lyons, F.S.L., *Internationalism in Europe 1815-1914*, Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963, as quoted by Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 212.

⁷⁴ Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation*, op. cit., p. 185. And: “By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a pattern of private international cooperation evolving into public international action” (Ib., p. 212).

International private organizations have significantly influenced intergovernmental conferences. They lobbied the 1815 Congress of Vienna (civil rights of Jews, liberty of the press, measures against literary piracy); the 1878 Congress of Berlin (petitions); the 1889-90 Brussels conference against slave trade; the 1899 First Hague Peace Conference (where the activism of popular groups “foreshadowed the method employed by NGOs in recent decades of using intergovernmental meetings as opportunities for coordinated lobbying and mass publicity” Charnovitz, Ib. p.197); the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference (where “the first ‘parallel’ NGO forum at an intergovernmental conference” was held, Ib. p. 197). Charnovitz contends that the format of exclusive diplomatic conferences “became less useful as the international agenda broadened. Governments recognized a need to hold technical conferences” (Ib., p. 198). In an era where few public international organizations existed, “the distinction between the IGO and the NGO had not yet crystallized” (Ib., p. 198). There were also conferences with “mixed composition” (Ib., p. 199): from 1853 to 1876, several International Statistical Congresses (Ib., p. 198); 1873 International Penitentiary Congress (Ib., p. 199); 1875 International Metric Conference; 1895 Sixth International Geographical Congress; 1902 establishment of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (Ib., p. 199). The influence of private international associations over intergovernmental policymaking and modern international law has been substantial. For instance, “The Red Cross provided a pattern for how NGOs could help formulate international law” (Ib., p. 200). “There were NGO fingerprints on new international conventions regarding rules of war, intellectual property, admiralty, prostitution, narcotics, labor and nature protection” (Ib., p. 212).

⁷⁵ Davies, Thomas Richard. *The rise and fall of transnational civil society*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁷⁶ Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 190.

⁷⁷ Ib., p. 190.

⁷⁸ See Willetts, Peter. *The Growth in the Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The Growth in the Number of ECOSOC NGOs*. www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.HTM (retrieved July 20, 2021).

⁷⁹ Stosic’s study is the already mentioned 1964 *Les Organisations Non Gouvernementales et les Nations-Unies*.

Chiang Pei-heng referred to it in his *Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations* 1981 book, pp. 20-21.

⁸⁰ “The number of international non-governmental organizations founded in the 1920s was twice the number founded in the entire nineteenth century.” Davies, Thomas Richard. *The rise and fall of transnational civil society*, op. cit., p.

involvement in intergovernmental diplomacy. They engaged, for instance, in the foundation of the International Labor Organization (1919) and, most notably, in the 1920 creation of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the United Nations⁸¹. As of 1935, pre-World War II tensions put a halt to this time of growth.

1.2.2. The internationalist mindset of the leading founders of the UN

It is chiefly through the United Nations Organization that the power of non-state actors grew to the point of achieving the revolutionary process this thesis analyzes. The establishment of the UN in 1945, the largest international organization in terms of membership that had then far existed, marked a decisive step forward in the process facilitating the march towards global governance. What spurred this process, however, was not international cooperation per se, but the internationalism underpinning the outlook both of the NGOs partnering with the UN and of the leading founders of the new body.

Internationalism vs. genuine international cooperation

Before examining the birth of the UN-NGO relationship, it is useful to remember what distinguishes genuine *international cooperation* from *internationalism* as a political principle and ideology. The world's socioeconomic development and its need for peace and security have, among other concerns common to humanity, made international cooperation increasingly desirable and necessary over the last two centuries. To serve its rightful purposes, international cooperation must stick to its nature, that is, be truly inter-national: stem from and be respectful of individual nations, and be geared towards what is good for all individual parties. The way international agreements are reached and their content should always remain under the control of national peoples, and not conflict with their sovereign will.

International cooperation can be distorted by ideology. *Internationalism* - an ideology as all -isms, absolutizes what is international – that is, it separates it to various degrees from its substance: individual nations. Internationalism consists in the tendency to place international cooperation above the will, identity (history, culture, religion...), norms and objectives of national peoples. This political principle is in a dynamic. It tends to grant increasing normative power to international bureaucrats and technicians who tend to exercise this power independently from the member states of the given organization, in ways that in practice surreptitiously *transcends* sovereign nations. At the end of the Cold War, national sovereignty would be submitted not only to international law⁸² but in practice, as this thesis' following two parts will show, also to global agendas that bureaucrats and their operational NGO partners contributed to elaborate.

9. Examples of international associations created in the first quarter of the 20th century are the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (1915), the International Chamber of Commerce (1919), Save the Children International Union (1920), the International League for the Rights of Man (1922).

⁸¹ “Before and during World War I, many private groups had begun to plan for the creation of an intergovernmental institution to maintain peace.” Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 213. “The League of Nations engaged NGOs in many of its committees and conferences... NGO involvement was not a consistent practice. But it happened enough to warrant expectations for its recurrence.” (Ib., p. 245). The democratic US President Woodrow Wilson did not manage to gain congressional support for the League of Nations.

⁸² See for instance Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment (Earth Summit) Declaration. It read: “National Sovereignty is subject to international law”. Global governance increasingly openly challenged national sovereignty. “The development of an ‘environmental community of fate’ transcending many boundaries, and the sovereignty of states, is a characteristic of the late twentieth century”. Foster, John W. Context. *In Whose world is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 36.

Affinity between internationalism and Marxism

It is useful at this point to be mindful of the affinity between internationalism and Marxism. As Thomas G. Weiss pointed it out:

“Karl Marx was... a personification of the trend that focused on the plight of persons without regard for nationality... from the 1860s on, Marxism was one manifestation of a growing Western tendency to view the human person as subjected to forces that were international or transnational in nature”⁸³.

The first part of this thesis will establish, as a striking historical fact, the socialist identity of the strategic advocates of what will become global governance at the end of the Cold War. Liberalism⁸⁴ and socialism have both had an internationalist perspective since the 19th century. But socialism as a political theory has more explicitly and persistently promoted and surfed on internationalism as a foundational principle. In their 1848 *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels stated:

“In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end”⁸⁵.

The International Workingmen’s Association created in 1864 in London, in other words the socialist First International, was one of the first international associations. It included Karl Marx as a leading member⁸⁶. Then in 1919 Vladimir Lenin, a staunch internationalist, established the Komintern, an association of Communist parties of the world. Incidentally, the Socialist International⁸⁷ NGO will obtain UN ECOSOC consultative status in 1973.

International private associations’ leadership in internationalism

Another nexus is worth mentioning here: that between international private organizations and internationalism. We noted, in the previous section, the proactive attitude, and indeed the historical leadership international private associations at times exercised over governments in the emergence of international organizations. This thesis’ first part will study the extent to which NGOs and other non-state actors have continued to exercise that leadership in the process that will lead from internationalism to transnationalism⁸⁸ and globalism by the fall of the Berlin wall. It will highlight the original ambivalence about who has been leading whom since the origins of the international private associations/intergovernmental organizations interaction.

⁸³ Weiss, Thomas G. et al. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Westview Press. 1994, p. 107.

⁸⁴ In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Scottish economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith advanced the notion that free trade would bring peace among nations through interdependence. Smith’s belief rested on his faith in the goodness of human nature. Smith influenced 19th century English liberal internationalism (John Bright and Richard Cobden). 19th century socialists and Karl Marx himself strongly criticized Smith, arguing that free trade (hence economic competition), could only result in imperialism and international conflicts.

⁸⁵ See <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/6620784-in-proportion-as-the-exploitation-of-one-individual-by-another> (retrieved February 27, 2022).

⁸⁶ Leon Trotsky wrote *The Manifesto of the Communist International* for the *Third International* or Comintern created in 1919. He also founded the *Fourth International* in 1938.

⁸⁷ As an NGO, the *Socialist International* obtained Category II ECOSOC status in 1973, and Category I status in 1995.

⁸⁸ The term *transnationalism* was popularized in the early 20th century by writer Randolph Bourne to describe “a new way of thinking about relationships between cultures”. Associated to corporations, it came into currency in the 1970s. It was later applied to NGOs and “civil society”.

Private organizations have, prior to 1945, targeted a host of *issues* that were international by their very nature and did call for international dialogue and cooperation⁸⁹. It pertained to their raison d'être to develop *cross-national agendas*. Their platforms were conceived to be common to all concerned countries. International private associations easily veered towards internationalism, all the more so that advocates of ideological agendas have often been internationalists seeking their widest possible transnational spread. There never was any need for international cooperation to grant these private associations a normative power at the expense nations.

Internationalist perspective underpinning creation of the UN

Let us now recall the *internationalist* perspective underpinning the creation of the UN system. The absence of the phrase *national sovereignty* from the UN Charter⁹⁰ is significant in this regard. We distinguish three sources of internationalism in the process that established the UN: that of the American democrats then in power⁹¹; that of the Soviet Union and Western communists; and that of the national (mainly US) and international private associations participating in the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945.

The idea of a new international organization - to preserve peace through *collective security*⁹² - germinated in the mind of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a democrat and ardent internationalist⁹³. Roosevelt, convinced of the need for US engagement and leadership, envisioned a post-war international order managed by the Allied Big Four, namely the US, the Soviet Union, Britain and China. His proposal for the creation of the UN first surfaced in the *Atlantic Charter* - the outcome of his 1941 wartime meeting with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In January 1942, the Big Four along with 22 other states formalized the proposals of the Charter by signing the *Declaration of the United Nations*, whereby they agreed to collaborate in fighting the Axis powers and committed in principle to found the UN once the war had ended. By 1945, altogether 47 governments in addition to the Big Four had signed the *Declaration*. The Big Four invited 46 of them to the San Francisco conference⁹⁴.

⁸⁹ Among the issues these organizations have been targeting prior to 1945, let us name first the slave trade and slavery, then the pursuit of peace, worker solidarity, free trade, international law, humanitarian aid, intellectual property, human rights, prostitution, narcotics, liquor, labor conditions, the protection of nature, women's rights, children, and the promotion of international associations.

⁹⁰ Although the "principle of sovereign equality" of all UN member states appears twice (Art. 2 and Art. 78). But this phrase dilutes and alters the meaning of sovereignty: it relates it to the *equality* of UN member states, not to their respective peoples. It suggests that equality transcends sovereignty.

⁹¹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and his administration. Harry Truman who succeeded Roosevelt after his death on April 12, 1945 succeeded in obtaining US Senate approval of the UN Charter. Roosevelt had striven to build domestic support for the UN. Pro-UN US Presidents have all belonged to the democratic party: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Jimmy Carter (member of the Trilateral Commission), Bill Clinton, Barack Obama... US Republicans have generally viewed internationalism as a threat to American sovereignty.

⁹² *Collective security* is an ambivalent concept: it is not *international security*.

⁹³ Roosevelt's idealism contrasted with the views of "realists" such as E. H. Carr (1892-1982), the author of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* first published in 1939 and considered foundational of the theoretical study of international relations. Carr, who incidentally was an admirer of the Soviet Union, called for a socialist system and an Anglo-Soviet alliance as the basis of a post-war order. Carr suggested that "elegant superstructures" such as the *League of Nations* "must wait until some progress has been made in digging the foundations". Carr, Edward Hallett. *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*. New York. Harper & Row. Second Edition. 1964, p. 239.

⁹⁴ "At San Francisco,... fifty governments, almost all anti-Axis belligerents, met to ratify a U.N. charter, accepting somewhat grudgingly what the Big Four had imposed," wrote Stanley Meisler in in *The United Nations – A History*. Grove Press. 1995. Revised Edition 2011, p. 2.

The San Francisco conference started right after the US and the USSR had consolidated their alliance at Yalta (February 4-11, 1945). The West had made important concessions to the USSR. Moreover, Western powers were at the time themselves internally plagued by communism⁹⁵ in significant measures. 1945 was a short-lived hour of post-war optimism. It was paradoxically also one of dangerous ideological ambivalence. The United Nations was founded at a moment that united soon-to-be Cold War enemies. The Charter enshrined the inclusion of the Soviet Union as one of the five permanent Security Council members. The Cold War started immediately thereafter⁹⁶. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had been a key founding member of the UN, and communist internationalism had informed the spirit of the new organization.

American communist Alger Hiss' crucial role at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and San Francisco

A silenced fact and an enduring embarrassment both to the United States and to the UN is the direct manner in which communist internationalism infiltrated the US preparations for the creation of the UN and the San Francisco negotiations. In 1944, the American Alger Hiss, an underground member of the Communist Party of America and a spy for the Soviet Union⁹⁷, was named Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs at the US State Department, a policy-making entity devoted to planning for post-war international organizations. Hiss then served as Executive Secretary of the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference⁹⁸, where representatives of the Allied Big Four, the US in a leadership position, drew up the broad outline for the future UN⁹⁹. Subsequently, Hiss was part of the US delegation to the February 1945 Yalta conference, where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin addressed the unfinished plans for the new international body. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, complemented by the Yalta proposals, formed the basis of negotiations for the San Francisco Conference.

Lastly, Hiss was named Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on International Organization: the San Francisco Conference. Hence an American communist and a spy for the Soviet Union occupied a strategic position throughout the process that led up to the creation of the UN, a period during which the US and the USSR were allies. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate to San Francisco, reportedly praised Hiss to US Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius,

⁹⁵ French President de Gaulle, for instance, made fatal compromises with the communists who had resisted against the Nazis. After the liberation, he nominated five communist ministers in his second government (1944-47). French communists played a leading role in post-World War II reconstruction. This explains the French support for the WTUC alongside the Soviet Union at San Francisco.

⁹⁶ During the Cold War (usually dated 1946, or 1947 to 1989, or 1991), the former allies in World War II found themselves opposed in a geopolitical conflict of unprecedented scope and historic length.

⁹⁷ The *Communist Party of America*, established in 1919 and influential from the 1920s through the 40s, had close ties with the American labor movement. In August 1948 Whittaker Chambers, a former American communist party member, affirmed he had known Hiss in the 1930s as a member of an underground organization of the US Communist Party trying to infiltrate the US government (see Weinstein, Allen. *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*. New-York. 1978). Hiss had worked at the US State Department since 1936. In late 1946, Hiss became president of the CEIP from which he resigned on May 5, 1949, after Chambers denounced him as a communist spy. In 1950, Hiss was convicted of perjury. Nixon "launched his political career in hot pursuit of Hiss and the alleged secret Communists of the New Deal" (Weiner, Tim. *Enemies: A History of the FBI*. Allen Weiner. 2012, p. 159).

⁹⁸ According to Stanley Meisler, Alger Hiss is the one who picked the Dumbarton Oaks location for the conference: "Alger Hiss, a young State Department officer who would be imprisoned six years later for perjury in a controversial espionage case that skyrocketed the anti-Communist career of young Congressman Richard Nixon, suggested Dumbarton Oaks, a secluded mansion with acres of sculpted garden on high land above Georgetown in northwest Washington". Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations. A History*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁹⁹ On the basis of a draft UN Charter produced by the US State Department's Subcommittee on International Organization in consultation with the US Congress in 1943. The 1943 Moscow Conference had recognized the need for a postwar international organization to succeed the League of Nations. "The United Nations was mainly an American idea, and its structure today closely follows the plans prepared by American diplomats during World War II," wrote Stanley Meisner in *The United Nations – A History*, op. cit., p. 3.

who chaired the US delegation to the conference, for Hiss' "impartiality and fairness"¹⁰⁰. Stettinius himself, who became the first US ambassador to the UN (1945-46), was considered too lenient with communism by democratic President Harry S. Truman.

NGO presence at San Francisco conference: role of the USSR

An indication of Soviet and American internationalism at San Francisco is the favorable outlook of their delegations on the participation rights of non-governmental organizations in intergovernmental processes. In San Francisco, in addition to the government delegates, there were some 1,200 NGO representatives¹⁰¹. The Soviet Union pressed for the obtention of participation rights for the World Trade Union Conference (WTUC), then the largest existing NGO. Incidentally, the WTUC would be constituted mainly by unions affiliated with communist parties after the departure of a number of Western trade unions in 1949¹⁰². "With Soviet and French support"¹⁰³, the WTUC "demanded a voice in the General Assembly, in addition to the maximum participation in ECOSOC, with a permanent seat and the right to vote"¹⁰⁴. The WTUC did so "mindful" of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) "tripartite idea of representation"¹⁰⁵ with governments, labor unions and employers' organizations as constituents¹⁰⁶. Created in 1919, the ILO, an early precursor of the new, power-sharing, politics this thesis studies, has been "the most daring of all international organizations in its approach to NGO participation. Tripartism is its quiddity"¹⁰⁷. The ILO integrated the UN in 1946, distinguishing itself from the intergovernmental structure of the rest of the system. The WTUC was one of the three first NGOs to receive ECOSOC accreditation in 1946.

James T. Shotwell and US support of NGO internationalism

The US support for NGO internationalism at San Francisco was more substantial, and obtained more decisive results, than the Soviet one. One individual played a decisive role in this respect: James T. Shotwell, a US democrat and lifelong internationalist, whom US NGO consultants¹⁰⁸ at the San Francisco Conference elected to lead their delegation. Shotwell was then representing the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)¹⁰⁹, an internationalist think tank that Alger

¹⁰⁰ Weinstein, Allen. *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*, op. cit., p. 361.

¹⁰¹ See Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 251, quoting Willetts.

¹⁰² The World Trade Union Conference (WTUC) became the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) a few months later.

¹⁰³ The French delegation to the San Francisco conference was led by the Christian Democrat Georges Bidault. But de Gaulle's compromises with French communists after the liberation affected the position of the French delegation.

¹⁰⁴ Willetts, Peter. *The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the multilateral future*, op. cit., p. 248. The WTUC did not obtain what it requested.

¹⁰⁵ Pei-heng, Chiang. *Non-governmental Organizations at the United-Nations. Identity, Role, and Function*, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁰⁶ National delegations to ILO's annual conference include two delegates from government, one from labor unions, and one from business.

¹⁰⁷ Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 216.

¹⁰⁸ NGOs had been absent from international discussions during World War II (1941 Atlantic Charter, 1942 Declaration by United Nations, 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference). The US delegation to San Francisco included as "consultants" representatives of 42 NGOs. The Roosevelt administration trusted these NGOs would help win public American support for the UN Charter. But "once in San Francisco," these US NGOs "also contributed to the drafting process." Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., pp. 250-251.

¹⁰⁹ Shotwell then directed the Division of Economics and History of the CEIP. The CEIP is a foreign policy think-tank founded in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie, a leading internationalist (who also established the Carnegie Corporation in 1911), dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations (which will become "international cooperation" in the following decades). The CEIP and the Carnegie Corporation have been supporting the UN since its foundation. In

Hiss would preside from 1946 until his indictment in 1949, when Shotwell replaced him in that capacity. Shotwell had been an advocate of NGO participation in international governance from the creation of the ILO to that of the UN. As a member of the study group established by democratic US President Woodrow Wilson to prepare materials for the peace negotiations at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, Shotwell had authored the provisions establishing the ILO¹¹⁰. This fact is highly relevant. Since 1945, ILO's tripartite structure has inspired strategic advocates of what will eventually turn into global governance after 1989¹¹¹.

The inclusion of a provision for an NGO consultative status in the UN Charter (Article 71) owes a lot to Shotwell and to US NGOs. As a prominent scholar observed, “The first major success of NGOs at the UN occurred as it was born. The draft of the UN Charter had no provision for NGOs”¹¹². The democratic US administration considered the NGO presence at San Francisco to have been a fruitful innovation. This “innovation”, we note, threw the seed of the full-fledged political revolution unfolded over the course of the following 50 years.

1.2.3. UN Charter Article 71

UN Charter Article 71 established that:

“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”

Article 71 juridically defined the nature of the UN-NGO relationship as one of *consultation*¹¹³. Article 71 broke historic ground¹¹⁴ by establishing a *formal* relationship between the new international body and what would henceforth be called non-governmental organizations (NGOs)¹¹⁵.

1947, the CEIP headquarters were moved closer to the UN in New-York. In the early 1990s, the Carnegie Corporation contributed to fund the work of the Commission on Global Governance.

¹¹⁰ The group was called “The Inquiry”. Shotwell had been Director of Research at the CEIP in 1917. In 1934 he successfully campaigned for Congress to allow US membership in the ILO. The same year as the US, the USSR became an ILO member. Shotwell presided the League of Nations association.

¹¹¹ Global governance is itself endowed with an informal tripartite structure: the UN as intergovernmental organization, “global civil society”, transnational businesses. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Cooperative Alliance and the World Federation of Trade Unions were the first three NGOs that received ECOSOC consultative status in 1946. To be noted is that “ten women’s NGOs were in the first batch of thirty-two NGOs given Category B status in 1947.” Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 151.

¹¹² Willetts, Peter. *The Rules of the Game: the UN and Civil Society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 248.

¹¹³ By contradistinction, *participation without vote* (in ECOSOC deliberations and that of the commissions) is the juridical nature of the relationship with the specialized agencies, as specified in Art. 70.

¹¹⁴ The forerunner of the UN, the League of Nations, cooperated with many private national and international associations but without ever “any permanent *official* procedures” to relate to them (Willetts, Peter. *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics. The construction of global governance*, op. cit., p. 7). See also Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., pp. 257-258.

¹¹⁵ “The Covenant of the League of Nations had only one provision pertaining to NGOs” (to the Red Cross). Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 220. Arguably UN Article 1 contained another seed of global governance, establishing as the UN’s fourth purpose: “To be a centre for *harmonizing* the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” (i.e. peace and security, friendly relations among nations, universal peace, and international cooperation in solving international economic, social,

Creation and first definition of the phrase “non-governmental organization”

The phrase *non-governmental organization* “was not in general currency before the UN was formed”¹¹⁶. It is the first term created by the global governance revolutionary process. It was created to distinguish organizations both private and international, non-governmental, non-state, non-UN member State from what the Charter would call, in another novel expression, UN *specialized agencies* which were, as for them, *intergovernmental*¹¹⁷ in nature. Let us underscore that Article 71 established the phrase “non-governmental organization” *without defining it*. ECOSOC resolution 288 (X) of February 27, 1950 provided the first definition of an “international NGO” (INGO)¹¹⁸, as “any international organization that is not founded by an international treaty”.

A dialectical relation between what is governmental and what is not

The expression NGO is negative: it suggests a dialectical, possibly Marxist¹¹⁹, relationship between what is governmental (and intergovernmental), and what is not governmental (nor intergovernmental). This dialectical relationship relates to the opposition between the national peoples, nations, their “social contracts”, common national values, national identity on the one hand, and the special and internationalist interests pursued by free associations on the other. The definition of modern democracy – government by the people for the people – suggests no contradiction between the government and the people. Quite the contrary, in a modern democracy, the people are the ones supposed to govern through their elected representatives. The then novel phrase non-governmental organization, we therefore suggest, could imply a distinction not only

cultural, humanitarian and human rights problems). There is an analogy between the verb “harmonize” and global governance’s *consensus-building* processes.

¹¹⁶ See Willets, Peter. *Non-Governmental Organizations*. UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems. Section 1 Institutional and Infrastructure Resources Issues. Art. 1.44.3.7. www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willets/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM (retrieved January 31, 2022). According to Willets, “When 132 international NGOs decided to cooperate with each other in 1910, they did so under the label, the Union of International Associations. The League of Nations officially referred to its ‘liaison with private organizations’, while many of these bodies at that time called themselves international institutes, international unions or simply international organizations” (Ib.). The phrase NGOs gained currency through Art. 71. It became popular in the 1970s when NGOs multiplied significantly. Scholars argue over the origins of this expression. Charnovitz noted that Jeremy Rabkin “has contended that the term ‘nongovernmental organization’ is a ‘Stalinist concept’ originating in a defense by the Soviet Union of its delegation to the ILO (Rabkin, Jeremy. *Why the Left Dominates NGO Advocacy Networks*, written version of paper delivered at conference entitled “Nongovernmental Organizations: The Growing Power of an Unelected Few,” American Enterprise Institute, June 11, 2003)”. Charnovitz, Steve. *Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law*. The George Washington Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper N° 2013-15. 2006, p. 351, note 18. Charnovitz affirms that Dwight W. Morrow provided the first documented case of the usage of the term in his 1919 book, *The Society of Free States* (see Charnovitz, Steve. *Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law*, op. cit., p. 351).

¹¹⁷ Art. 70 grants intergovernmental specialized agencies the right to participation without a vote: “The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies”. Specialized agencies will become key players in global governance.

¹¹⁸ The resolution “reviewed, amended slightly and codified” what had been the “developing practice” of NGO interaction with ECOSOC since 1946. Willets, Peter. Archive on NGOs in Global Politics. The ECOSOC Statute for Non-Governmental Organisations. <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willets/NGOS/RES31-96.HTM> (retrieved January 31, 2022). And: “The first session of ECOSOC established a committee to consider the arrangements for NGOs. Its report was adopted by the Council in June 1946, thus determining many of the main features of the system as it still operates today. The first question was to define what type of organisation would be accepted into consultative status. The committee recommended that an NGO should be concerned with matters falling within the competence of ECOSOC, its aims should be in conformity with the UN Charter, it should represent a substantial proportion of the people in its field and it should speak for its members through authorised representatives.” Willets, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Should J. Rabkin be right in asserting that the term NGO has a Stalinist origin.

from national governments but also from national peoples. At this point of our thesis, we usefully observe that international NGOs are neither national governments nor national peoples. Article 71, forged through the agency of NGOs, introduced in the Charter a political tension between the peoples making up UN member states and ECOSOC accredited NGOs, in other words a foundational ambivalence regarding the identity of *we the peoples of the United Nations*.

Julian Huxley, UNESCO and the policy-making role given NGOs

As UN specialized agencies were being created¹²⁰, some of them followed the UN Charter Article 71 model and provided for NGO involvement in their constitution. Such was for example the case of the World Health Organization (WHO constitution Articles 18 and 41) and of the UN Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO). In its Article XI 4¹²¹, UNESCO's constitution provided not only for consultation, but for *cooperation* with NGOs: it granted NGOs a *de facto* policy-making role. UNESCO thereby went significantly further than the UN Charter and pioneered processes that would become the trademark of global governance. UNESCO's revolutionary breakthrough was mainly attributable to the influence of a single individual: the British biologist Julian Huxley, UNESCO's first Director-General and the prime mover of its constitution. Huxley was not only an internationalist but a "towering figure"¹²² in UNESCO's relationship with NGOs. Huxley, who himself created NGOs, believed NGOs "could and should be more flexible than intergovernmental bodies" and granted them subventions "when he thought a particular kind of body was needed to promote UNESCO's broad principles and basic purposes"¹²³.

UN Charter Article 71 granted NGOs a name, a juridical status and a function within the UN system. It became "the rock on which all UN relations with NGOs were built"¹²⁴, *the juridical foundation stone of global governance*. The consultative role of NGOs at the UN was initially seen as non-political¹²⁵. NGOs present in San Francisco, however, contributed to enshrine in the UN Charter not only Article 71, but also the institutional, thematic and procedural building stones of global governance¹²⁶. They thereby played an eminently political role at the UN from the onset. Let us now see how.

¹²⁰ For instance the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 1946 (with then as a name the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, which was changed to its current name in 1953, when UNICEF turned into a permanent UN body), the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948...

¹²¹ UNESCO Constitution Art. XI 4: "The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental international organizations concerned with matters within its competence, and may invite them to undertake specific tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation by representatives of such organizations on advisory committees set up by the General Conference". And Art. IV 3: "The General Conference shall, when it deems desirable and in accordance with the regulations to be made by it, summon international conferences of states on education, the sciences and humanities or the dissemination of knowledge; non-governmental conferences on the same subjects may be summoned by the General Conference or by the Executive Board in accordance with such regulations".

¹²² Hoggart, Richard. *UNESCO and NGOs: A Memoir*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 105: "For UNESCO's relationships with its NGOs the key figure, the towering figure, was its first Director-General, Julian Huxley".

¹²³ Ib., p. 106.

¹²⁴ Willetts, Peter. *The Rules of the Game: the UN and Civil Society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?* op. cit., p. 248.

¹²⁵ "NGOs were seen as being 'non-political'". Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹²⁶ The US NGO working group called ABLE "suggested four changes to the draft UN Charter in respect of the new Economic and Social Council: it should hold regular conferences to receive recommendations from NGOs; coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies; add education to its functions and establish commissions for education and human rights". Seary, Bill. *The Early History: From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 26.

1.2.4. The role of ECOSOC and of soft issues in the march towards global governance during the Cold War

UN Charter Article 71 limited the relationship of NGOs to the Social and Economic Council (ECOSOC): it did not extend it to the other UN principal organs, notably the Security Council and the General Assembly. ECOSOC is the institution through which the operational collaboration between the UN and NGOs was birthed and historically developed. It is moreover to be stressed that it was specifically in the social and economic spheres, by promoting the advancement of “all peoples”¹²⁷ – that is, not only the advancement of UN member states -, that the Charter granted the UN a mandate transcending the boundaries of UN membership: without calling it as such, a *global* mandate. This globalist perspective *avant la lettre*, another global governance juridical stone inserted in the Charter, came from the draft of the UN preamble submitted by the South African statesman Field Marshal Jan Christiaan Smuts, a draft accepted as the basis of discussion. The internationalist Smuts - interestingly to be noted, the inventor of the novel *holism* concept¹²⁸-, also stood behind the insertion of equality (“equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”) and of tolerance in the preamble of the UN Charter¹²⁹. Smuts was the only signatory of both the League of Nations’ and UN’s charters.

The Security Council: the crucial organ of the UN for its member states

Conceived in the wake of two world wars, succeeding the League of Nations whose principal mission was the maintenance of world peace, the UN was founded to prevent further world conflict, maintain peace and ensure “collective” security as its primary objectives¹³⁰. These *hard issues*¹³¹, matters of high intergovernmental policy, imposed themselves in 1945 as the main

¹²⁷ The UN preamble identified as the UN’s fourth goal “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples”. The idea of “all peoples” comes from Marshal Smuts’ initial draft of the preamble, which included the following: “The promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples”. See Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, op. cit., pp. 910-913.

¹²⁸ Smuts pioneered the concept of holism. In his book *Holism and Evolution*, Smuts defined holism as the “fundamental factor operative towards the creation of wholes in the universe”. Smuts, Jan C. *Holism and Evolution*. New-York, The MacMillan Company. 1926, p. 86. Smuts’ holism is to be related to his staunch *internationalism*. Smuts was an early aspirant to the creation of a League of Nations, interestingly envisaged as a great political “whole”: “The unification of the four provinces in the Union of South Africa, the idea of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, finally, the great whole resulting from the combination of the peoples of the earth were just a logical progression consistent with his philosophical tenets” (Crafford, F. S. Jan Smuts: A Biography. Kessinger Publishing. 1943, p. 140.).

¹²⁹ See Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, op. cit., p. 914.

¹³⁰ Stanley Meisler relates what President Roosevelt envisioned when setting plans to found the UN: “When the Dumbarton Oaks conference was announced, Roosevelt, meeting reporters in his shirtsleeves on a warm day, explained what he had in mind: If some aggressor ‘started to run amok and seeks to grab territory or invade its neighbors,’ the new organization would ‘stop them before they got started.’” Meisler, Stanley. *The United Nations. A History*, op. cit., p. 3. UN Charter Art. 1 identified as the UN’s first purpose as follows: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” The idea of *collective* security was Roosevelt’s and a precursor to global governance’s *holistic* drive.

¹³¹ The Security Council is the only UN organ endowed with hard power (veto power of its five permanent members). The substantial body of international law that the UN developed over time is binding and also qualifies as hard. General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions, as well as the consensuses of UN conferences are “soft”, non-binding.

diplomatic concern of the UN's founding member states¹³². The latter naturally saw the Security Council as the crucial organ of the UN¹³³. Moreover, as World War II allies abruptly turned into Cold War enemies, putting an end to the hour of ambivalence we mentioned earlier and was concomitant with the creation of the UN, hard international security issues continued to dominate the agenda of the major powers until 1989: containing the threat of a nuclear war became their absolute priority. Yet the inclusion of both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America among the five permanent members of the Security Council in UN Charter Art. 23 placed the UN's principal organ, the Security Council, in a stalemate almost since the creation of the UN.

NGOs: the driving advocates of ECOSOC's soft issues

As the UN Charter was being drafted in San Francisco, NGOs successfully lobbied the founding member states for the upgrading of ECOSOC to the rank of a principal organ of the UN¹³⁴ (Art. 7 and Chapter X of the UN Charter). They also were successful at obtaining: the specification in the Charter that ECOSOC should set up a Commission on Human Rights (Art. 68)¹³⁵; the creation of UN agencies specialized in socioeconomic, cultural, educational, health and related fields (Art. 57); ECOSOC's coordination role of the activities of the specialized agencies (Art. 63); the insertion of provisions for socioeconomic (particularly health, education and equality for women¹³⁶) and human rights issues in the Charter¹³⁷ (for instance in Art. 62); and the provision enabling ECOSOC to call international conferences (Art. 62, 4). All of these NGO-inspired insertions in the Charter provided the juridical foundations that the agents of global governance

¹³² See Hoggart, Richard. *UNESCO and NGOs: A Memoir*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 98. Although there was also some deal of enthusiasm for rebuilding war-torn Europe and therefore for socioeconomic issues.

¹³³ The Charter establishes as principal organs of the UN the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.

¹³⁴ The Dumbarton Oaks proposals (*Arrangements for International Economic and Social Cooperation* of the *Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization* adopted on October 7, 1944) recommended the creation of an Economic and Social Council in their Chapter 9, to "facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (section A 1). It foresaw the creation of "specialized economic, social and other organizations and agencies" (A 2). But the Arrangements did not envision ECOSOC as a principal organ of the UN. NGOs, absent from Dumbarton Oaks but present in San Francisco, obtained the upgrading of ECOSOC to the rank of the other main UN organs.

¹³⁵ The establishment of the Commission on Human Rights owes a lot to Shotwell who pushed for an amendment in its favor. The commission, created in 1946, was eventually replaced by a *Human Rights Council* in 2006 (UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/60/251 of March 15, 2006).

¹³⁶ As Boutros-Ghali put in at the 1995 Fourth UN Conference on Women in Beijing: "Thus, in the Charter of the United Nations, States made a clear commitment to the rights of women: '... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women ...'. This was more than a statement of high ideals about the world of the future. It was a commitment to ensuring that men and women have and enjoy the same rights. And - unlike any other commitment made in the Charter - this was a commitment that could be measured. And it pointed the way forward in other ways, too. That commitment was included in the Charter because women's non-governmental organizations worked with government representatives to put it there." *Report of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women*. Beijing, September 4-15, 1995. A/CONF. 177/20/Rev. 1, p. 184. This document will henceforth be referred to as *Beijing Report*. And as Jane Connors observed it: "At San Francisco in 1945, a number of women's activists and organizations working under the umbrella of the Inter-American Commission on the Status of Women were successful in having equal rights of men and women and non-distinction on the basis of sex included in five Articles of the UN Charter". Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., pp. 150-1.

¹³⁷ Charnovitz, Steve. *Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance*, op. cit., p. 252; Seary, Bill. *The Early History: From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., pp. 26-27. NGOs obtained the strengthening of "wording covering ... equality for women" (Willets, Peter. *The Role of NGOs in Global Governance*. World Politics Review. September 27, 2011).

would profitably build on in the following decades. They were the juridical seeds of the global governance revolution this thesis addresses.

Chapter two will address the UN conferences held during the Cold War on *soft issues* such as human rights, the environment, population and women. NGOs, not UN member states, spearheaded the advancement of *soft issues* through intergovernmental processes at the UN during the Cold War, when these issues were of marginal relevance to the major powers. While the equal rights of women were included in the preamble of the Charter, the environment and population growth had not yet sufficiently emerged as international issues to make it in the foundational document. They were soon to be put on the UN agenda through the proactive leadership of “non-state actors”. These non-inter/governmental actors operated through ECOSOC, its commissions, the UN specialized agencies whose activities ECOSOC coordinates, and the UN conferences: all of which had made it in the Charter thanks to NGOs’ agency. They integrated their socioeconomic and environmental concerns into what became the UN’s *soft issues* political platform – not the original intent nor the priority of the UN’s founding member states.

Soft UN issues (women, population, environment) marred by ideology from the onset?

From what we already observed, the internationalist drive of those who exercised the greatest influence in the foundation of the UN, their ambivalent pro-NGO stance, the heavy input of a Marxist/communist perspective (both from the US side and from that of the USSR), Smuts’ “holistic” outlook, already demonstrated that the process leading to the creation of the UN was far from deprived of ideological load.

Ideally, the UN’s soft issues agenda should have developed in conformity not only with the will of individual UN member states but with the source of what is universal in the traditional (Greek and Judeo-Christian) sense. This thesis will explore whether it did so. Let us however already provide indications of the ideological content of soft issues in the early days of the UN, starting with women’s issues. Roosevelt named Virginia Gildersleeve, a practicing though non-avowed lesbian¹³⁸, as the only female member of the US delegation to San Francisco. Gildersleeve, connected to Shotwell since her university studies at Columbia, was one of the four women among the 169 signatories of the UN Charter and supported the Charter’s provision for the equal rights of men and women inspired by Smuts¹³⁹. Eleanor Roosevelt, a US delegate to the inaugural meetings of the first UN General Assembly in London in February 1946 and the first chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission (HRC), supported birth control and was connected to the movement’s leading spearhead and activist, Margaret Sanger¹⁴⁰. Among the 15 women

¹³⁸ Gildersleeve never identified herself as a lesbian, preferring instead the adjective “celibate”, although she lived for decades with her companion Professor Caroline Spurgeon and ended her life living with Barnard Professor Elizabeth Reynard, with whom she is buried at Saint Matthew’s Episcopal Churchyard, Bedford, New-York.

¹³⁹ See *Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women*. Background note. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/CSW60YRS/CSWbriefhistory.pdf (retrieved January 31, 2022).

¹⁴⁰ “Evidently an advocate of birth control during the 1920s, Roosevelt had chaired the Legislative Committee of the influential Women’s City Club, which supported Sanger’s effort to gain passage of a birth control law. In 1928 she joined the Board of Directors of the American Birth Control League. Though her active participation in the ABCL was minimal, her willingness to lend her name to it surely added a significant dose of respectability to that organization. However once FDR entered the White House Eleanor Roosevelt’s public support for birth control became problematic. As FDR’s administration was unwilling to support birth control, Eleanor Roosevelt muted her own opinion. As Hazel Moore of the National Committee for Federal Legislation on Birth Control observed, ‘Press asked Eleanor Roosevelt her position on narcotics, Hauptman case, appropriation for schools and then after she freely discussed all that ...[they] asked her ‘What is your opinion on Birth Control and the need of changing Federal Laws.’ ‘That is something I never discuss,’ said she.’ (Hazel Moore to Margaret Sanger, February 1935, *LCM*, 68:396). It was not until 1940 that Eleanor Roosevelt made even a mild public statement on birth control when, in response to

representing their respective governments at the first meeting of the ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)¹⁴¹ in February 1947, the American feminist Dorothy Kenyon¹⁴² was known as a birth control advocate in the 1920s. In the early 1970s, participating in the Women's Liberation Movement then being born, Kenyon turned into an abortion advocate.

Since the foundation of the UN, women's issues have been, in three different ways, a powerhouse of internationalism. First, it was in the nature of the feminist agenda to have an internationalist perspective. The Chairperson of the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) created in 1946, Bodil Begtrup, noted at the sub-commission's first meeting: "Women's problems have now for the first time in history to be studied internationally as such"¹⁴³. Secondly, the women's agenda occasioned a tight UN-feminist NGOs collaboration. From its inception the CSW "forged a close relationship with non-governmental organizations. Several international women's organizations addressed the Commission at the first session, and from then on, non-governmental organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC were invited to participate as observers"¹⁴⁴. Thirdly and equally, feminists proactively *linked* their issues to other UN agendas. From the beginning,

"The Commission members ... built close working relationships with the international human rights treaty bodies, the Commission on Human Rights, the Social Commission and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and specialized agencies such as UNESCO and UNICEF"¹⁴⁵.

The thematic linkages the CSW operated eventually served the mainstreaming of the feminist agenda throughout the UN system.

As for environmental issues, let us go back to Julian Huxley, UNESCO's first Director-General. Huxley played a leading role in bringing environmental concerns to the attention of intergovernmental processes. Huxley was a Darwinist, a eugenicist, a believer in the imposition of birth control methods on "the lowest strata", in favor of "open marriage", an agnostic atheist and spiritualist (medium), and the inventor, in 1957, of the now current term *transhumanism*¹⁴⁶.

a reporter's question, she indicated that she was not opposed to the 'planning of children', but did not seek to impress her views upon others." (New York Times, January 17, 1940). The Margaret Sanger Paper Project. *Margaret Sanger and Eleanor Roosevelt – The Burden of Public Life*. New-York University. Newsletter #11. Winter 1995. www.sanger.hosting.nyu.edu/articles/ms_and_eleanor_roosevelt/ (retrieved January 31, 2022). Margaret Sanger and the League of Nations had organized the first World Population Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, from 29 August to 3 September 1927.

¹⁴¹ On June 21, 1946, ECOSOC decided to confer upon the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women "the status of a full commission to be known as the Commission on the Status of Women". See Journal of the Economic and Social Council. First Year N° 29 Saturday, 13 July 1946. Second Session.

¹⁴² 1938-43, Kenyon worked on the League of Nations' Committee of Experts for the Study of the Legal Status of Women Around the World. She was a member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women until 1950. The US Republican Senator and attorney Joseph McCarthy accused her of involvement with 29 communist front organizations. In the 1950s and 60s, Kenyon worked for the radical leftist American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which defended women's right to abortion (in the name of their right to privacy) and was directly involved in the 1973 Roe vs Wade Supreme Court ruling.

¹⁴³ *Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women*. Background note, op. cit., p. 1. Also: "Although composed, like the Commission on Human Rights, of government appointees, the CSW was closely linked with the women's NGO community." Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 151.

¹⁴⁴ *Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women*. Background note, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Ib., p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Huxley was President of the British Eugenics Society from 1950 to 1962. "The lowest strata, allegedly less well-endowed genetically, are reproducing relatively too fast. Therefore birth control methods must be taught them".

Ironically, Julian Huxley was the brother of Aldous Huxley, author of the international best-seller *Brave New World* published in 1932.

Huxley spearheaded the interaction between NGOs and the UN in the environmental field. In 1948, two years after the establishment of UNESCO, he was directly involved in the creation of the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN, that would be renamed International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources – IUCN - as of 1956). The IUCN became, and has remained to this day¹⁴⁷, the most influential body on nature conservation¹⁴⁸. A “mixed” or “hybrid” body, it has been comprised of international and national NGOs, states and government agencies and intergovernmental organizations¹⁴⁹: as such, it has all along been a precursor of global governance’s multi-stakeholder partnerships’ system. Huxley was “delighted in mixed bodies where independent thinkers of all kinds were engaged with straight governmental representatives”¹⁵⁰. In the 1950s, UNESCO provided IUCN with funds for conservation education¹⁵¹. In 1961 the IUCN Board established the World Wildlife Fund¹⁵² (WWF – later the World Wide Fund for Nature, ECOSOC accredited in 1995) in London - a creation which, “once again, owed much to the endeavours of Julian Huxley”¹⁵³ and sought to grant the work of IUCN a stable financial basis.

Hence within the soft issues introduced on the UN agenda early on, one must discern the dangerous presence of seeds for ideological drifts whose developments will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

Due to a particularly tense Cold War geopolitical atmosphere, ECOSOC - the institutional powerhouse of global governance, let us repeat, remained weak during the first two decades of

Huxley, Julian S. *Man in the Modern World*. Chatto & Windus. London. 1947. Originally published in *The Uniqueness of Man*, 1941, p. 66. On the philosophical and religious side, Huxley, a signer of the *Humanist Manifesto* and the first President of the *British Humanist Association*, adhered to scientific humanism. He believed in human “betterment” through technology, in man being in charge of his own destiny. He authored *Religion without Revelation*. He also prefaced *The Psychology of the Occult* (1952), a book on the paranormal written by D. H. Rawcliffe. “Progress without a goal” was one of his catch phrases: according to this neo-Darwinist, evolution was meaningless.

¹⁴⁷ The IUCN now defines itself as “the global authority on the status of the natural world and the measures needed to safeguard it”. <https://www.iucn.org/about> (retrieved November 20, 2019).

¹⁴⁸ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 118: “Huxley notes in his memoirs: ‘We got back to Paris [in 1948] just in time for a Conference on Nature Conservation at Fontainebleau, which followed up the decision of principle, that UNESCO should concern itself with nature conservation policy, by establishing the IUCN, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, as an agency affiliated to the organization.’” (note 6, p. 143: Julian Huxley. *Memories II*. London. Penguin Books, 1978, p. 56).

¹⁴⁹ The two main mixed scientific and environmental bodies were the IUCN and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).

¹⁵⁰ Hoggart, Richard. *UNESCO and NGOs: A Memoir*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁵¹ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁵² Dutch Prince Bernhard, consort to queen Juliana and cofounder of the Bilderberg Group, friends with David Rockefeller, helped found WWF and became its first president in 1961.

¹⁵³ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 120.

its existence, and NGOs fairly ineffective¹⁵⁴. Over the time spanning between 1950 and 1971¹⁵⁵, hard security issues occupying the major powers, UN-NGOs relations went through a period of *underachievement*, to use Charnovitz's qualification.

¹⁵⁴ "Some Western countries (USA particularly) regarded many NGOs from Warsaw Pact countries as communist fronts and conversely a number of anti-communist Western NGOs were seen across the Iron Curtain as CIA-funded. Some of this controversy played out in ECOSOC's Committee on NGOs that deals with applications for accreditation to ECOSOC." See Global Policy Forum. *UN System and Civil Society. An Inventory and Analysis of Practices. Background Paper for the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil Society.* May 2003. <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/226-initiatives/32330-un-system-and-civil-society.html> (retrieved September 15, 2020).

¹⁵⁵ "At the height of the Cold War, several international NGOs came to be more sympathetic to the communists than Western opinion could tolerate." This had an impact on NGO relations with ECOSOC. See Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations.* In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 34.

CHAPTER 2

THE GESTATIONAL PERIOD AND THE SHIFT TO GLOBALISM

The global governance juridical, institutional, thematic and semantic (NGO) seeds that were thrown in the UN Charter through the agency of certain individuals and NGOs, and that we identified in chapter one, grew during the UN conferences held between the end of the 1960s and the fall of the Berlin wall: the two decades that Steve Charnovitz rightly identified as a time of *intensification* of the NGOs-UN relationship. This chapter will identify the extent to which NGOs and other non-governmental actors used the conferences to consolidate or introduce their special interests, either seminally present in the Charter or absent thereof, in the agenda of international cooperation, how they overpowered UN member states in this process and managed to develop a preferential collaborative relationship with the UN Secretariat. The identification of their special interests will enable us to evaluate the extent to which they reflected the ideological goals of the West's new left. This chapter will also examine the role of a series of UN-connected independent (non-intergovernmental) studies and commissions in conceptually leading the shift from internationalism to globalism – a shift conducive to global governance - in the 1970s and 1980s.

It is not part of this thesis' remit to expose in every detail how non-state actors spurred the advancement of novel agendas, language and ideological perspectives within international cooperation during the Cold War. It will suffice to our purposes to select eloquent examples of their leadership in the domains of population control, women's rights and environmentalism, which have been the powerhouse of the global governance revolutionary process.

2.1. The first wave of great UN international conferences

As a commentator noted, “The main drive for a closer … relationship of civil society and the United Nations came through participation in the so called ‘mega conferences’ of the 70s, 80s and 90s”¹⁵⁶. The intensification of the NGOs-UN relationship chiefly took place through what we shall call the *first wave* of the UN conference process (1968-85): the 1968 Tehran Conference on Human Rights; the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment; the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference¹⁵⁷; the 1975 Mexico World Conference on Women; the 1980 Copenhagen Second World Conference on Women¹⁵⁸; the 1984 Mexico International Conference on Population¹⁵⁹; and the 1985 Nairobi Third World Conference on Women. Also to be mentioned, though less of a contribution to the momentum towards global governance, were the first World Food Conference¹⁶⁰ held in Rome in 1974, the 1976 Vancouver Conference on Human

¹⁵⁶ Archer, Angus. *The vision of the project*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ Attended by representatives of 136 UN member states at a time when the UN counted 138 member states. Family planning was being promoted by 59 countries. The inclusion of the word “world” in the title of the conference, as in that of some other subsequent conferences, betrays their globalist ambition, which contrasted with the international nature of the UN.

¹⁵⁸ Attended by 145 UN member states (around 1,500 delegates).

¹⁵⁹ Attended by representatives of 147 member states (the UN then had 157 member states). At the time 123 countries promoted family planning.

¹⁶⁰ The first World Food Conference (attended by population control advocate and then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) was closely connected to the ideology underpinning the Bucharest Population Conference. The conference's outcome document, the *Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition* adopted on 16 November 1974 defined “food security” as the “availability at all times of adequate, nourishing, diverse, balanced and moderate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices”. E/CONF. 65/20.

Settlements (also called Habitat I), WHO's 1978 Alma-Ata Conference on Health-for-All, the first United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries held in Paris in 1981, and the 1982 Earth Summit held in Nairobi¹⁶¹.

Even if, as Peter Willets observed, the UN held "hundreds" of specialized conferences¹⁶² before 1996, the first wave conferences that most advanced global governance's *gestational* process were relatively few in numbers. They addressed "soft" topics that were, as we have seen, either timidly integrated in the UN Charter (human rights, women), implicitly included therein as part of economic and social progress and development (food, housing), or absent from the foundational document (the environment, population).

UN Charter Article 71 made it possible for ECOSOC accredited NGOs to participate as observers in the conferences. According to the Global Policy Forum, there were 57 NGOs with an official ECOSOC observer status at Tehran, over 300 at Stockholm, 114 at the 1975 Mexico conference, 163 at the 1985 Nairobi conference¹⁶³. It also became a practice for NGOs to hold fora or tribunes parallel to the intergovernmental conferences' process¹⁶⁴. These parallel events enabled NGOs to advance their own special agendas¹⁶⁵ uncontrolled by UN member states, to network and develop common strategies and platforms.

¹⁶¹ Due to the complete disinterest of US President Ronald Reagan then chiefly focusing on the Cold War, the conference was a flop. It is not retained as an official environmental summit.

¹⁶² Willets, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 49 and see note 46 p. 61. Willets listed 147 "global conferences" between 1961 and 1985.

¹⁶³ See Global Policy Forum. *UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory and Analysis of Practices*, op. cit. Other scholars provide different figures. According to Jyoti Shankar Singh, there were 109 NGOs, with about 300 representatives, accredited to the main conference in Bucharest and 154 NGOs with 367 representatives were accredited by the 1984 Mexico population conference. (See Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*. Earthscan. 1998, p. 123 and 125). Kristen Timothy who monitored the women's conferences (Mexico, Copenhagen and Nairobi) affirms the following: "NGO meetings were held to enable NGOs to gather to discuss the issues before the conference, but the actual number admitted as observers at the governmental conferences was very limited. At the Mexico City conference in 1975, NGOs had almost no direct access; they presented their petitions to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Helvi Sipila. At the mid-decade conference in 1980 at Copenhagen, NGOs at the governmental meetings again were few, and at the third conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985, fewer than 250 NGOs, representing large international coalitions, were given direct access to the governmental conference. These were organisations that had consultative status with the ECOSOC and included groups like Zonta, the International Federation of Business and Professional Women, the International Federation of University Women, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom." See Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*. In Development Studies Network. Women, Gender and Development in the Pacific: Key Issues. Women and Gender Mainstreaming, p. 56 (Republishing the article that appeared in Development Bulletin, no. 64. 2004, pp. 34-36).

¹⁶⁴ Such as the Environment Forum and the Life Forum in Stockholm, the NGO Population Tribune in Bucharest (1,350 participants), the International Women's Year Tribune in Mexico in 1975 (about 6,000 delegates), the NGO Tribune at the 1980 Copenhagen Conference (around 8,000 delegates), the NGO Forum in Nairobi (13,500 participants)... At the Bucharest Population Tribune, John D. Rockefeller III "made a point that 'family planning alone was not enough and that it should be integrated with modern economic and social development that emphasizes an overriding moral purpose – to improve the lives of all the people to combat poverty, hunger and disease' (Harkavy, 1995:66)". Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 123.

¹⁶⁵ For instance, at the first women's conference, individuals such as the Mexican lesbian activist Nancy Cárdenas, or the US feminist leader Betty Friedan, founder of the National Organization for Women (NOW), exercised their influence. It is interesting to note that the gay agenda informally made it at the first women's conference, preparing the ground for the intergovernmental adoption of the gender perspective at the fourth women's conference. Australia advocated that policies relating to women should not be discriminatory on the ground of sexual preferences (See Report of the *World Conference of the International Women's Year*. Mexico City, June 19 –July 2, 1975. E/CONF.66/34, p. 44).

2.1.1. Participation of NGOs in first wave conferences, and their leadership in transversal population agenda

The first wave UN conferences made it possible for demographic, socioeconomic and environmental issues to make headway at the UN. The population control agenda was a primary and transversal component of the overall UN conference process. This agenda, advocated first by non-state actors, has enjoyed the strong and consistent backing of the UN Secretariat and has played an immeasurable role in the power shift to the global unelected and self-proclaimed experts or elite.

UN conference process launched at Tehran against May 1968 backdrop

It is neither coincidental nor inconsequential that the first wave UN conferences took place against the backdrop of the Western cultural revolution, one of our thesis' fundamental determinants¹⁶⁶. The UN conference process took off when the sexual revolution was in full swing, in the late 1960s. The first UN International Conference on Human Rights, held in Tehran April 22-May 13, 1968 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the UDHR was exactly contemporaneous of May 68. May 68 exploded a few years after the commercialization of the contraceptive pill in the United States and in France, followed by its legalization¹⁶⁷. Paul R. Ehrlich and his wife Anne had just published their controversial book, *The Population Bomb*¹⁶⁸, predicting global famine by the 1980s as a result of “overpopulation”: an issue that the executive branches (not nation-states) of some Western powers, not least of the United States, were then concerned about.

This conjuncture helps to explain the insertion of the “right to family planning for parents” in the Tehran conference’s outcome document¹⁶⁹, the *Proclamation of Tehran* (Art. 16). Participating countries also passed a resolution, entitled *Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning (Resolution XVIII)*, declaring the use of contraception a human right and seeing increasing population growth as a threat to the achievement of human rights¹⁷⁰. The import of Tehran in the global governance process is the historic linkage the conference established between human rights, a component of the UN Charter, and population control, a novel and ideological agenda. Let us now examine the role of NGOs and individuals in establishing this intergovernmentally-endorsed linkage.

Proactive attitude of the IPPF and of John D. Rockefeller at Tehran

¹⁶⁶ The 1960s also coincided with the most powerful of the decolonization waves, with former colonies acquiring UN membership once they had declared independence.

¹⁶⁷ Contraception was commercialized in the US as of 1960. It was legalized in the US in 1965, and in France in 1967 (Neuwirth law).

¹⁶⁸ Ehrlich’s 1968 best-seller forecasted global famine in the 1970s and 80s due to overpopulation. Stanford University Professor Paul R. Ehrlich and his wife Anne wrote it at the suggestion of US environmental pioneer, conservationist and population controller David Brower. Brower had been executive director of the *Sierra Club*, one of the oldest environmentalist NGOs (created in 1892, received ECOSOC accreditation in 1973), traditionally close to the US Democratic party.

¹⁶⁹ Art. 16 of the May 13, 1968 Proclamation of Tehran is set out in this way: “The protection of the family and of the child remains the concern of the international community. Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children.”

¹⁷⁰ Res. XVIII read: “The present rapid rate of population growth in some areas of the world hampers the struggle against hunger and poverty, and in particular reduces the possibilities of rapidly achieving adequate standards of living, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, social security, education and social services, thereby impairing the full realization of human rights.” The resolution states in its operative paragraph 3 that “couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in this respect.” See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights. Res. XVIII: Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41, p.15.

Analysis shows that the main agents of Tehran's human rights-contraception linkage were the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)¹⁷¹ and John D. Rockefeller III, founder and first President of The Population Council¹⁷². As Roman Birke observed it:

"Studying the genesis and impact of Resolution XVIII adopted at the 1968 UN conference on human rights reveals a surprising history of how human rights became connected to a global agenda of population control. Tracing its roots to initiatives of non-state actors like the Population Council and the IPPF demonstrates the importance of private organizations for facilitating policy change at the UN"¹⁷³.

Both the IPPF and the Population Council were founded in 1952. Both received important funding from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund¹⁷⁴. The UN Secretariat demonstrated having had an exclusive affinity with these NGOs' philosophy since the 1960s¹⁷⁵, a fact which explains the solidity of their relationship, geared towards power-grab, throughout the global governance revolutionary process: a real collusion case.

Since its creation, the IPPF had had an internationalist perspective which prompted it to work with the UN to try and maximize its possibilities of wielding international influence. IPPF had pioneered the use of human rights (particularly of Article 16 of the UDHR¹⁷⁶) to justify population control¹⁷⁷. It had launched an aggressive human rights campaign to that effect prior to the Tehran conference. In April 1968, the IPPF wrote to the Tehran conference's Preparatory Committee, warning it that should the issue of population growth be omitted from the agenda of the conference, the articles of the UDHR would not "be achieved or maintained"¹⁷⁸.

The IPPF case exemplifies the rapid inroads of the goals of the Western sexual revolution into intergovernmental diplomacy in the 1960s. In the mid-1950s, IPPF had applied for Category B ECOSOC consultative status¹⁷⁹ and was then "rejected because of bitter opposition by Catholic

¹⁷¹ In Bucharest, several IPPF national officials "were included in official delegations, especially those from Asia and Europe". Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 122.

¹⁷² The Population Council received ECOSOC accreditation in 1972. Frederick Osborn, an inveterate eugenicist, was its second President (1957-59).

¹⁷³ Birke, Roman. *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning* (1968). <https://www.geschichte-menschenrechte.de/> (retrieved January 20, 2020).

¹⁷⁴ The Rockefeller Brothers Fund was founded in 1940 by David Rockefeller and his brothers. IPPF was founded in Bombay, in a country that would quickly become a leader in population control, including through forced sterilization. The Ford Foundation was another early financial supporter of the IPPF. The theme of rights has always been at the core of the IPPF's power-grab strategy. The IPPF founded its constitution on the principle of the *right* to family planning.

¹⁷⁵ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *The globalization of the Western Cultural Revolution*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2012, chapter 5.

¹⁷⁶ Art. 16 of the UDHR reads: "(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State."

¹⁷⁷ "In 1967, the IPPF launched an energetic human rights campaign in favour of population control. In a special issue of its magazine, *Planned Parenthood News*, the organization listed a number of human rights it predicted would be negatively affected should population growth not be reduced." Birke, Roman. *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning* (1968), op. cit. Amnesty, the leading human rights NGO founded in 1961, would later surf on that "achievement".

¹⁷⁸ See Birke, Roman. *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning* (1968), op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ Peter Willetts recalled: "The first session of ECOSOC established a committee to consider the arrangements for NGOs... The first question was to define what type of organization would be accepted into consultative status... It was decided to divide the NGOs into three categories. Category A organisations had 'a basic interest in most of the

governments”¹⁸⁰. But by the mid-1960s, the agenda of the IPPF had already gained much cultural ground in leading Western UN member states. It also matched the political will of some developing countries such as India, an early and adamant supporter of population control. In 1964 IPPF was put on the ECOSOC Register. In 1969 ECOSOC promoted the NGO to Category II consultative status, and in 1973 (when the sexual revolution was in full swing in Western countries) to Category I. This was just before the first UN Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974, in which IPPF again played a major part as it would continue to do in all subsequent conferences. Between 1965 and 1968, IPPF also gained consultative status with five UN specialized agencies¹⁸¹. Hence in just a few years’ time, the family planning federation assured itself a privileged consultative position with the main institutions of international socioeconomic governance. The federation’s strategic objective has been to incrementally and transversally *link* its contraceptive agenda and novel interpretation of human rights to all socioeconomic and environmental issues.

As for the Rockefellers, they have stood behind UN population programs ever since the 1946 creation of ECOSOC’s Population Commission. John D. Rockefeller III influenced the agenda of the Tehran conference in critical ways. In November 1966, he met privately with Maha Thray Sithu U Thant, then UN Secretary-General (1961-71), to discuss a strategic collaboration. Rockefeller intended to draft a declaration whereby population growth would be presented as a *problem* for future human development. U Thant, an early globalist, was a mover and shaker “eager to change the UN’s political abstention on population matters”¹⁸². He presented Rockefeller’s declaration (the *Declaration on Population*) on UN Human Rights Day in 1966¹⁸³,

activities of the Council’; Category B was for those with ‘a special competence’ in a few of [ECOSOC’s] fields of activity; and Category C organisations were primarily concerned ‘with the development of public opinion and with the dissemination of information’”. Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 32. Category C was replaced in 1950 by a Register of specialized organizations consultable on an *ad hoc* basis. In 1968, the names for the three categories of NGOs were changed to Category I, II and the Roster.

¹⁸⁰ Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, p. 33. Likewise: “Within the UN, the issues of population growth and overpopulation were highly contested until the mid-1960s. Catholic and communist countries regularly rejected any policy proposals brought up in UN commissions that aimed to negatively influence reproductive behaviour.” Birke, Roman. *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning (1968)*, op. cit.

¹⁸¹ In 1965 it gained consultative status with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in 1966 with the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1968 with UNESCO and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

¹⁸² “For the UN leadership, the human rights narrative was a welcome way to facilitate the desired policy change. Given that Rockefeller’s declaration was a private initiative that sought to forge a multilateral coalition outside the UN, U Thant could support the cause without having to rely on the votes of UN delegates. On November 18, 1966, U Thant, de Seynes, and the UN Bureau of Social Affairs director Julia Henderson met with Rockefeller and one of his assistants in the Secretary-General’s office on the 38th floor at UN headquarters in New York to discuss a possible collaboration. They agreed on the basic substance of the declaration—treating population growth as a fundamental problem for future human development. Soon, human rights became the focus of their discussion. Although the declaration only briefly referenced human rights, the meeting’s participants agreed that they should become its main selling point.” Birke, Roman, *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning (1968)*, op. cit. On Human Rights Day, December 10, 1967, U Thant made a statement on population in which he affirmed: “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must inevitably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else. But this right of parents to free choice will remain illusory unless they are aware of the alternatives open to them. Hence, the right of every family to information and the availability of services in the field is increasingly considered as a basic human right and as an indispensable ingredient of human dignity.” See United Nations. *Reproductive Rights*.

<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/rights/index.asp?msclkid=055d4324d11511ec9c573577a087e56e> (retrieved April 20, 2002).

¹⁸³ The Declaration was then signed by 12 UN member states, and by 30 UN member states in 1967.

strongly emphasizing “the connections between population growth and human rights”. U Thant referred to Rockefeller’s declaration in his opening remarks at the Tehran intergovernmental conference. Tehran’s *Resolution XVIII*, an intergovernmentally negotiated text, mentioned the declaration several times. We observe here how the private initiative of an individual, John Rockefeller, enjoyed the vigorous support of the UN Secretary-General, through whom it made headway into intergovernmental processes: a confirmation of the UN Secretariat’s historical collusion with the world’s leading agents of population control.

Human rights – contraception linkage: a major foundation stone for global governance

The linkage between contraception and human rights took place at the very start of the UN conference process. Subsequent conferences never challenged the linkage. Quite the contrary, they indelibly inscribed it in the entire conference process, first wave and second wave included, corrupting it with the ideology of the IPPF and like-minded individuals and organizations. The linkage became, so to speak, a refoundation stone of the UN and of the UDHR. It became global governance’s very foundation stone, at the origin of a concatenation of other linkages that would eventually produce global governance’s integrated framework of international cooperation. Under the unrelenting pressure of the IPPF, the Population Council and a growing network of likeminded non-governmental actors, the entire conference process, in both its first and second waves, would henceforth keep the UDHR hostage to a foundational ideological linkage. The executive branch of some major governments will strongly back this linkage and reinforce it¹⁸⁴.

The Tehran conference constituted the first major instance in which the UN formally ascribed negative effects to population growth¹⁸⁵, presenting the latter as a threat to human rights. Tehran marked a historic shift in the ideology of multilateralism, veering away from the positive view of development contained in the Charter, towards radical pessimism, an oft overlooked feature of the UN’s novel agendas – those of global governance. After Tehran came the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The Stockholm *Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment* affirmed that “the natural growth of population continuously presents *problems* [our emphasis] for the preservation of the environment, and adequate policies and measures should be adopted, as appropriate, to face these problems” (par. 5). It recommended in its Principle 16 that governments apply population control measures¹⁸⁶. Before addressing Stockholm’s specific contribution to the global governance process, apart from building on Tehran’s pessimism, we will now see to what extent the UN’s interconnected population and women’s conferences of the first wave built on Tehran’s historic human rights-contraception “linkage”.

Bucharest’s integration of population and development planning

The Rockefellers’ smashing influence over the UN population agenda pursued its march forward after Tehran. One analyst remarked:

“Initiated by their academic agents..., the UN Population Commission ... and the Secretary-General’s Fund for Population Activities – riddled with Rockefeller-created

¹⁸⁴ For instance, “After the Tehran conference, the US State Department sent a letter to all embassies suggesting that they urge governments to adopt population control measures by referring to the newly adopted human right.” Birke, Roman, *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning (1968)*, op. cit.

¹⁸⁵ Prior to 1968, the UN had at times addressed the possible effects of population growth on economic development, but not in an explicitly negative light.

¹⁸⁶ The principle read: “Demographic policies which are without prejudice to basic human rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned should be applied in those regions where the rate of population growth or excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on the environment of the human environment and impede development.”

advisors and consultants, have... been the direct organizers of the 1974 World Population Conference”¹⁸⁷.

The first UN intergovernmental conference on population¹⁸⁸ held in Bucharest in 1974 emphasized the integration of population and development planning - the next major foundational linkage of global governance’s agenda, durably rendering *development* inextricable from access to family planning and its underpinning secularistic anthropology. Bucharest’s *World Population Action Plan* stated that its “explicit aim” was “to help *co-ordinate* [our emphasis] population trends and the trends of economic and social development” (par. 1)¹⁸⁹. Anita Anand underscored how developed nations insisted “that population education was essential to economic development”¹⁹⁰.

Incidentally and indicative of the transition international cooperation was then in (from the modern synthesis to the postmodern *ethos*), the Bucharest *Action Plan* still had, in 1974, a positive outlook on population. In its opening paragraph, it qualified population as “the inexhaustible source of creativity and a determining factor of progress”. “Creativity” and “progress” are words still belonging to the language of Western modernity. They would soon vanish from global governance’s semantic system. Likewise, Bucharest still held on to national sovereignty: “The formulation and implementation of population policies is the sovereign right of each nation” (par. 14).

While the “right to family planning” was attributed to *parents* in Tehran, the language changed in favor of greater individualism at Bucharest, which attributed this right to “all couples and individuals”¹⁹¹ – an expression global governance would henceforth not depart from. Apart from the Population Council and the IPPF, a number of other likeminded population NGOs were active in the Bucharest preparatory process¹⁹². Contemporaneous of the Bucharest conference was US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s *National Security Memorandum 200* (“*Implications of*

¹⁸⁷ *How Rockefeller Nurtured and Controlled the ZPG [zero population growth] Plan for Depopulation*. Population Research Report IV. EIR Vol. 1, Number 16, August 19, 1974, p. 30.

¹⁸⁸ There had been two previous UN conferences on population, the first in Rome (August 31 – September 10, 1954), the second in Belgrade (August 30 to September 10, 1965), but they were academic and not intergovernmental. The Belgrade conference examined the relationship between population growth and economic development and connected population (fertility) to development planning. The concept of fertility began to be seen as an economic factor. The conference took place at the time USAID started to subsidize population programs.

¹⁸⁹ *Report of the United Nations World Population Conference*. Bucharest. 19-30 August 1974. E/CONF.60/19. Bucharest *World Population Action Plan*.

¹⁹⁰ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 93.

¹⁹¹ The Bucharest *World Population Plan of Action* read: “All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community” (B 14 f).

¹⁹² Among them let us name: the Population Crisis Committee, now called Population Action International (established in 1965 by William Henry Draper, Jr., Lammot du Pont Copeland and Hugh Moore, instrumental in the creation of the Office of Population within USAID and of UNFPA, fund-raiser for IPPF); the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) (founded in Paris in 1928 following the International Population Conference held in Geneva August 29 - September 3, 1927, the first World Population Conference, organized by Margaret Sanger, and stressing the influence of “population problems” on social, economic and political situations; IUSSP cosponsored with the UN Population Division the 1954 and 1964 - Rome and Belgrade respectively - conferences on population; the Population Institute (founded in the US in 1969 to ensure women’s access to contraception).

Worldwide Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests”), which used human rights to justify US support for population control in the developing world¹⁹³.

The Bucharest *Action Plan* not only accentuated the individualism inherent in the right to family planning but integrated the environmental perspective of Stockholm and highlighted the interrelation of population and socioeconomic development policies.

Phenomenal ascendancy of Western individualism at Mexico (1975), Copenhagen, Mexico (1984) and Nairobi

The right of access to contraception has historically served two agendas: a demographic one - population control, and a cultural one - “women’s rights”, “sexual liberation”, “free love”, the “right to pleasure”, the advent of Marcuse’s non-repressive civilization and its “liberation” from universal moral norms. Initially the UN operated the family planning-human rights nexus to serve the first of these agendas¹⁹⁴. The linkage between family planning and women’s status and rights – the following major foundation stone of global governance’s ideological agenda - accelerated the UN’s shift towards the goals of the Western cultural revolution. It timidly started being made in the late 1960s and would be more firmly established in the 1970s, as the international feminist movement took off and through the three UN women’s conferences that took place before 1989: Mexico, Copenhagen and Nairobi. Tehran *Resolution XVIII* had already noted “with interest that the Commission on the Status of Women [had] begun to study the relationship between family planning and the status of women”.

In 1972, a women’s rights and contraception advocate from Finland, the first woman till then in such a high-level position, was appointed UN Deputy Secretary-General for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs: Helvi Sipilä (1915-2009). Appointed Secretary-General of the 1975 International Women’s Year, Sipilä was the chief organizer of the first UN World Conference on Women (Mexico, 1975)¹⁹⁵. In 1975, she presented a study on the relationship between family planning and women’s rights¹⁹⁶, emphasizing the right of individual women to contraception. Mexico, in several instances, attributed the “right” to family planning to “individuals and couples”. And at this conference, “population was an issue of ‘women’s rights’ and freedom of

¹⁹³ The NSSM 200 read: “The US can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with: (a) the right of the individual couple to determine freely and responsibly their number and spacing of children and to have information, education, and means to do so; and (b) the fundamental social and economic development of poor countries in which rapid population growth is both a contributing cause and a consequence of widespread poverty.”

¹⁹⁴ Population control being a collectivistic, statist or globalist objective, an inherent contradiction marked the (individualistic) right of parents to family planning. A socialist participant from Yugoslavia in the Tehran conference, Vida Tomšić, argued that “only a socialist society would be able to ‘overcome the conflict between the individual human right to free and responsible parenthood, on the one hand, and social population policy, on the other.’ In socialist societies, Tomšić asserted, the will of the people is identical to that of the state; therefore only socialism can develop demographic policies in line with human rights.” From Birke, Roman, *UN Resolution on Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning* (1968), op. cit., pp. 10-11.

¹⁹⁵ In 1974, the General Assembly endorsed an ECOSOC proposal to convene an international conference on women during the International Women’s Year “to examine the extent to which UN organizations have implemented recommendations for the elimination of discrimination against women made by the Commission on the Status of Women” (Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations’ world conferences and civil society. In Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 97). “A parallel event called the Forum was organized to cater to the thousands of women who had been active in the women’s movements in their countries. Never before had women participated in such a high-level international event exclusively organized by them” (Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations’ world conferences and civil society. In Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 97).

¹⁹⁶ *Study on the Interrelationship of the Status of Women and Family Planning*. E/CN.6/575/add.5. Conducted between 1968 and 1974.

choice”¹⁹⁷. Mexico borrowed the phrase “freedom of choice”, from the women’s liberation movement and the nascent pro-choice movement¹⁹⁸. The appearance of this phrase in the language of an intergovernmental conference was a historic breakthrough. The agenda of UN conferences was henceforth marked by a prodigious ascendancy of Western individualism¹⁹⁹, impacting the great number of former colonies that had become UN member states since the 1960s.

Right after the 1975 Mexico Women’s Conference and upon a request formulated at the conference under the impulse of feminist activists²⁰⁰, the Commission on the Status of Women drafted, and approved in 1976, a Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The General Assembly adopted CEDAW in 1979 and the Convention was formally signed at the opening ceremony of the Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980²⁰¹. CEDAW was the first international juridical instrument addressing the issue.

The 1978 WHO Alma-Ata conference, in its landmark *Declaration*, established WHO’s *Health for All by the Year 2000 Strategy*²⁰², and primary health care as the key to attain health for all. Under the influence of the IPPF, the Alma-Ata conference integrated family planning as part of WHO’s “maternal and child health care”.

At the 1984 Mexico Population Conference²⁰³, by the time of which the strategic interaction between the UN Secretariat and NGOs in advancing the contraceptive agenda had become an untrenched practice, IPPF achieved another major “victory” for the international advancement of its individualistic perspective: IPPF obtained the insertion in the *Action Plan* of a recommendation suggesting that “suitable family planning information and services should be made available to adolescents [our emphasis]” (Recommendation 29). Mexico, more specific than Bucharest in “its recommendations on the interrelationship between population, environment and development”²⁰⁴,

¹⁹⁷ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 93.

¹⁹⁸ In 1973, the US Supreme Court Roe v. Wade decision ruled that the US Constitution protects a pregnant woman’s freedom to choose to have an abortion.

¹⁹⁹ Principle 3 of Mexico’s Declaration reflected that individualistic surge, which developed along the rise of statism: “It is the responsibility of the State to create the necessary facilities so that women may be integrated into society while their children receive adequate care.”

²⁰⁰ See Appendix E. Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*. Unpublished. Copenhagen Social Summit. March 6, 1995.

²⁰¹ Some participants in the Copenhagen Conference viewed it as a failure. The conference was marred by politicization of international and national events that were foreign to the conference’s theme.

²⁰² Halfdan Theodor Mahler (April 21, 1923 – December 14, 2016), a Danish physician, was WHO’s Director-General 1973-88. In a speech delivered at the 1976 World Health Assembly (WHO’s intergovernmental governing body) describing weakening social structures, Mahler launched his *Health for All by 2000* goal. Mahler played a major role in shaping the 1978 *Alma-Ata Declaration*. Upon leaving WHO, Mahler became IPPF’s Secretary-General for six years, until 1995. The IPPF praised him as “a tireless campaigner for sexual and reproductive health and rights”.

<https://www.ippf.org/news/announcements/ippf-honours-memory-dr-halfdan-t-mahler-former-ippf-director-general> (retrieved April 22, 2020).

²⁰³ This was the conference where the US adopted the “Mexico City Policy”, preventing US federal funding from being granted to NGOs promoting abortion. President Ronald Reagan did not attend or fund the 1984 Population Conference. The adverse attitude of the US government towards the agenda of the conference did not prevent the population control lobby from achieving important gains in Mexico, nor did it stop the IPPF from continuing to advocate women’s “right to choose” thereafter.

²⁰⁴ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 79.

represented a significant step forward towards the adoption of a novel integrated platform for international cooperation.

A year after Mexico, the global governance revolutionary process, now also driven by gender feminists, made important strides at the Third World Conference on Women held in Nairobi in 1985. Nairobi's purpose was to "assess progress" made at the end of the UN's Decade for Women (1975-85)²⁰⁵ towards implementing the goals established by the 1975 inaugural conference on women. The Nairobi conference resulted in the adoption, by consensus²⁰⁶, of the *Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women*. The 1985 Nairobi conference built. The *Strategies*, building on Mexico's individualistic breakthrough, identified adolescents, girls especially, as a group in special need of government attention²⁰⁷. For the first time in a UN conference, a discussion on lesbian rights took place in Nairobi²⁰⁸. The *Strategies* introduced the term "gender" (sixteen uses) - a new perspective which would have a bright future. Nairobi boosted the worldwide feminist movement for a 15-year period, recommending an on-going evaluation of women's achievements and failures through the year 2000.

Among the more than 15,000 participants who attended Nairobi's NGO Forum were Charlotte Bunch, an openly lesbian American human rights activist and scholar, and Betty Friedan, the co-founder (in 1966) of the US National Organization for Women, a pro-abortion activist and the author of *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) which kicked off the second wave of feminism in the US. Nairobi's NGO Forum sparked the formation of what Bella Abzug called "a global feminist movement"²⁰⁹ and an exponential growth of feminist organizations.

Non-governmental leadership in pushing the novel environmental agenda forward at the UN

We have just seen the critical role that a few NGOs and individuals have played in putting population control, the revolutionary cultural goals of the Western sexual liberation movement, radical feminism and their revolutionary novel anthropology on the agenda of the UN during the two decades preceding the fall of the Berlin wall, and in linking these goals to those of the UN in the areas of human rights and socioeconomic development.

Let us now examine the extent to which the international environmental agenda and its integration in intergovernmental diplomacy in the 1970s chiefly sprang, not from governments, but from "experts" and activists, NGOs and hybrid organizations. In chapter one, we already referred to Julian Huxley's 1948 creation of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). According to Anita Anand, "The environmental organizations which developed in ensuing

²⁰⁵ The Decade had been proposed at the 1975 Mexico first *Women Conference*.

²⁰⁶ Because of a strategy developed which allowed delegates to express reservations on the basis of individual paragraphs, rather than of the document as a whole.

²⁰⁷ See Nairobi's *Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women*, par. 58 11a: "Recognizing that pregnancy occurring in adolescent girls, whether married or unmarried, has adverse effects on the morbidity and mortality of both mother and child, Governments are urged to develop policies to encourage delay in the commencement of childbearing. Governments should make efforts to raise the age of entry into marriage in countries in which this age is still quite low. Attention should also be given to ensuring that adolescents, both girls and boys, receive adequate information and education".

²⁰⁸ Annelien Kappeyne van de Coppello, Dutch delegate to Nairobi and a politician of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, stood, *inter alia*, in favor of abortion, euthanasia and the legal rights of LGBTs. In 1986, a year after introducing lesbian rights in Nairobi, she was inducted into the Order of the Dutch Lion as a knight.

²⁰⁹ Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit. See Appendix E. Several regional feminist groups emerged that would become influential: Asian-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), Comité de América Latina y El Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM), Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF).

decades have been among the most effective forces in a movement for global governance”²¹⁰. The IUCN²¹¹ and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)²¹² trailblazed the global governance process in the environmental domain. The UN then considered these hybrid bodies as scientific or “expert” NGOs²¹³. More *political* NGOs started appearing in the late 1960s, notably Friends of the Earth (ECOSOC accredited in 1972, created in 1969 by David Brower, dubbed the “Archdruid”, who had incited the Ehrlich’s to write their 1968 *The Population Bomb* best-seller) and Greenpeace International (ECOSOC accredited in 1983, created in 1971).

The UN Conference on the Human Environment²¹⁴ held in Stockholm in 1972 historically established the *environment* as part of the UN’s nascent international *development* agenda. It thereby *linked* a novel issue absent from the Charter to one juridically belonging to the UN’s mandate. In UN General Assembly Resolution 2398 of December 3, 1968, containing the decision to convene the conference, UN member states declared themselves

“aware of the important work being done on the problems of the human environment by ... non-governmental organizations such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the International Council of Scientific Unions and the International Biological Programme”.

In his May 26, 1969 report to the General Assembly, exemplifying once again the UN Secretariat’s pro-NGO stance, UN Secretary-General U Thant made “a number of suggestions about the representation of NGOs at the forthcoming preparatory meetings. These and others were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly”²¹⁵.

U Thant invited the pro-NGOs Canadian Maurice Strong to be the Secretary-General of the conference. Strong, born in 1929, had aspired to engage in the UN since the discussions about the creation of the international body between Roosevelt and Churchill at the 1941 Atlantic Conference. At age 17, when working as a clerk at UN headquarters, he met and befriended David Rockefeller, son of the “philanthropist” John D. Rockefeller Jr. who had bought the land that was

²¹⁰ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 70.

²¹¹ In 1990, the name was changed to *World Conservation Union*.

²¹² A 1931 reconstitution of the *International Research Council* set up with four unions in London in 1919 “for the purpose of facilitating international cooperation in scientific work and promoting the formation of international unions in different branches of science”. Once the UN was founded, the ICSU “was concerned to ensure cooperation with the new UN specialized agencies dealing with scientific questions.” (Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 117). The ICSU became the first hybrid body attached to UNESCO.

²¹³ “The dynamic interaction between these hybrids NGOs and certain of the main UN specialized agencies proved fruitful.” Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 119.

²¹⁴ Stockholm was preceded by a few conferences, notably and first the UN Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilisation of Resources held in 1949, a year after the creation of the IUCN, and by the 1968 Paris Biosphere Conference, which sprang from a UNESCO initiative, which in its turn was influenced by both ICSU and the IUCN (See Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment. The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., pp. 119-120). In 1968 Sweden suggested to ECOSOC the idea of having a UN conference on human interactions with the environment. In 1968-69, by Res. 2398 (XXIII) and 2581 (XXIV), the General Assembly decided to convene a conference in 1972. Sweden offered to host it. Preparations for the conference included 115 governments. One of the essential conference objectives was a declaration on the human environment, whose basic idea originated with a proposal by UNESCO that the conference draft a Universal Declaration on the Protection and Preservation of the Human Environment. It is noteworthy that the adjective “human” was later dropped.

²¹⁵ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 122.

donated for UN headquarters in New-York²¹⁶. David Rockefeller was, like his father, a staunch internationalist, a supporter of birth control and of Margaret Sanger. Strong himself stated that he supported granting women a license to give birth²¹⁷. He declared himself to be “a socialist in ideology, a capitalist in methodology” – a statement that matched his career²¹⁸. Strong developed powerful friendships and networks of influence. Through Rockefeller he was connected to the Trilateral Commission, created by David Rockefeller in 1973²¹⁹, just after the Stockholm conference, and to the Council on Foreign Relations, formed in 1921 in the wake of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to further President Wilson’s internationalism, and largely funded in the late 1930s by the Rockefeller and Ford foundations. The three international NGOs that have developed and advanced the global environmental agenda since the early 1970s – the IUCN, the ICSU and the World Resources Institute (founded later, in 1982, and which Maurice Strong would chair as of 1994) - received funding from the Rockefeller-coordinated Environmental Grantmakers Association.

Experts and NGOs, especially the ICSU and the IUCN, heavily influenced the preparation for the Stockholm conference. In December 1970, Maurice Strong asked the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE)²²⁰, a committee just set up by ICSU, to prepare a “report recommending the design, parameters, and technical organization needed for a coherent global environmental monitoring system”²²¹. Strong also commissioned René Dubos - a Franco-American environmentalist and microbiologist affiliated with the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and author of the 1968 bestseller *So Human an Animal*²²² - to chair a group of

²¹⁶ John Rockefeller Jr. had supported programs at the League of Nations, funded the formation and expenses of the Council on Foreign Relations. David Rockefeller would chair the Council between 1970 and 1985.

²¹⁷ See <https://peakoil.com/enviroment/maurice-strong-interview-bbc-1972> (retrieved March 3, 2022).

²¹⁸ See <https://www.idlehearts.com/1324343/i-am-a-socialist-in-ideology-a-capitalist-in-methodology> (retrieved March 3, 2022). Strong’s carrier included, on the one hand, the presidency of Power Corporation of Canada at the age of 32, President of Petro-Canada (in 1976 Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (father of current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) made Strong the first head of the national oil company Petro-Canada) and head of AZL Resources, and on the other hand, serving on the Board of Directors of IUCN, WWF and the World Resources Institute. Strong reportedly said in support of Agenda 21: “Isn’t the only hope for this planet that the industrialised civilization collapse? Isn’t it our responsibility to bring that about?”. See for instance McLeod, Judi. *COVID-19. The Answer To Maurice Strong’s Autobiographical Question, ‘Where on Earth Are We Going’?*. Canada Free Press. April 24, 2020.

<https://canadafreepress.com/article/covid-19-the-answer-to-maurice-strongs-autobiographical-question-where-on-e> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

²¹⁹ In 1991, for instance, Strong wrote the introduction, and David Rockefeller the foreword, to a book by Jim MacNeil published by the Trilateral Commission, called *Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World’s Economy and the Earth’s Ecology*. Strong wrote this: “This interlocking is the new reality of the century, with profound implications for the shape of our institutions of governance, national and international. By the year 2012, these changes must be fully integrated into our economic and political life.” See for instance McLeod, Judi. Canada Free Press. November 24, 2008.

<https://canadafreepress.com/article/the-new-world-devised-by-maurice-strong-and-george-soros> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

²²⁰ A committee that the ICSU set up to identify environmental problems caused by man and to recommend solutions. “NGOs were discovering, as the IUCN and WWF had already done, that by the late 1960s governments needed to be influenced, not only by the methods developed in the late 1950s, but also by communication with the increasing number of influential and educated people who were concerned about environmental issues.” Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 121.

²²¹ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 122, note 29.

²²² *So Human an Animal* won the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction. In the book, René Jules Dubos (1901-1982) argued that technology dehumanized human beings who would be a product, not only of their genetic endowment, but also of their general environment. Dubos advocated a humanization of science. Dubos is credited for coining the famous environmental maxim, which later became a UN watchword: “Think globally, act locally”. Dubos spent the better part of his scientific career working at The Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, which was later renamed The Rockefeller University.

152 experts who would write a report on the state of the environment to advise the delegations to Stockholm and provide a “conceptual framework” – let us incidentally stress the significance of the use of this phrase - and background information for them²²³. This process was managed by an NGO, the International Institute for Environmental Affairs²²⁴, and the report was entitled *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet*. Maurice Strong also asked the IUCN to develop international conservation law²²⁵.

Stockholm was a turning point for environmental NGOs. As Anand observed it, Stockholm was

“the first time NGO representatives or individuals attended such a conference in large numbers and were noticed by conference organizers and the media. One hundred and thirty-four organizations engaged in the official proceedings. The formation of an NGO forum parallel to the official conference was one of several phenomena which became characteristic of subsequent global conferences”²²⁶.

Conflict arose at the conference between pressure groups, which turned the environment into a political issue on the agenda of UN member states, and the “scientific” NGOs. Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson) and Margaret Mead (a controversial American cultural anthropologist whose studies of sexual behavior in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia impacted the Western sexual revolution) “kept the old and the new factions from a breach, and … also served as a bridge between the NGOs on the one hand, and government delegates and secretariat officials at Stockholm on the other”²²⁷. The Stockholm conference resulted in a *Declaration* containing 26 Principles, an *Action Plan* and a resolution to the General Assembly calling for NGO collaboration with the United Nations and for the creation of a UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Stockholm also spurred the formation of environmental ministries, just as the 1975 Mexico conference would spur that of women’s ministries, demonstrating the political influence of processes driven by non-state actors at the multilateral level on the national level.

UNEP was created at the end 1972, with Strong elected as its first Executive Director (1972-75), on the recommendation of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim (1972-81), which again demonstrates the UN Secretariat’s historical support of global governance’s novel perspective²²⁸. UNEP funded some of the IUCN’s activities²²⁹, and the IUCN provided UNEP regular reviews of world conservation. NGOs set up the Environment Liaison Centre (ELC) in 1974 to facilitate

²²³ See Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 123.

²²⁴ Set up in New York in 1971, presided first by New York Times journalist Jack Raymond then, as of 1973, by Barbara Ward, co-author with René Dubos of *Only One Earth – The Care and Maintenance of a Smaller Planet*. The book, heavily consulted by delegates, contributed to shape the agenda of the Stockholm Conference. Some consider that this book contained the seeds of the new sustainable development concept. Ward changed the name of the organization to *International Institute for Environment and Development* (IIED). In 1985, IIED and the WRI began to produce the biennial *World Resources Report*, which today is solely a WRI publication. In 1987, Our Common Future cited IIED’s contribution to creating “a global agenda for change”.

²²⁵ IUCN got involved in the drafting and implementation of the *Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage* (1972), the *Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora* (1974) and the *Convention on Wetlands of International Importance* (1975).

²²⁶ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 82.

²²⁷ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 125.

²²⁸ Waldheim’s New-York Times obituary by Jonathan Kandell revealed that the former UN Secretary-General had hidden ties to Nazi organizations. *Kurt Waldheim, Former U.N. Chief, Is Dead at 88*. New-York Times, June 15, 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/world/europe/15waldheim.html?pagewanted=print> (retrieved January 20, 2020).

²²⁹ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 128.

their communication with UNEP. ELC acquired Category II consultative status with ECOSOC and rapidly grew in membership²³⁰. Strong convened the first international expert group meeting on climate change, and the ICSU “played a major role as the adviser to … UNEP in setting up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988”²³¹. In the climate change issue, NGOs, again, proactively preceded governments.

The 1972 *Stockholm Declaration* mentioned the root “sovereign-” twice, indicating respect for national sovereignty (states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their environmental policies).

Institutional outcomes of novel, NGO-driven issues’ headway

The novel socioeconomic, demographic and environmental issues’ headway at the first wave conferences had institutional outcomes. It resulted in the creation of a series of new UN specialized agencies. Examples are the creation of the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in 1969 (authorized by U Thant in 1967); the UN Environment Program (UNEP) in 1972²³², following the first environmental conference; as just seen, the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)²³³ and the UN Development Fund for Women²³⁴ (UNIFEM) in 1976, following the first women’s conference; and the UN Human Settlements Program or UN Habitat in 1978, following Habitat I. As the UN Charter entrusted the coordination of the activities of specialized agencies to ECOSOC, the multiplication of these agencies considerably expanded the role and practical mandate of the Council²³⁴ during the Cold War. Another institutional creation resulting from the proactive engagement of NGOs during this period is the establishment in 1975 of an interagency body to ensure a better coordination between NGOs and the UN system, its intergovernmental processes and events²³⁵: the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLs).

The creation of the new agencies was inter-governmentally approved. The process that prompted their creation and thereafter inspired their agendas and animated their activities was however largely driven by non-state actors. UNFPA has been in an exclusive operational partnership with the IPPF, Rockefeller’s agents and likeminded non-state partners since its creation. UNEP had defining strategic ties with the Rockefeller-connected IUCN, ICSU and the Environment Liaison Center umbrella NGO. As for UNIFEM, the international feminist movement was in the driver’s seat.

²³⁰ ELC also served as a communication link with HABITAT established in 1978 in Nairobi. In 1982, “the ECL counted 2,230 environmental NGOs in developing countries and 13,000 in developed countries”. Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 128.

²³¹ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 131. This “intergovernmental” panel is in reality governed by experts.

²³² Established by General Assembly Res. 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972.

²³³ Helvi Sipilä, a Finnish diplomat associated to the Liberal People’s Party and a promoter of women’s rights, had a great influence in the establishment of UNIFEM (UN General Assembly Session 31 Res. 133. A/RES/31/133 of December 16, 1976), initially called the Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women. Sipilä had been President of the International Federation of Women Lawyers.

²³⁴ UN Charter Art. 64/2: ECOSOC “may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.”

²³⁵ NGLs was formed at the initiative of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department of Public Information (DPI), “after the NGO experience at the World Food Congress in Rome in 1974” (Archer, Angus. *The Vision of the Project*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 4).

ECOSOC commissions, in collaboration with the UN Secretariat's Department of Social and Economic Affairs (DESA)²³⁶, were responsible for the organization of the specialized conferences. Human rights and women had been provided with corresponding ECOSOC commissions in 1946, as had also been the case with population²³⁷. An ECOSOC commission for the environment would not see the day until the 1990s (the Commission on Sustainable Development)²³⁸. Hence in the case of the Stockholm conference, the General Assembly instead of ECOSOC took charge of the preparatory work. In a mutually feeding process, the first wave UN conferences at once strengthened ECOSOC, its commissions, the new specialized agencies, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of the UN Secretariat and intensified the interactions between these bodies and NGOs, then growing in numbers and thematic diversity. While the Security Council remained largely ineffective both during and after the Cold War, ECOSOC has kept on growing in institutional importance and practical efficiency within the UN system since the late 1960s.

2.1.2. The rising appearances of non-governmental organizations in the outcome documents of the first wave of UN conferences

The environment, population and women's conferences – not the human rights conference – achieved a breakthrough for the formal, intergovernmental recognition of NGOs' self-assigned role in the UN conference process. NGOs took the lead in these three domains. The reports of the conferences held in the 70s and 80s "approved a series of policy statements relating to the role of NGOs within the UN system in policy and program design, implementation and evaluation"²³⁹. This means that over the course of the first wave UN conferences, the *role* assigned to NGOs in the conferences' outcome documents started gradually departing from the spirit of UN Charter Article 71. The conferences' reports encouraged coordination between NGOs, governments and intergovernmental bodies. At times they addressed their recommendations not only to UN member states, but also directly to NGOs²⁴⁰. All of these developments would gain revolutionary momentum during the post-Cold War conferences Tehran did not mention NGOs. The recognition of NGOs in the conferences' outcome documents started modestly at Stockholm (six appearances of "non-governmental organizations") and Bucharest (seven). The women's conferences of Mexico (1975) and Nairobi achieved a jump forward (57 and 31 times

²³⁶ DESA supports deliberations in the UN General Assembly as well as in the ECOSOC and ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies. This department of the UN Secretariat also organizes and supports consultations with NGOs.

²³⁷ Two other ECOSOC commissions were created in 1946: the Social Commission (renamed the Commission on Social Development in 1966), and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission on Population was created by ECOSOC Res. 3 (III) of 3 October 1946.

²³⁸ During the 1960s, IUCN lobbied the UN General Assembly to create a new status for NGOs. Interestingly, however, ECOSOC Res. 1296 (XLIV) of May 23, 1968, which mildly amended ECOSOC Res. 288 B (X) of February 27, 1950 on the Council's consultative arrangements for NGOs, still did not mention the environment as a subject requiring international attention. IUCN itself was eventually accredited with six UN organizations.

²³⁹ Lewis, David. *Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): definition and history*, op. cit., Academia.edu version, p. 5. NGOs provided significant input to the agenda and outcome documents of the conferences. came from NGOs, these documents gave non-governmental organizations a specific role in assisting states in implementation, publicity. The phrasing at times put all actors, state and non-state, virtually on the same level. For example the UN General Assembly resolution (Res. 30/3520 (XXX.) of 15 December 1975) which adopted the 1975 World Conference on Women Plan of Action and related resolutions, considered "that the decisions and recommendations of the Conference should be translated into concrete action without delay by States, organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations" and "urges non-governmental organizations, at the national and international levels, to take all possible measures to assist in the implementation of the World Plan of Action and related resolutions of the Conference within their particular areas of interest and competence".

²⁴⁰ See for instance section H (Non-Governmental Organizations) of the 1975 report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year (p. 61).

respectively): this reflects the feminist movement's aggressive self-promoting political advocacy and leading role in global governance.

Stockholm opened a Pandora's box

Stockholm's outcome document seemed to limit the role of NGOs mainly to one of *consultation*. It explicitly recognized that

"the documentation [our emphasis] for the Conference was based on a great volume of contributions from Governments, the United Nations system, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and individual experts... All of this material was reviewed by the Conference secretariat with the assistance of United Nations agencies, consultants and experts *from Governments* [Ib.], under the general guidance of the Preparatory Committee (7)".

Yet Stockholm also invited non-governmental organizations which had "an interest in the field of the environment to lend their full support and collaboration to the United Nations with a view to achieving the largest possible degree of co-operation and co-ordination" (Chapter IV Coordination. 18). By using such strong and inviting language, Stockholm opened a Pandora box. It made it clear from the launch of the international environmental agenda that the business of establishing this agenda did not belong to the UN and its member states alone.

Bucharest's "condescending" treatment of NGOs?

Bucharest affirmed that "the success" of its *World Population Plan of Action* would "largely depend on the actions undertaken by national Governments" (par. 96). However, it also urged governments "to utilize fully the support of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations" (par. 96) - for instance, "to help provide family planning services and to advise users of contraceptives" (par. 29 e). It recommended the active involvement of women "both as individuals and through political and non-governmental organizations, *at every stage and every level in the planning and implementation* [our emphasis] of development programmes, including population policies" (par. 41 b). The language of this last sentence is compelling.

In view of an efficient implementation of its *Plan of Action*, Bucharest urged international non-governmental organizations (INGO) to coordinate their activities

"with those of other non-governmental organizations, and with those of relevant bilateral and multilateral organizations, by expanding their support for national institutions and organizations dealing with population questions, and by co-operating in the promotion of widespread knowledge of the goals and policies of the Plan of Action" (par. 106).

The intergovernmental conference here gave direct recommendations to NGOs. It thereby set a pattern that the conference process would follow and consolidate especially in the revolutionary period *per se* (post-Cold War conferences).

In spite of the significant strides that Bucharest achieved in favor of global governance's objectives, Jyoti Shankar Singh, a leading, UN-affiliated, population expert considered in his 1998 *Creating a New Consensus on Population* book that the 1974 Bucharest's *Plan of Action* mentioned NGOs "in what would today be regarded a somewhat condescending manner", assigning "a secondary role to NGOs, compared with that of governments in the implementation

of the ‘goals and policies’ of the WPPA”²⁴¹. Singh’s wording (“condescending”, “secondary”) manifested the revolution that occurred between 1974 and 1998 in the UN’s perspective on NGOs. His formulation implied that by the latter date, NGOs would have acquired a role at least equal to that of governments in the implementation of population policies.

1975 Mexico Women Conference’s breakthrough

As already mentioned, the 1975 Mexico conference on women achieved a breakthrough for NGOs, by indicating the leading role that the feminist movement played in moving forward the global governance revolutionary process. Its inclusion in the *Report of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year* of a sub-section on NGOs confirmed this breakthrough: Mexico was the first among UN conferences’ outcome documents to make such an inclusion. In this sub-section, Mexico sought the “active involvement of non-governmental women’s organizations in the achievement of the goals of the 10-year World Plan of Action at every level” (section I, par. 48). The report made 13 proposals for NGO actions and recognized NGOs, “especially women’s organizations, national family planning and other population organizations...” as “important resources for development and vehicles for change” (section H). The phrase “vehicles for change” confirmed the revolutionary goal the feminist conference had assigned itself, and the special role of feminist NGOs in achieving this goal.

The conference advocated *coordination* of NGO activities “at the national and local levels with the activities of Governments, United Nations organizations and other intergovernmental bodies” (Ib.). It is not within this thesis’ purview to study where such coordination did take place, but where it did, it laid the foundations for a novel politics, harmonizing the activities of governmental and non-governmental actors along common, UN-defined goals. The global governance revolutionary process was then already on its way to render these goals common to the two categories of actors. Mexico addressed its recommendations for national action not only “primarily to Governments”, but also “to all public and private institutions, women’s and youth organizations, employers, trade unions, mass communications media, non-governmental organizations, political parties and other groups” (section I, par. 27): a breach in the UN’s international, intergovernmental nature that was a trademark of the global governance revolutionary process.

1984 Mexico Population Conference’s recognition of NGOs’ “expertise” and “experience”

At the 1984 Mexico Population Conference, the language regarding NGOs in the conference’s *Plan of Action* changed substantially with respect to Bucharest. Mexico’s *Report of the World Population* urged governments to recognize “the innovative role [our emphasis] which nongovernmental organizations, in particular women’s organizations, can play in improving the availability and effectiveness of family planning services” (Recommendation 28). Along the same line, the *Plan of Action* exhorted governments “to encourage the innovative activities of non-governmental organizations and to draw upon their expertise, experience and resources [Ib.] in implementing national programmes” (Recommendation 84). Such a recognition did not come about naturally on the part of UN member states. It resulted from intense lobbying on the part of family planning NGOs – an effort which the IPPF both championed and applauded²⁴².

Nairobi: strong pro-NGO language

²⁴¹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 124.

²⁴² “Writing in *Populi* soon after the Mexico Conference, Dr. Sai applauded the recognition accorded by Mexico to the NGOs: ‘... Mexico put this matter straight by giving clear recognition to the pioneering and innovative activities through which NGOs have shaped solutions to population problems.’ (Sai 1984, 25)”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 126.

The pro-NGO language of the Nairobi *Third Conference on Women Report* was particularly strong. Nairobi sought to strengthen the influence of NGOs and to improve NGOs' relationship and cooperation with governments and UN agencies²⁴³. It recommended, for instance, the launch of a

"comprehensive and sustained public campaign²⁴⁴ by all Governments, in close collaboration with non-governmental organizations, women's pressure groups, where they exist, and research institutions, as well as the media, educational institutions and traditional institutions of communication to challenge and abolish all discriminatory perceptions, attitudes and practices by the year 2000" (par. 77).

The cooperation between institutions interested in women's "advancement" during the Decade for Women (1975-85) - several United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and regional bodies – took an institutional form: the establishment of focal points for women's activities (par. 307). Nairobi advocated NGO input in *monitoring* the implementation of its goals (par. 309)²⁴⁵. It encouraged "greater recognition and support" of the "capacity of non-governmental organizations at all levels to reach women and women's groups" so that international and governmental agencies "involved in development co-operation" utilize their "potential" (par. 332).

The identification of the role of NGOs and other non-state actors in advancing, through the UN's first wave conferences, an agenda ideologically breaking from the spirit of the UDHR and at the same time promoting these NGOs' political role at the UN unveiled what will become an important thread running throughout our thesis: the direct correlation between NGO-driven transnational ideological agendas and the advent of global governance's new politics.

2.2. The shift to globalism

In parallel with the first wave UN conferences, while a relatively small number of NGOs connected to power-wielding individuals and foundations grew in influence and strengthened their ties with the UN, an equally small number of high-profile, like-minded, interconnected and UN-connected individuals conducted a series of independent initiatives, sowing and nourishing the seeds of what would become the new post-Cold War global development framework – sustainable development -, outside of the control of UN member states. Their independent studies and commissions accelerated the momentum, during the last decade of the Cold War, towards the full outbreak of the global governance revolution that would occur right after 1989. Their upstream conceptual work proved determining. Yet it is under-analyzed and known.

2.2.1. A series of independent studies and commissions

The 1980s were pivotal for the advocates of what will soon be named *global governance*. The successive establishment of the Brandt, Palme, Brundtland and South Commissions over the span of that decade preceded that of the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance in

²⁴³ See for instance: "The effectiveness of national machinery, including the relationship between Governments and non-governmental organizations, should be evaluated and strengthened with a view to improving cooperation" (par. 129).

²⁴⁴ "Target groups should include policy-makers and decision makers, legal technical advisers, bureaucrats, labour and business leaders, business persons, professionals and the general public" (par. 77).

²⁴⁵ "Monitoring and evaluation should, therefore, be carried out at international, regional and subregional levels based on national-level monitoring, including input from non-governmental organizations" (par. 309).

1990, itself laying the ground for that of the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) in 1992. Prior to this series of independent Commissions, however, two non-intergovernmental initiatives were seminal and hugely influential: *The Limits to Growth*²⁴⁶, the 1972 study commissioned by the Club of Rome that introduced the notion and language of sustainability²⁴⁷, and the 1980 IUCN's *World Conservation Strategy* where the full expression *sustainable development* appeared for the first time in a document of political weight²⁴⁸. A conceptual and ideological thread has connected all of these initiatives in a remarkable logical coherence and continuity.

The initiatives were either private and taken from outside of the UN (such as the Club of Rome's *The Limits to Growth* or Willy Brandt's Stockholm Initiative), or benefitted from some degree of official mandate or endorsement by the UN (such as IUCN's *World Conservation Strategy* or the Brundtland Commission). Some of the individuals partaking in them, in particular Willy Brandt, Maurice Strong, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Shridath Ramphal, have exercised their influence in the global governance revolutionary process over several decades. Blatant cooptation is observable from one commission to the next and between the commissions and the UN secretariat. The majority of the commissions' members came from a socialist/socio-democratic (or democratic, if American), background. The affinity of internationalism, then globalism with socialist collectivism²⁴⁹ that we identified earlier appear more clearly in the series of independent studies and commissions of the 1980s than in the first wave UN conferences.

The initiatives incrementally built on each other within a strategic, semantic and ideological framework outlined since the onset of the process soon after the creation of the UN. As in all revolutions, all was contained in the *seed*. One after the other, the initiatives operated thematic *linkages* between nature conservation, the environment, population, socioeconomic development and North-South cooperation, peace and security, human rights, NGO participation. By 1989, the main ingredients of the emerging novel and global synthesis had been integrated into each other within the umbrella concept of sustainable development, global governance's integrated, holistic platform and unifying principle. It is in the course of these independent initiatives, as chapter three will evidence, that some of the key words of the new global language were forged, *prior* to the first wave of UN intergovernmental conferences, and started gaining currency. The following two parts of this thesis will explore the extent to which these initiatives exercised conceptual and ideological leadership over the intergovernmental process.

²⁴⁶ Study supported by the Volkswagen Foundation and led by a team of 17 MIT researchers and whose main authors are Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III. It was first presented at international meetings in Moscow and Rio in 1971. Initially criticized by many, *The Limits to Growth* nevertheless became an international best-seller (10 million copies sold, in 30 languages). President Jimmy Carter (1977-81) was favorable to the conclusions of the study. The Club of Rome was founded in 1968 by Aurelio Peccei and Alexander King at David Rockefeller's estate in Bellagio, Italy. *The Limits to Growth* appeared four years after Paul R. and Anne Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb*. According to Anand, the report prompted "UN resolution 2997, authorizing the UN Conference on the Human Environment". Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations' world conferences and civil society. In Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁴⁷ The author of this thesis did not find an earlier public appearance of the word "sustainable".

²⁴⁸ Some see in the work of the alter-globalist economist René Passet (first President of ATTAC's scientific council), published in 1979, *L'Economique et le Vivant*, the first appearance of the framework that will later make up sustainable development, resting on three parameters - environmental, economic and social.

²⁴⁹ According to William F. Jasper, "At its 1962 Congress in Oslo, Norway, the *Socialist International* plainly declared: 'The ultimate objective of the parties of the Socialist International is nothing less than world government... Membership of the United Nations must be made universal.'" Jasper, William F. *Socialist International in Copenhagen: "Birth of Global Governance"*. The New American. January 8, 2010. <https://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/europe/item/8527-socialist-international-in-copenhagen-birth-of-global-governance> (retrieved February 18, 2022). We could not verify this information.

The Limits to Growth

The Limits to Growth was based on a *computer* simulation of exponential demographic and economic growth with a finite supply of resources, led by a team of researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): the study, we note in passing, is arguably the first major case of world governance by artificial intelligence. It advocated “entirely new approaches”²⁵⁰ to “redirect society towards goals of *equilibrium rather than growth* [our emphasis]”²⁵¹, to achieve a “*sustainable state of global equilibrium* [Ib.]”²⁵², “some sort of *nongrowing state* [Ib.] for human society”²⁵³. The transition to the global equilibrium, read the report, called for a “Copernican revolution of the mind”²⁵⁴, “a basic change of values and goals at individual, national, and world levels”²⁵⁵ – in other words, a revolution. Already in 1972, *The Limits to Growth* advocated a shift from the *modern* and *Judeo-Christian* growth paradigm to sustainability, a *postmodern* paradigm to the extent it fundamentally *destabilized* the conceptual content of growth in its universal acceptance.

The Limits to Growth inextricably linked its novel sustainability concept to a series of other novel concepts such as population stabilization, balance, zero growth, interdependence, a new global ethic, the *global* character of human and ecological problems. Seeking to address “the totality of the world problematique”²⁵⁶, the report had a *holistic* approach. It established *population stabilization*²⁵⁷ as the condition to achieve sustainability, and universal access to “100% effective birth control”²⁵⁸ or what the report called “perfect birth control”²⁵⁹ as the condition to reach demographic stabilization. Population stabilization, it further argued, “would require *trading certain human freedoms* [our emphasis], such as producing unlimited numbers of children or consuming uncontrolled amounts of resources, for other freedoms, such as relief from pollution and crowding and the threat of collapse of the world system”²⁶⁰. Developments since *The Limits to Growth* as well as the current global discourse demonstrate the report’s enduring ideological timeliness.

²⁵⁰ Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens III. *The Limits to Growth*. A Report of the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. A Potomac Associates Book. Universe Books. New York. 1972, p. 193. Donnella H. Meadows was a leader in the green movement of the 1970s. She presented herself as a humanist. The title of the weekly syndicated column on world events that Donnella Meadows contributed to from a systems viewpoint - *The Global Citizen* – is noteworthy.

²⁵¹ Ib., p. 193.

²⁵² Ib., p. 179. Their basic definition of “state of global equilibrium” is “that population and capital are essentially stable, with the forces tending to increase or decrease them in a carefully controlled balance.” Ib., p. 172.

²⁵³ Ib., p. 170. The report promotes a “model output that represents a world system that is: 1. Sustainable without sudden and uncontrollable collapse; and 2. Capable of satisfying the basic material requirements of all its people.” Ib., p. 158.

²⁵⁴ Ib., p. 196. “We affirm finally that any deliberate attempt to reach a rational and enduring state of equilibrium by planned measures, rather than by chance or catastrophe, must ultimately be founded on a basic change of values and goals at individual, national, and world levels. This change is already in the air, however faintly. But our tradition, education, current activities, and interests will make the transformation embattled and slow. Only real comprehension of the human condition at this turning point in history can provide sufficient motivation for people to accept the individual sacrifices and the changes in political and economic power structures required to reach an equilibrium state...” Ib., p. 195.

²⁵⁵ Ib., p. 195.

²⁵⁶ Ib., p. 193.

²⁵⁷ They “require that the number of babies born each year be equal to the expected number of deaths in the population that year. Thus the positive and negative feedback loops are exactly balanced.” Ib., p. 160.

²⁵⁸ Ib., p. 167.

²⁵⁹ A concept in which they include not only modern contraception but abortion.

²⁶⁰ Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

The Limits to Growth started on an alarmist note, quoting UN Secretary-General U Thant, who gave UN member states ten years to “launch a *global partnership* [our emphasis] to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to development efforts”²⁶¹. It is significant that - already in 1969 - the UN’s highest official would use the phrase “global partnership” in association with a global UN security, demographic, environmental and socioeconomic agenda²⁶². It indicates how the UN Secretariat has been an agent of globalism and a leading player in the global governance revolutionary process early on. Twenty years later, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, U Thant’s “global partnership” will become the object of an alleged “global consensus”. The unequivocally anti-growth, pro-population control, globalist and revolutionary character of *The Limits to Growth* laid the first conceptual foundation stones for what will likewise become the object of a consensus at Rio: sustainable development.

Importantly for this thesis’ purposes, the authors of *The Limits to Growth* called for *parallel political processes* to advance the new sustainability agenda²⁶³: for “the creation of a world forum where statesmen, policy-makers, and scientists can discuss the dangers and hopes for the future global system *without the constraints of formal intergovernmental negotiation* [our emphasis]”²⁶⁴. The Club of Rome thereby threw the seed of an *informal* new *global politics* coopting state and non-state actors – in other words of what will become “global governance” two decades later. The report also called for “radical reform of the institutions and political processes at all levels, including the highest, that of world polity”²⁶⁵.

The Club of Rome was the prototype of the informal political forum it called for. It was an *informal* group, so much so as to be dubbed the “invisible college”. Its founder Aurelio Peccei had significantly conceived it as a “non-organization” – another postmodern concept, to the extent it destabilizes institutions - to allow for greater freedom of thought and action. Maurice Strong, the Secretary-General of both the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment and of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, was one of its “international civil servants” members. Peccei was one of the first to argue that the “new problems” humanity confronted (including population growth and environmental degradation) were *global* in nature²⁶⁶.

²⁶¹ The entire quote from a 1969 U Thant text read: “I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General, that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control”, as quoted in Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁶² Global partnership will become the leitmotiv of Kofi Annan’s UN reforms efforts in the second half of the 1990s. In 2015, it will provide the title of Sustainable Development Goal 17: “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”. Another example of an early use of the term “partners” can be found in the 1969 report of the Commission on International Development entitled *Partners in Development* and chaired by Lester B. Pearson.

²⁶³ In a video entitled *Final Warnings* and which now seems to have been removed from the internet, Dennis Meadows wondered, 40 years after the publication of his report, whether democracies were capable of controlling the CO2 emissions, in other words whether a stronger and global regime was not in order.

²⁶⁴ Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*, op. cit., p. 194.

²⁶⁵ Ib., pp. 193-194.

²⁶⁶ The Club of Rome would keep on steadily marching forward in its globalism. Its 1991 report entitled *The First Global Revolution* stated: problems “are essentially global and cannot be solved through individual country initiatives [which] gives a greatly enhanced importance to the United Nations and other international systems.” King, Alexander and Schneider, Bertrand. *The First Global Revolution. A Report by the Council of the Club of Rome*. 1991.

Issued a few months prior to the UN 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment, *The Limits to Growth* profoundly influenced its Secretary-General Maurice Strong as well as the language and content of the conference's outcome documents. According to Anand, the Club of Rome's report "prompted UN Resolution 2997, authorizing the UN Conference on the Human Environment, with Canadian Maurice Strong as Secretary-General"²⁶⁷. Significantly however, the word *sustainable* did not make it in the *Stockholm Declaration*: this demonstrates how parallel processes, not intergovernmental ones, have led the way to global governance.

The World Conservation Strategy

As already mentioned, the IUCN had been the driving force behind the global environmental agenda since its foundation in 1948. In 1975, in the aftermath of the Stockholm conference in which it had played a decisive role, the hybrid body started working on a *World Conservation Strategy* (WCS), with financial assistance and collaboration from the WWF, UNEP, UNESCO and the FAO²⁶⁸. By 1977 the IUCN had recruited Maurice Strong to become its Bureau Chairman, a position he retained until 1981. UNEP launched the WCS in March 1980²⁶⁹. The WCS was subsequently welcomed by the UN General Assembly.

The WCS put in practice the political recommendations of *The Limits to Growth* by virtually putting on the same level individuals, non-governmental organizations, governments and intergovernmental bodies, coopting them all in the planning, executing and monitoring phases of conservation strategies²⁷⁰. It issued recommendations meant to be carried out by all these actors. As the Club of Rome, and as a hybrid body, the IUCN itself had been operating as a "model global governance" from the onset. To be noted is the fact this "model" was not produced from within the UN as an international organization: it did not originate in an intergovernmental debate and therefore cannot claim to represent the will of UN member states.

Subtitled *Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development*, the not widely read 77 pages long WCS document, principally authored by IUCN staff writer Robert Prescott-Allen, wielded a historic influence. Its main contribution to global governance's forward movement was its introduction of the concept and terminology of "sustainable development". Its stated objective was to "help advance the achievement of sustainable development through the conservation of living resources" and to provide "both an *intellectual framework* and *practical guidance* [our emphasis] for the conservation actions necessary" (foreword). For the first time in the global governance revolutionary process, the WCS linked the sustainable development concept to the notion of a *framework*.

The WCS was a revolutionary agenda for global behavioral and ethical change:

"Ultimately the behavior of entire societies towards the biosphere must be transformed if the achievement of conservation objectives is to be assured. A *new ethic* [our emphasis], embracing plants and animals as well as people, is required for human societies to live in harmony with the natural world on which they depend for survival and well-being. The

²⁶⁷ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations' world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁶⁸ The IUCN had previously received funding from the Ford Foundation to boost its international secretariat.

²⁶⁹ IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy. Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development*. 1980. <https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/WCS-004.pdf> (retrieved December 16, 2019).

²⁷⁰ For instance, "in some countries, nongovernmental organizations may wish to take the initiative" of conservation strategies and: "The more effective conventions need the constant, vigorous support of governments, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations." IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy*, op. cit., chapter 8, par. 3. Regulations must be monitored by all these actors.

long-term task of environmental education is to foster or reinforce attitudes and behavior compatible with this new ethic” (Section 13.1).

The WCS’s ethical perspective was *biocentric*, as opposed to *anthropocentric*²⁷¹. It defined development as “the *modification of the biosphere* [our emphasis] and the application of human, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human life” (Section 1.3). It is worth noting incidentally that the concept of “needs” flows from a socialist perspective, as opposed to that of “wants”, which reflects a liberal mindset. Human activities were deemed responsible for “progressively reducing the planet’s life-supporting capacity at a time when rising human numbers and consumption are making increasingly heavy demands on it” (Section 1.1). In the ideological line of *The Limits to Growth*, the WCS advocated the *stabilization of world population*²⁷². It also shared with the 1972 study a globalist approach. It introduced the notion of “global commons”²⁷³ and called for “global coordinated efforts... for concerted action at national and international levels, and for global solidarity to implement its programmes”²⁷⁴.

The independent commissions and studies of the 1980s

The Brandt Commission. In 1977, Robert McNamara²⁷⁵, then President of the World Bank, suggested the creation of a private commission to help break the impasse in the North-South discussions pertaining to economic development. He invited Willy Brandt, then President of the Socialist International and leader of the German Social Democratic Party²⁷⁶, to chair it. The

²⁷¹ The *World Charter for Nature* prepared by the IUCN and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982 posited that “Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action...” UN General Assembly Res. 37/7 of October 28, 1982. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f22a10.html> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

²⁷² IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy*, op. cit., chapter 1, par. 2.

²⁷³ “The global commons include those parts of the Earth’s surface beyond national jurisdictions - notably the open ocean and the living resources found there - or held in common - notably the atmosphere. The only landmass that may be regarded as part of the global commons is Antarctica”. IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy*, op. cit., chapter 18, par. 1.

²⁷⁴ IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy*, op. cit., foreword by Mohamed Kassas (President of the IUCN), Mostafa K. Tolba (Executive Director of UNEP) and John H. Loudon (President of the WWF).

²⁷⁵ A US democrat, McNamara had been the first President of the Ford Motor Company in 1960. The Ford Foundation has been an important financial supporter of the global governance revolution. After serving as Secretary of Defense under J. F. Kennedy and L. Johnson (1961-68), he became President of the World Bank (1968-81), where he immediately voiced his concern for “overpopulation” as a major hindrance to economic development. At the 1968 annual meeting of the IMF-World Bank Group, he stated that the World Bank would grant preferential access to resources to countries permitting birth control. The *World Bank* granted its first loan for family planning in 1970 (Jamaica). In the course of his life, McNamara was affiliated with the CEIP, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Trilateral Commission, the WRI, the Brookings Institution – all of which being leading institutional agents of global governance.

²⁷⁶ An ardent promoter of Ostpolitik, at the center of détente negotiations, Willy Brandt (1913-1992) had been the mayor of West Berlin when East Germany built the Berlin wall in 1961. He was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1969-74), leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (1964-87), and President of the Socialist International (1976-92). Some of the ideas advocated in the 1980 report had been already suggested a few years before by Zbigniew Brzezinski, co-founder in 1973 of the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller and its director until 1976. The Trilateral Commission is an NGO (ECOSOC accredited in 1974) with an initial internationalist perspective that eventually turned into a globalist one, that now defines itself as “a global platform for open dialogue, reaching out to those with different views and engaging with decision makers from around the world with the aim of finding solutions to the great geopolitical, economic and social challenges of our time”. Its members “share a firm belief in the values of rule of law, democratic government, human rights, freedom of speech and free enterprise that underpin human progress”. <http://trilateralmeetings.eu/about-the-trilateral-commission/> (retrieved February 2, 2022). Let us note that *Rotary International* and the *International Association of Lions Clubs* were both ECOSOC accredited already in 1947.

commission was called the Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues²⁷⁷. It issued its report in 1980: *North-South: A Program for Survival*²⁷⁸. The title conveys the fundamental *pessimism* underpinning the commission's work and, more broadly, that of the entire global governance process: the theme of *survival* has fueled the concepts and language of global governance's gestational process and has been a leitmotiv of global governance all along.

The Brandt Commission resolved the “impasse” between rich and poor countries through a *global* program forerunning global governance. Its globalist perspective was its chief contribution to the global governance process. It confirms the link we established in the previous chapter between internationalism/globalism and socialism/Marxism. The commission viewed the world as a “single” or “global” community with “global needs” and “global problems” calling for “global action”, stating that “global questions require[d] global answers”²⁷⁹. It wanted “*responsible world citizens* [our emphasis] everywhere to realize that many *global issues* [Ib.] will come to a head”²⁸⁰ by the end of the 20th century. It sought to develop a new international economic order or altogether a *new world order* – an idea Brandt affirmed he had considered already during World War II, when thinking of how to address “problems of decolonization and development in terms of a new world order”²⁸¹.

In continuity with *The Limits to Growth* and the *World Conservation Strategy*, North-South: A Program for Survival promoted the sustainability concept, which now already integrated the three parameters of the nascent paradigm (environmental, economic and social): “Our survival depends... on global cooperation to ensure a sustainable biological environment, and sustainable prosperity based on equitably shared resources”²⁸². As per the Brandt Commission, such an agenda implied the *enlargement* of the security concept, free access to family-planning and expansion of its services, balancing population and resources and the intensification of contacts between international institutions and NGOs: many of global governance's foundational ingredients.

Several Brandt Commission members would belong to one or several of the subsequent influential independent commissions. Let us name in particular Sven Olof Joachim Palme, Shridath Ramphal²⁸³, and Jan Pronk²⁸⁴, all of them *socialists*, as Brandt himself.

²⁷⁷ It met for the first time in Bonn in December 1977. The Commission's work was financed by the Dutch Government (about half of the total expenditure of the Commission's preparatory work) and substantial contributions from the governments of Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Regional organizations and funds, such as the Commission of the European Communities and the OPEC Special Fund assisted (see Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues. Willy Brandt. *North-South: A program for survival*. 1980, p. 226). www.channelingreality.com/Documents/Brandt_Commission_North_South_Rpt.pdf (retrieved August 10, 2020).

²⁷⁸ *North-South: A Program for Survival* advocated reshaping North-South relations following a “mutual interest” principle (the northern nations dependent on the poor countries for their wealth, and the poor countries dependent on the North for their development), as opposed to development aid.

²⁷⁹ Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues. *North-South: A program for survival*, p. 19.

²⁸⁰ Ib., p. 5.

²⁸¹ Ib., p. 6.

²⁸² Ib., p. 89.

²⁸³ Born in 1928, Sir Shridath Ramphal is a Guyanese politician who was the second Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (1975-1990), the co-chair of the Commission on Global Governance and a member of the Earth Charter International Commission. He was President of the IUCN (1991-94).

²⁸⁴ Pronk, a Dutch Labour Party politician, who had been a leader of the new left movement and was then Assistant Secretary-General of the UNCTAD, was an ex officio member of the Brandt Commission.

The Brandt Commission produced a second report in 1983: *Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery*. The two reports failed to get the political traction they sought²⁸⁵ during the Reagan (1981-89) - Thatcher (1979-90) years. Their revolutionary ideas, however, later had a bright future at the UN.

The Palme Commission. In 1980 Olof Palme (1927-1986), a former leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, twice Prime Minister of Sweden, in that position at the time of the 1972 Stockholm conference where he gave an address, initiated the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security²⁸⁶ addressing the threat of a nuclear war in a pacifist, disarmament perspective. The commission's report, *Common Security - A Program for Disarmament*, issued in 1982, made ample use of the qualifier "common". It shared the Brandt Commission's view "that the South and the North, the East and the West have 'mutual interests' in economic progress"²⁸⁷ and advocated a "doctrine of common security"²⁸⁸ (or "collective security") that would comprise economic security and come about through the strengthening of the UN security system. It contributed to global governance's conceptual integration process by linking *development* to a *pacifist disarmament perspective*. Illustrating the independent commissions' cooptation practice, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Shridath Ramphal counted among the 17 members of the Palme Commission.

The Brundtland Commission. The UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development²⁸⁹ (WCED, which also became known as the Brundtland Commission) in 1983²⁹⁰ and welcomed its report, *Our Common Future*, in 1987²⁹¹. This formal intergovernmental recognition indicates the inroads within the UN, by the late 1980s, of the new *Weltanschauung* elaborated from outside the intergovernmental system.

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-91) called upon Gro Harlem Brundtland²⁹², then leader of the Norwegian Labour Party, to chair the commission. He asked her to prepare a report which was to formulate a "global agenda for change". Each of the three words of the commission's mandate mattered. The UN was quietly moving from an *international* to a *global*

²⁸⁵ See The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common responsibility in the 1990s*. Prime Minister's Office. Stockholm. 1991, pp. 6-7.

²⁸⁶ Financed by the governments of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia and Sweden.

²⁸⁷ Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme. *Common Security. A Programme for Disarmament*. Pan Books. London and Sydney. 1982, pp. 175-76. The report's first chapter is entitled *Common Survival*.

²⁸⁸ Ib., p. 139.

²⁸⁹ We note the use of word "world", just as in IUCN's 1980 *World Conservation Strategy*, which abundantly used "global".

²⁹⁰ UN General Assembly Res. 38/161 of December, 19, 1983: "Process of preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond". The resolution suggested that the Commission should focus, *inter alia*, on defining a long-term agenda for action, proposing "long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development" during the following decades. The Commission was to "recommend ways in which concern for the environment may be translated into greater co-operation among developing countries and between countries at different stages of economic and social development and lead to the achievement of common and mutually supportive objectives which take account of the interrelationships between people, resources, environment and development." In other words, it was to propose a global agenda, common to all parts of the world.

²⁹¹ In UN General Assembly Res. 42/187 of December 11, 1987.

²⁹² Brundtland attended the Bilderberg meetings in 1982 and 1983, at the time when the launch of the Commission was being prepared. David Rockefeller also attended. She had been Norwegian Minister of the Environment (1974-79) and Prime Minister (1981). She would become Norwegian Prime Minister twice again (1986-89 and 1990-96), and Director-General of WHO (1998-2003).

perspective; *change* was the watchword. And change came along with an *agenda* designed to be *common* to all of humanity.

The Stockholm conference had achieved a breakthrough by putting the environment, absent from the UN Charter, on the agenda of multilateralism. Although Stockholm had started connecting the environment and development, in 1972, the environment was still an issue separate from the rest of the UN's socioeconomic agenda. The Brundtland Commission built on the *integration* work of the Brandt and Palme Commissions²⁹³. Furthermore, it issued its report after the first wave of major UN international conferences: after one UN human rights conference (1968 Tehran) that had linked family planning, absent from the UN Charter, to human rights; two UN population conferences (1974 Bucharest and 1984 Mexico²⁹⁴), and three UN international women's conferences (1975 Mexico, 1980 Copenhagen and 1985 Nairobi²⁹⁵) that had connected women's rights (introduced in the Charter by a few feminists), and the sexual revolution and population control agendas (absent from the UN Charter) to the nascent "global agenda". Chaired by pro-abortion environmental feminist Brundtland²⁹⁶, the commission advocated the integration of family planning²⁹⁷ in education and health care. It addressed women's changing role and their status, thereby preparing the ground for the gender perspective, although the word gender appeared only once in the report²⁹⁸.

Not an intergovernmental process, *Our Common Future* brought the integration process one decisive step further. It consolidated the linkages between socioeconomic development, the environment, women's issues, population stabilization and security²⁹⁹ that the first wave conferences and the previous independent commissions' reports had forged. It gave the "global agenda for change" a name: sustainable development. Sustainable development, which had been introduced by the *World Conservation Strategy*, was now in the process of becoming a fleshed-out, cross-sectoral, umbrella concept. Brundtland's sustainability paradigm sought to *balance* economic growth, social equity and environmental protection, in a way that *harmonized* or unified these three parameters, making them inseparable in the process.

Analyzing the meaning of the word "balance" is key to grasping some of the ideological challenges contained in the sustainable development agenda. The novel agenda's balancing act profoundly transformed, destabilized or deconstructed (postmodern processes) the identity of growth both as a modern concept (which had led to now universally recognized environmental and social abuses) and as a Judeo-Christian divine command. *Our Common Future* retained the

²⁹³ In the foreword of the report, Brundtland called the work of the commission she chaired "a third and compelling call for political action." World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*. October 1987. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf> (retrieved August 30, 2021).

²⁹⁴ The US withdrew its voluntary contribution to the IPPF in 1985 and to the UNFPA in 1986. "At the Mexico Conference an ad hoc caucus working on family planning and women's rights proved highly effective in getting official delegations to accept major recommendations on both these issues". Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 107.

²⁹⁵ The Nairobi conference stated that "the ability of women to control their fertility... forms an important basis for enjoyment of other rights" (par. 156).

²⁹⁶ Brundtland lobbied for abortion rights in Norway in the 1970s. In 1969, abortion on request was inserted in the platform of her political party, the Labour Party. Norway legalized abortion in 1978.

²⁹⁷ The report reads: "Increased access to family planning is itself a form of social development that allows couples, and women in particular, the right to self-determination."

²⁹⁸ In the title of a reference. There is no mention of empowerment.

²⁹⁹ The report connects the traditionally hard concept of security to a series of soft themes, using expressions such as environmental security (3), food security (39), ecological security, livelihood security, old age security, security of tenure, global security...

biocentric description of development made in the WCS³⁰⁰, asserting that sustainable development involved “more [our emphasis] than growth” (devaluing growth) and advocating a change in what it repeatedly called the “quality of growth” - whatever this was supposed to mean.

Our Common Future contained what has remained the prevalent definition of sustainable development since the report was issued: “development that meets the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”³⁰¹. The new paradigm defined development in terms, not of growth, but of *needs* and *aspirations* – socialist (needs) and subjective notions. Its anti-growth stance was all-encompassing: beyond economics, it also affected, for instance, demographics (seeking to ensure a “sustainable” level of population growth³⁰²). Inter-generational equity, a fundamental principle of sustainable development, put present and yet nonexistent “future generations” so to speak in the *balance*. Sustainable development has since its conceptual origins rested upon a pessimistic ethic of survival, sustainability, stabilization, conservation - not a universal ethic of life, growth and development.

Obeying a postmodern logic, the “balancing act” has blurred or dissolved identities and hierarchies. Its concrete meaning and outcomes have remained fuzzy to this day. Sustainable development has been subject to diverse and contradictory interpretations. The concept’s trailblazers, however, came from a clear and common ideological background. The paradigm was forged as a globalist, socialist and ecofeminist response to the neoliberalism and conservatism of Reagan and Thatcher and their nascent world order in the context of accelerated economic globalization in the 1980s.

Our Common Future did more than establishing the foundations for nascent global governance’s platform (sustainable development) and consolidating its novel language. Brundtland was a staunch supporter of increased NGO involvement in international governance. She welcomed the ideas that the already referred-to umbrella NGO - the Environment Liaison Centre (ELC) – had submitted the commission in 1986 in its report - *NGOs and Environment-Development Issues*. In this report, the ELC advocated “a matching level of commitment from the governmental and intergovernmental communities, *in genuine partnership with NGOs* [our emphasis]”³⁰³ in order to advance the novel agenda. *Our Common Future* would formally recognize, as a condition to achieve sustainable development, to “expand the rights, roles and participation” of “an informed public and of NGOs, the scientific community and industry” in “development planning, decision-making and project implementation”³⁰⁴. *Our Common Future* underlined the indispensable role of NGOs since Stockholm in “identifying risks, in assessing environmental impacts and designing and implementing measures to deal with them, and in maintaining the high degree of public and

³⁰⁰ “The ‘environment’ is where we all live; and ‘development’ is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.” World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., foreword.

³⁰¹ World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Part I, 2, par. 49. The definition further reads: “It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given and; the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.” (Ib.)

³⁰² Ib., Chapter 4, par. 2: “Present rates of population growth cannot continue”. Or Chapter 4, I, par. 7: “High rates of population growth that eat into surpluses available for economic and social development can hinder improvements in education and health”.

³⁰³ Bull, David. Environmental Liaison Center. WCED Public Hearing. In World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Part II 4, par. 65.

³⁰⁴ Ib., Overview, 4.4/96.

political interest required as a basis for action”³⁰⁵. It saw NGOs and private groups as efficient and effective providers of an “alternative to public agencies in the delivery of programmes and projects”³⁰⁶. By 1987, NGOs had developed influential coalitions and networks – a fact that *Our Common Future* acknowledged. In line with all the preceding studies and reports we mentioned, the Brundtland report challenged “traditional forms of national sovereignty” which it stated “raise particular problems in managing the global commons.” In her foreword to the report, Brundtland declared that the challenges of sustainable development “cut across the divides of national sovereignty”: it “transcended” national sovereignty, in other words.

Our Common Future provided the momentum for the 1992 Rio *Earth Summit* and its outcome document, *Agenda 21*³⁰⁷. Maurice Strong, Rio’s Secretary-General, participated as a member in the Brundtland Commission. Nitin Desai was its Senior Economic Advisor.

The South Commission. In the year the Brundtland Commission issued its report, the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere³⁰⁸, set up the South Commission with the view of strengthening South-South cooperation. Its report, *The Challenge to the South*, came out in 1990 as a follow-up to the 1983 Brandt report. We should mention that Nyerere, an African nationalist and anti-colonial activist, presented himself as a socialist.

2.2.2. Towards global governance as new world order

Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic pro-UN December 7, 1988 speech to the United Nations

On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev³⁰⁹, then USSR head of state, made a momentous speech at the United Nations, marking a historic re-entry of the USSR at the UN, at a moment Gorbachev described as “a turning point... in the development of world events”³¹⁰ - in effect preceding by one year the November 9, 1989 Berlin wall fall: an event which occasioned the “rebirth” of the UN through the outbreak of the global governance revolution that would immediately follow what many then called the end of the Cold War. Even before these historic events, the Soviet leader, widely popular in particular in Western Europe, weighed in on the new vision that the socialists and social democrats we identified in this chapter had prepared for the future of the UN in the shade of the Cold War.

³⁰⁵ Ib., Part II, 4.1, par. 67.

³⁰⁶ Ib., par. 73.

³⁰⁷ As well as the third UN Conference on Environment and Development held in 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa.

³⁰⁸ Nyerere, a Catholic, seemed to have mixed up the European socialist ideology with his Ujamaa or African “familiarism” or sense of the family and of the community which led him to affirm: “The African is by nature a socialist being”. He paradoxically and all at once admired Gandhi, Jacques Maritain, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Mao Zedong.

³⁰⁹ General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1985-91), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1988-89), USSR head of State (1988-91) and USSR President (1990-91). Gorbachev resigned on December 25, 1991. The Minsk Agreement of December 8, 1991 and the Alma-Ata agreement of November 21st of the same year created the Commonwealth of Independent States and put an end to the Soviet Union.

³¹⁰ Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the United Nations*. December 7, 1988. <http://www.literaster.com/writing/gorbachevs-speech-un-7-december-1988> (retrieved August 30, 2021). All subsequent quotes from Gorbachev in this section come from this speech unless otherwise specified. The turning point the Soviet leader alluded to consisted in particular in that, according to him, “the differences and oppositions inherited from the past” were “being reduced or removed”, but “new ones” were “appearing”. The event at the UN was followed by an encounter with US President Ronald Reagan and Vice President Georges Bush at Governors Island. This was the fifth Gorbachev-Reagan meeting (following Geneva 1985, Reykjavik 1986, Washington 1987, Moscow 1988).

In his speech, the Soviet leader took an unequivocally pro-UN stance. He advocated UN strengthening and a renewal of international relations that would shift them from the superpowers' bipolar confrontation to an "internationalization of the dialogue and negotiating process". He praised the UN - this "most prestigious world organization" - for being "capable of accumulating the collective reason and will of mankind". In his view, events were "increasingly confirming the world's need" for the UN.

Gorbachev spoke at the UN about a year after the publication of *Our Common Future*, the report of the commission chaired by the socialist Brundtland and of which the Russian Vladimir Sokolov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and an early global sustainable development advocate, was a member³¹¹. *Our Common Future* had just laid out the globalist vision for the new era humanity was then entering. Gorbachev's own globalist perspective - an organic fruit of his Leninist internationalism - procured a decisive encouragement to the conceptualizers and agents of the new world vision, whose strategy and ideology he demonstrated in his speech to widely share.

The *Kairos* Gorbachev alluded to was, to a significant extent, the product of his own policies, both internal and foreign. At home, his perestroika and glasnost were promoting "openness", enhanced freedom of speech³¹², the "democratization" of the USSR, the "decentralization" of its economy. This "revolutionary restructuring", he argued at the UN, contained "a colossal potential for peace and international co-operation". In terms of foreign policy, Gorbachev, who had decided for disarmament (nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons) and reduced armed forces, advocated the "demilitarization of international relations", thereby converging with the pacifist views expressed a few years earlier in the *Palme Commission* report. It was then "evident" to him that "force and the threat of force" could "no longer and should not be instruments of foreign policy"³¹³. Gorbachev also called for the end of economic blocs. The USSR leader arguably had no other choice than to take this direction. Internally, he was constrained by the exhaustion of the Soviet Union, veering towards implosion. Externally, the threat of a nuclear war ushering in total destruction was more than real.

Hence at the end of 1988, the USSR head of state proactively proclaimed the formation of "a breach ... in the impenetrable wall of suspicion and hostility". With assurance and a prophetic accent, he announced that "the understanding of the need for a period of peace" was "making a way for itself and becoming the dominant trend". In effect, the world conflict was then coming to an end. Gorbachev called for change, for a break from "customary stereotypes".

³¹¹ Sokolov was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences who pioneered the environmental movement in Russia and was awarded the "Order of Lenin" in 1981. He was a globalist and an early advocate of sustainability.

³¹² "Not long after the handshake at the start of the Moscow summit, Reagan raised what he called a sensitive topic. It was so sensitive, he said, that if word he had mentioned it leaked to the press, he would deny it. It had to do with religious freedom. Saying he was speaking as a friend, he asked Gorbachev, 'What if you ruled that religious freedom was part of the people's rights, that people of any religion - whether Islam with its mosque, the Jewish faith, Protestants or the Ukrainian church - could go to the church of their choice?' Religious freedom, besides being valuable on its merits, would make agreements with the United States much easier.

If Gorbachev would guarantee religious tolerance, Reagan said, attitudes in America toward the Soviet Union would change dramatically. 'You will be a hero, and much of the feeling against your country will disappear like water in hot sun.' See Brands, H. W. *How Reagan used religious freedom to reshape Russia*. May 17, 2015.

<https://nypost.com/2015/05/17/reagans-religious-plea-to-gorbachev-revealed/> (retrieved February 27, 2020).

³¹³ The second Reagan administration (1985-89) was different from the first, Reagan starting to endorse demilitarization.

Immediately after its creation in 1945, the UN had, Gorbachev observed, “found itself under the onslaught of the Cold War” which prevented the organization from realizing the vision of its founders. In 1988, the Soviet Union re-entered multilateralism with a leading and globalist vision, imbibed by Russian Messianism, for the “new role” the world body was to play in the nascent post-Cold war era.

What new role did Gorbachev envision for the UN? His historical materialistic analysis of “the present stage of history” led him into a grand vision for the next stage in the “progress” of “civilization”. Gorbachev sought to establish a continuum between “the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917”³¹⁴ - both of which represented in his mind an “enormous spiritual wealth” -, and the next stage of “progress” yet to be “constructed” and in which he wanted to proactively take part. He opined that the new world order had to build on these “two great revolutions”, which “have exerted a powerful influence on the actual nature of the historical process and radically changed the course of world events. Both of them, each in its own way, have given a gigantic impetus to humanity’s progress” and “shaped a way of thinking that still prevails in the public consciousness.” Yet “radical”, believed Gorbachev, were the differences “between what which was yesterday and that which is taking place today”.

Gorbachev’s next stage of “progress” was to be marked by a “search for a *consensus of all mankind* [our emphasis], in movement towards a *new world order* [Ib.]”³¹⁵ - the new world order, let us recall, being a phrase that Willy Brandt, with whom Gorbachev was in good terms³¹⁶, cherished. What were the contours of his new world order? Let us expose the three ingredients present in his quote: *consensus, global, order*.

Consensus. Gorbachev defended the idea that the world had to move from confrontation to dialogue, cooperation and consensus. His proposal, however, contained an undiscerned paradox. Gorbachev, who unequivocally held on to the communist ideology³¹⁷, proactively advocated at the UN what he called “the de-ideologic of inter-state relations”³¹⁸. This “de-ideologic” – a “demand of the new stage”, as he labelled it - was in a dialectic. On the one hand, it did not entail,

³¹⁴ Elsewhere Gorbachev stated: “In October 1917, we parted with the old world, rejecting it once and for all. We are moving toward a new world, a world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road.” <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/536687> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³¹⁵ The “new world order” is a definitely globalist expression. It has always been used in reference to an order transcending individual nations and promoting collective security and global governance. It seems that the strongly internationalist US Democratic President Woodrow Wilson stands at the origin of the term. Wilson referred to a “new order of the world” when he called for the League of Nations at the end of World War I. This new order would *transcend* the common great power politics. Virginia Gildersleeve, interestingly, the lesbian member of the US delegation to San Francisco, referred to a “new world order” at the time the UN was founded (in an interview with the New York Times). The expression re-emerged as the Cold War was reaching its end. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi spoke of a new world order characterized by “non-violence and the principles of peaceful coexistence” at the Russo-Indian talks of November 21, 1988. But Gorbachev’s December 7, 1988 UN speech was the first major substantial conceptual introduction of a “new world order”: the leadership, interestingly, came from the Soviet head of state, not the Americans. Elsewhere Gorbachev affirmed: “Further global progress is now possible only through a quest for universal consensus in the movement towards a new world order.” <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/679704> (retrieved February 2, 2022). When Boris Yeltsin (1991-99) replaced Gorbachev in Russia and Bill Clinton (1993-2001) replaced Bush in the US, the new world order phrase temporarily stopped being used.

³¹⁶ See for instance Dhombres, Dominique. *M. Gorbachev a reçu M. Willy Brandt pendant plus de cinq heures*. Le Monde. May 29, 1985.

³¹⁷ Elsewhere Gorbachev stated: “In principle as a philosophy, a model of organising society, Communism has to be respected. As regards the use of certain methods to advance social justice and greater regulation by the state, there are certain methods that are useful. What we need is a new society, a new civilization and convergence of all that is best in both [Communism and Capitalism].” <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/577015> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³¹⁸ Even before the West proclaimed the “end of ideology” after the fall of the Berlin wall, Gorbachev took the lead.

Gorbachev insisted, giving up one's "convictions, philosophy". On the other, Gorbachev strongly defended *diversity* (which was then becoming a key paradigm of emerging global governance), "the principle of freedom of choice" as a right of the peoples.

The synthesis of Gorbachev's dialectical reasoning was a global consensus "transcending" ideological differences and an ethic of *tolerance*³¹⁹ and "unity": "everyone should take part in moving towards more unity in the world". Gorbachev searched for "a way to the supremacy of the common human idea over the countless multiplicity of centrifugal forces". In his view, there was no alternative to a global consensus, to a "*balance* [our emphasis] of interests within an international *framework* [Ib.]", which were a "condition for *survival* [Ib.] and progress". Gorbachev's explicit concern for humanity's "survival" stemmed from his fear not solely of the threat of a nuclear war³²⁰, but of an impending "ecological catastrophe".

Importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Gorbachev's envisioned consensus was not only about "an end to the era of wars, confrontation and regional conflicts" and "political terrorism", but also about an end to the era of "aggression against nature, the terror of hunger and poverty" – it was precisely about the themes that the post-Cold War conferences would address and build a "global consensus" on. His inclusion of *social justice* was to be interpreted in the light of the Marxist, collectivistic ideology he held on to. Gorbachev concluded his speech by characterizing such a consensus as "our common goal", that can be attained "only by acting together".

Global. Gorbachev listed some of the "problems" which had in his view become "global", "common to all mankind" and required "combined efforts": economics, food, energy, ecology, information, demography, the development gap between North and South, humanitarianism... Clearly dominant were his ecological concerns³²¹, which he linked to socioeconomic and demographic ones³²². Hence without naming it, Gorbachev implicitly promoted *Our Common Future*'s sustainable development paradigm which, as a reminder, by then already integrated three parameters (economic, social and environmental). The Soviet leader called "for a fundamentally new type of industrial progress": "international economic security is unthinkable outside a *linkage* [our emphasis] not only with disarmament [in line with the *Palme Commission*] but with overcoming the world-wide ecological threat [in line with the *Brundtland Commission*]". As Brandt had done it in his commissions, Gorbachev enlarged the concept of security to integrate "soft" issues³²³. At the end of 1988, he mentioned the Soviet engagement in the preparation for the 1992 Rio conference on the environment³²⁴.

³¹⁹ Elsewhere Gorbachev stated: "For a new type of progress throughout the world to become a reality, everyone must change. Tolerance is the alpha and omega of a new world order." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1096385> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³²⁰ "Sometimes people ask me why I began perestroika. Were the causes basically domestic or foreign? The domestic reasons were undoubtedly the main ones, but the danger of nuclear war was so serious that it was a no less significant factor." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1463101> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³²¹ The Chernobyl tragedy (April 26, 1986) had traumatized the Soviet Union and encouraged Gorbachev towards denuclearization and environmental concerns.

³²² Gorbachev also mentioned foreign debt, space, regional knots like Afghan conflict or Palestine as "common" problems. He was a supporter of birth control, quoted as having said: "We must speak more clearly about sexuality, contraception, about abortion, about values that control population, because the ecological crisis, in short, is the population crisis. Cut the population by 90% and there aren't enough people left to do a great deal of ecological damage." See <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/609354> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³²³ Gorbachev called for a "decisive revision of views on the entire total of problems of international cooperation as a major element of universal security." This enlarged view corresponded to the vision then being elaborated at the UN.

³²⁴ "Within the UN framework a conference on the environment is planned for 1992. We welcome this decision and are preparing for such a forum to produce results corresponding to the scale of the problem."

Order. Founding his new world order on the need to collectively address “global problems”, Gorbachev substantially contributed to the shift from the *internationalist* vision of the leading founders of the UN to the *globalist* vision of the conceptualizers of global governance. The phrase “global governance” had not yet come into currency in 1988. The Soviet leader did not use it³²⁵. But Gorbachev did point to a *new world order*, in which “world policy” (“world” being another word for “global”) would be determined by placing the “interests” and “values of mankind first”, that is, above the interests of individual states. Gorbachev’s collectivistic perspective clearly inspired his new world order. Although the Soviet leader did not use the word “normative” (which would impose itself later in the novel global language), it was clear that he stood in favor of the birth of some kind of global enforcement power to efficiently address “global problems”. In his view, “the world community has to learn to *shape* and *direct* [our emphasis] processes in such a way as to preserve civilization”, and humanity had then “arrived at a frontier when uncontrolled spontaneity leads to a dead end”. The reborn UN would therefore need to be endowed with some kind of globally normative capacity or authority.

Particularly importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Gorbachev referred to a new world order or global political system that would co-involve states and what he called “socio-political currents” – by which he clearly meant something equivalent to “global people power”: “The very tackling of global problems requires a new volume and quality of co-operation by states and socio-political currents regardless of ideological and other differences.” He claimed that the Soviets were “delighted” about the rise of “people’s diplomacy”, “that an ever-greater number of state, political, party and public figures are ready to shoulder the burden of universal responsibility... scientists, cultural figures, representatives of mass organizations and various churches and activists...” Gorbachev encouraged the “idea of a regular convening, also under the UN’s auspices, of an assembly of public organizations”³²⁶. To interpret his statements, it is important to remember that in the Soviet system, every social or political institution was “public”: “private associations” were nonexistent. But Gorbachev did clearly refer to the host of transnational “non-state actors” that were then gaining critical power at the UN, in particular NGOs. His encouragements to these actors bolstered up the agents of the nascent global political revolution. Gorbachev used different words to signify strategic processes akin to those of global governance’s Western agents. This may have been an issue of translation from the Russian, or Gorbachev may not have been familiar with the novel UN terminology. The strategic, conceptual and semantic

³²⁵ The Soviet leader even seemed to be in favor of a global government: “An awareness of the need for some kind of global government is gaining ground, one in which all members of the world community would take part.” <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/785094> (retrieved February 2, 2022). And so was David Rockefeller: “Some even believe we [Rockefeller family] are part of a secret cabal working against the best interests of the United States, characterizing my family and me as ‘internationalists’ and of conspiring with others around the world to build a more integrated global political and economic structure - One World, if you will. If that’s the charge, I stand guilty, and I am proud of it.” David Rockefeller. *Memoirs*. Random House. New-York. 2003, p. 405. Rockefeller is also quoted as having said in 1991, either to the *Trilateral Commission* or at the Bilderberger meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany (a meeting also attended by then-Governor Bill Clinton, Dan Quayle, Ruud Lubbers, Henry Kissinger...): “We are grateful to The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine and other great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and respected their promises of discretion for almost forty years. It would have been impossible for us to develop our plan for the world if we had been subject to the bright lights of publicity during those years. But the work is now much more sophisticated and prepared to march towards a World Government. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.” See for instance <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/288636-we-are-grateful-to-the-washington-post-the-new-york> (retrieved February 27, 2020).

³²⁶ In the Soviet Union, obviously, no “private” organization existed. The largest public organization in the Soviet Union was the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which served as an umbrella organization for the 30 branch unions.

convergence between his vision and that elaborated by the Western global governance agents is however striking. Mikhail Gorbachev revealed himself in the late 1980s as a pro-UN, pro-NGOs, pro-global governance, pro-sustainable development, pro-population control globalist.

The global green agenda became Gorbachev's primary mission no sooner did he resign from his post as President of the USSR on December 25, 1991, after the Soviet Union's implosion. He viewed the "threat of environmental crisis" as "the 'international disaster key' to unlock the new world order."³²⁷ He then, *inter alia*, created the Green Cross International, an NGO pursuing legally, ethically and attitudinally normative ambitions. His NGO's mandate would include ensuring "basic changes [our emphasis] in the values, actions and attitudes of government, the private sector and civil society, necessary to develop a sustainable global community"³²⁸: very similar goals to those of the *World Conservation Strategy*. Alongside the ILO, the IUCN, the WCS, the Club of Rome..., Green Cross International became a model global governance in its multistakeholder structure (government, private sector, civil society).

The pro-sustainable development and pro-global governance perspective of Gorbachev's speech at the UN was anything but surprising. Gorbachev was friends with Maurice Strong. Both were members of the globalist pro-sustainable development Club of Rome. In 1987, after the Brundtland Commission had called for "a new charter to guide state behaviour in the transition to sustainable development"³²⁹, Strong and Gorbachev discussed the idea of an *Earth Charter* which they eventually concretized through the NGOs they respectively set up³³⁰. Gorbachev also had a personal relationship, strategic and ideological affinities, and cooperative ties in the area of the environment with UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar (1982-1991). At the Global Forum on Environment and Development³³¹ held in Moscow in January 1990, for instance, where Gorbachev made the opening speech and de Cuellar the closing one, and Gorbachev supported "the role of the United Nations in global environmental problems"³³², suggesting the creation of an "international Green Cross that offers its assistance to States in ecological trouble"³³³, and

³²⁷ <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/679713> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³²⁸ Green Cross International Celebrity Supporters & Events. <http://www.looktothestars.org/charity/green-cross-international> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

³²⁹ World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., section 5.2, par. 85.

³³⁰ The idea of the *Earth Charter* was intended as the "sustainable development equivalent" of the UDHR. At the first UNCED PrepCom, the secretariat of the conference proposed an *Earth Charter*. At the Earth Summit, Strong and Boutros-Ghali explicitly expressed hope for its development. In 1994, Maurice Strong and Mikhail Gorbachev restarted the *Earth Charter* as a "civil society" initiative of the organizations that they had respectively founded (the Earth Council and Green Cross International), with the financial help of the Dutch government. The drafting of the charter was almost finalized at the Rio+5 Forum held in Rio March 13-19, 1997, organized by the Earth Council, attended by Bella Abzug and Juan Somavia. The drafting of the Charter was overseen by an independent commission convened by Strong and Gorbachev and chaired by Steven Clark Rockefeller, an advisory trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Among the other members of the Earth Charter Commission were Ruud Lubbers - Prime Minister of The Netherlands (1982-94), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2001-05), accused of sexual harassment, honorary member of the Club of Rome -, Federico Mayor - UNESCO Director-General 1987-99, member of the Club of Rome -, Leonardo Boff - former Italian missionary priest in Brazil, advocate of liberation theology -, and Shridath Ramphal (Guyana). After being approved at a meeting of the Earth Charter Commission held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, the final text of the Earth Charter was officially launched on 29 June 2000 in a ceremony at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, attended by queen Beatrix.

³³¹ Attended by "over 700 world religious and legislative leaders" who "cooperated with top Soviet authorities", organized by the New-York based Global Forum of Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders and "hosted by the Supreme Soviet, all faith communities in the USSR, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity (Moscow)", the Global Forum was "multi-stakeholder" as the jargon would later name it. *Archives of the Global Climate Change Digest*. Vol. 3, N° 4, April 1990. Item #d90april114.

³³² Archives of the Global Climate Change Digest, op. cit.

³³³ On 6 June 1992, six months after having resigned as USSR President (Dec. 25, 1991), the former Soviet leader was approached by the Rio Earth Summit civil society delegates to create Green Cross International. At the same

would match the Red Cross' mandate in the humanitarian area. His speech manifested his faith in the “philosophy of limits” launched by *The Limits to Growth*. Green Cross International (GCI) was eventually established in Kyoto, Japan on April 18, 1993, at a subsequent meeting of the Global Forum, following the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and with the purpose of building upon its work. Pérez de Cuellar became a board member.

The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance.

In January 1990, just a few weeks after the historic fall of the Berlin wall, Willy Brandt - he again - conveyed members of his commission together with representatives from the other independent commissions in Königswinter, Germany, to outline prospects for a “new world order”³³⁴ – Brandt’s and now also Gorbachev’s expression - to govern the post-Cold War era. Ingvar Carlsson³³⁵, Shridath Ramphal, and Jan Pronk³³⁶, all socialists, were appointed to create a working group. The group – that called itself the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance - met in Stockholm on April 22, 1991. Participants included, apart from the group’s three leaders and the living chairs of the former commissions (W. Brandt, G. H. Brundtland and J. Nyerere), Nafis Sadik³³⁷ (UNFPA Executive Director 1987-2000, who would be appointed Secretary-General of the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development), Maurice Strong³³⁸, Eduard Shevardnadze³³⁹ (then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR under Gorbachev), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (who would play a key strategic role in UN reform under UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan), the US democrat Robert McNamara. The Initiative’s members nourished strong ties with the UN system and in particular with the Secretariat at this historic moment.

The Stockholm Initiative’s report, *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*³⁴⁰ explicitly sought to steer post-Cold War multilateral cooperation towards “global governance”: it is the first report

time, Swiss National Council parliamentarian Roland Wiederkehr founded a “World Green Cross” with the same objective. The organizations merged in 1993 to form Green Cross International.

³³⁴ A Willy Brandt quote about the new world order: “The New World Order is a world that has a supernational authority to regulate world commerce and industry; an international organization that would control the production and consumption of oil; an international currency that would replace the dollar; a World Development Fund that would make funds available to free and Communist nations alike; and an international police force to enforce the edicts of the New World Order.” <https://whatsmyquote.com/quote/the-new-world-order-is-a-world-that-has-a-supernational-authority-to-regulate-world-commerce-and-industry-an> (retrieved March 5, 2022)

³³⁵ Ingvar Carlsson was Leader of the Swedish Democratic Party (1986-96) and twice Prime Minister of Sweden (1986-91, then succeeding Olof Palme upon his assassination in 1986, and 1994-96). He had been Swedish Minister of Environmental Affairs (1985-86).

³³⁶ Jan Pronk was then Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation advocating the integration of socioeconomic development and environmental protection. Pronk will be a member of the *Commission on Global Governance*, as will Maurice Strong.

³³⁷ Born in 1929, the Pakistani Nafis Sadik was appointed in 1970 Director-General of Pakistan’s Central Family Planning Agency, which she had joined in 1966. She joined UNFPA in 1971, two years after its creation. In 1987 she was appointed Executive Director of UNFPA, a post she maintained until 2000. She then was the first woman to lead a major UN agency. She remains to this day (February 2022) Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Asia. She is the prototype of an individual who will have been in the UN system for almost a lifetime and wielded incommensurate influence in bringing global governance about.

³³⁸ The report of the Initiative called for the eradication of extreme poverty through a commitment to achieve sustainable development, to be made at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. It made it clear that sustainable development went through population stabilization – a goal the Initiative wanted to be fostered at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD).

³³⁹ Eduard Shevardnadze (1928-2014) was First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, leader of Soviet Georgia (1972-85), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years (1985-91), then advocate of détente and a soft line with the West.

³⁴⁰ The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common responsibility in the 1990s*. Prime Minister’s Office. Stockholm. 1991. The headings of *Common Responsibility in the 1990s* are: peace and security,

among those of the independent commissions of the 1980s that explicitly used the phrase. In the view of its authors, the UN as an *international* organization would have become obsolete: “The present institutional set-up is not adequate to enable the nations of the world to deal effectively with the *global* [our emphasis] issues, to set *new rules* and to *enforce* [Ib.] them”³⁴¹. The report urged “nations to build a system of global governance”³⁴² that would comprise a “global law enforcement arrangement”³⁴³, a “global security treaty system”³⁴⁴, agreement on “global norms” that “must gradually acquire the status of law”³⁴⁵, a “global emergency system”³⁴⁶. It advocated the strengthening of the UN, in particular of its socioeconomic activities³⁴⁷, and a “stronger position and the means to exercise authority” for the UN Secretary-General³⁴⁸. Let us deduct from what precedes that the report’s authors, several of whom wielded decisive influence at the UN in the early 1990s, viewed global governance as a political “system”³⁴⁹ endowed with global normative and enforcement power. This thesis’ parts two and three will explore the extent to which they succeeded in establishing the novel system.

The report even seemed to suggest a sort of refounding of the UN. It proposed “that a World Summit on Global Governance be called, similar to the meetings in San Francisco and at Bretton Woods in the 1940s”³⁵⁰. The reference to San Francisco and Bretton Woods is eloquent, even if the report did not use the verb “re-found”. The intention was clearly to redesign multilateralism in a way that amounted to a *refoundation from within*. This meant the Charter would be kept, and existing institutions left standing. We will revisit and analyze in subsequent chapters the “from within” character of the global governance revolution in its various manifestations.

It is critical to realize how the authors of the report sought to inscribe the revolutionary proposals of the independent commissions and of their own initiative in a continuum with the UN Charter. They did so in a strategic attempt to grant them juridical legitimacy. They claimed that the need for a strengthened system of *global* governance had “been recognized by farsighted world leaders, from the founders of the United Nations in the 1940s to the members of the independent Commissions in the 1980s”³⁵¹. Their anachronistic “observation” failed to distinguish the internationalism of UN founders, who established an international organization, from their own

development, environment, population, democracy and human rights and global governance. The report was published by the *EcoSocialist Review* (Summer 1991 issue). In a book published in 2015 entitled *Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe*, Michael Löwy traces the history of ecosocialism since the 1970s. Löwy advocates a revolution through what he calls “global democratic planning” (extending democracy into the economic domain) to turn over the capitalist system and bring about a planned society that would allegedly be people- and planet-centered. In *Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature*, John Bellamy Foster challenged the conventional interpretation of Marx’s critique of capitalism and bourgeois progress and demonstrated how Marx’s philosophical naturalism and adherence to the theory of evolution revealed his concern for the need to protect the environment.

³⁴¹ The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 36. The report proposes to enlarge the concept of security so as to include “threats that stem from failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, and lack of progress towards democracy” (Ib., pp. 17-18). These socioeconomic, environmental and demographic issues should, according to the report, be addressed by the *Security Council*: “There is a need to be able to handle the security dimension of economic and ecological issues at the Security Council level” (Ib., p. 38).

³⁴² Ib., p. 36.

³⁴³ Ib., p. 12.

³⁴⁴ Ib., p. 15.

³⁴⁵ Ib., p. 36.

³⁴⁶ Ib., p. 12.

³⁴⁷ Ib., p. 39.

³⁴⁸ Ib., p. 38.

³⁴⁹ Ib., p. 36.

³⁵⁰ Ib., p. 41.

³⁵¹ Ib., p. 37.

globalism. They sought to quietly mute this organization into global governance. Global governance, they reckoned, would clearly “require a new concept of sovereignty”, reduced in scope in the name of global interdependencies. This, they likewise recognized, would represent “a difficult political transition”, as many countries remained attached to nationhood³⁵².

Hence this global governance would not come about naturally. It would need to be consciously *constructed*. That meant “returning to San Francisco – not to the drawing board but to the process of designing for *survival* [our emphasis]”³⁵³. Incidentally, let us once again underline the appalling pessimism underpinning global governance. In fact, the participants in the Stockholm meeting reckoned that the commissions of the 1980s had begun the “intellectual work of appraisal and reform”³⁵⁴. They believed that the commissions’ effort now needed “to be more structured, and a pathway to decision to be developed”³⁵⁵. They explicitly stated they did not envision the main actors of this “designing for survival” to be nation-states. They suggested instead that the best way to prepare for it would be the establishment, “as a matter of priority”³⁵⁶, of “an independent commission, non-governmental in the nature of the Commissions whose work we have referred to in this memorandum”³⁵⁷, “of an independent International Commission on Global Governance”³⁵⁸. In other words, global governance would be constructed by a handful of experts. This thesis’ parts two and three will analyze whether and how the second wave conferences achieved the global governance vision of a handful of like-minded experts. The authors of *Common Responsibility in the 1990’s* wanted radical change. As in all revolutions, however, the content of their proposed change remained fuzzy.

The Commission on Global Governance.

In April 1992, just a year after the Stockholm Initiative, Willy Brandt – he again - established the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) to draft a blueprint for reforming the UN into global governance. He invited Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal, members of the Stockholm Initiative and of previous commissions, to cochair it. Ramphal, who had been a member of the Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland commissions, was then President of the IUCN. Maurice Strong, Jan Pronk and Jacques Delors counted among the 26 other members of the new commission³⁵⁹. Then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali endorsed Brandt’s proposal: a new evidence of UN Secretary Generals’ support for the revolutionary outlook of the Stockholm Initiative and the commissions of the 1980s. Several foundations, including the Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation, funded the commission’s work. For the purposes of highlighting the remarkable thread connecting the few key agents of the global governance revolutionary process, let us recall that James T. Shotwell, the man behind the insertion of Article 71 in the UN Charter, had had a lifelong connection with Carnegie. The CGG issued its report, *Our Global Neighborhood*³⁶⁰ in 1995 and presented it to the fiftieth anniversary

³⁵² Ib., p. 37.

³⁵³ Ib., p. 37.

³⁵⁴ Ib., p. 37.

³⁵⁵ Ib., p. 37.

³⁵⁶ Ib., p. 42.

³⁵⁷ Ib., p. 41.

³⁵⁸ Ib., p. 42.

³⁵⁹ Several members, such as Abdlatif AlHamad (Kuwait), Anna Balletbo i Puig (Spain), Bernard Chidzero (Zimbabwe), Qian Jiadong (China), Maurice Strong (Canada) and Brian Urquhart (United Kingdom), had belonged to previous commissions. Members of the Commission on Global Governance ideologically belonged to an ecofeminist and socialist perspective. Most of them had some kind of connection to the UN.

³⁶⁰ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*. Oxford University Press. 1995.

session of the General Assembly. Incidentally, the Stockholm Initiative had introduced the notion of “one human neighbourhood”³⁶¹.

Although chronologically, the CGG belongs to the post-Cold War, revolutionary period of the global governance process, we insert a few analytical remarks about its work at the end of this thesis’ first part because of the commission’s direct strategic and ideological continuity with the Stockholm Initiative and the independent commissions of the 1980s. Parts two and three will abundantly refer to *Our Global Neighborhood* in their analysis of global governance as content and as process.

Our Global Neighborhood called, *inter alia*, for a strengthened UN having authority over “the global commons”³⁶², greater authority for the UN Secretary-General, global taxation, the establishment of UN specialized agencies as “centers of authority”³⁶³, an Economic Security Council³⁶⁴, an International Criminal Court³⁶⁵, the adoption of a “global civic ethic”³⁶⁶ and the expansion of partnerships between “global civil society”³⁶⁷ and intergovernmental organizations. The hard, institutional changes that the commission proposed will be only partly realized³⁶⁸. The CGG’s report, however, described a political revolution that was then effectively unfolding, during the post-Cold War UN conference process: the UN-NGOs partnership revolution that will be the object of analysis in this thesis’ following two parts. The outbreak of the civil society revolution, when global governance was moving out of its gestational stage into full blossoming, was concomitant with the report’s drafting.

In the line of *The Limits of Growth* and succeeding reports, *Our Global Neighborhood* consolidated the connection between “rapid growth in population” and what it called “environmental security [our emphasis] through the impact that people have on the earth’s life-supporting resources”³⁶⁹. It viewed population, development and the environment as interconnected issues that must be governed by the “principle of sustainable development”³⁷⁰. The language of *Our Global Neighborhood* reflected both an ideological continuity with the work of the preceding commissions, and the phenomenal advancement of the global governance process³⁷¹ by 1995 within the same ideological framework. The specificity of the report was its

³⁶¹ The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 36.

³⁶² Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 57, for example. In the early 2000s, Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza introduced a related concept: “global public goods”. See Kaul, Inge and Mendoza, Ronald U. *Advancing the Concept of Global Public Goods*, in Kaul, Inge, Conceição, U. Pedro, Mendoza, Ronald and Le Goulven, Katell, eds. *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*. New York. Oxford University Press. 2003. On June 16, 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested to turn Covid vaccines into a global public good. He spoke about it in his first conversation to Joe Biden when the latter took office.

³⁶³ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 346.

³⁶⁴ Corresponding to the enlarged definition of “security” that the commissions of the 1980s had proposed.

³⁶⁵ Which will effectively take place on July 17, 1998 with the adoption of the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. NGOs played a leading role in its creation. The *Rome Statute* entered into force in 2002, following 60 ratifications, formally establishing the Court.

³⁶⁶ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 55, for instance.

³⁶⁷ Ib., p. 55, for instance.

³⁶⁸ Hard changes that were not adopted are for instance the abolition of the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, a new Council for Petitions, the reform of the Security Council to make it “more representative”, the establishment of a UN Volunteer Force, granting the Trusteeship Council the custody of the “global commons”...

³⁶⁹ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 29.

³⁷⁰ Ib., p. 30.

³⁷¹ The report’s language used novel expressions forged previously, such as future generations (7), global framework (1), quality of life (6), sustainable development (11), partner- (3), global ethic (6), global civic ethic (6), NGOs (27),

use of novel political paradigms, chief among them governance, global governance, global civil society and a global ethic.

global civil society (5), international civil society (7), global (374), global governance (39), governance (93), consensus (16), gender (7 – sensitivity, equity, roles...), sexual orientation (2), human security (2), planetary security (3), population growth (5), global neighbourhood (62).

PART TWO

THE REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS SYSTEMIC CONTENT

The defining role of the post-Cold War wave of UN conferences (1990-96)

CHAPTER 3

SETTING THE STAGE: DEFINITIONS AND BOUNDARIES, 1989 HISTORICAL CONJUNCTURE AND TRIGGER FOR THE REVOLUTION'S OUTBREAK

This thesis' part one identified key strategic milestones in the global governance revolutionary process during its seminal and gestational periods. At the beginning of part two, which addresses the revolution itself and more specifically how global governance was constituted as *systemic content*, it is necessary to start by defining what we mean by "global governance revolution". Delimiting the boundaries of this thesis and of its part two, chapter three also defines some of the key concepts we will henceforth use: *partners*, *content* and *process*, *framework*, *new paradigms* and *paradigm shifts*, *system* and *linkages*, the framework's *pillars* (visible and hidden), the partners' *gains*, *sealed consensus* or *framework*, the framework's *unbroken transmission chain*, and the *new politics*.

Chapter three then identifies the historical circumstances and the driving factors that triggered the revolution's outbreak and determined its course in fundamental ways. The events of 1989 occurred at a time when the global governance process had reached a critical point of conceptual and programmatic maturity. The main interpretation made of these events at the time (end of history, end of ideologies and global state of consensus) served as a springboard for building, and seemingly reaching, a global consensus on an attractively-presented agenda that had been largely preset during the Cold War. The non-state authors of this agenda entered the new era from a position of strength.

3.1. What do we mean by global governance revolution?

It is not within this thesis' remit to expose and compare the many different theories of revolution³⁷². Suffice it for our purposes to name the features associated with the dominant understanding of the concept: sudden and radical changes in the core of a given social or political structure, revolt against the national authorities in place, violent power-grab by groups who do not legitimately detain authority, abrupt change of political regime, coup d'Etat, overthrow of institutions, transgression of the law, power shift, sweeping and non-violent societal transformation that can span relatively long periods of time, "liberation" rhetoric (from what the revolutionaries portray as a form of oppression or injustice), visionary or ideological project. Beyond the social and political domains (Glorious revolution, American revolution, French revolution, Bolshevik revolution, Chinese revolution...) domains, revolutions may also occur in a number of other fields, *inter alia*, in sciences (Copernicus, Einstein...), economics (industrial, digital...), culture and civilization (May 68, shift to postmodernity...), anthropology (sexual revolution, feminist revolution, LGBTs...).

³⁷² Among the revolution theorists let us randomly name: the German political scientist and philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-75), author notably of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and of *On Revolution* (1963); the American sociologist and political scientist Charles Tilly (1929-2008), author of *European Revolutions, 1492-1992* (1993); the American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr (1936-2017), author of *Why Men Rebel* (1970); the American conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet (1913-96), author of *The Sociological Revolution* (1966); French philosopher, sociologist, political scientist Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron (1905-83), author of *La Révolution introuvable – Réflexion sur les événements de Mai* (1968); Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1944-); French historian François Furet (1927-97) who specialized in the French revolution and its ideological legacy (author *inter alia* of *La Révolution française, en collaboration avec Denis Richet*. 1965).

Our thesis is the emergence of global governance as a political revolution. To what extent do the processes we analyze match the commonly accepted features of a revolution that we just listed? Who were the legitimate power holders, and the illegitimate power-grabbers? What changes did the revolutionaries achieve? How wide-ranging were they? What was their vision? How abrupt were the changes? Was the revolution violent or non-violent, was it *transgressive*? Was there a power shift? A regime change? An overthrow of institutions? Answers to these questions will progressively appear over the course of this thesis.

At this juncture of our thesis, however, the findings in the two preceding chapters allow us to already draw a number of important conclusions, which subsequent chapters will further clarify. The non-UN member states individuals and groups we identified themselves abundantly advocated - to give just a few examples using some of their expressions already included in our thesis up to this point - a power shift (Jessica Matthews), a redirection of societies towards new global goals, entirely new approaches, a transition to a new perspective, a “Copernican turn of the mind”, a basic change of values at all levels (from global to the single individual) (*The Limits to Growth*), a new security concept (*North-South: A Program for Survival, Our Common Future*)³⁷³, a redefinition of civil society, fundamental changes in the ethic, actions and attitudes not only of governments but of business and “civil society” - a *new world order*³⁷⁴ (Gorbachev)... Power sharing with non-state actors (which even the UN Secretary-General would recognize as “revolutionary”, but in a positive sense³⁷⁵), a globalist perspective transgressing the UN’s international mandate, the globalization of the (anthropologically violent) goals of the Western feminist and sexual revolution and corresponding new rights *breaking from* the UDHR’s underlying spirit and anthropology, radical change with respect to the UN’s original concepts of development, rights, values..., were the clear intent and platform of the agents of the global governance revolution. Gorbachev explicitly inscribed the programmed revolutionary global platform in a continuum with the French and Russian revolutions.

3.1.1. Revolutionary process vs. revolution

Was the global governance revolution *sudden*? To answer this question, one must take into account that revolutions do not erupt *ex nihilo*. They proceed by stages. Three stages usually

³⁷³ The UN Charter clearly distinguished security form the social and economic sectors, granting each their respective organs. Illustrating global governance’s redefinition of security, let us cite the Brandt Commission’s report: “The world needs a more comprehensive understanding of security which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects.” Independent Commission on International Development Issues. *North-South: A Program for Survival*, op. cit., p. 207. And *Our Common Future*: “The whole notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress – locally, nationally, regionally and globally”. World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Part I, 3, par. 86. The idea of an independent Commission for Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. The commission issued a report entitled *Human Security Now. Protecting and Empowering People*. New-York. 2003.

³⁷⁴ The phrase “new world order” is reminiscent of *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, the inscription on the Great Seal of the United States (since 1782), appearing on the one-dollar bill (since 1935) with masonic symbols such as the eye in the pyramid and the eagle.

³⁷⁵ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan himself has used the term “revolution” to qualify in particular the unprecedented participation of NGOs and other non-state actors in UN conferences and the political nature of this participation. See for instance *Kofi Annan salue la ‘révolution non gouvernementale’ et invite la société civile à renforcer son partenariat avec l’ONU*. 59ème Conférence annuelle DPI/ONG. UN Press Release ONG/604-PI/1736. September 8, 2006. While the UN interpreted the term in a positive light, valuing the social and ethical changes the revolution achieved as “progress”, this thesis has a more comprehensive scope and a more critical perspective.

characterize a revolutionary process: the seminal and gestational stage; the outbreak and unfolding (the revolution itself, whose success depends on a *critical mass* won over by its objectives); the implementation and widespread dissemination of the revolution's platform. The three stages are revolutionary, but we need to distinguish a *revolutionary process* from a *revolution*. The distinction matters to delimit the boundaries of this thesis. This thesis focuses exclusively on the two first stages of the global governance revolutionary process.

Three stages: seminal and gestational, revolution itself, implementation

A long intellectual, political and strategic maturation, taking place in restricted circles, usually precedes a revolution's outbreak. This first period is determining. Visionaries and intellectuals set the revolution's *agenda for change*. Spearhead activists, inspired by the visionaries, make first, localized attempts at power-grab. They or their ideological heirs will develop into the revolution's agents. The revolution breaks out once its platform is conceptually ready, its agents are strategically positioned and have access to power and resources (military, political, cultural, financial³⁷⁶...), there is a willingness to support its objectives on the part of certain sectors of society, and external events provide a trigger for its agents to grab power and overturn the established order. In contrast to the revolutionary process' first stage, the second stage generally unfolds extremely rapidly. It accomplishes the revolution's objectives. The revolutionary process then enters its third, implementation phase. This phase has vertical and horizontal dimensions: on the one hand, it profoundly (vertically) changes the content of cultures, societies, language, laws, politics; on the other, it horizontally spreads like wildfire from the revolution's epicenter to peripheries, under the surveillance of the revolutionaries now in power.

The ideas developed by the “philosophes”³⁷⁷ over the course of the 18th century prepared the ground for the 1789 French revolution, which overthrew the *Ancien Régime* (1589-1789). Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*, issued in 1848, was written almost 70 years before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, which installed totalitarian Marxism-Leninism in the stead of the Russian Empire and created the Soviet Union in 1922. Herbert Marcuse, the father of the sexual revolution and himself a disciple of both Marx (1818-83) and Freud (1856-1939), published *Eros and Civilization*, the platform of the sexual revolution, in 1955, 13 years before the May 68 youth revolt, when Western civilization took a radical turn and disowned its classical and Judeo-Christian roots and identity.

The seminal and gestational phases of the global governance process that part one traced expanded over the decades separating the creation of the UN and 1989. Global governance's platform came to a point of conceptual maturity in the late 1980s. The influential independent reports mentioned in chapter two, produced in restricted circles of globalist visionary “experts” and politicians, had been leading the shift from internationalism to globalism. *Our Common Future*, the decisively globalist³⁷⁸ 1987 report of the independent Brundtland Commission,

³⁷⁶ This thesis does mention some of the main financial supporters of the agents of the global governance revolutionary process (Rockefeller, Ford and MacArthur Foundations, Carnegie), but more research is needed in this field.

³⁷⁷ Those of de Montesquieu (1689-1755), Voltaire (1694-1778), Rousseau (1712-78), Diderot (1713-84), Beaumarchais (1732-99), among others.

³⁷⁸ The word “global” appeared 97 times in *The Limits to Growth* (1972), 93 times in the 1980 Brandt report and 236 times in *Our Common Future* while it was scarcely present in the outcome documents of the first wave UN conferences, except for that of the 1972 Stockholm conference (28 times), demonstrating the role of environmentalism in the advancement of globalism. Feminism came second.

embodied the platform of nascent global governance, its vision and leading concepts. It was, even in the words of UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, a *global agenda for change*³⁷⁹.

This chapter examines the role of the events of 1989 in *triggering* the launch of the global governance revolution itself, the second and central phase of the global governance process that this thesis' parts two and three expose and analyze. It is necessary to mention at this point, even if it will be the purpose of subsequent chapters to demonstrate it, that the agents of the global governance revolution achieved their key strategic objectives through the UN's second wave conferences, by which we mean the nine international conferences that took place in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall. In six years' time (1990-96), at thunderlight speed, these conferences constituted global governance's agenda as a *system* of integrated *new paradigms* expressed by means of a language that was absent from the Charter and the UDHR. This agenda, in the makings during the Cold War as showed, then became the substance of what the major UN conferences called both a "global consensus"³⁸⁰ and a "framework"³⁸¹ for international cooperation – a "globally normative framework"³⁸² for the 21st century as the UN Secretariat later called it. The core of the revolution consisted in turning the global platform prepared during the Cold War by a minority of like-minded visionaries into an intergovernmental consensus. Concomitantly, the agents of the revolution's power-grab installed a *functional new political system transcending* national and local governments with a view to enforcing a platform that they critically contributed to shaping: a partnerships' regime, *alias* what this thesis calls *global governance*. Their achievements were thus political in a dual sense: in that of a platform, and in that of a political system or "regime".

Anticipating a conclusion that will be drawn from the findings in this thesis' parts two and three, and doing so in order to justify our application of the term "revolution" to the UN's second wave conferences, let us already state that by the end of this wave, global governance's agenda had been set in its main constitutive components. The pillars of the post-Cold War development framework had been firmly established. They had become the objects of a "global consensus" joined by all UN member states. In that sense, the revolution *per se* was over in 1996. Global governance's revolutionary process, however, continued to move forward: it immediately thereafter entered its third phase: implementation.

Boundaries of this thesis: the two first stages of the revolutionary process

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how the global governance revolutionary process brought about a ruling new and global politics, made up of a systemic platform on the one hand, and operational political mechanisms on the other. Both were established by the end of the revolution *per se*.

To highlight the existence of a thread between the revolutionary process' two first foundational stages is our purpose, obviously not to be exhaustive about the highly complex, manifold and multifaceted developments that have marked them all along. Neither is it within the purview of this thesis to address the historical unfolding of the third stage of the process, that of implementation. We will limit ourselves to opening enough perspective on this phase to

³⁷⁹ In the foreword, Brundtland called the report "a global agenda for change". The word "change" appears 250 times in *Our Common Future*.

³⁸⁰ The phrase "global consensus" appeared in the outcome documents of Rio, Cairo, Beijing and Istanbul. The word "consensus" also appeared in the documents of Jomtien, New-York and Rome. See Appendix A4.

³⁸¹ The word "framework" appears in all the conferences' reports, most abundantly in Rio and Istanbul. The phrase "global framework" appears in Rio, Cairo, Beijing, Rome. See Appendix A4.

³⁸² "Normative framework", appears already once in Rio's Agenda 21.

demonstrate the unbroken *continuum*, forward movement and coherence of the entire global governance process as a whole and the enduring radical changes the revolution achieved.

Content and process: boundaries of parts two and three

Revolutions commonly operate changes of a dual nature: conceptual (agenda for change: the revolution's content) on the one hand, and political (power shift: the revolution's process) on the other. In a revolution, content and process are indissoluble: power is grabbed by and shifted over to the proponents of the revolutionary agenda.

This thesis' part two focusses on how the agents of the revolution constituted global governance's new politics *as systemic content*. Part three uncovers and analyzes global governance's new political system as resting on new political actors, on a redistribution and redefinition of the roles of old and new actors, shifting their balance of power, and the destructive effects of the new regime on the former international order and on democracy.

Both parts base their analysis on the findings contained in the revolution's primary documents – the conferences' reports, related UN resolutions, and the report of the Commission on Global Governance. They each explore the extent to which the global governance revolution as new politics relates to postmodernity, destabilizes the modern political system and its basic tenets, and rejects what can be universally recognized as true about the human being.

3.1.2. Introductory perspective on the radical changes justifying the use of the term “revolution”

As alluded to just above, the global governance revolution this thesis studies retains a number of features from common understandings of what a revolution is. The analysis of the radical changes that this revolution achieved will make the substance of this thesis' upcoming chapters. It is necessary at this stage to introduce them in broad outline and by the same token, to discern their specificities. The global governance revolution distinguishes itself in several ways³⁸³.

Its foundational and defining feature is to have occurred, not at the level of a national state, but above it, at the so-called "global level": a level that the revolution's agents themselves constructed and has since often coexisted with, or superseded in practice, the "international level". The artificial construction of a virtual global level, a level simulated in the minds of the global social engineers but nonexistent in actual political and juridical reality, is in itself eminently revolutionary. An important related trademark of the global governance revolution is to have installed political mechanisms of a winning efficiency, through which the wide-ranging changes that the partners

³⁸³ In his 1940 book *The New World Order*, Herbert G. Wells called for a revolution of an "altogether different type" (p.79) than one that would be an "explosion" or a "coup d'état" (p.78) as the French and Bolshevik revolutions had been. "The new Revolution aims essentially at a change in directive ideas. In its completeness it is an untried method. It depends for its success upon whether a sufficient number of minds can be brought to realise that the choice before us now is not a choice between further revolution or more or less reactionary conservatism, but a choice between so carrying on and so organizing the process of change in our affairs as to produce a new world order, or suffering an entire and perhaps irreparable social collapse" (p. 79). Wells described his "new and complete Revolution... in very few words. It is (a) outright world-socialism, scientifically planned and directed, plus (b) a sustained insistence upon law, law based on a fuller, more jealously conceived resentment of the personal Rights of Man, plus (c) the completest freedom of speech, criticism and publication, and sedulous expansion of the educational organization to the ever-growing demands of the new order. What we may call the eastern or Bolshevik Collectivism, the Revolution of the Internationale, has failed to achieve even the first of these three items and it has never even attempted the other two. Putting it at its compactest, it is the triangle of Socialism, Law and Knowledge, which frames the Revolution which may yet save the world" (p. 84). Wells, H. G. *The New World Order*. First Published January 1940. Orkis Press. 2014.

operated first at this “global level” (changes in policy-making processes, educational content, development and health care priorities, business ethics, cultures...) were supposed to impact all levels, down to the local one and even the single individual itself: the global governance revolution was a global-to-local revolution. It was a major powerhouse of cultural and political globalization at a critical time in history.

Another specificity of the global governance revolution is that it did not overthrow existing international institutions. It operated its fundamental changes *within* and *through* the UN institution and its system (even if, as already seen, it did create, as it unfolded, a number of new institutions - new agencies, funds and programmes – within the UN), within hard law (within the UN Charter)³⁸⁴, within the core content of human rights, of health and education policies and norms, to some extent within its language (even if it mainly proceeded through a novel language), through processes this thesis describes and analyzes. It even promoted changing culture and religion *from within*³⁸⁵. The paradigms of the “revolution within”, however, did radically *break from* the mandate, spirit, core content, ideology of the UN institution through which the revolution unfolded. They dramatically *destabilized* or *deconstructed* the established order. The global governance revolution grafted itself on the perspective of the Western postmodern new left³⁸⁶, which its new paradigms embody. *Deconstruction* has been postmodernity’s watchword since Derrida. This thesis contends that deconstruction from within, deconstruction of what is, of what is given, of what is universal, of what Sartre called the “en soi”, is by essence *violent*.

The revolution was led, not by the UN institution’s legitimate power-holders, but by external agents. Even if the revolution happened quietly, without bloodshed, its agents, as part three will demonstrate, have forcibly (although by the sole means of *soft power*) grabbed effective political power. A massive power transfer took place, away from sovereign governments over to these non-state agents, whom we shall call “the partners”, resulting in a new balance of power.

UN member states were made to adopt, as a matter of “global consensus”, agendas stemming from non-state actors who had been in a direct operational partnership with UN bureaucrats during the Cold War since the 1960s and became the revolution’s driving agents in the 1990s. The consensus, supposed to be intergovernmental, was in reality *multi-stakeholder* (“broader” than just intergovernmental), as the UN Secretariat would later qualify it. UN member states ended up adopting partnership with these actors as a normative political principle. These features – that of a *consensus*, that of its being *global* and *multi-stakeholder* – are all in themselves revolutionary: the first broke from UN majority vote decision-making³⁸⁷, the second from the organization’s *international* mandate and the third, from the *intergovernmental* nature of the UN. These developments had an irreversible character in the sense that governments have never claimed their sovereign and normative power back: the partners’ framework remains standing.

³⁸⁴ It is not within this thesis’ purview to examine the influence of non-state actors in the reinterpretation of existing hard international law and the adoption of observatory comments.

³⁸⁵ See for instance UNFPA. *Working from Within. Culturally Sensitive Approaches in UNFPA Programming*. 2004. Or Peeters, Marguerite. *The Globalization of the Western Cultural Revolution*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2012, pp. 170-176.

³⁸⁶ The West’s new left was born out of the realization of the Soviet regime’s abuses. “La chute du communisme... annoncera le triomphe de la révolution 68”. Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique*. Les Editions du Cerf. 2016, p. 19.

³⁸⁷ UN General Assembly decisions are made by simple majority or a majority of at least two-thirds depending on the nature of the issues.

Lastly and to repeat, the revolution shifted the focus and priority of international cooperation from the UN Security Council and hard security to ECOSOC and soft social, demographic and environmental issues - some of which were not even mentioned in the Charter³⁸⁸.

For all of the reasons we just listed, this thesis establishes that the changes we disclose were not a mere evolution, but indeed a full-blown revolution and one distinguishing itself of all preceding revolutions by its global scope. The following chapters will spell out these specific features of the global governance revolution.

3.1.3. Defining key terms delimiting this thesis' boundaries

This thesis recurrently uses a few terms according to a meaning specific to its *problématique*. We will now clarify what we mean by the following words and expressions: *the partners, content and process, the framework, new paradigm, paradigm shift, system and linkages, conceptual pillars, the partners' gains, sealed consensus or framework, transmission chain, new politics*. These terms delimit the exclusive focusses of this thesis' research.

The “partners”

We call “partners” all agents of the global governance revolution: the non-inter/governmental actors who, although being political and juridical *outsiders* to the UN’s intergovernmental processes, have exercised their influence *within* and *through* these processes to construct the new global regime as content and as process. Part one provided a sense of who the “partners” concretely were: individuals, experts, independent commissions, NGOs, foundations linked to transnational businesses, clubs... Governmental executives (when acting in their own, individual capacity), directors and bureaucrats of UN agencies (when acting independently from intergovernmental control), UN secretariats and the UN Secretary-General himself (when siding with non-governmental actors rather than with UN member states) were also partners. The *partners* were ideologically and strategically like-minded.

Chapter six will distinguish *primary partners* (who set the global agenda) from *implementing partners*, who came on board after the agenda was well established. We shall alternatively call the primary partners the *global elite*, the *global enlightened despots*, the *enlightened leaders*, the *global experts* (less frequently the *autocrats* to emphasize their lack of submission to external constraints or popular control, the *logocrats* to highlight their ruling by words, or the *oligarchs* to underscore their small number).

While standing in principle hierarchically below sovereign governments, the partners’ influence over them during global governance’s revolutionary process was not marginal, but hegemonic and historic. As already noted, and as the following chapters will strive to evidence, the partners have stood at the conceptual and ideological origin of the novel language, themes, paradigms, agenda and political mechanisms that make up global governance. They also wove the linkages that have constituted global governance as a *system*.

³⁸⁸ UN Charter Art. 62/1 allows the Economic and Social Council to “make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, *and related matters* [our emphasis]” and to “make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.” The Charter does not provide, however, for a broadening of the ECOSOC mandate to the environment. The integration of the environment into socioeconomic development could be due to a will to make it fall under the UN mandate.

This thesis does not ambition to provide a full list of “the partners”. It focusses on those who wielded the greatest influence in establishing the new regime during the revolution and determined its course.

Content and process, and boundaries of this thesis

This thesis focusses on demonstrating the partners’ leadership over intergovernmental processes, hence over UN member states as sovereign governments, in bringing about global governance as *content*, as *process* and as a political *system*. This focus is exclusive.

Sustainable development as an umbrella concept – that is, inclusive of all the multifarious new paradigms introduced in the UN conference process as a whole and constituted by a number of sub-agendas - is global governance’s platform, its content. Operational partnerships between state and non-state, (inter)governmental and non-governmental actors are the political mechanisms through which the post-Cold War agenda for “international” cooperation was set, became the object of an alleged “global consensus”, and has been, until this day, implemented: they make up global governance as process.

The global governance revolution that this thesis addresses brought about a systemic *new politics* astride the two facets we just identified: new both as content and as process. An essential and explicit component of the global governance agenda itself – of the *content* of the revolution - was the *partnership principle* - the political paradigm expressing the revolution as *process*. Content and process are inextricably linked within one single political *system*.

As regards *content*, this thesis finds its analysis on the partners’ concrete “gains” in the conferences’ outcome documents: on the language that they – not intergovernmental negotiations - coined, pushed *through* these intergovernmental negotiations, made it in the final reports, and has been there to stay. In its exposure and analysis of the partners’ “gains”, this thesis makes no claim at exhaustivity. Its objective is to provide sufficient evidence to attain indisputable conclusions about the partners’ leadership in establishing what we shall call the *conceptual pillars* of the global governance framework. This thesis makes no attempt at offering a comprehensive overview of each conference’s overall agenda.

As regards *process*, our objective limits itself to ascertain, through the provision of conclusive evidence, the advent of an operational new global partnerships’ regime by the end of the revolution. This thesis leaves aside the analysis of intergovernmental negotiations as evolving independently from the partners’ influence. It also does not address how ideological opposition to the partners’ agendas manifested itself during the revolution. Again, this thesis finds its analysis on what the conferences’ final reports contained.

Framework

This thesis limits itself to analyzing the *framework* of the new politics both as content and as process. It is therefore necessary to clarify what we mean by “framework”.

A framework is a fundamental conceptual, ethical or practical structure that provides a perspective, a way of looking at reality. Vice versa, a framework’s particular perspective ensures this framework’s structural, conceptual, ideological, ethical, operational... coherence. Common to all elements within the framework, the perspective becomes normative for all of these elements and interlinks them amongst themselves. Once entered, a framework becomes constraining. Elements that do not adhere to the framework’s normative perspective are *out*.

The word “framework” was absent from the UN Charter. It was not the intent of the UN founding members, respectful of national sovereignty, to *frame* international cooperation. It was however the intent of the global governance revolutionary agents to do exactly that. During the Cold War, the concept started appearing in the documents, in all the conferences’ reports since the 1972 Stockholm environmental conference³⁸⁹ and more frequently in the reports of the independent commissions since the 1980 *World Conservation Strategy*³⁹⁰. The post-Cold War “consensus” on sustainable development was conceived as a global framework for the 21st century, indicating global governance’s paradoxical will to *enforce* an agenda that was essentially *soft* in nature. The framework moved forward, retained its integrity and has remained standing up to this day.

Since the early 1970s, the partners have wanted to *frame* international cooperation within a particular perspective differing from that of the Charter and the UDHR and limiting UN member states’ exercise of their sovereignty. Establishing a framework is a political act, an act of government. Those who conceived, built and watched over the integrity of the conceptual, political and ethical structure of global governance all along are the real decision-makers, even if they are not formally endowed with political legitimacy, as are governments.

New paradigms and paradigm shifts

Although they did not make it in the documents that this thesis studies, *new paradigms* and *paradigm shifts* were phrases that were in common currency at the UN during the 1990s³⁹¹, illustrating the wind of change blowing over the organization at the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War conferences operated a series of interconnected *paradigm shifts* - from the semantic, conceptual, anthropological and ideological framework of international cooperation as defined by the UN Charter and the UDHR to a completely different and global agenda³⁹². This series of interconnected paradigm shifts makes up the global governance revolution.

The word paradigm is semantically akin to “framework” and has a normative character. In 1962, Thomas Kuhn had defined it as “a framework for understanding something, a worldview”³⁹³. Joel Barker later defined *paradigm* as “a set of rules that define limits, and establish what’s necessary to be successful within those limits”³⁹⁴. Hence a paradigm is a pattern of thinking, feeling, doing; it is a fixed, rigid, deeply rooted norm. A *paradigm shift* is a change from one way of looking at reality to an altogether different perspective³⁹⁵. It is a *revolution* implying profound and irreversible changes.

³⁸⁹ The 1972 Stockholm *Action Plan for the Human Environment* refers to a “framework for environmental action” (Part 1, chapter 2 A).

³⁹⁰ During the Cold War, the concept of “framework” appeared more frequently in the reports of the independent commissions: *World Conservation Strategy* (8), *North-South: A Program for Survival* (32), *Our Common Future* (31). For instance, in the latter report: “The concept of sustainable development provides a framework for the integration of environment policies and development strategies” (Part I, II, par. 48). After 1989, the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit is the only conference that did not use the word.

³⁹¹ For example, WHO’s new health paradigm introduced in the early 1990s. See Nakajima, Hiroshi. *A message from WHO: towards building a new health paradigm in the 21st century*. PMID: 1407829. DOI: 10.1177/026010609200800302. <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1407829/> (retrieved June 25, 2021).

³⁹² See Appendix D on the paradigm shifts achieved by the global governance revolution.

³⁹³ Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. University of Chicago Press. 1962.

³⁹⁴ Barker, Joel. *Discovering the Future: the Business of Paradigms*. ILI Press. 1985.

³⁹⁵ The Copernican revolution, for example, was a paradigm shift from the Ptolemaic model according to which the Earth, stationary, was at the center of the universe to an heliocentric model placing the sun at this center. Or Einstein’s curved space-time radically shifted Newton’s paradigm (force of gravity in a flat, infinite universe).

*System and linkages*³⁹⁶

Frameworks and paradigms closely relate to *systems*. A system is “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole”³⁹⁷. Systems are in a *holistic* dynamic.

A defining feature of the post-Cold War global framework as a whole, and of each of its constitutive paradigms individually, was to be *holistic*. The second wave conferences constructed sustainable development as a *whole* – as a *system* - made up of a set of integrated, interacting and interdependent new paradigms, values (new global ethics) and practices (new politics) constituting a particular perspective. This particular way of viewing reality was that of the agenda-setting partners, who exercised gravitational force over the system and bound its components together. Opponents to the system, who threatened its performance and dynamism, were expelled out of it. The global framework became an instrument of empowerment for those adhering to its perspective, for the partners who became agents of global social transformation³⁹⁸.

Global governance’s system was woven by way of *linkages*. This thesis has begun to, and will continue to focus on the *chief linkages* the partners successfully forged between their special interests and the various intergovernmental agendas of international cooperation. Chapter five, recalling and further identifying the ideological identity of those partners most dynamically engaged in global governance’s linkages process, will analyze the nexus between ideology and system-building. It will study the extent to which the partners’ ideological drive played a binding role in the system’s weaving process. This will help determine the entire global governance system’s ideological load.

The framework’s pillars

This thesis does not ambition to address global governance’s entire agenda, all of its framework’s constitutive paradigms. It focusses exclusively on the set of conceptual *pillars* on which the structure has been established during the first two stages of the revolutionary process.

What we mean by *pillars* are the partners’ main conceptual and political achievements, what they managed to patiently and laboriously interweave in the system, as concretely revealed in the conferences’ outcome documents. The pillars semantically, conceptually, ideologically differ from the mandate the UN Charter gave member states. Global governance’s framework rests on pillars pertaining to environmentalism, population control and feminism, the three domains the partners had trailblazed since the revolution’s seminal stage. The pillars have uninterruptedly kept the framework standing since they first appeared - some of them at the seminal stage of the global governance process, others only at the revolutionary stage *per se*. An indication of what has been a pillar is whether a concept present since the early or revolutionary stages of the global governance process made it in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which represent the

³⁹⁶ Incidentally, we find interesting that the conceptualizer of governance, hence indirectly of global governance, started working on what he called *linkage politics* already in the late 1960s. See Rosenau, James N., Ed. *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. The Free Press. New York. 1969.

³⁹⁷ [System | Definition of System by Merriam-Webster](#). The notion of *system* – may imply the *influence of related forces* (as in a gravitational system), a tendency to attain *equilibrium* among the components, the exercise of *vital functions* (as in the respiratory system).

³⁹⁸ In *The Constitution of Society* (1984), Anthony Giddens defined *systems* as “the situated activities of human agents” and the “patterning of social relations across space-time”. In the same book he described *structures* as “systems of generative rules and sets, implicated in the articulation of social systems” and in *Politics, Sociology and Social Theory* (1995), as “sets of rules and resources that individual actors draw upon in the practices that reproduce social systems”. Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society*. University of California Press. 1984. And Giddens, Anthony. *Politics, Sociology and Social Theory*. Stanford University Press. 1995.

UN's "global development framework" until 2030 (and previously in the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs).

The main pillars have been: sustainable development; climate change mitigation; family planning/sexual and reproductive health/reproductive rights; freedom to choose; demographic control/population stabilization; women's rights; women's empowerment; the gender equality perspective; children's rights; the rights approach; education/health/quality of life/food security... *for all* (equity); partnerships with non-governmental actors; mechanisms; holism; development "with a human face" or "people-centered" development; global ethic; new global social contract; global governance; global citizens/people; global democracy; "Sacred Earth" spirituality³⁹⁹. Some of these pillars only appeared in the reports of the independent commissions. For their revolutionary character to be adequately understood, one must analyze their conceptualizers' perspective, intent and interpretation.

The partners' gains

The pillars, erected by the partners, correspond to what have been their major "gains". A *gain*, a word used by the partners themselves⁴⁰⁰, meant for them a victory towards the achievement of their special interests over UN member states or over any ideological opponent to their agenda. The word betrays the essentially ideological nature of the battle that the global governance process represented. To the extent the partners' paradigms were ideologically loaded, they were divisive. Their adoption in the "consensus documents" was often a matter of contention during the conferences' intergovernmental negotiations. They became "gains" for the partners when, as a result of a political combat, they became the object of an intergovernmental consensus. They then entered the framework of international cooperation for the 21st century. Besides having remained standing pillars of global governance's conceptual framework, the partners' gains often became the driving priorities of global governance and the binding components of its systemic agenda. The partners have watched over the transmission of their gains each step of the way. This thesis limits itself to tracking the transmission chain of the partners' "gains": this is another one of its boundaries.

Sealed consensus or framework

By nature a framework, once constituted, is a *sealed* system, in the sense that the elements that do not adhere to its normative perspective, as already stated, are *out*. Its constitutive pillars fully established by 1996, the global governance framework has been *sealed* ever since.

By "sealed", we do not mean that no new paradigm integrated the framework after 1996⁴⁰¹. We rather signify that the systemic logic binding its paradigms tightly together closed the framework to diverging political or ideological viewpoints. The integration of new components in the framework happened only provided that these components aligned themselves along its conceptual, ethical, strategic, ideological perspective. After 1996, no reopening of the alleged

³⁹⁹ As we shall see, Maurice Strong's wife belonged to a group called Wisdom Keepers, which produced the *Rio Declaration of the Sacred Earth Gathering*.

⁴⁰⁰ The word was particularly prevalent in the language of feminist activists. See for example Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 170: "... many of the gains by women that appear in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action had been agreed".

⁴⁰¹ While global governance's production of new paradigms considerably slowed down after Istanbul, it did not completely stop. Normative framework, cultural diversity, cultural liberty, responsibility to protect, human security, comprehensive sexuality education, country ownership, data revolution, alliance of civilizations, cultural sensitivity, multi-stakeholder (consensus, approach, partnerships...) are examples of paradigms that name conceptual processes born before 1996 and penetrated the framework after 1996. They would thereby immediately and unequivocally be linked to global governance's existing paradigms.

“consensus” efficiently took place⁴⁰², no discarding of any of its conceptual pillars (sustainability, climate change, reproductive health, gender, partnerships...), no dismantling of the global governance mechanisms, no revisiting of its underpinning global ethic. On the contrary, the framework kept on being consolidated and was integrally transmitted up to the SDGs.

Post-1996 mounting ideological opposition to the “global consensus”, either as a whole or in some of its components, did not prove powerful, strategically astute or efficient enough to challenge and “reopen” the “consensus”, which has remained “closed” or sealed” since the end of the revolution. On the contrary, history reveals that since 1996, the ideological agenda inherent in some of the framework’s pillars has jumped forward and hardened. The most eloquent example is probably the mutation of the gender equality paradigm from the feminist agenda to the LGBTQI etc. agenda, and how gender mainstreaming has pursued and deepened its invasion of all institutions, including traditionally more conservative ones such as NATO.

Obviously, a framework can be deconstructed or abandoned over time if the balance of power between its genuine builders and defenders and its opponents or those uninterested in its perspective tilts in disfavor of the latter⁴⁰³. Even the anti-globalist Trump administration, however, coexisted *in parallel* with global governance’s standing framework and did not manage, nor did it even attempt, to unseal it, dismantle it, break it and overthrow it, to conceptually uproot its pillars, to reopen the “consensus” which has kept on pursuing its implementation course globally, and to change the language of international cooperation⁴⁰⁴.

The framework’s unbroken transmission chain

A remarkable feature of global governance is how its initial semantic, conceptual, ethical, strategic and ideological framework has remained standing in its integrality up to this day. In an unbroken continuum, the framework was consistently carried forward from the Cold War independent reports and commissions and the first wave conferences to the second wave, to the post-revolution reform of the UN system under Kofi Annan, to the MDGs and ultimately to the SDGs⁴⁰⁵. The revolution’s implementation phase consolidated the framework by spreading its perspective globally and rooting it locally. This thesis would be without relevance if the processes it studies had stopped governing us today. The framework’s endurance relates to the power the partners managed to maintain over the mechanisms of global governance all along.

⁴⁰² Even if opposition manifested itself and got more organized, especially against the revolutionary anthropological agendas.

⁴⁰³ In *New Rules* (1976), Anthony Giddens highlighted that structures (frameworks) should not be viewed as “simply placing constraints upon human agency, but as enabling”. In his view, structures, stable in general, can be changed, “especially through the unintended consequences of action when people start to ignore them, replace them, or reproduce them differently”. Giddens, Anthony. *New Rules*. Hutchinson. London. 1976.

⁴⁰⁴ Defunding abortion programmes, pulling out of UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO... does not break the “framework”. It creates obstacles and weakens these agendas for a while, until there is a shift to a favorable administration. It encourages the partners to strengthen their independent networks.

⁴⁰⁵ Examples of language in the SDGs coming from the global governance process are: blueprint, sustainable, for all, global challenges, climate change, centrality of environmental concerns in international cooperation, basic needs, ethics of equity, inclusion, equality, non-discrimination, participation of all, gender sensitivity, people-centeredness, biodiversity, food security, indicators, sexual and reproductive health-care services, family planning, quality education, quality of life, equal access, education for sustainable development, sustainable lifestyles, global citizenship, cultural diversity, all forms of discrimination against all women and girls, all forms of violence against all women and girls, harmful practices, universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, empower, inclusion of all, mitigation and adaptation, green jobs, sustainable consumption and production, sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature, sustainable patterns of consumption and production, ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels, broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance, capacity-building.

New politics

This thesis uses the term *new politics* as an alternative to *global governance*, to *partnerships' politics*, to *new global partnership* or to *new world order*. Likewise *sustainable development* will henceforth stand for the entire global agenda as elaborated by the end of the revolution, as holistically integrating all the agendas, goals, platform, paradigms of the entire UN conference process. Alternatively, this thesis uses the expressions *global agenda*, *global goals*, *global platform* to signify the content of the new politics.

3.2. Trigger for the revolution: the dominant interpretation made of the 1989 historical conjuncture

The events of 1989 provided a historic opportunity for the UN's revitalization or reform after the institutional stalemate in which the four and a half Cold War decades had maintained the organization almost since its foundation. The dominant interpretation then made of these events – that of the *end of history* and *end of ideology* combined discourse – served as trigger for the revolution's outbreak. This interpretation later proved to have been flawed⁴⁰⁶.

3.2.1. Commonalities of two short-lived hours of hope (1945 and 1989): founding and “re-founding” the UN

Remarkable are the similarities between 1945 and the end of the 1980s. Both were historic hours of hope for humanity. Peace, security, international stability, authentic human development, respect for the dignity of the human person seemed within reach following the apparent resolution of two world conflicts. Both were marked by a prominent Soviet involvement in multilateralism, and a US-Soviet cooperation. Founded in 1945 to help stabilize international relations, ensure international security and establish peace, the UN was “re-founded” in the early 1990s to implement a new vision, that of the independent commissions of the 1980s in favor of an enlarged and redefined security concept.

Short-lived hours of hope, that accomplished much for the UN

Both these hours of hope, however, proved to be short-lived⁴⁰⁷. The Cold War immediately followed the first. As Samuel Huntington and others pointed out, much of the optimism of the 1989 era quickly got lost with the Bosnian war (1992-95), a concatenation of national internal conflicts and signs of decay, and geopolitical instability.

As *Our Global Neighborhood* put it,

⁴⁰⁶ The American political scientist and political economist Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952-) developed his *end of history* thesis, initially in an essay published a few months before the November 1989 events (*The End of History?* The National Interest. No. 16. Summer 1989) and then in his 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man* book. In these publications, Fukuyama argued that the global spread of Western liberal democracy and capitalism signaled the horizon of humanity's social, cultural and political evolution. He later revisited his theory, recognizing how identity groups threatened liberalism.

⁴⁰⁷ Samuel Huntington was a critic of “the new world order” and of Fukuyama’s “end of history” theory. In his 1997 best-seller *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, he observed that that disillusionment quickly followed the short-lived end of the Cold War euphoria moment. Multiple ethnic conflicts, the breakdown of law and order, China's rise on the world scene, neo-communism and neo-fascism, the UN's inability and that of the US to put an end to bloody local conflicts, genocides quickly imposed themselves at the end of the Cold War. According to Huntington, history had not ended. The clash of civilizations would be its next stage. 9/11 in 2001 would corroborate his thesis.

“When the cold war ended in 1989, it appeared reasonable to contemplate a serious, new look at prospects for demilitarizing international relations. Cold war rivalry ... was over, and it seemed that a new era of global harmony might be possible. That moment of euphoria was short-lived, however. Although the tide of democracy was rising, it could not stem the subsequent outbreak of a host of cruel and devastating civil conflicts. In 1991 and 1992, eleven major wars broke out and the human death toll in all twenty-nine of the ongoing wars reached 6 million, according to Ruth Leger Sivard”⁴⁰⁸.

No matter how brief the 1945 and 1989 “Messianic moments” ended up being, both did accomplish much for the UN. Born at the first, with the adoption of its Charter, the UN started being reborn at the second, not through a Security Council reform which never took place, but through its second wave conferences. No sooner did the Berlin fall on November 9, 1989 than the UN started convening its second wave of major conferences to define the contours of 21st century multilateralism and the vision supposed to revitalize the ailing body.

Ambivalent hours marked by unhealthy US-USSR cooperation

Both 1945 and 1989 were also hours marked by an unhealthy cooperation between two leading founders of the UN, the US and the USSR, by a dangerous ambivalence. In 1989, both leaders of the superpowers, Georges H. W. Bush and Michael Gorbachev, each in their own way and from their own perspective, whether liberal or Marxist, wanted some kind of UN revitalization. Bush proposed to at last “fulfill the historic vision”⁴⁰⁹ of the UN founders, a vision which he interpreted from his liberal democratic perspective (that of Fukuyama’s end of history). At the very time the East-West confrontation was reaching its end, Gorbachev operated a historic reentry of the Soviet Union into multilateralism, pursuing a different, globalist and neo-Marxist, vision. As seen in chapter two, in friendly and collaborative terms with UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar and Maurice Strong, Gorbachev enthusiastically supported UN strengthening and wholeheartedly identified with the vision that the commission headed by the socialist Gro Harlem Brundtland had just elaborated in *Our Common Future*. “Providential” man who surfed on the internal decay of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian regime to reform the regime, Gorbachev also became a “providential” man who weighed in on the UN’s rebirth, favoring its transition to global governance.

The Soviet presence at two lynchpin moments in the history of the UN bore consequences on the ideological direction the international body had taken since its foundation⁴¹⁰. In the 1980s Gorbachev remained a convinced believer in Marxism-Leninism and an atheistic materialist⁴¹¹. As an analyst opined, the internal changes he then proposed in favor of “democracy”, “freedom” and “human rights” were “expressed wholly within the terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology”⁴¹².

⁴⁰⁸ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 122.

⁴⁰⁹ President George H. W. Bush. *Address before a joint session of Congress on the end of the Gulf War*. March 6, 1991.

<http://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-6-1991-address-joint-session-congress-end-gulf-war> (retrieved February 3, 2022).

⁴¹⁰ A consistent socialist and collectivistic stance has been permeating the policies of UN agencies, in particular those of the ILO, UNCTAD, WHO and UNESCO. American neo-conservatives have contended that global governance has produced a softer version of the ideology that had produced Leninism, and that global governance succeeded the Soviet Union in balancing US power in the world. In effect, the pro-global governance stance of a number of Western European countries has been motivated by anti-Americanism.

⁴¹¹ There is only one step from Marxism-Leninism to social democracy. Gorbachev gradually veered towards social democracy in the early 1990s and founded Russia’s social democratic party in 2001. In 2007, he founded the *Union of Social Democrats*. He was critical of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/570929> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

⁴¹² Gooding, John. *Gorbachev and Democracy*. Soviet Studies. 42 (2), pp. 195-231, p. 197.

Gorbachev himself reckoned this⁴¹³. His vision for global governance and its environmental agenda was no less imbued by Marxist collectivism, while Bush's vision for a new world order was pregnant with Western liberalism. 1989, "the end of the Cold War", did not resolve the antagonism.

The Soviet leader's vision for a new world order and that underpinning nascent global governance's sustainable development agenda strikingly converged. The socialist origins of the global governance revolutionary process explain this convergence. Both in Gorbachev's reasoning and in that of the leading agents of sustainable development active at the UN during the Cold War, a logical nexus appeared between Marxist ideology, sustainable development, the "end of ideology" proclamation, the construction of a globally normative consensus or "framework", the rebirth of the UN as global governance. Both promoted a new paradigm that would be at once "people-centered" and "planet-centered" - although Gorbachev formulated these ideas a bit differently⁴¹⁴. The UN-Gorbachev view of a "new world order" was dominant at the end of the 1980s. The West, the US in particular, then failed to provide a vision for the new era other than the globalization of its own "model". It allowed those who did have a vision to move forward unhindered by opposition, at least for a while. In his December 7, 1988 speech to the UN, Gorbachev took moral leadership and filled the vacuum.

President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), cautious and reactive, was repeatedly and widely criticized for lacking vision at the end of the Cold War. The American President himself started using Brandt's and Gorbachev's "new world order" phrase in 1990, in the context of the Gulf War⁴¹⁵, marked by a historic collaboration between the US and the USSR. Three speeches are worth mentioning. The first was Bush's famous *Toward a New World Order* speech to a joint

⁴¹³ Gorbachev affirmed: "According to Lenin, socialism and democracy are indivisible... The essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice. We want more socialism and, therefore, more democracy." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/679770> (retrieved February 2, 2022). Gorbachev is also quoted as having said: "I'm still committed to the socialist idea because the socialist idea, correctly understood, includes the principles of freedom and social justice. It also includes the recognition of the value of democracy. When we speak about social justice, it means that freedom should be used not only in the interest of profit but also in the interest of the advancement of the people who create all values." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1499985> (retrieved February 2, 2022). And: "New approaches are needed, new orientations in both thought and action. We must make the transition to a new civilization...We are talking of a transition toward a new civilization. No one knows what it will be like. What is important is to orient in that direction... I am convinced that a new civilization will inevitably take on certain features that are characteristic of, or inherent in, the socialist ideal." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/577020> (retrieved February 2, 2022). In his UN speech he used the hybrid phrase "Soviet democracy" and promoted human rights. He said: "I should like to add the voice of my country to join in the high assessments of the significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 40 years ago, on 10th December 1948. That document is still topical today. It also reflected the universal nature of the aims and tasks of the UN. The most suitable way for a state to mark the anniversary of the declaration is to improve its own conditions at home for the observance and defense of the rights of citizens." And He recognized: "I say again that I am an atheist. I do not believe in God." <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1463100> (retrieved February 2, 2022).

⁴¹⁴ Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the United Nations*, op. cit.: "In the light of the present realities there can be no genuine progress either by infringing the rights and liberties of man and peoples, or at the expense of nature." Elsewhere Gorbachev reckoned: "To me, nature is sacred. Trees are my temples and forests are my cathedrals." https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/138353.Mikhail_Gorbachev

Gorbachev presented "people-centeredness" as follows: "the democratization of international relations is not only the maximum internationalization of the solution of problems by all members of the world community, it is also a humanization of those relations. International links will fully reflect the real interests of the peoples and reliably serve the cause of their common security only when at the centre of everything there is the human being, his concerns, rights and liberties." Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the United Nations*, op. cit.

⁴¹⁵ On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the Helsinki Summit on September 9, 1990, Bush and Gorbachev jointly resolved to collaborate in opposing Iraq's aggression.

session of the US Congress on September 11, 1990. He then stated: “Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun... We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders”⁴¹⁶. Three weeks later on October 1st, 1990, Bush addressed the UN and asserted that the Soviet agreement to condemn the aggression of Iraq put an undisputable end to the Cold War⁴¹⁷. He proclaimed:

“We are hopeful that the machinery of the United Nations will no longer be frozen by the divisions that plagued us during the Cold War, that at last - long last - we can build new bridges and tear down old walls, that at long last we will be able to build a new world based on an event for which we have all hoped: an end to the Cold War.”

Bush’s third speech took place following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On March 6, 1991 Bush addressed the US Congress and evoked the “unprecedented international cooperation and diplomacy” that had marked the operation “Desert Storm”. He announced the coming into view of a new world order, quoting Winston Churchill’s “world order in which the principles of justice and fair-play protect the weak against the strong”. He called for a “world where the UN freed from Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders”, “a world in which freedom and respect for human rights finds a home in all nations.”

Commitment to US leadership in the world and pursuit of US national interests on the one hand, and on the other, international cooperation (with security as its priority, as was the original intention of President Roosevelt), a rebirth of the UN, made possible by what the American President viewed as a new US-Soviet Union partnership, characterized Bush’s *new world order*. As for him, Gorbachev supported the partners’ globalist and holistic vision for UN rebirth elaborated in the shade of the Cold War, with socioeconomic and environmental concerns as the new priority.

3.2.2. Choices confronting sovereign governments at the end of the Cold War⁴¹⁸: what shape was international cooperation to take?

The precipitate decline of the Soviet Union happened against the backdrop of an unprecedented acceleration of economic globalization. It put multilateralism at a critical juncture. How would international cooperation respond to the Kairos?

UN-centered, multipolar or unipolar new world order?

After November 9, 1989 and in the early 1990s, the basic choice governments had to make, and then was the object of much scholarly and political debate, was between a UN-centered post-Cold

⁴¹⁶ Bush described his new world order as follows: “A new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and West, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony... A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.” President Bush. *Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit*. September 11, 1990. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217> (retrieved January 3, 2022).

⁴¹⁷ “And when the Soviet Union agreed with so many of us here in the United Nations to condemn the aggression of Iraq, there could be no doubt - no doubt then - that we had, indeed, put four decades of history behind us.” President George H. W. Bush. *Address to the United Nations General Assembly*. October 1, 1990. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207268.htm> (retrieved January 3, 2022).

⁴¹⁸ Many view the Malta Summit (December 2-3, 1989) that took place between George Bush and Gorbachev just after the fall of the Berlin wall as the official end of the Cold War.

War “new world order” and alternatives to this option. One of them, superpower cooperation (US-USSR) and leadership, did not survive the immediate post-Cold War moment and the implosion of the USSR. Other alternatives included a multipolar world, US leadership in a multipolar world, and a unipolar world⁴¹⁹ understood as *Pax Americana*⁴²⁰. As history later demonstrated, there has been no clear-cut choice among these diverse, evolving and contradictory world visions, which have often pragmatically coexisted.

A critical mass of influential leaders, governments, non-state actors and the UN itself favored UN-centeredness and therefore UN reform and strengthening. As Thomas Weiss expressed it, “In the wake of the Cold War, many citizens and diplomats expressed optimism about the role of UN multilateralism in a ‘new world order’”⁴²¹. The generally pro-Gorbachev Western Europe saw UN strengthening as an antidote to American unipolar leadership in the new era.

UN “quasi-global” membership and alleged “universal moral authority”

The UN considered itself best-positioned to respond to the challenges of globalization for two main reasons. First, it had itself grown, by the end of the Cold War, into an almost “global” organization in terms of membership⁴²². The decolonization process, started in the 1960s⁴²³, was followed by the independence of former Soviet Republics and satellite states after the fall of the Berlin wall. As a result of these two successive developments, UN membership had almost quadrupled since the organization’s foundation⁴²⁴: it jumped from 51 in 1945 to 184 in 1993.

Secondly, the UN presented itself as the only institution capable of making globalization human, ethical and sustainable, claiming that it had received an ethical mandate and enjoyed universal

⁴¹⁹ In 1990, Charles Krauthammer authored *The Unipolar Moment*, an article in which he affirmed that “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is an unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies”. Krauthammer, Charles. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 70, No. 1, America and the World 1990/91, pp. 23-33, p. 23.

⁴²⁰ *Pax Americana* would universally implement the end of history theory. It implied leadership by US and allies, open markets, multilateral institutions, military preponderance of the US, liberal democracy (multi-party system, political freedoms, separation of powers into different branches of government, constitution that enshrines the social contract freedom, rule of law, human rights, democratic representation, elections, civil liberties - freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to security and liberty, the right to privacy, the right to equal treatment under the law and due process, the right to a fair trial, the right to life, the right to own property, the right to defend oneself, and the right to bodily integrity).

⁴²¹ Weiss, Thomas G. et al. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴²² In his promotion of global governance, Otfried Höffe pointed out in 2001 “the universal membership of the United Nations: now even both Koreas are members and only Switzerland and micro-states such as Kiribati, San Marino, and Monaco are still missing”. Höffe, Otfried. *A subsidiary and federal world republic: Thoughts on democracy in the age of globalization*. In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, op. cit., p. 200.

⁴²³ According to P. Willetts, the political balance of the UN, which had been under Western dominance since the beginning of the Cold War, then started shifting: “The Soviet Union made a determined effort to reinstate the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). With the more radical of the Afro-Asians supporting the argument that Western Cold War prejudices had distorted the universality of the UN, ECOSOC in June 1967 placed WIDF and IADL in Category B”. Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴²⁴ See the historical growth of UN membership at <https://www.un.org/en/sections/Member%20states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html> (retrieved March 26, 2020). At the founding of the UN, there were 51 members. By 1990 (after three decades of decolonization), 166 members. By 1993, 184 (after the entry of former communist countries - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). And by 2011, 193 (after the entry of last country, South Sudan).

moral authority. The UN drew its “moral authority” from the UDHR, itself founded in substantial ways on the biblical notion of universality⁴²⁵.

There was a great deal of fideism about the UN⁴²⁶. UN member states had not monitored the internationalist/globalist new left’s Cold War preparations for their version of a new world order. The UN offered to become the necessary ethical counterweight to the global economic power of the market which, by 1989, had increased exponentially, while the power of nation-states seemed to be on the wane. The UN sought to increase its alleged global normative power and thereby to position itself at the strategic center of global governance⁴²⁷.

“Experts’” recommendations for veering towards global governance

In the immediate aftermath of the Berlin wall fall, the authors of *Common Responsibility in the 1990s* explicitly recommended that the UN veer towards global governance, naming the new and global political system as such for the first time. Influential socialists or left-leaners counted among the leading architects of the global governance version of a new world order in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The Cold War global governance process, in which “experts” and non-governmental actors had taken the lead in setting the UN’s long-term agendas for socioeconomic, demographic and environmental cooperation, was well entrenched by 1989. It was already clear that global governance would be a political system under their primary control, not that of sovereign governments. Subsequent chapters will explore the extent to which the intergovernmental process would, in the 1990s, walk the globalist trail blazed by the independent reports of the 1970s, 80s and early 1990s. The UN had started presenting an ever-increasing number of issues, no longer as “international”, but as “global”.

International cooperation (respectful of national sovereignty) or global governance?

In 1989, even those consciously or unconsciously ruling out globalism and global governance, as assumed to be the case of the US under the Republican presidency of George H. W. Bush, generally agreed on the necessity for some level of renewed international cooperation and UN reform. Governments however may not have been fully aware of the choice they were then confronting between an international cooperation respectful of individual nations and globalism. What shape was UN revival to take?

Given the partners’ dramatic lead in setting the sustainable development/global governance “framework” during the Cold War, there would have been a need for the sovereign governments making up UN member states to firmly reestablish the post-Cold War UN on its juridical, intergovernmental, foundations. Traveling the global governance route was not a fatality. In 1989, the real alternative was that UN member states reclaim control of the UN from the “partners” and reposition themselves at the helm of the organization.

⁴²⁵ The Western cultural revolution and related secularization had however put the concept of universality in a profound crisis by 1989. A decision had to be made on whether the concept was still useable in the era of multiculturalism and globalization, or whether a “new global ethics” was needed.

⁴²⁶ And there still is overwhelming naïve trust in the organization, in spite of all its failures at fulfilling its peace mandate, and in spite of its practical transformation into global governance’s hub and its global diffusion of destructive anthropological agendas.

⁴²⁷ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *The globalization of the Western cultural revolution*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2012, pp. 21-22.

In practice, the states most cherishing their sovereignty, not least the United States under the Republican Reagan (1981-89) and Bush (1989-93) administrations tended to disregard, fail to discern or drastically underestimate the advancement of global governance processes by 1989, the power the partners already wielded within the nascent system, and their further power-grab intent. They behaved as if they were unaware of the existence a “framework”, of the history of how, and by whom, this framework had been constructed over the two decades preceding the fall of the Berlin wall, of the challenges the framework potentially presented to their sovereignty. This explains UN member states’ passivity at a crucial hour: they made no effort at independently examining “the framework”, restoring real intergovernmental leadership, submitting the new paradigms to a national examination in every UN member states, and re-introducing pluralism in the intergovernmental debate over the vision needed for the new era. Their lack of political will to do this gave the partners a free rein to maintain their lead, grab power and launch the revolution.

Consciously or not, willingly or not, UN member states allowed the global governance revolution to break out after 1989, consenting to multilateral decision-making becoming a “multi-stakeholder” affair at the service of “global” agendas. This choice pitted globalization against the nations making up UN member states. Writing in 1997 - that is, just after the revolution had achieved its chief objectives -, the American scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter (an influential supporter of the global governance version of the new world order) produced an analysis calling Bush’s restoration of the post-World War II order a “chimera [...] infeasible at best and dangerous at worst”⁴²⁸. In her view, the new order was not a liberal institutionalist one, but one in which state authority disaggregated and decentralized in the face of globalization.

3.2.3. How the combined “ends” of history and ideology discourse and the “global state of consensus” rationale facilitated “the partners” power-grab

Let us now explore in which ways the 1989 events triggered the revolution’s outbreak.

In 1989, the Western modern model – democracy, “universal values” (liberty, equality, human rights...), free-market economic system, social contract, participation in free and fair elections, majority vote, multi-party system, representation, independent judiciary, rule of law, civil liberties, the nation-state... - seemed to have won the day and become humanity’s end horizon. In the apparent, and short-lived, absence of an “enemy”, it was then believed to be, in the phrase of Francis Fukuyama which travelled the world over, the *end of history*⁴²⁹. Western leaders,

⁴²⁸ The full quote reads: “Many thought that the new world order proclaimed by George Bush was the promise of 1945 fulfilled, a world in which international institutions, led by the United Nations, guaranteed international peace and security with the active support of the world’s major powers. That world order is a chimera. Even as a liberal internationalist ideal, it is infeasible at best and dangerous at worst. It requires a centralized rule making authority, a hierarchy of institutions, and universal membership. Equally to the point, efforts to create such an order have failed. The United Nations cannot function effectively independent of the major powers that compose it, nor will those nations cede their power and sovereignty to an international institution. Efforts to expand supranational authority, whether by the U.N. secretary-general’s office, the European Commission, or the World Trade Organization (WTO), have consistently produced a backlash among member states. The leading alternative to liberal internationalism is ‘the new medievalism,’ a back-to-the-future model of the 21st century. Where liberal internationalists see a need for international rules and institutions to solve states’ problems, the new medievalists proclaim the end of the nation-state. Less hyperbolically, in her article, ‘Power Shift,’ in the January/February 1997 Foreign Affairs, Jessica T. Mathews describes a shift away from the state - up, down, and sideways - to supra-state, sub-state, and, above all, nonstate actors. These new players have multiple allegiances and global reach.” Slaughter, Anne-Marie. *The real new world order*. Foreign Affairs. Sept/Oct 1997. Vol. 76. Issue 5. New-York, pp. 183-197, p. 183.

⁴²⁹ In *Why Liberalism Failed*, Patrick Deneen contended: “Liberalism’s victory was declared to be unqualified and complete in 1989 in the seminal article ‘The End of History’ by Francis Fukuyama, written following the collapse of the last competing ideological opponent. Fukuyama held that liberalism had proved itself the sole legitimate regime

whether conservative, leftist or centrist⁴³⁰, were confident in the definitive triumph of their own model. They seemed to have no other vision for the new era than the plain maintenance and incremental global spread of modern democracy.

Correlated to the “end of history” thesis was that of the “end of ideology/ies” after the collapse of Marxism-Leninism. This widespread proclamation rested on the assumption that Western societies at the end of the Cold War, and the basic tenets of Western liberal democracy itself, were free of ideology. The absence of bipolar ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism would henceforth have placed the world in a “state of consensus”⁴³¹. As history had “ended”, so went the rationale, the state of consensus was there to stay. What is more, it was necessarily “global”⁴³², and all the more so in an era of accelerating economic globalization.

The two components of the proclaimed state of consensus

The content of the proclaimed state of consensus had two basic components. The first was the victory of the “Western model” we just evoked. The second was the agreement, which seemed to flow naturally out of the end of the Cold War, to shift the priorities and focus of international cooperation away from the hard security imperative - the containment of a nuclear war having supposedly lost its *raison d'être* - towards soft socioeconomic, demographic, environmental, humanitarian and human rights issues: the very areas in which “the partners” had developed a programmatic vision and had in that sense a definite lead over nations and UN member states⁴³³. The consensus *Zeitgeist* provided a historic opportunity for the partners and “global experts” to present their own platform as globally consensual and to grab power.

Within the “global consensus” proclaimed to exist on both these components, however, radically differing interpretations in fact coexisted, rendering the content of the consensus highly ambivalent and dangerously unstable, if not nonexistent, from the onset.

on the basis that it had withstood all challengers and defeated all competitors and further, that it *worked* because it accorded with human nature. A wager that was some five centuries in the making, and had been first instantiated as a political experiment by the Founders of the American liberal republic exactly two hundred years before Fukuyama’s bold claim, had panned out with unprecedented clarity in the often muddled and contested realm of political philosophy and practice.” Deneen, Patrick J. *Why Liberalism Failed*. Yale University Press. 2018, p. 28.

⁴³⁰ European conservative politicians (Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher) and US Republicans (George Bush) lacked creative vision for the post-1989 world. Leftist European leaders such as François Mitterrand (1981-1995) had a pro-Gorbachev and pro-UN stance (See for instance Coume, Laurent. François Mitterrand et l’URSS. In Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps 2011/1-2 (N° 101-102), pp. 32-34). They also had a pro-democracy and pro-human rights discourse.

⁴³¹ Consensus being a word Gorbachev used in his 1988 UN speech. Sinnar Shirin in 1995 provided several reasons for the rising influence of NGOs following fall of Berlin wall, including the end of East-West rivalry: “First, the ebbing political and military rivalry between East and West allowed for international consensus to develop in favor of humanitarian action... Within the growing world-wide respect accorded them, NGOs could not be so easily ignored by countries with an eye to their international image... Secondly, diminishing superpower competition made Western donor governments less willing to offer aid to Third World countries as a means of exercising influence... A third reason for the ballooning influence of NGOs in the 1990s is the greater role they assumed in determining policy, both in Western capitals and in the United Nations. NGOs are gaining more authority in determining US foreign policy now that the demise of the Soviet threat has loosened the rigidity of power calculations.” Shirin, Sinnar. *Mixed Blessings: The Growing Influence of NGOs*. Harvard International Review. Vol. 18. Issue 1. 1995/1996, p. 55.

⁴³² The qualification “global” was abusive if only because not all the world’s countries were then UN member states.

⁴³³ Under the two Reagan-Bush administrations (1981-89), the US government was in the Cold War mindset, and the focus remained on hard security, even when that focus began meaning nuclear disarmament. The issues the UN was focusing on (the conference series that was being prepared) remained of minor or no relevance under the Bush-Quayle administration (1989-93).

Ambivalence of the consensus on the Western model

Let us consider the ambivalence within the consensus on the first component, the victory of the Western model. This model was then defended, not only from Fukuyama's liberal viewpoint, but from a (neo-)Marxist one as well. This coexistence created an ideological split within an artifice of consensus. Gorbachev, notably in his 1988 UN speech⁴³⁴, advocated democracy, freedom, human rights and a "de-ideologic of interstate relations". His position would reflect that of many ex-communists and socialists in Europe and elsewhere at the time.

Heirs to Marxism's original *internationalism*, socialists and eco-socialists as well as many American leftists, however, as opposed to liberal democrats attached to national sovereignty even while defending economic globalization, had by the end of the Cold War become *globalists*. The leftist global elite had developed, as seen, a globalist interpretation of "the Western model".

Liberal democrats, as for them, then failed to discern the cracks in their own system. The failure of liberalism has recently been the object of analysis. In his 2018 book *Why Liberalism Failed*, Patrick J. Deneen exposed liberalism's "increasingly systemic failure, due to the bankruptcy of its underlying political philosophy, of the political system we have largely taken for granted"⁴³⁵. He argued:

"Far from celebrating the utopic freedom at the 'end of history' that seemed within grasp when the last competing ideology fell in 1989, humanity comprehensively shaped by liberalism is today burdened by the miseries of its successes. It pervasively finds itself to be caught in a trap of its own making, entangled in the very apparatus that was supposed to grant pure and unmitigated freedom"⁴³⁶.

Deneen included among liberalism's "maladies" the

"corrosive social and civic effects of self-interest – a disease that arises from the cure of overcoming the ancient reliance upon virtue... Undermining any appeal to common good, it induces a zero-sum mentality that becomes nationalized polarization for a citizenry that is increasingly driven by private and largely material concerns"⁴³⁷.

Deneen furthermore contended that liberalism, a

"political philosophy that was launched to foster greater equity, defend a pluralist tapestry of different cultures and beliefs, protect human dignity, and, of course, expand liberty, in practice generates titanic inequality, enforces uniformity and homogeneity, fosters material and spiritual degradation, and undermines freedom"⁴³⁸.

Deneen denounced liberalism's *individualism*. The end of history proclamation took place not only at the end of the Cold War, but against the backdrop of the Western Freudo-Marxist cultural revolution, which itself had irremediably destabilized the Western model and had become a dynamic source of this model's ambivalent interpretations. The Western neo-Marxist cultural

⁴³⁴ Gorbachev affirmed: "Further world progress is possible now only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement towards a *new world order*."

⁴³⁵ Deneen, Patrick J. *Why Liberalism Failed*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴³⁶ Ib., p. 6.

⁴³⁷ Ib., p. 29.

⁴³⁸ Ib., p. 3.

revolution paradoxically originated in Western liberal individualism⁴³⁹ and its progressive rejection of the West's classical and Judeo-Christian civilization over the centuries. By disconnecting Western so-called "universal values" from the source of universality, from the freedom-truth, freedom-morality⁴⁴⁰, happiness-good, reason-reality moral nexuses, the Western cultural revolution had reduced Western "universal values" to practical empty shells.

The Western cultural revolution had had profound political consequences. As seen in chapter one, human dignity, liberty, equality, universal human rights, democracy became subject to interpretation according to individuals' *free choice*: a process of perpetual change deprived of clear, genuinely consensual content. The multiplicity of interpretations resulted in an unmanageable fragmentation of national social contracts. Dangerous cracks in the edifice started appearing. At the very time, in 1989, the West proclaimed the definitive and universal triumph of its own model, at the very time a majority of non-Western countries seemed to endorse this "model", this model's fundamental tenets were in an abyssal crisis. The West was drifting towards postmodernity and a post-truth⁴⁴¹ perspective, that is a perspective whereby Western societies were in practice no longer interested in the truth. In this light, the "end of history" was in reality the end of the Western modern political system, the universalization or globalization of a moribund model.

From what we just stated we can deduct that the 1989 proclaimed consensus on the modern "Western model" was in reality a consensus on what had become a postmodern *process of change*. This thesis debunks Fukuyama's end of history myth from an angle differing from that of Huntington: from the angle of the advances of postmodern deconstruction occurring *within* the Western model. We contend that defenders of liberal democracy such as Fukuyama had largely neglected discerning what the "Western model" had concretely become by 1989. Western leaders were blinded by complacency, incapacitated by their lack of self-criticism, their failure to discern the practical political effects of the cultural revolution by 1989. They consequently shunned their moral responsibility at a critical hour in human history. They left a leadership vacuum that the agents of the global governance revolution were all too eager to fill. The latter seized the Kairos, the short-lived end of history global consensus moment.

Ambivalence of the consensus on the new priorities for international cooperation

Building a "new global consensus for the 21st century" – a consensus on the priorities for post-Cold War international cooperation - became the UN's catchphrase no sooner did the Berlin wall fall. The organization embarked on this exercise without shilly-shallying: it started convening the second wave conferences precisely in 1989. In the absence of "enemies", there now seemed to exist a consensus on shifting the focus of international cooperation from "security, traditionally

⁴³⁹ Liberalism, argued Deneen, "conceived humans as rights-bearing individuals who could fashion and pursue for themselves their own version of the good life. Opportunities for liberty were best afforded by a limited government devoted to "securing rights", along with a free-market economic system that gave space for individual initiative and ambition. Political legitimacy was grounded on a shared belief in an originating "social contract" to which even newcomers could subscribe, ratified continuously by free and fair elections of responsive representatives." Ib., p. 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Didn't Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59) himself famously say: « La liberté n'existe pas sans morale, et la morale sans la foi » ? See <https://citation-celebre.leparisien.fr/auteur/alexis-de-tocqueville#:~:text=Alexis%20De%20Tocqueville%20Historien%2C%20Homme%20politique%2C%20Philosophie%2C%20Scientifique.droits%20il%20n%27y%20a%20pas%20de%20grand%20peuple>. (retrieved November 4, 2021).

⁴⁴¹ "Post-truth" was named the word of the year for 2016 by Oxford Dictionaries, which defined this adjective as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief." See <https://www.politico.eu/article/post-truth-enters-oxford-english-dictionary/> (retrieved May 3, 2022).

defined”, which “was supposed to be the primary task of the world organization”⁴⁴², to socioeconomic, environmental, demographic, humanitarian and human rights issues.

The “consensus” was ambivalent, however. While modern ideologies *as meta-narrative systems* had self-destructed by 1989, their residues profoundly imbued not only the fabric of Western societies, but, as seen in this thesis’ part one, the agendas of nascent global governance since the 1960s. The end of ideology myth generated a flawed *global consensus Zeitgeist*. In a post-ideology world, so went the mistaken and constructed assumption, what the UN had then started labelling as the “global problems”⁴⁴³ of humanity and “the Planet” - such as poverty, environmental degradation, climate change, population growth, migration, gender inequality, human rights abuses, humanitarian crises... – were presented as if they would be purely technical, as neither political nor moral. The political consequence of these problems’ allegedly merely pragmatic order was that they necessitated, to be resolved, “global experts” and grass-roots experience – not political debate among diverging ideological viewpoints, that were henceforth allegedly nonexistent.

The rationale we just exposed further assumed that the “partners”, who had started elaborating “solutions” to the “problems” that the first wave conferences had identified during the Cold War, would have proven their “expertise” in the “soft” domains that the UN would now give priority to. In 1989, they and their like-minded disciples surfed on the powerful wave of a historic moment of winning optimism. The end of ideologies proclamation and its deriving global state of consensus offered the non-governmental partners a historic opportunity to posit themselves as the indisputable “global experts” that the post-Cold War world needed. This thesis’ part three will assess the degree to which the UN’s second wave conferences transferred power from sovereign governments to non-governmental actors, to “those who knew”, the “global experts”, falsely and strategically assumed to be ideology-free.

Other contradictions inherent in the argumentation we just exposed went unnoticed. First, the enterprise of “building” a consensus contradicted the proclamation of an existing “state of consensus”: if a genuine consensus did exist, why would there have been a need to *construct* one? Secondly, the *global(ist)* sustainable development agenda was itself in a non-avowed tug of war with the consensus on the victory of the Western model, traditionally cherishing national sovereignty and “universal values”. The globalist agenda had little to do with the vision that was then declared to have won the day, i.e. the “end of history” and the triumph of the Western model founded on national sovereignty.

The global consensus *Zeitgeist* was as short-lived as the “end of history” myth. It lasted just long enough, however, for the revolution to achieve its goals in the immediate post-1989 years. It was already on the wane by the time the second wave conferences reached its end. Today the end of history/end of ideology/global state of consensus interconnected myths have been debunked. But humanity and the world’s governments remain framed and governed by the paradigms set in the *consensus myth moment*. This highlights the relevance of this thesis.

Connaturality of the UN conference process and of the post-Cold War global consensus Zeitgeist

⁴⁴² Weiss, Thomas G. et al. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴⁴³ The word “global” prominently appeared in the second wave conferences. For instance, *Rio Agenda 21* (228), Cairo (44), Copenhagen (45), Beijing (78), Istanbul (140).

The word “consensus” had started timidly appearing in some of the first wave conferences’ outcome documents⁴⁴⁴. It was more prominently present in the independent commissions’ reports⁴⁴⁵ – arguably an indication of the leadership taken by leftist intellectuals and non-governmental actors in advancing the consensus concept, process and mindset.

The consensus mindset denigrates majority vote as a divisive and exclusive process. By contradistinction, it hails consensus decision-making as inclusive, engaging, and qualitatively superior. Consensus-building became a basic tenet of the new postmodern politics and a value of its ethics. It is in the nature of a “consensus” to command alignment of all parties without exception. The consensus mindset is therefore antithetical to modernity’s ideological and political *pluralism*⁴⁴⁶. It is through the conference process, itself operating by consensus-building, not majority vote, that the partners-experts patiently and laboriously wove their agenda in international diplomacy. In the end, they obtained that their agenda became the object of a “global consensus” by the mid-1990s.

The 1989 *state of consensus* discourse proved a smokescreen hiding both the partners-experts’ power-grab and the ideological character of their “gains”. It was efficient in neutralizing potential opposition to sustainable development and its derivative paradigms, deemed free of ideology and attractively presented as such⁴⁴⁷. The dramatic strategic use the partners would make of the consensus discourse escaped political analysis. Being adopted as a matter of global consensus in the name of “expertise”, sustainable development and its derivative concepts were presented as the *only way forward* for humanity, to which there would be no alternative other than global doom.

The ambivalence of the consensus on the Western model and the ambivalence of the consensus on the content of the new priorities for international cooperation demystifies the proclamation of a post-Cold War “state of consensus”. The fact is that after centuries of a Western cultural process attacking the traditional content of universality on the one hand, and decades of communism on the other, how could a genuine consensus have appeared in 1989, out of a hat, on the core content of international cooperation, democracy, human rights, equality, liberty, the relationship between

⁴⁴⁴ See Appendix A2.

⁴⁴⁵ The 1972 Stockholm conference was the first intergovernmental conference to refer to consensual decision-making. The word “consensus” appeared in the outcome documents of the 1972 Stockholm conference (12), the 1975 Mexico conference (1) and the 1985 Nairobi conference (3). It appears once in the *World Conservation Strategy*, but 16 times in *North-South: A program for Survival*, and 14 times in *Our Common Future*. Two significant examples from the Brandt report are: “There is much in favour of a ‘programme of survival’ with common and unifying objectives: we must aim at a global community based on contract rather than status, on consensus rather than compulsion” (p. 11). And: “The valuable and unprecedented basis for consensus in the UN system, for communicating between North and South, and between East and West, must be preserved. It is vital to get the best out of it, to strengthen it, and to build on it, utilizing the experience of the last three decades and the benefits of wide participation. An increasingly interdependent world must organize itself for the different and more difficult tasks of the future, which will call not only for political will and wisdom, but for a framework of institutions and negotiations which can convert policies and ideas into action” (p. 192).

⁴⁴⁶ Chantal Delsol addresses this issue in chapter five of *L'Age du Renoncement*: « Consensus, l'autre de la démocratie ».

⁴⁴⁷ In an interview with World Bank Vice-President Ismail Serageldin, this author asked him whether the notion of sustainable development, adopted by all parties at the end of the Cold War, was ideological or just pragmatic. Serageldin responded the following: “Sustainable development is not an ideology. What is sustainable development other than common sense, proper management of our resources, concern for our children, concern for the environment in which we live? It is what normal rational people would want, not to destroy that on which they rely, not to destroy the opportunities for their children and to try to improve conditions of where we live”. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 53 of December 13, 1996, item 3. Marguerite A. Peeters’ Archives.

man and nature and between man and woman, on the identity of the family, on the nature of economic development, on the roles of nations? Had the dialectical conflict between the Marxist and capitalist perspectives genuinely been resolved overnight? Weren't nations and societies themselves internally divided over these issues? The double substance of the post-Cold War consensus reduced itself to an agreement on global democratization and on new priorities for international cooperation. But there was no consensus on the content of both.

3.3. The partners' position of strength in 1989

The end of the East-West divide, accelerating economic globalization, the proclaimed "ends" of history and ideology, the consequential proclaimed global state of consensus, the need for a strong new world vision and for UN reform provided an impressive and historic ensemble of favorable circumstances for the subversive process that had been unfolding during the Cold War decades to suddenly transform itself into a full-blown revolution. Surfing on post-Cold War enthusiasm, the partners seized the Kairos *tout de suite*. We shall now examine how they responded to the call for a new world vision, the degree to which they led post-Cold War global consensus-building - an exercise that juridically belonged to UN member states, the rapidity with which they occupied the ground and prevented alternative visions from being considered at the UN.

In 1989 the partners had a vision for the new era, and they had a ready-made agenda. They had a political platform for global governance (sustainable development), and a political regime for sustainable development (partnerships, or global governance). By 1989, the partners ambitioned to become, by stealth, the new global ruling class.

3.3.1. A pre-set conceptual and semantic "framework"

A quick recapitulation of the tangible "gains" the partners had obtained by 1989 is necessary before embarking on the presentation and analysis of their post-Cold War achievements in the following chapters.

Their primary and central realization was to have conceptually elaborated a novel "framework" for international cooperation. IUCN's 1980 World Conservation Strategy, followed by Brundtland's 1987 Our Common Future had given it the name "sustainable development", the seeds having been planted much earlier, in the 1972 The Limits to Growth report. The 1972 Stockholm conference was the first UN conference to use the word "framework", and the World Conservation Strategy, the first independent report to do the same.

Introduction of a novel language, that will become global governance's semantic system

The contents of the partners' framework expressed themselves by means of a novel language: a language either absent from the UN Charter and the UDHR, or reinterpreting the language in these documents. The historical tracing of the new words and phrases done in the charts in Appendix A shows that the women and environmental movements, followed by the population control lobby, had been the most dynamic and creative forces behind the production of the novel language⁴⁴⁸ during the Cold War. It also demonstrates the leadership of the independent reports of the 1970s, 80s and 90s⁴⁴⁹ in introducing certain terms which would become pivotal to global

⁴⁴⁸ This appears in Appendix A2 (language of the first wave UN conferences).

⁴⁴⁹ *The Limits to Growth* broke historic semantic ground. Its language would be used in UN intergovernmental processes all the way to the post-Cold War "global consensus" and to the current framework of international cooperation. Language of *The Limits to Growth* included: future generations (1), sustain- (12), sustainable (7, none, however, as associated with the word "development"), balance (19), equilibrium (75), quality of life (4, once using

governance's semantic system, such as "global partnership", "global governance", "climate change", "people-centered", or "holism". An incomplete and random list of the novel words and phrases that had already surfaced in the first wave UN conferences⁴⁵⁰ includes the terms "sustainable", "sustainable development", "partner/ship", "change", "agents of change", "transformation", "consensus", "family planning", "couples and individuals", "abortion", "safe abortion", "unmet need", "human reproduction", "freedom of choice", "empowerment", "stereotype", "gender", "sexual preference", "women's rights", "autonomy", "children's rights", "non-discrimination", "quality of life" (including "quality of life for all"), "health for all", "food security", "global", "governance", "private sector", "population stabilization", "balance" or "equilibrium", "survival", "comprehensive", "linkage", "integration", "enlargement", "future generations", "global level", "at all levels", "private sector", "informal", "global environment", the "Earth", the "Planet", "mainstream", "transnational", "dialogue", "international community", "revolution", "network", "diversity", "role"⁴⁵¹... The novel language progressively built up what would become the semantic system of the post-Cold War new global consensus.

The appearance and increasing use of the adjective global indicates a gradual shift from the internationalism that had prevailed among issue-oriented international organizations and intergovernmental organizations up to the foundation of the UN, to the globalism that would win the day during the global governance revolution.

Linking the novel language to international cooperation

The partners' second major Cold War achievement was to have started *linking* their novel language, concepts, issues, ideological perspective, mostly absent from the UN Charter and UDHR, to international cooperation. The series of linkages and the integration process incrementally transformed the framework, nascent by the end of the 1980s, into a system that would, in the 1990s, be qualified as holistic⁴⁵². Chapter five will revisit this important development.

the expression that will be the leitmotiv of UN documents in the 1990s, i.e. "quality of life for all"), global (97 as already mentioned, including global partnership, global problems, global equilibrium), family planning (6), birth control (24), population growth (42), stabiliz- (25, mainly of population), surviv- (6), interdependence (1), environment (73), world's citizens (1). No use of non-governmental organizations, global commons, governance, consensus, stakeholder, transnational. The *World Conservation Strategy* included sustainable development (17 times), the root sustainab- (100), the adjective sustainable (27), future generations (3), surviv- (27), global (28), ethic (8, but no appearance of global ethic), planning (44). WCS made one mention of sovereignty (item 15, par. 1), to deconstruct the concept as an obstacle to the world conservation of nature. Language in *North-South: A Program for Survival* contained: sustainable (4 times), stabilization (45), including of population, global (93), survival (28), quality (of life 1, of growth 3), partnership (14), family planning (14), interdependence (25), environment (78), women (72), rights (27), world citizens (1), non-governmental organizations (1). Pervasive in *Our Common Future*, and indicative of global governance's forward movement, were the words and roots: sustainable development (205, and sustain- 401), global (236, as already mentioned), surviv- (61), participat- (57), NGOs (43), women (42). Also used were balance (36), future generations (23), consensus (14), sovereign- (17, in a negative sense), quality of life (8), spiritual (3), equilibrium (3), partnership (2), holistic approach (2), governance (1). Global governance and civil society, however, were absent.

⁴⁵⁰ The process gradually and imperceptibly moving away from the language of the UN Charter started, not in Tehran, which still used "traditional" language, but in Stockholm, where we find, for example, the expressions quality of life (2), future generations (3), global problems (1), balance (14), non-renewable resources, population growth... The expressions *family planning* and *unwanted pregnancies* were introduced for the first time, not in Tehran, but in Bucharest, which also used quality of life, global, population growth, the environment. In the 1975 *Mexico Report*, we find the novel notions of *partner/ship* and *sexual preferences*.

⁴⁵¹ To identify where, when and in which proportion these words appeared in the outcome documents of the first wave UN conferences and/or in the reports of the independent commissions of the 1980s, see Appendices A2 and A3.

⁴⁵² The word "holistic" was absent from the reports of the first wave UN conferences and from the independent reports (except for *Our Common Future*), but the words or roots comprehensive, integrat- and link- were present in

During the revolution itself, the novel words and expressions that the partners had introduced during the Cold War crystallized into a semantic system. This system then kept on expanding to include an impressive number of new words and expressions bound together by the same inner logic, either spelling out already existing words or creating new expressions altogether⁴⁵³. Hence the two distinctive features of the revolutionary period per se were on the one hand the creation of a semantic system and on the other, the proliferation of words and expressions within the framework.

Setting an agenda for change

A third important realization of the partners by the end of the Cold War was to have procured international cooperation not only with a conceptual framework, but with concrete *plans of action*. Their intention was to have their objectives effectively *implemented*. There was an *agenda for change*, as indicated by the use of words such as “agenda”, “change”, “transformation”, “implement-”, “follow-up”, “monitor”, “data”, “standards”, “target”, “indicator”, “surveillance”, “mechanisms”, “commitment”, “accountable” in the documents of the first wave conferences and independent reports since 1972⁴⁵⁴.

Partners' solid cooperative relationship with the UN

Lastly, it matters to our purposes to highlight the solidly rooted cooperative partnership with the UN Secretariat and the UN system that the non-governmental partners had established by 1989. This relationship has been global governance's primary and foundational partnership. Including in its most controversial components, the partners' framework has been built under the aegis of the UN with the uninterrupted and undivided support of UN Secretaries-General, strategic officials within the UN Secretariat, ECOSOC and UN specialized agencies. This dynamic operational partnership explains how the partners could maintain their grip on their gains' transmission chain over the decades spanned by the global governance revolutionary process. The collaboration between the non-governmental actors promoting the new framework and the UN had become ideologically and politically exclusive by the end of the Cold War.

3.3.2. The partners in strategic positions of influence at the launch of the revolution

Our research up to this point leads us to the conclusive observation that the leading conceptualizers of the global governance revolution between 1945 and 1989 have historically been strikingly few in numbers. We also noted how strategically and ideologically aligned they were, in particular in their globalism, (neo-)Marxism, pro-NGOs stance, environmentalism, feminism, population control and sexual revolution agendas. The history of their interrelationships manifests an astounding level of cooptation amongst them – a self-serving cooptation that has a lot to do with the cohesiveness in global governance's transmission chain. Cooptation was especially patent in the independent commissions of the 1980s and early 1990s that wielded critical influence in bringing about the new system, but we shall see that it continued into the revolutionary stage.

these documents. Holistic appeared in the *Rio Agenda 21* (9), Cairo (4), Beijing (5), Istanbul (1) and Rome (1) conferences' reports.

⁴⁵³ See Appendix B for a non-exhaustive list of words and expressions belonging to global governance's semantic system. Sustainable, green, gender, quality, diversity, quality, empowerment... have been spelled out into an expanding list of substantives.

⁴⁵⁴ See Appendices A2 and A3.

In many instances, the effective leaders of the global governance revolutionary process were some way or another affiliated to organizations external to the UN such as the Socialist International, or more frequently to globalist groups such as Carnegie, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, the Club of Rome, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group⁴⁵⁵ and to foundations such as Rockefeller, Ford, MacArthur, Carnegie. The partners commonly adhered to the agendas of the few NGOs, hybrid organizations and social movements which wielded crucial influence in setting global governance's agenda: IPPF, Population Council, IUCN and its individual members, ICSU, the World Resources Institute (WRI)⁴⁵⁶, WWF, Friends of the Earth, a swelling crowd of gender feminists to which the UN had opened wide its doors... Absolutely none among them dissented from global governance's ideological line and integrated agenda. As seen, all the UN Secretaries-General of the gestational and revolutionary periods have demonstrated indiscriminately supporting the global governance framework: U Thant, Kurt Waldheim, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Ghali.

A few individuals have played a pivotal role. When contemporaneous, they usually knew each other and interacted, constituting a narrow, strategically and ideologically aligned group that set in motion and piloted global governance's revolutionary process. Among them let us name, as a reminder and far from pretending being in any way exhaustive, Jan Smuts, James Shotwell, Julian Huxley, Alger Hiss, John and David Rockefeller, Maurice Strong, Robert McNamara, Willy Brandt, Halfdan Mahler, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Gustave Speth, Jan Pronk, Nafis Sadik, Nitin Desai. Individuals whose names will only start appearing in our thesis as of now were already engaged in the revolutionary processes during the Cold War, affiliated to the partners' networks: as examples, Fred Sai, Gertrude Mongella, Richard Jolly, Federico Mayor, Juan Somavia⁴⁵⁷, Mahmoud F. Fathalla⁴⁵⁸, Steven Sinding⁴⁵⁹, Bella Abzug... Scholars external to the UN are worth mentioning for conceptualizing some of global governance's key political concepts: James Rosenau (governance), Joseph Nye (soft power)... Some have exercised their influence over several decades, in fact many from global governance's seminal stage into the gestational stage, or from the gestational stage into the revolution. The influence that an infinitesimal number of

⁴⁵⁵ The Bilderberg Group, one of the world's influential networks, was co-founded in 1954 in Holland (Bilderberg Hotel in Osterbeek) by David Rockefelller and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.

⁴⁵⁶ The WRI was founded in 1982, thanks to a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. It has been historically close to US democrats. The WWF had "grown dramatically with partners in several countries. WWF-USA secured more than US\$25 million in grants from the MacArthur Foundation, Andrew K. Mellon Foundation, US and foreign governments, international agencies and individual gifts to launch a new NGO, the World Resources Institute... The WRI joined the WWF and the IUCN to become a three-cornered NGO foundation for the global environmental agenda... In the mid-1980s Donald Ross of the Rockefeller Family Fund invited leaders of five other foundations to meet informally. From this grew the Environment Grantmakers Association, a nearly invisible group of more than 100 major foundations and corporations. They meet annually to discuss projects and grant proposals and decide which NGOs to fund." Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations' world conferences and civil society. In Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

⁴⁵⁷ Juan Somavia was Chairman of the Social Committee of the UN ECOSOC (1991-92), Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the World Summit for Social Development (1993-95), President of the UN ECOSOC (1993-94 and 1998-99), Director-General of the International Labor Organization (1999-2012).

⁴⁵⁸ Born in Egypt in 1935, Professor Mahmoud F. Fathalla earned his medical degree in obstetrics and gynaecology from the University of Cairo in 1962 and his Phd from Edinburgh University in 1967. Fathalla was Senior Advisor, Biomedical and Reproductive Health and Research at the Rockefeller Foundation, President of the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, and former Chairman of IPPF's International Medical Advisory Panel. He has also served as the Chairman of the WHO Global Advisory Committee on Health Research. He was a founder of the *Safe Motherhood Initiative*.

⁴⁵⁹ Sinding spent 20 years of his career at USAID, during which time he served as population advisor to the World Bank. Carnegie consulted him. He was Director of Population Sciences for the Rockefeller Foundation, professor of population and family health at Columbia University, Director General (2002-06) of the IPPF, which he is credited with "rejuvenating".

individuals (with respect to the world's peoples, to "we the peoples of the United Nations") over the norms and values of international cooperation in the 21st century is abusive: it is a coup of unprecedented scope.

Continuum in revolutionary process' leadership

At the end of the Cold War, the "partners" occupied strategic posts at the helm of the processes and institutions making up the nascent operational political system that would crystallize into global governance in the early 1990s.

In 1989, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar nominated Maurice Strong Secretary-General of the 1992 Rio conference. Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of UNFPA from 1987 to 2000, a member of the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, was nominated the Secretary-General of the 1994 Cairo conference. Fred Sai, who had cofounded IPPF in his homeland Ghana in 1967 and chaired the Main Committee of the 1984 UN Population Conference in Mexico City, was IPPF's President between 1989 and 1995 and chaired both the Preparatory Committee for the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and its Main Committee. Halfdan Mahler, who had served three terms as WHO Director-General (1973-1988) and had initiated and directed the elaboration of WHO's 1978 Health-For-All strategy, became Director of the IPPF (1988-1995) and as such exercised a major influence in the Cairo conference process. Gro Harlem Brundtland who had chaired the influential commission bearing her name in the 1980s became Vice President of the Socialist International (1988-1999) and WHO Director-General (1998-2003).

James Gustave Speth⁴⁶⁰, who had founded the MacArthur-funded World Resources Institute in 1982 and presided it until 1993, had been head of the Carter administration's Council on Environmental Quality and member of the Clinton-Gore transition team and was a protégé of David Rockefeller, became the Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Chair of the United Nations Development Group from 1993 to 1999, at the critical time when the UNDP played a key coordination role in UN reform, in streamlining the UN system along the conferences' new world vision and in normatively establishing the *governance* political paradigm. Speth also served as Special Coordinator for Economic and Social Affairs under UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Nitin Desai⁴⁶¹ who, let us recall, had been Senior Economic Advisor of the Brundtland Commission which provided the momentum for the 1992 Rio conference and who had drafted the chapters of *Our Common Future* dealing with sustainable development⁴⁶², became the Deputy Secretary-General of the Rio Earth Summit (1990-93) and UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs (1992 to 2003), during the decisive transformative years of the UN into global governance. Desai also organized the Copenhagen Social Summit.

⁴⁶⁰ A US democrat, Speth headed the group that examined the US' role in natural resources, energy and the environment as senior adviser to President-elect Bill Clinton's transition team (Nov. 1992-Jan. 93). See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 55 of December 18, 1996. Marguerite A. Peeters' Archives. Interview with Gustave Speth.

⁴⁶¹ Desai headed the newly created Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, whose mandate was to support the various United Nations intergovernmental bodies, including ECOSOC and its Commission on Sustainable Development. As head of the UN Secretariat's DESA, Desai organized and managed the Copenhagen Summit on Social Development (1995).

⁴⁶² Nitin Desai told this author: "I was involved in the Brundtland commission. I was one of the persons involved in writing the report, *Our Common Future!* In fact, some of the early material on sustainable development for the Brundtland Commission was written by me". See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 185 of September 5, 2002. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. Interview with Nitin Desai.

The African gender feminist Gertrude Mongella⁴⁶³ was nominated Secretary-General of the UN Fourth International Conference on Women in Beijing. Mongella had been Vice-Chairperson to the 1985 Nairobi World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for Women as of 1985. Richard Jolly⁴⁶⁴ who had co-authored UNICEF's influential 1987 report, *Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth*, became coordinator of the UNDP *Human Development Report* and special adviser to UNDP Administrator Gustave Speth, with whom he collaborated in reforming the UN and streamlining UN agencies along the second wave conferences' new global consensus. Federico Mayor, UNESCO Director-General from 1987 to 1999, has been a member of the Club of Rome and of the Bilderberg Group and contributed to streamline UNESCO's educational objectives along the new global "consensus".

Our research up to this point has already given us a sense of the massive influence that Maurice Strong exercised in the global governance revolutionary process almost since the creation of the UN until his death on November 27, 2015 (on the eve of the Paris climate change conference or COP 21, which incidentally was the direct legacy of the 1972 Stockholm conference). It is useful here to recapitulate some of the strategic positions this individual occupied and some of his social networks.

Strong had been the Secretary-General of the first UN environmental conference (Stockholm 1972), the first Executive Director of UNEP (1972-75), the convener of the first international expert group meeting on climate change, an "international civil servants" member of the Club of Rome, a member of the Brundtland Commission, of the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance and of the Commission on Global Governance. Strong was friends with David Rockefeller, Gustave Speth, Michael Gorbachev (with whom he sponsored the *Earth Charter*). He had close ties with Vice President Al Gore and with James Wolfensohn whom he advised when the latter was President of the World Bank (Wolfensohn himself was on the Rockefeller Foundation Board and on the Population Council Board). Strong served on the Board of Directors of IUCN, WWF and the WRI (chairman of the latter as of 1994). Through Rockefeller, he was connected to the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. Strong often spoke at the Cathedral of St John the Divine (which would contribute to global governance's spiritual component⁴⁶⁵). He was a Foundation Director of the World Economic Forum.

⁴⁶³ A Tanzanian politician, Mongella had a vast experience in international diplomacy: Tanzanian Representative to ECOSOC's Commission on the Status of Women in 1989, Member of the Trustee to the United Nations INSTRAW from 1990 to 93, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women on Women in Beijing. After Beijing she was UN Under-Secretary and Special Envoy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Women's Issues and Development from 1996 to 1997, Member of the Advisory Group to the Director-General UNESCO for the follow-up of the Beijing Conference in Africa, South of the Sahara in 1996, Senior Advisor to the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa on Gender Issues in 1997, a member of the Regional Reproduction Health Task Force for the World Health Organization's African Region in 2002. She became a member and President of the Pan African Parliament in 2004.

⁴⁶⁴ *Adjustment with a Human Face* critiqued how the World Bank and the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programs impacted health and education. From 1982 to 2000, Richard Jolly was an Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, first as Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF (1982-95) and from 1996 as Coordinator of the UNDP's Human Development Report and Special Adviser to the UNDP Administrator (Gus Speth).

⁴⁶⁵ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 34 of June 17, 1996. Marguerite A. Peeters' Archives. The Cathedral of Saint John the Divine in Divine housed The Temple of Understanding for several decades in the late 20th century. The Temple of Understand is an interfaith organization seeking to achieve "peaceful coexistence" among individuals, communities and societies through interfaith education.

David Rockefeller, who had co-founded the Bilderberg Group (1954), the Trilateral Commission (1973) and presided the Council on Foreign Relations, remained hugely influential in the 1990s, notably through his friends who were then strategically positioned at and around the UN.

Defeating support of major Western powers and of the UN Secretaries-General

US democratic President Bill Clinton's two terms of office (1993-2001) historically coincided with the second wave UN conferences from the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights to the 1996 Rome Food Summit, Kofi Annan's first wave of UN reform and the 2001 adoption of the MDGs. These were critical years for the global governance revolutionary process. Vice President Al Gore and Timothy Wirth⁴⁶⁶, indiscriminate and aggressive advocates of the novel global agendas⁴⁶⁷, headed the US delegation to some of these conferences. On the European side, the Union, then in full expansion after the collapse of communism, kept on being dominated by Western European countries which were proactively pushing for the advancement of global governance. The socialist Jacques Delors, a member of the Commission on Global Governance, presided the European Commission for three consecutive terms (1985-1995), coinciding with the last years of the preparatory stage of the global governance process and with the revolution itself. In 1989 he established the Commission's Cellule de Prospective which proved to be fully aligned along the global goals the UN was then pursuing, and to adhere to the consensus logic⁴⁶⁸. The partners enjoyed the defeating support of the major Western powers - the US Executive and the European Union as "representative" of its member states - during the revolution. This support helps explain the smooth unfolding of the revolution, unhindered by major opposition: in practice, in spite of decolonization and the resulting expansion of UN membership to former colonies, the West and the US in particular still governed the UN.

As for the UN, apart from the just mentioned entrenched collaborative partnership with non-governmental partners it had developed by 1989, the two UN Secretaries-General during the revolution - Pérez de Cuellar (1982-91) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-96) – ardently engaged in advocating global governance's overall agenda. Suffice it to mention, as regards de Cuellar, that most of the great second wave conferences were convened under his second mandate and that in 1983, he had requested Brundtland to head the independent commission that would produce global governance's programmatic report, *Our Common Future*. As for Boutros-Ghali, a staunch advocate of NGOs' involvement in international diplomacy⁴⁶⁹, he was in office during

⁴⁶⁶ The US democrat Tim Wirth had organized the historic Hansen hearings on climate change (Washington, 1988, the year the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had been established through Maurice Strong's agency). Wirth chaired the US delegation at the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development. He was then the (first) US State Department's Undersecretary for Global Affairs (1993-97), where he collaborated with Vice President Al Gore on global environmental and population issues, supporting the administration's views on global warming. Prior to that nomination, he had been national Co-Chair of the Clinton-Gore campaign. Wirth led US negotiations for the 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference. He then became the first President of the UN Foundation (1998-2013) just created by Ted Turner to advocate for and support the UN's global agenda. Wirth has collaborated particularly closely with the UNFPA and has been diversely associated with a number of organizations belonging to global governance's networks, including Rotary International, the Gates Foundation and the Club of Madrid.

⁴⁶⁷ The partners stopped enjoying that support when the political pendulum swang back to the Republicans under the administration of President George Bush (2001-09). But Barack Obama's two terms (2009-17) coincided with the closing of the MDGs and the preparations for, and the adoption of, the SDGs before the election of Republican Donald Trump (2017-21).

⁴⁶⁸ Directly depending from the European Commission's President and headed by Jérôme Vignon until 1998. "La cellule dispose d'un style maison et d'une méthodologie de recherche propre à faire émerger la diversité européenne et à développer une vision globale et /ou de long terme, facilitant la recherche du consensus au-delà des intérêts nationaux particuliers." <https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/12256-forward-studies-unit-launches-its-own-homepage/fr> (retrieved February 4, 2022).

⁴⁶⁹ Boutros-Ghali considered NGOs to be "a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world". Willetts, Peter, Ed. *The Conscience of the World. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*, op.

the revolutionary years, from the Rio Earth Summit to the Rome Food Summit. Kofi Annan's mandate (1997-2006) trespasses the purview of this thesis. It is however worth stating that the UN reform he conducted streamlined the system along the conferences' "global consensus". Annan was known as the partnerships' man *par excellence*.

3.3.3. Exponential growth of NGO partners

While this thesis focusses exclusively, as already indicated, on those non-governmental partners which wielded the greatest influence in establishing global governance's "framework" and its pillars, the historic numerical expansion of international NGOs and other transnational non-governmental political processes since the creation of the UN is a factor that played in favor of global governance's power shift away from sovereign governments⁴⁷⁰. The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* acknowledged the dramatic growth of "the size, diversity, and international influence of civil society organizations", their "spectacular flourishing"⁴⁷¹ since the foundation of the UN.

Role of first wave conferences in the growth of NGOs

Singh noted that after the 1974 Bucharest first population conference, "the number of NGOs devoted to development, the environment and population increased tremendously"⁴⁷². The scholar added that "in many countries NGOs began receiving more funding from both governmental and non-governmental sources" and "received increasing recognition and support from the international community, in particular the UN"⁴⁷³. During the UN Decade for Women (1975-85), which had been proposed at the 1975 Mexico first women's conference, feminist NGOs considerably grew "in number, influence and sophistication"⁴⁷⁴. The 1970s also saw an explosion in the number of environmental NGOs.

cit., p. 311. Appendix C. He also said: "We must build a framework which takes into account not only political issues, but economic behaviour and social and cultural aspirations" (Ib.).

⁴⁷⁰ According to Thomas R. Davies, the peak growth periods were 1945, 1968 and 1989. In the late 60s, the "emergence of the transnational environmentalist movement" and in the 1980s, "the rapid growth of the development aid sector" help explain the growth. Davies, Thomas Richard. *The rise and fall of transnational civil society*, op. cit., p. 11. According to the Global Policy Forum, "During the 90s there was an explosion of NGO involvement in all activities of the UN. Their involvement in the cycle of major conferences, in particular, charted new territory (qualitatively as well as quantitatively). Whereas in early UN conferences (such as the Human Rights conference in Tehran, 1968 and the Stockholm environment conference in 1972) there had been a significant and influential NGO presence, this was largely confined to the specialist UN-followers who sought to put specific ideas forward and debate with fellow technicians from national delegations. What emerged in the 90s (and a precursor to that was NGO participation in the three women's conferences in 1975-85) was a completely new phenomenon. These events were... opportunities for lobbying, prototype 'global parliaments', teach-ins, trade fairs for NGOs and others to parade their programmes, demonstrations, cultural events, information dissemination... Some... regard them as a truly 21st century phenomenon – a compelling product of the Network Age and a corrective to the failings of traditional democratic institutions." Global Policy Forum. *UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory and Analysis of Practices*, op. cit.

⁴⁷¹ *Our Global Neighborhood* referred to this growth in more general terms: "Important non-governmental organizations and movements have existed for as long as the modern state. But the size, diversity, and international influence of civil society organizations have grown dramatically during the past five decades. The spectacular flourishing of such organizations at first centred mainly on industrial countries with high living standards and democratic systems. More recently, such organizations have begun to blossom in developing countries and in former Communist countries in Europe." Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴⁷² Singh, Jyoti Shankar, *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 124.

⁴⁷³ Ib., p. 124.

⁴⁷⁴ Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 148. At the 1975 Mexico Conference, UN member states had already recognized the determining contribution of NGOs in their Declaration: "National non-governmental organizations should contribute to the advancement of women by assisting women to take advantage of their opportunities, by promoting education and

Immediate post-Cold War accelerated growth of transnational “civil society”

By the end of the Cold War, the number, size, diversity and international influence of NGOs had grown dramatically. In 1956, the Union of International Organizations counted 985 “international NGOs operating in three or more countries”. “Forty years later,” the same organization counted “more than 28,000”⁴⁷⁵. As far as NGOs accredited at the second wave UN conferences are concerned, their number grew exponentially with respect to the first wave⁴⁷⁶. According to Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith as referred to by Thomas R. Davies, “the number of INGOs promoting social change goals sextupled between 1953 and 1993”⁴⁷⁷.

In an article published in 2008, Davies stated that the end of the Cold War was “said to have been the critical event in facilitating the accelerated growth of transnational civil society in the last two decades”⁴⁷⁸. He noted it was only “in the period since the end of the Cold War that the term ‘transnational civil society’ and the bolder term ‘global civil society’ have entered popular usage”⁴⁷⁹. This thesis’ part three will analyze global governance’s usage and interpretation of the term *civil society*.

Second generation UN-NGOs relations: part of the institutional architecture of global governance

The involvement of NGOs in the UN-organized post-Cold War world conferences marked a historic turning point in the establishment of global governance. Tony Hill, when head of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLs) in Geneva, qualified the post-Cold War UN-NGOs relations as “second generation”. He described this second generation as

“marked by the much larger scale of the NGO presence across the UN system, the more diverse institutional character of the organizations involved, now including national, regional and international NGOs, networks, coalitions and alliances, and the greater diversity of the issues that NGOs seek to address at the UN. Above all, the second generation of UN-NGOs relations are essentially *political* [our emphasis] and reflect the motivation of NGOs to engage with the UN as part of the institutional architecture of global governance [Ib.]”⁴⁸⁰.

information about women's rights, and by co-operating with their respective Governments” (par. 4). Mexico also had a section on “global action”, demonstrating the leadership of the feminist movement in globalism.

⁴⁷⁵ Foster, John W. *Context*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 25.

⁴⁷⁶ 1378 NGOs in Rio, 841 in Vienna, 934 in Cairo, 1138 in Copenhagen, 2600 in Beijing. See *UN System and Civil Society – an Inventory and Analysis of Practices. Background Paper for the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil Society*. May 2003. <https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Funece.org%2FDAM%2Fenv%2Fpp%2Fppif%2FUN%2520SYSTEM%2520AND%2520CIVIL%2520SOCIETY.doc&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK> (retrieved February 4, 2022).

According to Tony Hill, the number of ECOSOC accredited NGOs grew from 744 in 1992 to 2,350 in 2003. See Hill, Tony. *Three Generations of UN-Civil Society Relations*. April 2004.

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31824.html> (retrieved June 1st, 2020). But many more NGOs cooperated with the Secretariat and UN agencies informally, escaping intergovernmental control. See Willetts, Peter. *The Growth in the Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The Growth in the Number of ECOSOC NGOs*. www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.HTM (retrieved July 20, 2021).

⁴⁷⁷ Davies, Thomas Richard. *The Rise and Fall of Transnational Civil Society: The Evolution of International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1839*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁷⁸ Ib., p. 12.

⁴⁷⁹ Ib., p. 2.

⁴⁸⁰ Hill, Tony. *Three Generations of UN-Civil Society Relations*, op. cit.

As Hill rightly observed and as chapter four will evidence, “the newly-emerged national and regional NGOs sought to engage directly in intergovernmental deliberations and, through advocacy and mobilization work, *influence their outcomes* [our emphasis]”⁴⁸¹. Hill’s remarks about the *political* character of the post-Cold War UN-NGO partnership and NGOs’ ambition to belong to the “institutional architecture of global governance” provide an authorized confirmation of our thesis’ definition of global governance as a partnerships’ regime.

The pro-global governance scholar Lester Salamon considered truly “remarkable” what he called a “massive upsurge of organized, private voluntary activity outside the boundaries of the market and state”⁴⁸². He viewed this upsurge “as every bit as important a historical development as was the rise of the nation state”⁴⁸³. This comment likewise corroborates our thesis’ qualification of global governance as *revolutionary*.

⁴⁸¹ Ib.

⁴⁸² As quoted by John W. Foster. Foster, John W. *Context*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 24 and endnote 4 p. 59. Salamon, professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Director of the Center for Civil Society Studies at The Johns Hopkins Institute for Health and Social Policy Studies, specialized in “alternative tools of government action” and NGOs. He wrote extensively on “global civil society” and “the non-profit sector”.

⁴⁸³ As quoted by John W. Foster. Foster, John W. *Context*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 24 and endnote 4 p. 59. Likewise, Gerard Clarke, in a 1998 article, *Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World*, argued: “Political Scientists in years to come... face an interesting challenge in documenting and conceptualizing the role of NGOs in the ‘associational revolution’, a revolution which is fast becoming one of the most significant political developments of the late twentieth century.” In *Political Studies*. Vol. 46. Issue 1. 1998, p. 52.

CHAPTER 4

THE REVOLUTION: PARTNERS' LEADERSHIP IN ESTABLISHING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE'S FRAMEWORK AS SYSTEMIC CONTENT DURING POST-COLD WAR WAVE OF UN CONFERENCES (1990-1996)

Chapter four addresses the *global governance revolution* and more specifically the constitution of global governance *as content*. It focusses on exposing the *partners' leadership* in establishing global governance's conceptual *pillars* and *framework* and in forging the strategic *linkages* through which global governance's content became a tightly-knit *system*, as per the definitions provided in the last chapter.

We start by introducing the second wave UN conferences through which the revolution historically took place during the six years period immediately succeeding the fall of the Berlin wall. We will observe a programmatic continuum between the first, Cold War wave and the second, post-Cold wave conferences. We then identify, conference after conference, the major milestones in the unfolding of the revolution, its leading agents and how these agents achieved their strategic *gains*. Using conclusive examples, we focus on identifying the proactive initiatives the partners took to seamlessly weave their novel social, environmental, ecofeminist, population stabilization, sexual revolution, human rights and political paradigms in the fabric of the supposedly intergovernmental “global consensus”.

Leaving leave aside the intergovernmental negotiations processes *per se*, this chapter, as the rest of the thesis, focusses exclusively on the partners' successful integration of their special interests in intergovernmentally-endorsed documents. Our purpose is not to offer a comprehensive overview and analysis of the “global consensus” in each of its single components. It is to find out how the pillars on which the sustainable development framework has been conceptually resting since the revolution were established and thenceforth put at the top of the agenda of international cooperation.

The primary sources for this chapter are the conferences' *reports* (which we also call their *outcome documents*) as published by the United Nations, related UN General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions, and documents emanating from the UN's specialized bodies. The conferences' reports have been there to stay. They yielded a historic influence over the direction of international cooperation up to this day, as manifest in the SDGs which maintain “the framework” then set as well as the partners' revolutionary paradigms and gains.

Secondary sources frequently used in this chapter include the work of those authorized few authors (direct partners in global governance and a few scholars) who closely monitored the unfolding of events as they historically took place. This chapter will also refer to the interviews that this author, who participated in the conferences as of the Copenhagen Social Summit, was able to conduct with high level UN officials and key strategic agents of global governance in the 1990s, and to the reports she then wrote⁴⁸⁴. As preceding chapters, chapter four uses the charts in Appendix A as an instrument for analyzing the constitution and evolution of global governance's semantic system.

⁴⁸⁴ Interactive Information Services reports.

4.1. Second wave of UN's conference process to construct new world order

The UN launched a second wave of great international conferences⁴⁸⁵ no sooner did the Berlin wall fall. The specific purpose of the post-Cold War conference process was to build a new global consensus on the norms, values and priorities for international cooperation in the 21st century, to construct what Willy Brandt and Michael Gorbachev, among others, then called a *new world order*⁴⁸⁶. The second wave conferences offered the partners the opportunity to turn the novel agenda they had elaborated during the Cold War into an intergovernmentally-endorsed normative global consensus for the 21st century: this is, let us underline, the essence of the revolution.

4.1.1. Conferences planned at end of the Cold War lynchpin moment

The then so-called “global consensus” was built in just six years’ time, through nine high-profile conferences covering the same soft themes as the first wave conferences – i.e. human rights, the environment, population, women – now adding to this package education, children and social development (which included health, a social topic on which, as opposed to education, no specific post-Cold War conference was organized). The conferences were the following: the World Conference on Education for All, Meeting Basic Learning Needs (Jomtien, Thailand, March 5-9, 1990); the World Summit for Children⁴⁸⁷ (New-York, September 29-30, 1990); the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992); the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June 14-25, 1993); the Fourth International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) (Cairo, September 5-13, 1994); the World Summit for Social Development, also known as the Social Summit (Copenhagen, March 6-12, 1995); the Fourth International Conference on Women (Beijing, September 4-15, 1995); the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, or Habitat II, or the City Summit (Istanbul, June 3-14, 1996); the World Food Summit (Rome, November 13-17, 1996).

UN member states consented to walking the path that global activists had traced during Cold War

Surfing on the 1989 Kairos, when governments and societies alike acutely felt the need for a new world vision, the UN managed to convene several of these conferences at heads of states level⁴⁸⁸. On December 2–3, 1989, the Malta Summit had put an end to the historic East-West confrontation. The preparation for the conferences, except for that of the Food Summit, started

⁴⁸⁵ We limit our definition of “second wave conferences” to the major conferences of the immediate post-Cold War years that played a defining role in the construction of the “new global consensus”. There were a number of other conferences in those years, which played a minor role in this exercise. Let us mention as examples the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Paris, September 3-14, 1990), the international Aids conferences, the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokohama, Japan, May 23-27, 1994), the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (Barbados, April 25-May 6, 1994), and UNCTAD IX (Midrand, South Africa, April 27-May 11, 1996), which asked for “the integration of representatives of civil society (NGOs, private/business and academic sectors) into its work”. Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations' world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴⁸⁶ The *new world order* expression, diversely interpreted although generally associated to the idea of global governance, remains in vogue today.

⁴⁸⁷ Jomtien and New-York, although not convened by the General Assembly, were major conferences with regard, on the one hand, to the pivotal role education would play in the spread of the revolutionary global platform and on the other, to the integration of “children’s rights” in all subsequent “major” conferences.

⁴⁸⁸ The conferences called “summits” were held at the level of heads of states or governments. Others, such as the Cairo conference, were held at ministerial level (UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/41/176, adopted on 22 December 1992 stated that the Cairo Conference would be held at ministerial level).

between 1989 and 1992⁴⁸⁹: a timing strikingly coinciding with the “end of the Cold War” lynchpin moment. Three weeks after the Malta Summit, by its Resolution 44/228 of December 22, 1989, the UN General Assembly decided to convene the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and immediately thereafter launched its Preparatory Committee. The convergence of these dates is no coincidence: the UNCED’s comprehensive sustainable development platform was to impose itself globally as the post-Cold War *Weltanschauung*. By convening the conference, UN member states followed the Brundtland Commission’s proposal: the commission had requested an international conference that would actively follow-up on the recommendations it made in its 1987 report, *Our Common Future*. The commission had also called upon the UN to “transform [its] report into a UN Programme of Action on Sustainable Development”⁴⁹⁰. As it turned out, the Rio conference, intergovernmental by nature, strictly conformed to, built on and expanded the programmatic vision that an independent, non-governmental commission conducted by a few “experts” had articulated.

Did UN member states’ formal decision to convene the second wave conferences in the immediate post-Cold War moment indicate the direction they had freely and consciously chosen to give international cooperation in the 21st century? To answer this question, one must take into consideration the findings exposed in this thesis’ previous chapters. The partners had elaborated a platform that they wanted to enforce. They had exercised their influence upstream through the direct collaborative relations they had forged with the UN Secretariat and ECOSOC. They often stood at the origin of the initial proposal to hold these international conferences, and the more controversial was a conference’s agenda, or novel with respect to the UN Charter, the greater was their lead and collusion with the UN Secretariat⁴⁹¹. To the extent the diplomats representing UN member states at the conferences, themselves supposed to represent their respective nations, and at times even heads of states themselves consented to walk the entrenched path that “experts” and non-state global activists had traced in the shade of the Cold War, they displayed a disconcerting amount of submission to processes they had not initiated and were not under their direct control.

In a continuum with the first wave conferences: UN conference process as a “whole”

The UN insisted on its entire conference process, first and second waves included, being *in a continuum*, each conference building on the perspective, norms, language and ideological achievements of previous ones. This primarily appeared in the conferences’ outcome documents,

⁴⁸⁹ In 1989, the General Assembly convened the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, and the executive heads of UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank convened the Jomtien Conference on Education. In 1990, ECOSOC recommended that a World Conference on Women be held in 1995 (Res. 1990/12 of May 24, 1990), and the General Assembly endorsed this recommendation a few months later (UN General Assembly Res. 45/129 of December 14, 1990). In 1991, the General Assembly introduced the idea of holding a Habitat II conference in the second half of the 1990s (UN General Assembly Res. 46/164 of December 19, 1991). The *General Assembly* convened the *Social Summit* in 1992.

⁴⁹⁰ See World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Part III, 3, par. 124: “To achieve the needed change in attitudes and reorientation of policies and institutions, the Commission believes that an active follow-up of this report is *imperative*. It is with this in mind that we call for the UN General Assembly, upon due consideration, to transform this report into a UN Programme of Action on Sustainable Development. Special follow-up conferences could be initiated at the regional level. Within an appropriate period after the presentation of the report to the General Assembly, an international Conference could be convened to review progress made and promote follow-up arrangements that will be needed over time to set benchmarks and to maintain human progress within the guidelines of human needs and natural laws”.

⁴⁹¹ Prodded by the powerful population control lobbies partnering with the UN Secretariat and several UN agencies, ECOSOC decided in July 1989 to convene an International Meeting on Population in 1994 and designated its Population Commission as the Preparatory Committee (See ECOSOC Res. 1989/91). The intergovernmental process was then launched. ECOSOC Res. 1991/93 of July 26, 1991 decided to call the meeting “International Conference on Population and Development” (ICPD). The conference was formally convened by ECOSOC Res. 1992/37 of July 1992. The General Assembly in Res. A/RES/47/176 of March 17, 1993 endorsed the objectives of the conference.

which frequently used the verb “to build on” to indicate this continuum⁴⁹². The 1992 *Rio Declaration*, for example, reaffirmed the 1972 *Stockholm Declaration* and sought “to build upon it”⁴⁹³. The continuum was not only between conferences on the same theme, but cross-thematic. The Cairo *Programme of Action* for instance made a point of specifying that the population conference was “not an isolated event” (par. 1.5), that it built on past UN population conferences and policies and would be the foundation on which future UN conferences, *not only on population*, would build⁴⁹⁴. The *Beijing Declaration* stated its determination to “achieve the full and effective implementation of the Nairobi Forward looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women” (par. 11) and its effort to “build on [our emphasis] consensus and progress made at previous United Nations conferences and summits” (par. 10).

Insistence on the continuum of the conference process as a whole manifested a long-term perspective and a strategy. Conference upon conference, a world vision was being constructed that redefined and reoriented the agenda of international cooperation as established in the Charter⁴⁹⁵. In a cumulative manner, the conferences built a single, integrated and cohesive consensus. They constituted a *whole*. In this “whole”, all was interconnected to all. As the conferences integrated the partners’ gains, their stated “continuum” ensured the transmission of these gains and consolidated them over time, from one conference to the next, from the Cold War period to the post-Cold global consensus. Never was there any break in this transmission chain, which conveyed the partners’ most controversial “gains” along with the most consensual components of the intergovernmental agenda.

4.1.2. Procedures for UN conferences facilitated birthing global governance

The UN conference process, first and second waves included, birthed global governance. To grasp how the partners could grab the critical amount of power they did wield during the conferences, it is useful to identify the main organizational steps in a UN conference process.

⁴⁹² The insistence on a continuum in the overall conference process also appeared in the Secretary-General’s reports.

⁴⁹³ The Rio Declaration opened with these words: “The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992, reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, and seeking to build upon it...”. *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992. Annex I. *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*. UN GA A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) of August 12, 1992. Henceforth all references to this *Report* will be shortened to *Rio Decl.*

⁴⁹⁴ On the one hand Cairo “builds on the considerable international consensus that has developed since the *World Population Conference* at Bucharest in 1974 and the *International Conference on Population* at Mexico City in 1984”. *Report of the International Conference on Population and Development*. Cairo, September 5-13, 1994. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1. Progr. of Action, par. 1.5. On the other hand, its own outcomes “are closely related to and will make significant contributions to other major conferences in 1995 and 1996, such as the World Summit for Social Development, the Fourth World Conference on Women..., the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), the elaboration of the Agenda for Development, as well as the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations” (ib., par. 1.7). Henceforth all references to the *Report of the International Conference on Population and Development* will be shortened to *Cairo Decl.*, *Cairo Progr. of Action* or *Cairo Report*.

⁴⁹⁵ Joe Sills, then Director, *UN Information Center* in Washington D. C. explained to this author that the post-Cold War conferences called on “everybody in the international community to redefine and reorient the international agenda as it relates to the economic and social matters.” See *Interactive Information Services*. Report 24 of April 1, 1996, item 2. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives. Interview with Joe Sills (February 1996).

The UN Secretariat enjoys decisive maneuvering space⁴⁹⁶. The UN Secretary-General appoints the Secretary-General⁴⁹⁷ of the conference and the Secretary for the conference's Preparatory Committee. The relevant department of the UN Secretariat writes the conference's first draft, on which intergovernmental negotiations will be based⁴⁹⁸. In order to do so, the Secretariat consults the experts and NGOs of its choice. Over time, a direct, well-established, time-honored working collaboration has developed between the Secretariat and certain experts and NGOs. As it occurred before the negotiations stage, it was not submitted to ECOSOC accreditation rules and escaped intergovernmental control. The draft determines the entire process. Prior to any intergovernmental negotiations, the UN Secretariat-consulted experts tandem sets the agenda, defines the objectives, coins the language, procures the overall vision. The tandem's foundational influence will prove difficult to reverse in later stages. Participation in agenda-setting in turn empowers the partners to steer the entire process in the direction they initially established.

The Secretariat submits its draft to intergovernmental negotiations. The aim is to build a consensus among UN member states on the conference's pre-set agenda. Negotiations take place over the course of a series of intergovernmental Preparatory Committees⁴⁹⁹ or PrepComs (three or four, over the course of two or three years). ECOSOC-accredited NGOs participate in the PrepComs as observers, as they will in the final conference - the final stage of negotiations. The PrepComs provide NGOs with the opportunity to lobby both national delegations and the Secretariat. In practice, the agenda of the most influential NGOs is already in the draft. Analysis reveals that the fruit produced by their lobbying efforts went far beyond what could have been obtained through their observer and consultative status: it was the fruit of a *political* participation.

The conference then takes place, finalizing negotiations and reaching "consensus" on the outcome documents⁵⁰⁰. These usually consist, on the one hand, of a declaration providing principles and a vision, and on the other of a plan of action, also called framework for action, program for action, platform for action and containing global time-bound⁵⁰¹ goals. The General Assembly then

⁴⁹⁶ Hoggart, Richard. *UNESCO and NGOs: A Memoir*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 103: "At the United Nations, the relationship with NGOs never officially goes beyond 'consultation'... In practice, the distinctions between the UN and UNESCO are not as sharp as these formal statements suggest. Some prestigious NGOs at the UN do have close working relations with the Secretariat." And: "So, at best, a good NGO could have a kind of balancing role between the Secretariat, often under pressure to give way to expediency, and governments who were putting on that pressure. Such NGOs, if properly employed by the Secretariat, could define and refine policy often better than UNESCO itself could" (ib., pp. 113-114).

⁴⁹⁷ UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar appointed Maurice Strong as Secretary-General of Rio and Ibrahim Fall of Vienna. Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed the Executive Director of UNFPA, Nafis Sadik, as Secretary-General of Cairo, Juan Somavia of Copenhagen, Gertrude Mongella of Beijing, Wally N'Dow of Istanbul.

⁴⁹⁸ The draft of the *World Population Plan of Action*, for example, was prepared by the UN Secretariat's Population Division with the assistance of an advisory committee of experts. It had been reviewed by ECOSOC's Commission on Population and discussed at five regional meetings.

⁴⁹⁹ For Cairo, ECOSOC's Commission on Population served as Preparatory Committee. For Beijing, the Commission on the Status of Women served as Preparatory Committee.

⁵⁰⁰ In Jomtien: *The World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs*. In New-York: *The World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children* and a *Plan of Action*. In Rio: *The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*; *Agenda 21*; *Forest Principles* (informal name given to the *Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests*). In Vienna: *The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*. In Cairo: *The Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development*. In Copenhagen: *The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development*. In Beijing: *The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. In Istanbul: *The Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and the Habitat Agenda*. In Rome: *The Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action*.

⁵⁰¹ For instance, the goal of Jomtien was to universalize basic education by the year 2000. New-York's plan of action also extended to the year 2000. Cairo had a 20-year action plan (to grant universal access to reproductive health "as

endorses the conference's report in a resolution⁵⁰² and designates the ECOSOC commission in charge of following-up on the conference to ensure its implementation by its set "target-date".

The conferences set a monitoring process in motion. Governments were asked to annually report back to the relevant commission. Accredited to these meetings, the NGO partners acted as watchdogs over their *gains*. They pressured governments to implement their "commitments" and prevented any reopening of the "consensus" on their "gains"⁵⁰³. As alluded to in chapter three, they considered the consensus to be *sealed* once it had been reached.

The second wave UN conference process claimed to have elaborated an agenda *for the 21st century*. They had a long-term perspective. Indicative of this perspective was the process' inclusion of "plus five", and at times "plus ten" and even "plus 20" or "plus 25" conferences⁵⁰⁴ purposed to monitor what it called the "progress made" in the implementation of their respective agendas. These follow-up conferences were "more" than merely intergovernmental in the sense that they involved a multiplicity of non-state actors. They will then be called "multi-stakeholder".

Conference process' ideological intent: strategies in the face of opposition

The rise of better organized ideological opposition to particular components of the new global agenda either stopped the conferences' follow-up process or turned it into conferences exclusively of the like-minded. This was illustriously the case at the Cairo+5 conference in The Hague in 1999, at the Cairo+10 conference in Amsterdam in 2004 or at the Cairo+25 conference in Nairobi in 2019, the purpose of all of which was to network exclusively among the unfailing advocates of sexual and reproductive health.

The other option in the face of opposition was to stop the holding of future world conferences for fear of any reopening of the already obtained "consensuses". As the gender feminist scholar Kristen Timothy deplored it in 2004, for example, "the lack of political will to prevent the rolling

soon as possible and no later than the year 2015", *Progr. of Action*, par 7.6) that was extended in 2010 (UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/65/234) and remains valid until 2030. Beijing's targets were to be met by the year 2000. Rome's target was to reduce by half the number of undernourished people no later than 2015.

⁵⁰² For example, UN General Assembly Res. 47/190 of December 22, 1992 endorsed the Rio Declaration and urged that necessary action be taken to provide effective follow-up. Or UN General Assembly Res. 48/121 of December 20, 1993 endorsed the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

⁵⁰³ The best governments could do in the subsequent intergovernmental processes was to try and avoid using this or that term.

⁵⁰⁴ Jomtien+5: the Mid-Decade Meeting of the International Consultative Forum on Education for All (Amman, Jordan, June 16-19, 1996) was a "multi-stakeholder" event (250 decision-makers from 73 countries, including ministers of education, and multilateral, and bilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations). Jomtien+10: the World Education Forum (Dakar, Senegal, April 2000) where participants demonstrated a collective commitment to action to achieve the goals and targets of Education for All by 2015. To appraise the implementation of Agenda 21, Rio had the largest number of follow-up conferences. Rio+5 was held in 1997 in New York during a special session of the General Assembly, which called for further action in Res. S-19/2. Rio+10 took place in the form of a conference: the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002. The conference expressed the same dissatisfaction regarding the implementation of Rio's environmental objectives and reaffirmed UN commitment to "full implementation" of Agenda 21. Other follow-up conferences included the 2009 UN Summit on Climate Change (Copenhagen), Rio+20 or the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio, June 13-22, 2012, with the participation of 180 world leaders, its outcome document being *The Future We Want*), the 2015 Sustainable Development Summit in New-York, all the "Conferences of the Parties" of Rio's UN *Framework Convention for Climate Change* or COPs, including COP 25 or the 2019 Santiago Climate Change Conference, and of course *Agenda 2030* and its SDGs. Cairo+5 took place at the Hague in 1999. Due to ideological opposition, Cairo+10 was not a regular intergovernmental event but a meeting of the ideologically-aligned in Amsterdam, and so was Cairo+25 in Nairobi. Rome+10 or the Rome Food Summit took place in June 2002 in Rome, as did the World Summit on Food Security in November 2009.

back of gains already made and the emergence/re-emergence of a conservative/religious agenda” which “are causing many women to question the viability of the UN as a political space for their activism”⁵⁰⁵. When the “holding a fifth world conference on women under the auspices of the UN” was being debated, Timothy observed “the uncertainty that prevails among women NGOs about the future”⁵⁰⁶. The fact is that there has been no fifth world conference, neither on women nor on population. This manifests the partners’ power over the holding of UN conferences. Incidentally, we note Timothy’s use of the word “gain”.

The partners’ gains vs. UN member states’ reservations

The goal of the conferences’ negotiations was to reach *consensus*. All the countries that had become UN member states by the time of a given conference and participated in it joined its respective consensus. But a significant number did so while making *reservations*: statements of non-alignment on specific points contained in the conference’s agenda. Countries’ *reservations* were frequently precisely on what the partners proclaimed to be *gains*: those components of their agenda that had been contentious during the negotiations and were inserted in the final documents. Reservations often revealed the points about which sovereign governments and the partners were in a tug of war. These comprised what some UN member states perceived as threats against, for example, national sovereignty, freedom, freedom of expression, the free market, parental rights, the nature of the family as based on marriage between a man and a woman, motherhood, sexual morality and the content of sexuality education, the right to life, male and female sexual identity... In the conferences’ aftermath, countries’ reservations tended to be overlooked. They were completely forgotten in the implementation phase, which focused exclusively on the alleged “consensus” and the “commitments” governments had or would have made. This indicated the partners’ victory against sovereign governments, the power they held over them in the global governance process.

4.2. Specific contribution of each conference to building global governance as content

The second section of this chapter aims at demonstrating, conference after conference, the leading role of the partners in the post-Cold War global consensus-building exercise and at evidencing the power mechanisms they used to achieve their gains.

4.2.1. Jomtien: putting education at the service of the new global agenda

The World Conference on Education for All - Meeting Basic Learning Needs (Jomtien, Thailand, March 5-9, 1990) was the first main UN conference taking place after the fall of the Berlin wall. Although Jomtien was not *per se* an intergovernmental conference – convened as it was by the executive heads of four UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO - the UN’s education agency - and the World Bank), in other words by *the partners*, not by the UN General Assembly -, we include it as the first milestone in the second wave of the UN conference process with regard to the central role education was then set to play in the global governance revolution⁵⁰⁷.

A reoriented and enlarged education for all paradigm

Participants in the Jomtien conference joined a consensus on an attractive *education for all* paradigm supposed to ensure equal and universal access to “quality basic education” by the year

⁵⁰⁵ Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵⁰⁶ Ib., p. 58.

⁵⁰⁷ Jomtien was cosponsored by 18 governments and organizations.

2000⁵⁰⁸. Since Jomtien, education for all has been a pillar of global governance's systemic content. Subsequent conferences included Jomtien's education for all and/or basic education in their platforms⁵⁰⁹. The 1945 UNESCO constitution included the *education for all* concept once. This constitution assumed a connection between *education for all* and an "unrestricted pursuit of objective truth"⁵¹⁰. Jomtien, by contradistinction, grafted itself not on the pursuit of truth – a perspective that had, by 1990, completely vanished from the UN's platform - but on the revolutionary "gains" that the global governance process had achieved during its Cold War gestational period. Using words such as stereotyp-, gender, partnerships, global, consensus, framework... Jomtien *reoriented* education for all by linking it to the emerging global platform. Subsequent conferences would advocate a complete education reform so as to align education along their global goals. Jomtien made a major contribution to the launch of global governance's partnerships' politics, which we will address in this thesis' part three.

Jomtien's quietly-but-radically redefined education for all paradigm resulted from a multidimensional *conceptual enlargement process* (called "broadening" in the Jomtien document). Jomtien *broadened*: first, the *concept and scope* of basic education beyond "knowledge" to include "skills, values and attitudes" (*Framework for Action*, Art. 1); secondly, the notion of children's "basic learning needs" beyond literacy to include "formal and non-formal education programmes in health, nutrition, population, agricultural techniques, the environment, science, technology, family life, including fertility awareness, and other societal issues" (*World Declaration on Education for All*, Art. 5); thirdly, the *scope* of education, making learning "lifelong", begin at birth with "initial education" provided not only by the family but also by "institutional programmes"; fourthly, the scope of the delivery system beyond formal education to non-formal education; lastly, the scope of the social actors to get involved in education for all. Jomtien coopted non-state actors, "all available instruments and channels of information, communications and social action", in the implementation of its novel, reinterpreted education for all programme. It encouraged the mobilization of the media to "realize their potential towards meeting basic education needs of all" (*World Declaration on Education for All*, Art. 5).

Education at the service of the novel paideia

Jomtien insisted that the enlargement processes we just listed "should constitute an *integrated system* [our emphasis] - complementary, mutually reinforcing, and of comparable standards" (*World Declaration on Education for All*, Art. 5). Jomtien's novel education for all paradigm was a *holistic system*. This system broke away from classical education. It tacitly ambitioned to substitute it with a new and global *paideia* ($\pi\alpha\delta\epsilon\alpha$) conforming to the sustainable development *ethos* and training "good citizens" at the global level. In this holistic system, the most radical agendas became inextricable from the more consensual or universally-acceptable ones.

Beyond education for all, Jomtien used a number of terms that became systemic features of global governance's platform, ethics and politics. Examples are "for all", "equal access", "universal access", "quality", "basic" (or "primary"), people's "needs", "skills", "non-formal", "broaden".

⁵⁰⁸ But the Education for All movement launched in Jomtien went beyond 2000 and is still operating today.

⁵⁰⁹ New-York, Rio, Cairo, Beijing and Istanbul integrated "education for all", and Vienna and Copenhagen, "basic education".

⁵¹⁰ The UNESCO constitution reads: "The States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, *in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth* [our emphasis], and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives."

These terms have underpinned global governance's education policies to this day⁵¹¹. Except for the “for all” expression, they were absent from the UN Charter⁵¹².

Particularly striking is Jomtien's introduction of the phrase *gender stereotyping* (*World Declaration on Education for All*, Art. 3, 3): an indisputable indication of the gender feminist anthropology of UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank, and the ideological direction they then sought to give education. UNFPA joined the “Education for All” initiative immediately after the Jomtien conference, becoming its fifth institutional partner. UNFPA then labored to consolidate the *linkage* between education (in which Jomtien specifically integrated population, “family life”, “fertility awareness”) and its sexuality education, gender training, education to sexual rights agendas. Through Jomtien's education for all movement, UNFPA has lobbied governments to infuse these agendas in the core curriculum at all levels. This rapidly became a groundswell globally affecting and changing the content of education.

The multidimensional “broadening” that Jomtien achieved made it possible for subsequent conferences to put education for all at the service of their respective platforms, whether it be children's rights, family planning, sustainable development, climate change, women's rights, reproductive and sexual health, the gender agenda, global citizenship and so on. All of these linkages, integrated in the Education for All movement that Jomtien launched, are scheduled to remain on the agenda of global governance until 2030⁵¹³. In Jomtien, education became a springboard for the realization of global governance's social, environmental, demographic, political, ethical and ideological objectives. It was the first milestone in a UN-launched process to “redo education from within” for sustainable development⁵¹⁴, spurred by the partners' conviction that people had to “own” the global agenda through education, otherwise nothing would happen. The partners therefore made it a priority to mobilize the education sector.

The Education for All movement coopted non-state “partners”. The five UN agencies behind this movement efficiently partnered in particular with trade unions such as Education International to streamline educational contents in the 1990s along the overall novel global agenda. Yielding to their pressure, many governments followed suit. Jomtien was a major turning point as regards education reform.

⁵¹¹ The targets of Sustainable Development Goal 4 on education include, for instance, the words “all girls and boys”, “quality primary and secondary education”, “equal access”, “quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education”, “skills”.

⁵¹² “For all” appeared eight times in the UN Charter mainly *in the context of human rights*. By contradistinction, global governance will apply it to its socioeconomic agenda – to quality of life, reproductive health and rights, health...

⁵¹³ See for instance Sustainable Development Goal 4, target 7: “By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development”.

⁵¹⁴ See Interview with Hans van Ginkel, Rector, United Nations University by Marguerite A. Peeters. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 191 of October 30, 2002, item 4. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. At the 2002 UN *Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development*, Ginkel laid out the UN's objective “to integrate sustainable development into the curriculum at all education levels and sectors is needed to ensure that students from primary to post-secondary are aware of its imperatives and respect its principles and values in their professions and as habits of everyday life”. He spoke to this author about the need for a “longitudinal type of curriculum development which starts very early and continues throughout school life” to “redo education from within” and which coopts NGOs, teachers' unions, governments in the process.

Since Jomtien, UNESCO has developed education for all guidelines that it has considered “globally normative”. It has elaborated contents or programs on “education for sustainable development”, “global citizenship education”, “civic education”, “human rights education”, “gender training”, “population education”⁵¹⁵, “comprehensive sexuality education”, “education for climate action”⁵¹⁶... At the end of the second wave conferences, at the 1996 City Summit, Federico Mayor, UNESCO’s Director-General during the global governance revolution (1987-99), announced that he had created a focal point in UNESCO’s Office of Programming and Evaluation⁵¹⁷ to follow-up on UN conferences and ensure the revision of budgets to effectively implement them. In Mayor’s view, the conferences provided guidelines for the “management of social transformation” required by the “new social contract” embodied in the sustainable development framework⁵¹⁸.

Education for All in the footsteps of Health for All

Through its “education for all” paradigm, Jomtien sought to accomplish in the area of education what the 1978 WHO Alma-Ata conference⁵¹⁹ had achieved through the adoption of the “health for all” paradigm. “Health for all” aimed to realize universal access to primary healthcare by the year 2000 – a goal now reconducted until 2030. Health for all has been WHO’s overarching goal, and primary health care, WHO’s top priority, since the 1978 launch of its Health for All strategy.

WHO’s strategy’s chief conceptualizer was Halfdan Mahler, at the time WHO Director-General. The World Health Assembly (WHA), i.e. WHO’s governing intergovernmental body, consented to his leadership. This demonstrates, as does the Jomtien conference itself, the critical lead that the directors or secretariat of UN agencies have not infrequently taken over their member states - a lead that is a defining feature of the global governance process. Mahler had rooted the health for all paradigm in an ethic of equity⁵²⁰ that WHO has ever since interpreted in the light of a collectivistic/socialist perspective. Education for all and health for all belong to the same

⁵¹⁵ In 1993, the agencies behind the Education for All movement - UNESCO, UNDP, the World Bank, UNICEF, UNFPA - requested the nine most populous countries of the world, including India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, to invest from their own budget 6% of their GNP to lower their population. At the Jomtien+5 conference, those countries had substantially increased their contribution to “population education”. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 36 of June 24, 1996, item 5. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

⁵¹⁶ See for example: UNESCO. *Education for Sustainable Development*. <https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-sustainable-development>. UNESCO. *Global Citizenship Education*. <https://en.unesco.org/themes/gced>. UNESCO. *Civic Education*. <https://atom.archives.unesco.org/civic-education>. UNESCO. *Human Rights Education*. <https://atom.archives.unesco.org/human-rights-education>. UNESCO. *Reimagining our futures together: a new social contract for education*; executive summary. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379381>. UNESCO. *Education and Gender Equality*. <https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-and-gender-equality>. UNESCO. *Population education in non-formal education and development programmes: a manual for field-workers*. <https://healtheducationresources.unesco.org/library/documents/population-education-non-formal-education-and-development-programmes-manual-field>. UNESCO. *Comprehensive Sexuality Education Implementation Toolkit*. <https://csetoolkit.unesco.org/toolkit/getting-started/what-comprehensive-sexuality-education>. UNESCO. *Education for Climate Action*. <https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-sustainable-development/cce> (retrieved October 27, 2021).

⁵¹⁷ An office created in 1988 under Mayor’s directorship. [UNESCO. Bureau of Studies, Programming and Evaluation - UNESCO Archives AtoM catalogue](#) (retrieved October 27, 2021).

⁵¹⁸ See *Interactive Information Services*. Report 36 of June 24, 1996 by Marguerite A. Peeters, item 7. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

⁵¹⁹ It is interesting that WHO chose the capital city of a Soviet Republic, Kazakhstan, to launch its socialist-grounded Health for All strategy.

⁵²⁰ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 40 of August 5, 1996 and Report 41 of August 12, 1996 regarding the dialectics between monotheistic ethics and WHO’s health-for-all ethics of equity.

philosophy and ethic. They have inspired the UN's development frameworks up to the SDGs⁵²¹. Both are social pillars of global governance's framework⁵²².

4.2.2. New-York: linking children's rights to sustainable development

Since the end of World War I, individuals and NGOs had taken the lead in introducing the idea that children should have rights and in addressing this theme internationally⁵²³. The 1959 UN *General Assembly Declaration of the Rights of the Child* marked the first important, although non-binding, international agreement on the fundamental principles of children's rights. Non-state actors played a leading role in UNESCO's International Year of the Child (1979)⁵²⁴. In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Granting children legal rights, it was a revolutionary breakthrough⁵²⁵. The convention entered into force two weeks before the 1990 World Summit for Children was held in New-York September 29-30, 1990, six months after Jomtien. Convened at the highest level of political commitment, the largest-ever gathering of heads of states and governments addressing the "well-being" of children was the first in the series of post-Cold War UN summits⁵²⁶.

New-York's language indicates the summit's grafting onto the global governance process. The conference used terms such as global, partnership, quality of life, sustainable development, consensus, food security, family planning, empowerment, gender, enhancement of women's status, basic services, basic education, education for all, primary health care, "universal access". It included family planning in "basic services". The specific contribution of New-York to global governance as content was to *link* children's well-being and rights to these novel agendas and to integrate them in a single, *enlarged*, holistic package.

As the second wave conferences unfolded, UN agencies – chief among them UNICEF - and their non-governmental partners watched over the integration of the New-York summit's goals with those of the other conferences. After Cairo and Beijing, UNICEF will accelerate its

⁵²¹ Sustainable Development Goal 3: "Ensure healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages". And Sustainable Development Goal 4: "Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all".

⁵²² "The new Director-General of the World Health Organization has stated that one of his top priorities is 'Health for all' saying that 'ensuring universal health coverage without impoverishment is the foundation for achieving the health objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals – because when people are healthy, their families, communities and countries benefit. Our top priority must be to support national health authorities' efforts to strengthen all the building blocks of health systems and to enact policies aimed at ensuring health care is equitable and affordable for all'". From WHO Drug Information Vol. 32, No. 3, 2018. <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/330904> (retrieved May 4, 2022).

⁵²³ Save the Children, launched in 1919 in London by Eglantyne Jebb, was the first international movement for children. Jebb is credited for introducing the idea that children should have rights. Save the Children International got ECOSOC accreditation status in 1993.

⁵²⁴ Archer, Angus. *The Vision of the Project. Preface*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵²⁵ See Interview with Rebecca Rios, UNICEF Chief, Child Rights and Public Policy Section, by Marguerite A. Peeters. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 27 of April 26, 1996, items 1, 2 and 3. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. Rebecca Rios admitted in our January 25, 1996 interview that it was "a revolutionary idea that children have rights". We asked her whether UNICEF was "enlarging" its interpretation of the CRC in the light of the language of the second wave UN conferences. The answer was "yes", because, since these conferences, "there is a better understanding of human rights in general". According to Rios, the Cairo Conference talked about "basic human rights for women, the same for Beijing".

⁵²⁶ In 1989, the heads of governments of five countries (Canada, Egypt, Mali, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden) proposed to hold a Children Summit. UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar adopted their project. He entrusted UNICEF, among other organizations, to support it.

mainstreaming of reproductive health⁵²⁷ and gender, thereby linking the “well-being” and “rights” of children to global governance’s most controversial agendas.

4.2.3. Rio: establishing global governance’s systemic framework

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992) was “a major landmark on the road to global governance”⁵²⁸. Then and there, global governance’s systemic content - sustainable development as the framework of its overall political platform - and its process - the new partnerships politics - became the object of a proclaimed *global consensus* joined by 178 UN member states. Rio was in that sense the most critical and defining conference of the global governance revolution.

The UNCED procured a systemic agenda for the post-Cold War new world order: *Agenda 21*. Agenda 21 is supposed to continue framing and governing international cooperation until at least 2030, since the SDGs incorporate the language and objectives of Agenda 21. To what extent did Agenda 21 stem from the proactive initiative of “the partners”, not primarily from that of sovereign UN member states? We will try and answer that question in this section.

A systemic agenda for the 21st century

The UNCED offered post-Cold War humanity not only a “global blueprint” or a “roadmap” for sustainable development, but a global *agenda for change*. Agenda 21⁵²⁹ made it explicit by its very name that it was an *agenda* for the 21st century. Pervasive in the document was the emphasis on agenda, change, acceleration, action, results, delivery, monitoring⁵³⁰. As Gustave Speth, then Director of the WRI (which together with the IUCN, substantially contributed to set the Summit’s agenda), put it in a 1992 *Foreign Policy* article, Agenda 21 was “an impressively detailed manual that translates the vague concept of sustainable development into workable policies and programs”⁵³¹. Speth, interestingly, here reckoned the *vagueness* of the concept. The Earth Summit urged political actors at all levels (international, national, regional and local) to get actively involved and to commit. It called on all countries to create a *national plan for sustainable*

⁵²⁷ See January 25, 1996 interview with Rebecca Rios, UNICEF Chief, Child Rights and Public Policy Section, by Marguerite A. Peeters, op. cit. In 1996, UNICEF was developing a strategy to focus on the health of the teen-age girl, on her “reproductive health”, admitted Rebecca Rios, even if the expression as such is not present in the Convention. The strategy was “based on studies and the needs of girls, on the work we have been doing for many years, pointing out the need of young girls to be protected against unwanted pregnancies,” she explained. UNICEF was focusing on this “from the education and health perspective”, not necessarily from a “rights perspective”. But for UNICEF, education and health were rights. Rios spoke of “the right to health, to have access to health services. So our concern about young girls’ health has to take into account her reproductive implications.”

⁵²⁸ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 88.

⁵²⁹ A 350 pages document divided into 40 chapters, themselves grouped into 4 sections: 1. Social and Economic Dimensions (combating poverty, changing consumption patterns, promoting health, achieving a more sustainable population, and sustainable settlement in decision making); 2. Conservation and Management of Resources for Development (atmospheric protection, combating deforestation, protecting fragile environments, conservation of biodiversity, control of pollution and the management of biotechnology, and radioactive wastes); 3. Strengthening the Role of Major Groups; 4. Means of Implementation (science, technology transfer, education, international institutions, and financial mechanisms). The issues the UNCED addressed included systematic scrutiny of patterns of production, particularly the production of toxic components, alternative sources of energy to replace the use of fossil fuels which the Rio conference connected to climate change, new reliance on public transportation systems in order to reduce vehicle emissions, the growing usage and limited supply of water.

⁵³⁰ The document mentioned *agenda* (205), *change* (252), *accelerat-* (31), *framework* (103), *implementation* (746), the root *monitor-* (144).

⁵³¹ Speth, James Gustave. *A Post-Rio Compact*. Foreign Policy N° 88. Autumn 1992, pp. 145-6. See <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149323> (retrieved April 2, 2020).

development consistent with the 27 principles of the *Declaration*⁵³². It furthermore requested every local government to draw its own “Local Agenda 21” (LA21)⁵³³. At the UNCED, the global governance revolution was gaining ruthless momentum.

Decisive was Rio in building the global governance agenda *as a system* through a series of *linkages*. Building on the 1972 Stockholm conference, Rio explicitly and definitively *tied* socioeconomic development to environmental protection⁵³⁴ - the former belonging to the mandate of the UN (UN Charter Art. 55), as opposed to the latter: sustainable development holistically *enlarged* development by integrating social and environmental parameters. Rio furthermore unequivocally reinforced global governance’s foundational linkage between sustainability and the UN’s population policies. It made it clear that the elimination of “unsustainable patterns of production and consumption” went along with “appropriate demographic policies” (Decl., Principle 8) and introduced for the first time the concept of “reproductive health” (10 uses) in the UN conference process. It linked sustainable development to the feminists’ gender perspective⁵³⁵ (18 uses of gender, and two of stereotyp-). Rio not only interlinked socioeconomic, environmental and population issues within its system, but also lifestyles (consumption behavior), ethical and even spiritual issues.

A watershed: unprecedented involvement of NGOs

The UNCED was a watershed for global governance as *process*. Analysis of the new partnerships politics is the object of this thesis’ part three. A few words about this development are legitimate here to the extent that Agenda 21 dedicated one of its four major sections to strengthening partnerships. Partnerships were therefore a major component of Rio’s agenda, of global governance *as content*.

Rio created a new political category, which it called *Major Groups* and was comprised of nine subgroups identified as partners in sustainable development. Agenda 21 imposed itself as a platform, not only for UN member states, but for all major actors in society and for all “the

⁵³² Intergovernmental negotiations on the Declaration were extremely difficult. The final text was produced through the forceful intervention of the chairman of the Main Committee, Tommy Koh (1990-92). After Rio, a majority of countries set up an advisory group to promote dialogue between government officials, businessmen, environmentalists and other key players on national policy. In the US, for instance, Executive Order 12852 of June 29, 1993 (under Bill Clinton) established the President’s Council on Sustainable Development: a multi-stakeholder structure charged with recommending a national action plan for sustainable development to the President. The council issued its report in 1996: *Sustainable America: A New Consensus*. One of its ten goals was population stabilization. The report read: “A sustainable America is one where all Americans have access to... reproductive health services” (p. 141). The council was terminated by Executive Order 23238 of September 30, 1999. Among its members were Dianne Dillon-Ridgley, then Executive Director of WEDO, Michelle Perrault, then International Vice President of Sierra Club, and Jay D. Hair, President of the World Conservation Union (1994-96). It is further evidence of the level of cooptation we have observed all along the global governance process that the council would be presided by Jonathan Lash, Speth’s successor as Director of the WRI.

⁵³³ See Agenda 21’s chapter 28. Europe is the continent where LA21 has been most implemented. The most striking example is Sweden, where all local governments have a Local Agenda 21 initiative. The Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) currently counts “1,750 local and regional governments committed to sustainable urban development”, representing over 25% of the global urban population https://iclei.org/en/our_network.html (retrieved June 2, 2020).

⁵³⁴ Principle 4 of the Declaration read: “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.” And: “Agenda 21 ... reflects a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level on development and environment cooperation”. *Rio Decl.*, op. cit.

⁵³⁵ Maurice Strong had appointed a gender adviser for the Rio preparatory process.

people” transnationally. The *Rio Declaration* addressed itself directly, not only to States, but to “States and people”⁵³⁶. Rio thereby *enlarged* the UN into global governance.

The involvement of NGOs, experts and other non-state actors in the Rio process since its inception and the influence they wielded were unprecedented in the history of UN conferences⁵³⁷. Maurice Strong, the conference’s Secretary-General, observed when closing the summit that “no international conference of governments had enjoyed a broader range of participation and greater contributions from NGOs than this one”⁵³⁸. Immediately after the Earth Summit, Gustave Speth stated in the already mentioned article in *Foreign Policy*:

“Rio signaled the rise of an increasingly powerful group in international diplomacy: non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Earth Summit brought together an international community of scientists, policy experts, business groups, and activists representing a wide array of interests. Although far from cohesive themselves, NGOs worked together surprisingly well throughout the summit process, lobbying and educating delegates, helping draft agreements, and communicating with the 9,000 journalists who covered Rio”⁵³⁹.

The “educator” and “drafting” roles Speth assigned these non-state actors was particularly revealing of the partners’ mindset: ignorant politicians must submit to global experts as to the “enlightened despots” of the post-Cold War era.

Nitin Desai, the summit’s Deputy Secretary-General (1990-93), authoritatively observed in 1994 the *visionary, expertise and policy-making* role NGOs had played in the Rio process:

“NGOs and, more generally, organizations of the civil society no longer simply have a ‘consumer relationship’ with the United Nations. They have increasingly assumed the role of promoters of new ideas, they have alerted the international community to emerging issues, and they have developed expertise and talent, which, in an increasing number of areas, have become vital to the work of the United Nations both at the policy and operational levels. If we recall the process of the preparations for the Earth Summit, we can see very clearly that their contributions were essential to the shaping of the agenda”⁵⁴⁰.

Speth and Desai were two strategic players in the global governance revolution. As senior UN officials they both acknowledged the breakthrough environmental, development and ecofeminist NGOs achieved in Rio. They welcomed the political role that NGOs self-assigned and grabbed. What is more, they implicitly or explicitly considered NGOs to be “vital” as agenda-setters,

⁵³⁶ Principle 27 of the Declaration committed “States and people” to “cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable development”. *Rio Decl.*, op. cit.

⁵³⁷ At Rio NGOs wielded an influence that was, according to Sally Morphet, “much more extensive than seems to have been the case at Stockholm”. Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 138. Diane Dillon-Ridgley, President of Zero Population Growth, told this author that this “quote civil society revolution started and turned a significant corner with the 1992 Rio Conference.” Diane Dillon-Ridgley was a Member of the US delegations to Rio, Istanbul, UNGASS-’97 and Johannesburg. She was also associated to WEDO, of which she had been chief executive officer. And see *Interactive Information Services*. Report 35 of June 21, 1996, item 2. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

⁵³⁸ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 136.

⁵³⁹ Speth, James Gustave. *A Post-Rio Compact*, op. cit., p. 146.

⁵⁴⁰ Desai, Nitin. *Address to the Organizational Session of the Open-Ended Working Group of ECOSOC on the Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations*. February 17, 1994.

visionaries, experts, policy-makers, awareness-raisers, educators of official delegates, and leaders in implementation within the sustainable development framework.

When opening the Earth Summit, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced that NGOs “should have a critical role in the follow-up activities”⁵⁴¹. Maurice Strong recommended at the end of the conference to “expand the participatory process that has meant so much to us here - participation of people through non-governmental organizations in the implementation of Agenda 21, and indeed in the United Nations itself”⁵⁴². Strong suggested “to review entirely the system of arrangements within the United Nations for greater participation of these organizations”⁵⁴³. His recommendation of a *formal* review did not lead to anything substantial, but this did not prevent the revolution from achieving its goals and moving forward informally with tremendous efficiency.

The creation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) on the eve of the UNCED reflected how international cooperation was then in the throes of a political revolution. The GEF was established as an independently operating financial organization of a multi-stakeholder nature, gathering 183 countries in partnership with international institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the private sector. The purpose of the new organization was to support projects relating to what it called “global environmental issues” such as climate change, biodiversity, the ozone layer, food security, sustainable cities, land degradation, international waters and to serve as financial mechanism for several conventions, including the three conventions opened for signature at Rio. The GEF was also to support national sustainable development initiatives. The GEF was to operate as per the power-sharing principles of global governance and at its exclusive service.

Changing ECOSOC accreditation rules, at the urging of NGOs, for the Rio PrepComs

Let us now observe the influence that environmental and ecofeminist NGOs concretely exercised on the UNCED during the conference’s preparatory process. NGOs’ first gain was to obtain that the four Rio PrepComs (1990-92) open wide their doors to them - that is, beyond NGOs in ECOSOC consultative status⁵⁴⁴, transgressing the Council’s standard accreditation rules.

Jyoti Shankar Singh, a long-time UNFPA official, described how this change of accreditation procedures took place:

“Hundreds of environmental and development NGOs were interested in the preparatory process for the UNCED and many had no official status with the UN. The Preparatory Committee for the UNCED, *at the urging of NGOs* [our emphasis], established *its own criteria* [Ib.] for accrediting NGOs to the Preparatory Committee and the Rio Conference and decided to admit on a provisional basis a very large number of such NGOs that were not on the ECOSOC list”.

⁵⁴¹ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 136.

⁵⁴² Ib., p. 137, quoting from *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. UN document A/CONF.151/26 (vol. IV), p. 74.

⁵⁴³ Ib., p. 137, quoting from *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. UN document A/CONF.151/26 (vol. IV), p. 74.

⁵⁴⁴ In decision 1/1, PrepCom I allowed, as in Stockholm, “concerned NGOs” to participate as observers “as long as they were directly interested in the matters discussed at the Conference, even if they were not in consultative status with ECOSOC”. Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., pp. 134-35. (Decision 1/1 was adopted on August 14, 1990, see Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UNCED, UN Doc. A/45/46, pp. 22-3).

The Rio practice, pursued Singh, “set a precedent for the ICPD and several other major UN conferences”⁵⁴⁵. NGOs *demanded* more power and influence. They grabbed power in ways that circumvented intergovernmental control. The UN Secretariat stood on their side, not on that of sovereign governments.

As a result of Rio’s specific accreditation procedures, an unprecedented number of NGOs participated in the PrepComs as observers. They got involved from the beginning - from the agenda-setting stage. The IUCN and the WRI coordinated NGOs. Serving as illustration of the level of cooptation existing among the partners, the person acting as NGO liaison at the Rio Earth Summit, the Ecuadorian Yolanda Kakabadze, later became President of the IUCN (1996-2004), President of the WWF (2010-2017), and a trustee of the Ford Foundation.

NGOs abundantly used then nascent electronic networks (igc.org) so as to prepare for the NGO Forum (which took place a week before the official conference) and to channel information to and from the UNCED agenda planners.

Maurice Strong, IUCN and NGOs as agenda-setters

Maurice Strong, the Secretary-General of the Earth Summit, the globalist environmental movement’s leading trailblazer, was an unconditional supporter of IUCN’s self-attributed role in environmental policy-making. Upon Strong’s death in 2015, IUCN recalled that Strong had been “IUCN Patron of Nature and former IUCN Councillor” and identified him as “the torchbearer for the cause of sustainable development – as visionary, humanist, teacher, businessman and diplomat, as well as a global thought and action leader”⁵⁴⁶. As a reminder, IUCN was the “heavyweight”⁵⁴⁷ hybrid umbrella organization created in 1948 by Julian Huxley to whom the UN’s initial interest in environmental issues can be attributed. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the International Institute for Environment and Development, the WRI and the World Wild Fund (WWF), *inter alia*, were members of the IUCN at the time of the UNCED process.

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez De Cuéllar asked Strong to lead “an ad hoc secretariat to support the work of the Preparatory Committee”⁵⁴⁸, which was chaired by Ambassador Tommy Koh. Upon the advice of this ad hoc secretariat, Koh called upon the IUCN to help in the preparatory process. Sally Morphet affirmed: “Subsequently IUCN staff worked with Maurice Strong and his team in drafting the final conference document, Agenda 21”⁵⁴⁹. Agenda 21 drew on two strategic documents, to which IUCN had both substantially contributed as leading co-author. The first was *Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living*⁵⁵⁰ issued by IUCN/UNEP/WWF in 1991: the second edition of the *World Conservation Strategy* that had, in

⁵⁴⁵ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

⁵⁴⁶ <https://www.iucn.org/pt/node/18825> (retrieved September 6, 2020).

⁵⁴⁷ Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 138. Illustrating the important UN recognition of IUCN, IUCN’s President, Martin Holdgate addressed the intergovernmental plenary session at the UNCED, where he underlined “the need for new partnerships in the pursuit of sustainable development”. Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 136. After his retirement from IUCN, Holdgate would become Secretary of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Board on Sustainable Development: another example of cooptation. IUCN, one of the most influential organizations, now has a membership of over 1,400 governmental and non-governmental organizations.

⁵⁴⁸ Ib., p. 134.

⁵⁴⁹ Ib., p. 134.

⁵⁵⁰ The second edition enjoyed the collaboration of a number of international organizations (intergovernmental and NGOs), including FAO, ILO, Habitat, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, The World Bank, WHO, WRI. This manifests how “consensual” IUCN’s perspective had become within and outside the UN by 1991. The first edition only had FAO and UNESCO as collaborators. Both reports were co-authored by Robert Prescott-Allen.

1980, first introduced the sustainable development paradigm⁵⁵¹. The renewed strategy benefitted from a larger collaboration of the UN system, notably of the UNFPA, the UNDP (created in 1965) and the WHO, and of other partners, among which the WRI (founded in 1982 by Gustave Speth, and that Maurice Strong would chair after the Rio conference). It used much of the language that would impose itself in the second wave conference process. It established *targets* for change and *indicators* for sustainability, stressing the need to “measure progress” toward the objective of sustainability.

The second strategic document that Agenda 21 drew on was *Global Biodiversity Strategy*, put out in 1992 by UNEP/IUCN/WRI, in consultation with FAO and UNESCO. IUCN and ICSU helped shape not only Agenda 21, but also two of the conventions that Rio opened for signature: the *Framework Convention on Climate Change* (FCCC)⁵⁵² and the *Convention on Biological Diversity* (CBD)⁵⁵³.

Bella Abzug, the Women’s Caucus and the gender ecofeminist influence at the UNCED

British author Thomas Harding observed that in Rio, “environmental groups became more sensitive to *integrating* [our emphasis] social awareness into their ecological thinking”. Harding commented that this linkage occurred “mainly as a result of pressure... from women’s groups angry that reproductive rights were being placed below consumption issues in the debate over population”⁵⁵⁴. These feminist groups had themselves linked their agenda to that of the transnational environmental movement: they were gender ecofeminist. We observe again how non-state actors proactively led the linkages process that constituted sustainable development as systemic content. The gender feminist NGOs had constituted themselves in a belligerent lobby: the Women’s Caucus⁵⁵⁵. The caucus became a dominant political force at the UNCED.

The Women’s Caucus made unrelenting efforts at the UNCED to integrate women’s empowerment, women’s rights, non-discrimination, gender, reproductive health... into *Agenda 21* and the sustainable development framework. The caucus, asserted Singh⁵⁵⁶, “was extremely

⁵⁵¹ The two documents share an interesting front page logo, in which three pyramids are fitted into each other, the top one larger and more luminous than the other two, all of them contained within an encompassing circle. They explain the symbol in this way: “The circle symbolizes the biosphere – the thin covering of the planet that contains and sustains life. The three interlocking, overlapping arrows symbolize the three objectives of conservation: maintenance of essential ecological processes and life-support systems; preservation of genetic diversity; sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems.”

⁵⁵² These treaties created a “Conference of the Parties” (COP): a permanent body of delegates having the authority to adopt protocols through which to implement and administer the treaty. At the end of *the Earth Summit*, 154 countries had signed the climate convention and 156 had signed the biodiversity convention. The *Climate Change Convention* led to the Kyoto Protocol (1997, effective February 16, 2005 after ratification by 55 states parties to the convention) and to the Paris Agreement (drafted November 30-December 12, 2015 and signed April 22, 2016).

⁵⁵³ The UNCED opened for signature three legally binding agreements. In addition to the two mentioned above, the *United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification*.

⁵⁵⁴ Willetts, Peter. *Introduction*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 13, quoting Thomas Harding. *Mocking the Turtle*. New Statesman and Society. September 24, 1993, pp. 45-6.

⁵⁵⁵ PrepCom IV “seems to have been particularly important in the context of women’s issues”. Morphet, Sally. *NGOs and the Environment*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 135.

⁵⁵⁶ Even if ideologically biased, Singh is an authoritative reference in the area of population control and reproductive health. Singh’s career was one of engagement in UN population activities. It included: UNFPA liaison officer (1972-73), Assistant Executive Secretary World Population Year (1973-74), Executive Coordinator UN International Conference on Population (Mexico 1982-84), Executive Coordinator UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1992-94), Chairman *The Earth Times* (1996-98), Special Adviser to UNFPA Executive Director (1996-99).

effective in promoting many women's concerns in the UNCED preparatory process" and "was able to get a number of major proposals included in Agenda 21"⁵⁵⁷.

The Women's Caucus continued to exert massive influence at subsequent conferences. Given its leadership role in the global governance revolution, it is necessary to say a few words about its origins, agenda, strategy, and the Machiavellian genius of its foundress and leader, Bella Abzug (1920-1998)⁵⁵⁸. Abzug was a hardline American feminist and pro-gay rights advocate, whose pro-Soviet stance since World War II and communist affiliation before she engaged in the radical left sexual liberation movement in the US is worth mentioning.

In 1990, Abzug founded the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)⁵⁵⁹ with a view to mobilizing the participation of female "gender" activists in the international UN conferences of the 1990s. WEDO was the leading force of the Women's World Congress for a Healthy Planet (Miami, November 8-12, 1991)⁵⁶⁰ where the Women's Caucus was launched and prepared its agenda for the UNCED: the *Women's Action Agenda 21*. This strategic document included "a clear statement on women's reproductive health issues", advocating women's "reproductive freedom" and demanding "women-centred, women-managed comprehensive reproductive health care and family planning, including the right to prenatal care, safe and legal voluntary contraception and abortion, sex education and abortion (WEDO 1992:20)"⁵⁶¹. Incidentally, Abzug was a leading advocate of the shift from institutions to "people" – a shift that became a hallmark of the global governance revolution. She claimed she wanted "that societies function for people and not for institutions alone"⁵⁶². As per the new global ethics, reproductive rights and gender equality would be "people-centered", "on the side of people". WEDO remained the Women Caucus' powerhouse all along. The caucus also counted other extremely aggressive NGO representatives among its participants, such as those coming from the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).

In an interview on March 6, 1995⁵⁶³, "Battling Bella" as the pugnacious and colorful Bella Abzug was nicknamed, exposed the strategy and methodology that she, WEDO and the Women's Caucus used to reach the goals they were pursuing in the second wave UN conferences at and since Rio. The strategy comprised five major steps: agenda-setting; establishment of a political pressure group; highly organized and bellicose lobbying; formation of an operational and structured partnership with actors external to the caucus (UN and UN member states); self-positioning as watchdogs.

Gender ecofeminists, under the charismatic leadership of Bella Abzug, started by carefully defining the contours of their own agenda. Abzug attributed great importance, on the one hand,

⁵⁵⁷ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵⁵⁸ Bella Abzug (1920-98) was a US social activist, leader in the women's movement, cofounder of the National Women's Political Caucus with Gloria Steinem, Betty Friedan and others, one of the first members of the US Congress to support gay rights, supporter of Zionism, socialist. In 1974, together with Democratic New York City Representative, Ed Koch, she introduced the Equality Act of 1974, the first US federal gay rights bill.

⁵⁵⁹ WEDO grew out of Women's Foreign Policy Council/Women USA Fund Inc.

⁵⁶⁰ The Miami congress was organized by the Women's International Policy Action Committee (IPAC), itself established by the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO). It was attended by almost 1,500 women from 83 countries.

⁵⁶¹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 132. According to Singh, "Several NGO representatives meeting in Rio at the same time prepared what was called the NGO Treaty on Population, Environment and Development." (Ib., p. 108).

⁵⁶² Appendix E. Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁵⁶³ Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit. All Bella Abzug quotes in the following paragraphs come from this interview.

to strategically choosing or forging the language that would convey the gender ecofeminist agenda, and on the other, to a careful reflection on how to *link* this agenda to the UN conferences' broader environmental, human rights and development framework and hide it within holistic new paradigms. *Language* and *linkages* occupied a central place in the Women's Caucus' strategy and methodology, as it did in the overall global governance revolution.

Once the agenda, its specific language and the linkages strategy had been set, gender ecofeminists constituted *a lobby*. They gave it a name: the Women's Caucus. Abzug described the process: "We build big constituencies that are organized, *have a political drive* and that will be able to exert pressure even in those countries that have traditional, cultural and social conditions which move in the opposite direction in giving women equality". Nothing would stop Abzug. She wanted, through the constitution of "big constituencies" (a word she seems to have introduced in global governance's vocabulary), to have "a greater militancy, a greater demand, a greater determination to have things change". Abzug's "big constituencies" - the numerous members of the caucus who flooded the second wave UN conferences - in reality represented an infinitesimal minority with respect to the world's women. The apparent numerical factor and the absolute determination of the revolution's agents (loud voice, political skills, ruthlessness, tenacity, perseverance) contributed to the Women's Caucus' historic "gains" during the revolution.

Once established as a lobby, the Women's Caucus tirelessly engaged in *political activism*. The caucus was extremely organized. It used brutal methods, advancing forward in bulldozer fashion without ever conceding anything. The caucus strategically claimed to represent all the world's women so as to occupy the whole ground, leaving no space for opposition or pluralism. Day in and day out, each step of the way, the caucus monitored intergovernmental negotiations, both at the PrepComs and at the conferences' meetings. It reacted immediately to intergovernmental documents, producing lists of carefully worded amendments which became its lobbying tools. The caucus lobbied both the ideologically supportive UN Secretariat (upstream), and all national delegations - whether ideologically like-minded or not. It championed political engagement. Abzug boasted that while not being "part of the official", by which she meant being only "an NGO, WEDO", the caucus was "very successful" at changing official (intergovernmental) document policies. As it indeed turned out, the caucus' reproductive rights, ecofeminist and gender agendas did become the conferences' agendas and the object of an intergovernmental consensus: the example *par excellence* of the revolution this thesis addresses.

Through its proactive political leadership, the Women's Caucus acquired a "status". It filled the vacuum left by the unengaged. Abzug alleged the caucus created a "need" for its documents: national delegations, she claimed, "wanted" them and used them. To the extent they did so, they put themselves in the effective dependence of NGOs pursuing radical agendas. An operational partnership quickly developed between the caucus, the UN Secretariat and willing national delegations. This partnership imposed itself as a seemingly invincible political force. Self-qualifying as *experts*, the caucus' members "demanded" – the verb Abzug used - to be "treated as *partners*". Abzug boasted that "partnerships" were in the conferences' outcome documents "because we [the caucus] demanded it". Hence the supposedly "intergovernmental consensus" on "partnership" with non-state actors originated, not in the will of UN member states, not in intergovernmental negotiations, but in these non-state actors' adamant "demand". This finding is at the core of our thesis' argument, at the core of the global governance revolution.

The last step was for the Women's Caucus NGOs to act as governments' *watchdogs* – a word belonging to Abzug's vocabulary that would soon integrate UN policy documents. The caucus relentlessly pressured governments to implement the "commitments" they would have made (i.e.

the “commitments” they made under the caucus’ pressure): “We have good language. Now we want the music”, chanted Abzug. History has shown that the caucus would largely obtain the “music” that it wanted.

Abzug repeatedly used the verb “demand” and “want” to qualify the attitude of the non-governmental caucus’ participants. These non-state actors posited themselves above UN member states. They acted as if they were the process’ *executive*. They “demanded” the language and provisions that they “wanted” in the documents, the right to speak at the Plenary, to be treated *as governments’ partners*, and that governments implement their agenda. Without Battling Bella, without her political genius, unbeaten drive and combative spirit, the outcome of the second wave UN conferences would have been very different. Abzug illustrates the power one single individual can wield in the course of history, and corroborates our thesis’ finding regarding the leadership of just a few individuals in the global governance revolution.

Rio’s spiritual component: Baha’is’ globalism and Wisdom Keepers’ neo-paganism

Global governance’s environmental agenda came along with a spiritual component that originated in Julian Huxley’s spiritualism, naturalism and neo-Darwinism, and broke through at the UNCED⁵⁶⁴. The integration of this spiritual element principally came from two related movements: Baha’ism and neo-paganism.

According to some sources⁵⁶⁵, Maurice Strong was connected to the Baha’is. The Baha’is have been in a close collaborative relationship with the UN from the organization’s early days. Their NGO, Baha’i International Community, was registered with the UN as an NGO in 1948 and gained ECOSOC accreditation status in 1970. The Baha’is believe in the unity of all people, in a unified world order, in the unity of religion⁵⁶⁶, and in the role the UN could play to bring this unification agenda about. This has made many of them unconditional supporters of global governance, and explains their active presence in the UN’s post-Cold War conference process.

Already in 1936, Shoghi Effendi, head of the Baha’i religion from 1921 to 1957⁵⁶⁷, had called for the permanent establishment of a “machinery” that would incarnate the oneness of humanity:

“World unity is the goal towards which a harassed humanity is striving. Nation-building has come to an end. The anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving towards a climax. A world, growing to maturity, must abandon this fetish, recognize the oneness and wholeness of human relationships, and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this fundamental principle of its life”⁵⁶⁸.

⁵⁶⁴ See IUCN’s relationship to spirituality at, for instance <https://www.iucn.org/commissions/commission-environmental-economic-and-social-policy/our-work/religion-spirituality-environmental-conservation-and-climate-justice> (retrieved February 5, 2022).

⁵⁶⁵ This thesis could not verify the claim made by some sources that Strong was a devout Baha’i. It appears at least certain that Strong had a great appreciation for the Baha’is. As read Arthur Dahl’s obituary: “He had a great appreciation for the Baha’is, and when my wife wanted to interview him for a film on Baha’u’llah that she was making for the Holy Year 1992 (*Baha’u’llah, Secret of the Century*), he agreed immediately to the interview”. See Dahl, Arthur. Maurice Strong (1929-2015). November 28, 2015. [Maurice Strong \(yabaha.net\)](http://yabaha.net) (retrieved May 17, 2022).

⁵⁶⁶ In 2005 the Baha’is published a document entitled *One Common Faith*. See <https://www.bahai.org/library/other-literature/official-statements-commentaries/one-common-faith/> (retrieved February 5, 2022).

⁵⁶⁷ Grandson of Abdu’l-Bahá (1844–1921) who was himself the son of Bahá’u’lláh (1817–1892), who claimed to be the prophet announced by the Báb (1819–1850).

⁵⁶⁸ This quote is reproduced on page one of “Turning point for all nations” – a brochure put out by the Baha’is on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN.

The “machinery” that Strong contributed so critically to bring about has been in a tug of war with state sovereignty, nations and nation-states since the inception of the global governance revolutionary process.

At the UNCED Hanne Strong⁵⁶⁹, wife of Maurice Strong, launched the Wisdom Keepers group with the goal of adding a spiritual component to the Rio “consensus” and bringing about “spiritually based environmental education” serving the sustainable development agenda. The Wisdom Keepers produced the *Rio Declaration of the Sacred Earth Gathering*: an alarmist, profoundly pessimistic document urging “the World Community” (an nonexistent entity) to “act speedily with vision and resolution to preserve the Earth, Nature and humanity from disaster”. For Wisdom Keepers, “the time” to do so was “now. Now or never.” To be noted is how the declaration capitalized both the earth and nature, but not humanity. The *Declaration*’s advocacy for a “renewed respect for the superior law of Divine Nature”⁵⁷⁰, and its statement that “the universe is sacred because all is one” betrayed its neo-pagan, naturalistic or pantheistic spirituality – quite reminiscent of Julian Huxley’s “applied spiritual ecology” that was in Huxley’s view to replace the world’s great religions⁵⁷¹. The spiritual component coming from this informal group transpired in the preamble of the *Rio Declaration*, which recognized “the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home” – the “Earth” being capitalized.

The integration of a spiritual component in global governance’s systemic agenda reveals that nothing escaped the revolution’s holistic, all-inclusive dynamic. This dynamic has interlinked the Wisdom Keepers’ “spirituality” and all components of sustainable development. Global governance’s “spirituality” completely accords with components of the new agenda pertaining to human sexuality that other great religious traditions, especially Christianity, would consider immoral.

Outlines of the new world order: sustainable development, global governance, global human security

A few months after the UNCED, Gustave Speth laid down in specific terms, in his 1992 *Foreign Policy* article, how he considered “the outlines of the new world order” to have become “clear”⁵⁷² at the Earth Summit. Speth displayed his undivided support for global governance and its new ethics⁵⁷³.

Speth built on Willy Brandt’s advocacy for an *enlarged* security concept. Rio, in his view, concentrated on “environmental security”, and by so doing contributed to shifting the goal of diplomacy “from conflict management to common endeavor”⁵⁷⁴. In Speth’s view, President

⁵⁶⁹ Hanne Strong is also President of the Manitou Foundation, which she founded with her husband in 1988 “to honor and develop the human spirit and to bring about a sustainable world”, and of the Manitou Institute, initiated in 1994. The Wisdom Keepers and The Manitou Foundation remain active today. See <https://www.wisdomkeepers.earth/> and <http://manitou.org/foundation/about/> (retrieved February 5, 2002).

⁵⁷⁰ Wisdom Keepers. *Rio Declaration of the Sacred Earth Gathering*. <https://www.silene.org/en/documentation-centre/declarations/declaration-of-the-sacred-earth-gathering> (retrieved March 10, 2022).

⁵⁷¹ Thomas Huxley, Julian’s grand-father, was a great defender of Darwin. Robert Tapp summarized Julian Huxley’s religious views as follows: “As for religion – now was the time ‘to replace the multiplicity of conflicting and incompatible religious systems’ with a ‘scientific theology.’ We should view religion as ‘applied spiritual ecology’ whereby men and women come to understand the world around them, themselves, and all other humans more effectively”. Tapp, Robert B. Huxley, Julian, pp. 409-10. https://rbtapp.com/files/NEU_files/eu-jh_web.pdf (retrieved September 7, 2020).

⁵⁷² Speth, Gustave J. *A Post-Rio Compact*, op. cit., p. 145.

⁵⁷³ The UNDP was charged with coordinating UN reform and streamlining the UN system along the conferences’ new world vision.

⁵⁷⁴ Speth, Gustave J. *A Post-Rio Compact*, op. cit., p. 145.

George H. W. Bush's vision for a new world order, emphasizing "mutual security" as it did, was an "old order"⁵⁷⁵. As opposed to the former East-West world order, Rio's new order had a North-South axis of world affairs. "New values, new sources of international strength, and new areas for world leadership [were] coming to the fore"⁵⁷⁶: the Earth Summit "inseparably" linked the "new international values of equity and environment"⁵⁷⁷. "Earth Summit diplomacy", Speth explained, "focused on building a new system of international responsibility through inclusive multilateral agreements"⁵⁷⁸. It "had little to do with superpower conflict"⁵⁷⁹. Speth posited Rio on the side of progress: Rio's new order would be ethically superior to the former order. The American globalist Speth criticized his own country's resistance to Earth Summit diplomacy⁵⁸⁰.

The 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* (HDR), the first issued after Speth became UNDP Administrator, addressed development cooperation in the post-Cold War era. It promoted the paradigm of "global human security"⁵⁸¹, conceptually akin to sustainable development, and proposed "a new framework of global governance"⁵⁸². What the report called "the imperatives of global human security and development in the 21st century" demanded, in the view of its authors, "a wave of creative innovations similar to that in the 1940s"⁵⁸³. Hence the supporters of a new framework for global governance recognized their proposals to be *re-foundational*. They called for the "design of a strengthened United Nations role in sustainable human development"⁵⁸⁴. The report also stressed the need for UN *streamlining*, for UN agencies "to identify common missions and complementary approaches to helping countries realize their sustainable human development goals"⁵⁸⁵ and for the international community "to better define a common sense of purpose and unifying themes"⁵⁸⁶. These changes turned out to be the core substance of UN reform under Kofi Annan, a process in which Speth played a pivotal role.

Strong's incommensurate role in global governance for over four decades

At the very start of his mandate in 1997, right after the second wave conferences had provided the organization with its "new vision" for the 21st century, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

⁵⁷⁵ Ib., p. 145.

⁵⁷⁶ Ib., p. 145.

⁵⁷⁷ Ib., p. 145.

⁵⁷⁸ Ib., p. 145.

⁵⁷⁹ Ib., p. 145.

⁵⁸⁰ "Yet at Rio, the US ship of state, adrift since the Cold War's end, hit the shoals. On issue after issue, the United States found itself out of step and isolated. The Bush administration dragged its feet, fearing that a tougher climate protection agreement would require a serious national energy policy and cost America jobs. Many in the administration believe that there is a nearly irreconcilable conflict between environmental and economic performance. They also doubt that the threat of global warming is serious." Speth, James Gustave. *A Post-Rio Compact*, op. cit., p. 147. It should be noted, however, that President Georges W. H. Bush had appointed, as head of the US delegation to Rio, the Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, a man who supported the Rio agenda: William K. Reilly. Reilly had been President of the World Wilde Fund, and would later (in 2012) become a member of the IUCN.

⁵⁸¹ UNDP Human Development Report 1994. *New Dimensions of Human Security*. UNDP. 1984, p. 68. The independent commissions of the 1980s had started forging a new security paradigm. *North-South: A Program for Survival*, for instance, included a section on "A New Concept of Security". Independent Commission on International Development Issues. *North-South: A Program for Survival*, p. 89.

⁵⁸² UNDP Human Development Report 1994. *New Dimensions of Human Security*, op. cit., p. 81.

⁵⁸³ Ib., p. 83.

⁵⁸⁴ Ib., p. 83. The other two proposals presented as urgently needed were: 1.- The creation of an Economic Security Council to reflect a much broader concept of security; 2.- The restructuring and strengthening of the existing institutions for global economic management.

⁵⁸⁵ Ib., p. 83.

⁵⁸⁶ Ib., p. 83.

appointed none other than Maurice Strong as Executive Coordinator of UN Reform⁵⁸⁷. Incommensurate will have been Strong's role in global governance – a role that spanned its gestational, revolutionary and implementing periods. A year before his death, at the 2014 UN General Assembly, Strong called on world leaders to “rise to their historic responsibility as custodians of the planet, to take decisions that will unite rich and poor, North, South, East and West, in a new global partnership to ensure our common future”⁵⁸⁸. Strong then used, almost 50 years later, the very expression UN Secretary-General U Thant had introduced in 1968 and was quoted in *The Limits to Growth* - “global partnership”. He also used Brundtland’s 1987 expression - “our common future”: two significant examples of the striking continuum in global governance’s overall revolutionary process.

4.2.4. Vienna: linking human rights to “the framework”

As established by the General Assembly in 1989, the general purpose of the World Conference on Human Rights was to assess “progress made” in the field of human rights since the 1948 adoption of the UDHR. After four and a half decades of human rights standard-setting, the UN now wanted to shift its focus to *implementation*. The General Assembly, at its 47th session in 1992, stated that the goal of the Vienna conference was to *link* human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) to development and democracy.

Linking rights to sustainable development and all its components: Vienna’s rights approach Vienna took place right after Rio. By 1993, “development” had become *sustainable development* at the UN. Vienna integrated the UN’s human rights agenda in the broad sustainable development “framework”⁵⁸⁹. This integration entailed linking rights to what were, or would become after Vienna, individual components of “the framework”, such as nature conservation, reproductive health or gender equality. These linkages would, in the agents of global governance’s view, qualitatively *enlarge* the scope of human rights and their core content. Some of the linkages would be highly controversial and would, in the view of their opponents, profoundly destabilize the core content of rights.

Vienna was an important milestone in the launch of the so-called UN’s *rights approach*. This approach assumed the existence of an inchoate claim of “right” to almost anything and consisted in addressing all issues, old and novel, from the standpoint of rights: women, development, peace, children, food, housing, health, AIDS, environment, indigenous peoples etc. Being centered on people’s rights, the rights approach was deemed “people-centered” and became a cornerstone of the new world order. After Vienna, the UN promoted a view of the 21st century as the *century of human rights*, aiming to create a “universal culture of human rights” by the 21st century through human rights education: Vienna consolidated the *link* between human rights and education⁵⁹⁰. The advocates of the new, divisive and positive rights proved to be the first advocates of global governance’s so-called rights approach.

⁵⁸⁷ As a result of Strong’s coordination work, a report entitled *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* was issued.

⁵⁸⁸ UNEP’s website. Maurice Strong (1929-2015). www.unep.org/annualreport/2015/en/in-focus-maurice-strong.html#:~:text=At%20the%202014%20UN%20General%20Assembly%2C%20Maurice%20Strong,new%20global%20partnership%20to%20ensure%20our%20common%20future’ (retrieved January 30, 2020).

⁵⁸⁹ As reads its Art. 17: “The World Conference on Human Rights recognizes the necessity for a continuing adaptation of the United Nations human rights machinery to the current and future needs in the promotion and protection of human rights, as reflected in the present Declaration and within the framework of a balanced and sustainable development for all people”. Vienna also mentioned sustainable development in par. 20 and 27.

⁵⁹⁰ The Vienna Progr. of Action contained a section on human rights education (D, par. 78 to 82).

A new holistic human rights framework

Vienna promoted a new, holistic human rights framework. During the Cold War, civil and political rights were set apart from social, economic and cultural rights, the latter having been marginalized during that period. On view of rehabilitating them, Vienna insisted on the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all rights⁵⁹¹. It underlined the “interdependence” between democracy, development and respect for human rights⁵⁹². In a revolutionary *broadening* of perspective, the conference took historic steps to promote and protect the rights of certain *categories* of people - women, children, indigenous peoples and “minorities” – that either did not appear in the *Universal Declaration*⁵⁹³ (indigenous and minorities) or were only discretely mentioned (women and children). The Tehran Proclamation⁵⁹⁴ mentioned women only. Vienna was the first conference to specify that the human rights of women (as including the right to family planning) and of the girl child were an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. Its Article 41 stipulated “a woman’s right to accessible and adequate health care and the widest range of family planning services”.

Unprecedented integration of “women’s rights”, redefined

Jane Connors, a scholar from the University of London, contended that the “amount of space devoted to the human rights of women” in the Vienna outcome documents was “one of the most striking aspects” of the *Declaration and Programme of Action*⁵⁹⁵. In her view, “apart from the perennial issues of the indivisibility and the universality of human rights, the concerns of women dominated both the World Conference on Human Rights and its attendant NGO Forum”⁵⁹⁶. It was perhaps the first time in the history of the women’s movement, noted Connors, “that women participated fully to ensure that women’s rights would be integrated into international and regional human rights policy”⁵⁹⁷.

⁵⁹¹ The inalienability of rights tended to be dropped out over the course of the global governance revolutionary process because the concept relates to a stable concept of being, of human nature, and to the notion of conscience.

⁵⁹² The Vienna *Decl.* and *Progr. of Action* specified, in Art. 11, that “The right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”. They clearly related the Vienna agenda to sustainable development, as Art. 27 also suggested: “Every State should provide an effective framework of remedies to redress human rights grievances or violations. The administration of justice, including law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies and, especially, an independent judiciary and legal profession in full conformity with applicable standards contained in international human rights instruments, are essential to the full and non-discriminatory realization of human rights and indispensable to the processes of democracy and sustainable development”.

⁵⁹³ The UN Charter, in its preamble, reaffirms, the “faith” of the “peoples of the United Nations” “in the equal rights of men and women”. The UDHR does not mention indigenous peoples. Its Art. 25/2 states: “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection”.

⁵⁹⁴ Tehran Proclamation Art. 15 reads: “The discrimination of which women are still victims in various regions of the world must be eliminated. An inferior status for women is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations as well as the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The full implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is a necessity for the progress of mankind.”

⁵⁹⁵ Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Woman at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 147.

⁵⁹⁶ Ib., p. 173.

⁵⁹⁷ Ib., p. 171. The scholar quotes the feminist Donna J. Sullivan describing Vienna as the “extraordinary success of women’s rights activists worldwide to end the historic disregard of human rights violations against women” (note 96, Donna J. Sullivan. Women’s Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. *American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 88. 1994, p. 152), Ib., p. 169.

What Connors viewed as “advances”⁵⁹⁸ were, in her recognition, “to a great extent, attributable to the activities of a select group of activists and NGOs”⁵⁹⁹ active at the regional preparatory meetings and at the conference itself. These included Bella Abzug’s Women’s Caucus, the ever-present IPPF, influential NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW)⁶⁰⁰, Amnesty International⁶⁰¹ (AI) and International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), which proved “committed to women’s rights”, and the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership (Rutgers University), which “had decided to focus on redefining human rights from a feminist perspective”⁶⁰² in 1990 and was, in Connors’ view, among the most engaged. These ideologically aligned partners were the agents of the linkage between human rights and the agendas of the Western sexual and feminist revolution. They enjoyed the support of the US delegation under the Clinton administration. The alternate US delegate to the Vienna conference was the democrat and pro-abortion feminist Geraldine Ferraro.

IPPF’s historical leadership in the rights-family planning/contraception linkage

Since its 1952 foundation, the IPPF had presented its contraceptive and “sexual liberation” agenda as a matter of rights: it had been the agent *par excellence* of global governance’s rights’ approach. Actively participating in the UN conference process since Tehran, when for the first time (under the federation’s pressure), an intergovernmental conference linked family planning to human rights for the first time, the IPPF had championed integrating its ideological objectives into the human rights, socioeconomic, environmental and population issues that UN conferences addressed. IPPF stood behind Vienna’s reaffirmation of its revolutionary Tehran gain. “Building on” Tehran and Vienna, IPPF would produce the “reproductive rights” paradigm at Cairo, which was not a human rights conference.

The 1995 IPPF *Sexual and Reproductive Rights Charter* remains the best illustration of how the IPPF has striven to put universal rights at the service of its contraceptive, abortive and sexual “liberation” agenda. In this so-called “Charter” – let us note in passing IPPF’s inadequate use of a juridical term, the IPPF being an NGO, not a state –, the federation reinterpreted 12 rights⁶⁰³ from the *Universal Declaration* and other human rights instruments, making these rights inclusive of sexual and reproductive rights. This is how IPPF sought to surreptitiously transform juridically non-existent rights into allegedly “universal rights”. The IPPF denied that it was creating “new” rights, or reinterpreting universal rights. It claimed that it was merely “enlarging” and “clarifying”

⁵⁹⁸ Connors identified several feminist “gains” obtained at Vienna. Vienna classified violence against women, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation and trafficking as human rights abuses. It mainstreamed women’s rights in all UN human rights activities. It called for the universal ratification and strengthening of the implementation of CEDAW, adopted in 1979 and which had placed women’s rights squarely on the UN’s human rights agenda.

⁵⁹⁹ Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Woman at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 147.

⁶⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch was created in 1978 by Robert L. Bernstein with a view to monitoring the former Soviet Union’s compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

⁶⁰¹ Amnesty International (AI) was founded in London in 1961. According to Rachel Brett, AI’s creation “marked the beginning of the real development of the international human rights movement”. Brett, Rachel. *The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations*. In *Political Studies*. XLIII. 1995, pp. 96-110, p. 97.

⁶⁰² Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Woman at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 169.

⁶⁰³ See IPPF. *The IPPF Charter on Sexual and Reproductive Rights. Vision 2000*. 1995. The right to life; the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to equality and to be free from all forms of discrimination; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of thought; the right to information and education; the right to choose whether or not to marry and to found and plan a family; the right to decide whether or when to have children; the right to health care and health protection; the right to the benefits of scientific progress; the right to freedom of assembly and political participation; the right to be free from torture and ill treatment. The IPPF Charter contains a section on how NGOs can contribute to human rights processes.

the content of rights already declared universal, bringing out of them what they supposedly potentially contained. Because of the power IPPF and its partners have wielded in global governance, the core content of universal human rights has become irremediably ambivalent. Within “universal” human rights, contradictory interpretations have now coexisted. The insertion of IPPF’s rights agenda in the UN conferences contributed to a fundamental destabilization of the core contents of “universal human rights”.

Emphasis on NGOs’ major role

The theme of NGOs was absent from the Tehran Proclamation. Vienna’s outcome document by contradistinction emphasized the “major role” of NGOs (par. 73, for instance). NGOs have traditionally been states’ chief accusers when it came to human rights abuses: “While governments have been reluctant to criticize their counterparts, NGOs developed as ‘lynchpins’ of the UN human rights system”⁶⁰⁴. In an article published in 1996, Jane Connors quoted a feminist commentator opining that “in no organ of the United Nations do international non-governmental organizations play a more active and influential role than in the Commission”⁶⁰⁵ on human rights. Following Vienna, the UN fully accepted NGOs and grass-roots initiatives as natural human rights advocates and partners in implementation. The IPPF, presenting itself as a human rights advocacy organization with unmatched grassroots experience, proclaimed itself perfectly fitted to the job.

In conclusion, Vienna grafted itself on the global governance revolution by “enlarging” the interdependence between development, democracy and human rights into a possible interdependence between “sustainable development”, partnership with non-state actors, and the new rights. It opened a door that would not be closed. Consequently, opposition to the three components of this enlargement could henceforth be viewed as un- or anti-democratic, anti-development and anti-human rights.

4.2.5. The Cairo watershed: the framework’s reproductive health and rights pillar

The assiduous observer of UN population policies Jyoti Shankar Singh stated NGOs’ exceptional political role in the Cairo process:

“The decision-making process at UN conferences has now become an increasingly complex and difficult process, with many actors. In the case of the ICPD, however, two things were very clear. First, NGOs were very much part of the decision-making process. Second, they were among those responsible for the acceptance of a programme of action that broke new ground on many policy and programme issues”⁶⁰⁶.

In a long continuum of linkages

The Fourth International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo September 5-13, 1994, inscribed itself in global governance’s long process *linking* population to environmental concerns, socioeconomic development and human rights. Anita Anand rightly pointed out that the “history of the UN’s involvement with the population issue goes back to Julian Huxley and his association with the British Population Investigation Commission and the

⁶⁰⁴ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 91.

⁶⁰⁵ Connors, Jane. *NGOs and the Human Rights of Woman at the United Nations*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 154 (note 40. Boulding, Elise. *Female Alternatives to Hierarchical Systems, Past and Present*. International Associations. Issue 6-7. 1975.)

⁶⁰⁶ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 136.

Eugenics Society”⁶⁰⁷. Huxley contributed in a foundational way to linking nature conservation and other environmental concerns to population control and eugenicist agendas. The integration of population control, development and environmental concerns was seminally present, let us remind ourselves, in *The Limits to Growth* as it was in the Stockholm conference⁶⁰⁸. Two important landmarks in the population-human rights continuum were the inclusion of the right of parents to family planning at the 1968 Tehran conference, and the attribution of this right to “couples and individuals” at the 1974 Bucharest conference.

Rio had integrated the novel reproductive health paradigm in its sustainable development framework. Cairo sealed the integration process⁶⁰⁹ and tightly wove the UN’s post-Cold War population paradigms in Rio’s framework. As read its *Programme of Action*:

“The 1994 Conference was explicitly given a *broader mandate* [our emphasis] on development issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered in isolation” (par. 1.5).

Cairo’s watershed gains: a “people-centered” and holistic approach to population and development

Cairo, in a continuum with the partners’ gains at previous conferences, was a major watershed for UN population policies. It operated a Copernican turn, a “seismic shift not easily reversed”⁶¹⁰, from the UN’s top-down, institutional, population control⁶¹¹ approach focused on numbers to one presented as “bottom-up”, focused on the so-called “unmet needs” of “couples and individuals” and their “rights”. The new approach claimed to rule out coercion⁶¹². The UN qualified it as “people-centered”. “People-centeredness” was a defining feature of the overall “new global consensus”.

A series of mutually integrated “new paradigms”, forged by the partners, constituted Cairo’s new “people-centered” approach. They included *sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights* which themselves included the “rights of adolescents to privacy, confidentiality, respect and informed consent” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 7.45) in reproductive health matters⁶¹³, *unmet*

⁶⁰⁷ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 93.

⁶⁰⁸ The *Stockholm Decl.* read: “The natural growth of population continuously presents problems for the preservation of the environment” (Art. 5).

⁶⁰⁹ Chapter 3 of the *Cairo Progr. of Action* stressed the further integration of population, socioeconomic development and the environment. See in particular Par. 3.28 and Par. 3.29-3.32.

⁶¹⁰ 1994 Cairo conference prompted ‘no less than a revolution’, *Population and Development Commission told*. UN press release POP/897 of March 24, 2004, paraphrasing Barbara Crossette, former UN Bureau Chief of the New-York Times. See <https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/pop897.doc.htm> (retrieved June 4, 2020).

⁶¹¹ Cairo “was a victory for women’s organizations and developments groups working in the field who had direct experience with the short-comings of programmes based on pure ‘population control’ paradigms.” (Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 95). And “Cairo was as much about the empowerment of women as about population policies and programmes... Cairo used gender equality as its guiding principle”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 106.

⁶¹² Principle 8 of the *Cairo Progr. of Action* read: “Reproductive health care programmes should provide the widest range of services without any form of coercion”.

⁶¹³ Cairo recommended that “countries should, where appropriate, remove legal, regulatory and social barriers to reproductive health information and care for adolescents” (*Progr. of Action*, par. 7.45). Through its focus on adolescents’ reproductive health, Cairo kicked off the globalization of the Western sexual revolution.

needs (for ex. par. 14.1), the *right to choose* (for ex. par. 7.14), the *empowerment of women* (for ex. chapter 4), *various forms of the family* (for ex. par. 5.1), *informed consent* (for ex. par. 7.17), *unsafe abortion* (for ex. par. 7.44), *safe motherhood* (for ex. par. 8.22)...

Among the partners' chief historic "gains" in Cairo was the "linkage" they operated between *women's empowerment* and their *right to choose* (notably abortion). Another major gain was the integration of reproductive health services in *primary health care*⁶¹⁴. Cairo thereby ensured the *priority* reproductive health services would henceforth be given in development assistance and national health plans: since 1978, let us recall, universal access to primary health care had been WHO's strategic priority to achieve "health for all". Cairo's integration resulted in rendering reproductive health services practically inseparable from basic health care.

Through the series of revolutionary linkages it operated, Cairo championed *holism* and decisively contributed to the constitution of global governance as *systemic* content. It is becoming clear that this systemic content was heavily ideologically loaded.

Dialectical synthesis of "people-centeredness" and new geopolitical objectives

Cairo considered its "people-centered" paradigms as the most effective way to reach *population stabilization* – Cairo's novel demographic paradigm (for ex. *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 3.15 and 6.1)⁶¹⁵. Cairo did not abandon the UN's objective to reduce population growth rates but it merged this demographic goal with implementing people-centered sustainable development. The new paradigms operated the dialectical synthesis of so-called "people-centered" objectives (women's empowerment through access to contraception and "safe abortion"- individualistic and hedonistic objectives) and geopolitical and environmental ones - those viewing "population control as an

⁶¹⁴ See par. 7.6, which lists reproductive health services to be provided in the context of primary health care. It includes "abortion as specified in par. 8.25". And see interview with Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, WHO Director General, by Marguerite A. Peeters, in *Interactive Information Services*. Report 7 of October 13, 1995, item 2. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. Nakajima stated: "You know that there were tendencies to ignore family planning in general primary health care. It is the reason why we brought back family planning to reproductive health care services in the context of primary health care. The success of family planning in many developing countries, be it Islamic, Catholic or Socialist is due to the fact that they incorporated family planning into primary health care, especially maternal and child care". And see *Interactive Information Services*. Report 20 of March 7, 1996, items 3 and 4. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. WHO reproductive health official Dr. Tomris Turmen explained to this author how Cairo further integrated reproductive health into primary health care. Turmen told us: "since the 70s, there has been an agreement to put the family planning component into maternal and child health care: this was the first step of integration. In addition to family planning," she continued, "there was a big moment at the end of the 1980s, on reduction of maternal mortality, when the world saw shocking figures, that in the developing world, the chances of dying for a pregnant woman were a hundred times greater than for a woman in a developed country." So the second step was to integrate "safe motherhood packages into primary health care". In the 1960s, all these concepts were "fragmented", according to Ms. Turmen. "Reproductive health put all these in a continuum." Dr. Türmen explained how WHO concretely interpreted *integration*: "If I come to a health clinic with my child who needs immunization, the person who provides care must be able to advise me on my next pregnancy, must be able to ask me: 'are you expecting another sibling, are you taking any precaution, do you want to do so, if you want to do so, there is some information and it is available here'." Dr. Türmen said that "that one time contact with the woman and the child should be utilized to its full. So we are trying to maximize the potential of the situation that we live and work in."

⁶¹⁵ The Secretary-General (not the intergovernmental process) introduced the notion of population stabilization at the 1984 Mexico Population Conference: "In a statement made at the inaugural ceremony, Mr. Rafael M. Salas, Secretary-General of the Conference, said that the overriding objective of population policies should be the stabilization of the global population, subject to respect for the dignity and freedom of the human person and with due regard for the availability of resources, technological progress, the safeguarding of the environment, and social innovations. He called for the continuation and strengthening of global population programmes, until the promise of stabilization was within sight" (III, par. 19).

essential requirement for sustainable development”⁶¹⁶ and tending to stick to a demographic mindset, focusing on numbers.

Acrimonious intergovernmental debates, “glorious” political and cultural victory for the partners

The partners’ controversial paradigms caused considerable dissention during the Cairo intergovernmental negotiations. The debate at the conference was, in Singh’s word, “acrimonious”⁶¹⁷. The outcome was uncertain. “Cairo began with uncertainties and tensions; it ended in a blaze of glory”⁶¹⁸ and an “extraordinary breakthrough”⁶¹⁹. Cairo’s “gains”, “victory” and “breakthrough” were “the partners””. They were not those of UN member states, not those of “we the peoples of the United Nations”, not those of nations. In the already quoted from March 6, 1995 interview with Bella Abzug, the leader of the Women’s Caucus candidly affirmed: “We have a terrific document in the Cairo document. We changed the whole basis and thesis of how you deal with population. That came as a result of women and the pressure of the Women’s Caucus”⁶²⁰.

Cairo’s historic victory for the partners was not only political and ideological. It was also cultural and financial: “The Cairo Conference broke the taboo on open and frank discussion of sex-related topics at intergovernmental forums”⁶²¹. Cairo spurred donor countries to significantly increase funding for population-related activities. Powerful multi-stakeholder financial coalitions of the like-minded would later develop to support the implementation of Cairo’s agenda⁶²². Over time, these coalitions became increasingly organized, efficient, and autonomous from the will of the world’s nations, illustrating global governance’s continuous consolidation.

The “partners” conceptual leadership in the Cairo revolution

Let us now examine the partners’ concrete role in the conceptualization of Cairo’s core new paradigm - reproductive health, the partners’ Cairo “landmark achievement”⁶²³.

⁶¹⁶ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 93.

⁶¹⁷ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶¹⁸ Ib., p. 161. “In her closing speech, Nafis Sadik, Secretary-General of the conference and Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), declared the new Program of Action a ‘quantum leap’ forward for population and development. Fred Sai, Chairman of the Main Committee (the key working committee of the conference), concluded that ‘we have succeeded beyond our wildest dreams’” (International Planned Parenthood Federation 1994). Members of the US delegation proclaimed Cairo to be a foreign policy triumph for President Clinton. Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth said, ‘I think the world is never going to be the same after Cairo’ (Los Angeles Times 1994). Feminist groups expressed pleasure that they had achieved much of what they had wanted at Cairo. Other participants went so far as to assert that it had been a conference with no losers. All parties left with the sense that they had been witness to a significant moment in history.” McIntosh, Alison and Finkle, Jason L. *The Cairo Conference on Population and Development: A New Paradigm?* Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 2. Published by Population Council. June 1995, pp. 223-260, p. 224. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2137493> (retrieved January 30, 2020).

⁶¹⁹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 71.

⁶²⁰ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁶²¹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 74.

⁶²² For example, the Family Planning Summit held in London on July 11th, 2012 at the initiative of the British government and of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, attended and supported by representatives of the most powerful governmental and financial players in global governance, which made a defeating financial commitment to drastically increase access to contraceptive information, services and supplies for the poorest women of the world, especially for unmarried girls. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 293 of August 16, 2012 and Report 294 of August 25, 2012.

⁶²³ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 29. The conceptual integration making up reproductive health was first advocated at the International Conference on Better Health for Women and Children

The *reproductive health* concept had been absent from UN population conferences⁶²⁴ until Cairo. As a reminder, the Women's Caucus, more precisely the IPPF which actively participated in the caucus, had introduced it in the conference process at Rio, although the root *reproduct-* had appeared in the conferences' reports already since Stockholm (1972). The attribution of the notion of "reproduction" to human procreation came from Margaret Sanger, the founder of the IPPF. Sanger wanted to liberate women from, as per her own expression, "the slavery of reproduction", and to do so through access to contraception and abortion.

Reproductive health is the product of a conceptual *enlargement*. This enlargement was achieved through integrating, next to family planning, a host of other components, the main ones being decidedly ideologically divisive, some of them being authentically consensual⁶²⁵.

The forging of the reproductive health paradigm resulted from the collaborative effort of institutions that had historically led the combined population control/sexual revolution movement at the UN and had been the initial proponents and advocates of the right to contraception and abortion: the UNDP/UNFPA/WHO/World Bank Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction, under the directorship of WHO official Mahmoud Fathalla (1986-92), and in practical partnership with the IPPF and the Rockefeller Foundation. This programme, incidentally, denotes the ideological entanglement of the UNDP, the UNFPA, the WHO and the World Bank for decades with the IPPF, and the oneness of view of these UN specialized bodies.

Throughout his time at WHO, Fathalla also chaired IPPF's International Medical Advisory Panel. He became Senior Advisor at the Rockefeller Foundation after the Cairo conference. Since the 1970s⁶²⁶, Fathalla had been a staunch advocate of abortion, free choice, a woman's "ownership" of her body, gender mainstreaming and a vocal critic of what feminists called "patriarchalism". He pioneered the use of the concepts of "safe motherhood" and "safe abortion". Concomitantly, Fathalla proactively advocated *people-centeredness*, *linkages* and *holism*⁶²⁷, revealing in which

through Family Planning (Nairobi, October 5-9, 1987), cosponsored by UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, the World Bank, WHO, IPPF and Population Council.

⁶²⁴ The root "reproducti-" has been used in the outcome documents of UN conferences ever since Stockholm, where it was associated with "human reproduction" (6 uses), in Bucharest (7), Mexico 1975 (6) and Nairobi (5).

⁶²⁵ Such as "universal access" to the "full range" of contraceptives (including so-called "emergency contraception"); so-called "comprehensive sexual education", purely technical, not only amoral but immoral in its content; AIDS prevention through such "sexual education" and condoms; voluntary sterilization; *in vitro* fertilization; so-called "safe abortion" where it is legal - the idea being that, in order to be safe, it has to be legal: hence the pressure SRHR agents exercise on African governments to legalize abortion; "sexual health and rights", which are strategically fuzzy enough to include the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (LGBT) agenda. The universally acceptable components of SRHR include: the obstetric care that poor women vitally need when they are pregnant or delivering; prenatal and post-natal care; newborn health; breastfeeding; the treatment of cancers of the reproductive system; the treatment of sexually transmitted infections, including AIDS; the fight against the horrible practice of female genital mutilation. SRHR are a "package". They form an indissoluble, "holistic" whole, mixing subversive, minority objectives and genuinely consensual ones.

⁶²⁶ Fathalla wrote himself, or prompted the publication of WHO's allegedly "normative" material on so-called "safe abortion". To give but one example: Fathalla, Mahmoud F. and Cook, Rebecca J. *Women, abortion and the new technical and policy guidance from WHO*. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2012;90, p. 712. doi: 10.2471/BLT.12.107144. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3437073/> (retrieved April 3, 2020).

⁶²⁷ "His teaching – looking at women's health in a holistic and person-centred way – is fully reflected in his myriad lectures and statements." See

<http://www.safeabortionwomensright.org/professor-mahmoud-f-fathalla-unarguably-the-greatest-womens-health-rights-champion-of-the-last-century-at-80-something/> (retrieved April 3, 2020).

ideological light these defining features of the artificial new “global consensus” were to be interpreted.

WHO had worked on the content of the definition of reproductive health for “about 30 years” with the IPPF, its primary partner in this domain. WHO procured the paradigm’s basic definition⁶²⁸ as contained in the Cairo draft. Singh revealingly observed that the conceptualizers of the new paradigm had “never brought [it] to the attention of WHO’s principal organ – the World Health Assembly”⁶²⁹ - the World Health Assembly being the intergovernmental body juridically mandated to govern the WHO. Singh candidly explained that “one of the reasons given at the time by several former WHO officials was that a debate on the definition would have brought up such potentially divisive issues as reproductive rights, adolescent health and parental responsibilities, and abortion”⁶³⁰. These divisive agendas all ended up being included in WHO’s, and Cairo’s, new paradigm.

Singh likewise stated that it was only at Cairo’s PrepCom III, when the Secretariat’s *Draft Final Document: Programme of Action of the Conference* was being discussed, that several national delegations asked WHO for its definition of reproductive health. This conclusively demonstrates the phenomenal leadership and strategic advance of WHO, the IPPF and its other NGO partners over UN member states in setting Cairo’s conceptual framework. WHO then provided its long and fuzzy definition, substantially similar to the one found at paragraph 7.2 of the *Cairo Platform for Action*⁶³¹ (reproductive rights being “defined” at paragraph 7.3). By PrepCom III however, negotiations were in an advanced state and turning back with respect to the partners’ gains was already very difficult.

Through his above-mentioned acknowledgments, Singh tacitly admitted that the WHO’s “reproductive health” conceptualizers, fully aware as they were of its controversial character, wanted to *hide* their real agenda to the legitimate power holders at the WHO and at the UN, their member states, and strategically sought to push their divisive agenda forward while avoiding an open intergovernmental confrontation. The strategy consisted, moreover, in using deceptively attractive and seemingly consensual language and to avoid clearly defining it: in *semantic manipulation*. Such are the non-intergovernmental origins of reproductive health, a standing pillar of global governance – that is a partners’ “gain” incorporated in the current “framework” of international cooperation, the SDGs.

⁶²⁸ WHO provided its definition of reproductive health at PrepCom III when asked “by several delegations to explain what the term ‘reproductive health’ meant... WHO went on to say that ‘the content of this definition of reproductive health [was] derived from nearly 30 years of policy established by WHO’”. See Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 31.

⁶²⁹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 31

⁶³⁰ Ib., p. 31.

⁶³¹ “Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant. In line with the above definition of reproductive health, reproductive health care is defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and services that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by preventing and solving reproductive health problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually transmitted diseases.”

Another groundbreaking input of NGOs at Cairo was the novel “various forms of the family” paradigm (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, chapter 5). According to Singh, two NGOs - the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC) and CEPPIA – stood behind the insertion of the new paradigm in the final document. As the expert observed: “It was agreed that *all those who voluntarily come together and define themselves as a family* [our emphasis], accepting a commitment to each other’s well-being, should be respected, supported and affirmed as such”⁶³². Later on in the global governance process, the homosexual interpretation of the gender concept, whose feminist interpretation became the object of a “global consensus” at Beijing, would graft itself on Cairo’s “various forms of the family”.

Cairo eloquently exemplified the combination of factors that has made the advancement of global governance possible all along: the proactive initiatives, power-grab and manipulation techniques of the “global experts” partnering with the UN as agenda-setters on the one hand, and the passive consent or naivety of UN member states, sovereign governments on the other. The revolution – the NGO power-grab in the environmental, population and women’s “sectors” – had been in full swing since Rio. The agenda of a handful of global experts-ideologues will have an immeasurable impact on the policies, laws, educational content and cultures in all parts of the world but especially in developing nations.

NGOs’ defining input in the PrepComs

The partners’ input in Cairo’s preparation was defining. Cairo’s Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) met three times: PrepCom I March 4-8, 1991; PrepCom II May 1-21, 1993; PrepCom III April 4-22, 1994. The IPPF was the UN Secretariat’s leading partner in drafting the Cairo conference’s “conceptual framework”. Fred Sai, then President of the IPPF, chaired the Main Committee of the Cairo Conference’s PrepComs⁶³³. Nafis Sadik, designated as the Secretary-General of the Conference⁶³⁴ was the Executive Director of the UNFPA, of which the IPPF had been the primary partner since the fund’s creation in 1969.

The conference secretariat (UN Secretariat Population Division and UNFPA) molded its NGO accreditation procedures according to those developed at the UNCED: NGOs that were not in ECOSOC consultative status could nonetheless apply to be accredited as observers⁶³⁵. Moreover, many national delegations to the conference process – from the US, Europe and developing countries such as India and Bangladesh - included NGO representatives. The double membership of these individuals enabled them to operate from inside the political process. Some members of the Women’s Caucus who were also on national delegations “were in a position to ensure that the proposals made by them were given adequate attention and consideration at the second and third

⁶³² Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 111. See *Interactive Information Services*. Report 20 of March 7, 1996, item 3. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives. WHO reproductive health official Dr. Tomris Turmen explained to this author what she meant by “family”: “When I say family, I am not using the word in a conservative sense. Family for me means ‘an extended environment where decisions about health are taken’”.

⁶³³ See Willetts, Peter. *The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 267. Sai also chaired the main committees of both the 1984 International Conference on Population and Development in Mexico City and the ICPD in Cairo.

⁶³⁴ “A full year before PrepCom II, Dr. Sadik had already begun to think of a 20-year time-frame on the grounds that the proposed goals and objectives could only be achieved in that period of time”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 41. Sadik had been working at UNFPA since 1971 and was single-mindedly on IPPF’s ideological side.

⁶³⁵ On February 12, 1993, “ECOSOC decided upon a procedure that was similar to that used for the UNCED for accrediting NGOs”. ECOSOC Res. 1993/4 recognized “the importance of non-governmental participation in the preparatory process and the Conference itself”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 127.

sessions of the Preparatory Committee”⁶³⁶. This was the case of Bella Abzug, leader of the Women’s Caucus and a member of the US delegation headed by Vice President Al Gore, and of Fred Sai, a member of his country’s national delegation, Ghana, while chairing the Main Committee and presiding IPPF.

The Main Committee took up the topic of “reproductive health” at PrepCom II, in which the 185 NGOs present as observers “played an extremely important role”⁶³⁷. The committee did so after the holding of several “expert” and NGO meetings. The UN Secretariat’s Population Division, in consultation with UNFPA⁶³⁸, had convened six “expert group meetings” in 1992-93. Among the recommendations made at these meetings were *linking* family planning to the right to abortion, to the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and of infertility, to maternal and child health, and to women’s reproductive health. Reproductive health was the conceptual product of *linkages*.

Let us give two other eloquent examples of NGO influence on PrepCom II. Bella Abzug’s WEDO had launched, prior to PrepCom II, “a cooperative effort with like-minded activists and organizations aimed at influencing the ICPD process in a manner similar to that used in the Rio process”⁶³⁹. In Singh’s authorized observation, the Women’s Caucus “emerged as one of the most successful lobbying groups at PrepCom II”⁶⁴⁰. It played “a critical role in ensuring that women’s empowerment became the most important cross-cutting theme in the ICPD Programme of Action”⁶⁴¹. In the Women’s Caucus’ view, universal access to reproductive health, modern contraception and “safe abortion” were a sine qua non condition of women’s empowerment⁶⁴².

The other defining NGO input in PrepCom II came from the IPPF, which celebrated its 40th anniversary at a congress held in New Delhi, October 23-25, 1992. The IPPF Assembly declared at the congress “its firm adherence to the concept of sexual and reproductive health”⁶⁴³. It launched a strategic plan, Vision 2000 which, in the words of the IPPF,

“committed member associations to a series of far-reaching goals, including the empowerment of women, meeting unmet demand for contraception, the elimination of

⁶³⁶ Ib., p. 109.

⁶³⁷ Ib., p. 129.

⁶³⁸ The six meetings were on: population, environment and development (New York, January 20-24, 1992); population policies and programmes (Cairo, April 12-16, 1992); population and women (Gaborone, June 22-26, 1992); family planning, health and family well-being (Bangalore, October 26-29, 1992); population growth and demographic structure (Paris, November 16-20, 1992); population distribution and migration (Santa Cruz, January 18-23, 1993). The two meetings that addressed reproductive health were the ones in Gaborone and Bangalore. The Gaborone women “experts” were unequivocally in favor of a universal right to abortion. The input of these two meetings “which sought to synthesize the views of three different groups of people (health professionals, family planning programme managers and women’s groups), were very useful to the ICPD Secretariat in preparing the Proposed Conceptual Framework of the Draft Recommendations of the Conference (UN, 1993c)”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 34.

⁶³⁹ “The Women’s Caucus produced a document: Suggested Revisions to the Conceptual Framework for the Draft Recommendation of the ICPD, Offered by Women’s Caucus from All Regions” (WEDO 1993a). This document was given to all the NGOs as well as all the official delegations and many of its suggestions were picked up by them.” Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 109.

⁶⁴⁰ Ib. cit., p. 132.

⁶⁴¹ Ib., p. 109.

⁶⁴² According to Singh, “A great majority of the NGOs that participated in the Women’s Caucus were pro-choice and pro-family planning”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 46.

⁶⁴³ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 40.

unsafe abortion and addressing the needs of the world's young people, all under a practical framework of service delivery”⁶⁴⁴.

Vision 2000, an NGO policy document adopted two years prior to Cairo, contained the essential ingredients of what would become at Cairo an intergovernmental “consensus”. It was a major milestone in the establishment of reproductive health as a pillar of global governance’s framework.

At the New Delhi congress, IPPF’s President Fred Sai and its Director-General Halfdan Mahler⁶⁴⁵ (who, as a reminder, had served three terms as WHO Director-General from 1973 to 1988, which in itself is evidence of the historical collaborative ties between WHO and the IPPF) – as well as the Secretary-General of the Cairo Conference Nafis Sadik, among others, brought up “the challenge of meeting the *unmet need* [our emphasis] for family planning among *couples and individuals* [Ib.], providing a better rationale for future population policy”⁶⁴⁶. Their supposedly “bottom-up” approach was then deemed strategically more efficient, than previous top-down population control. Along the same lines, Steven Sinding, then Director of Population Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation (and who would become IPPF’s Director-General 2002-06) proposed “abandoning the use of demographic targets and expressing the objectives of family planning programmes solely in terms of achieving a fully satisfactory response to the stated desires of women and couples”⁶⁴⁷. Hence the “concept of unmet need became the major theme for discussion at the IPPF Member Assembly held in conjunction with the 40th Anniversary Congress”⁶⁴⁸. As it turned out, the unmet *need* concept, and its matching *rights* concept (sexual and reproductive rights), both coming from the IPPF and the Rockefeller Foundation, became the cornerstone of Cairo’s overall agenda, a pillar of global governance and a defining feature of its alleged “people-centeredness”.

Cairo’s defining contribution to the new politics

As a result of NGOs’ political drive in the Cairo process and their collusion with the UN Secretariat, Cairo’s outcome document dedicated an entire chapter to partnering with NGOs. Ahead of PrepCom II, the Secretariat, in its *Proposed Conceptual Framework of the Draft Recommendations of the Conference*⁶⁴⁹, suggested the inclusion of a chapter on NGOs -

⁶⁴⁴ <https://www.ippf.org/news/announcements/ippf-honours-memory-dr-halfdan-t-mahler-former-ippf-director-general> (retrieved April 7, 2020).

⁶⁴⁵ “Dr Mahler drove the creation and implementation of IPPF’s long term strategic plan, Vision 2000, which was adopted by the entire Federation in 1992, the 40th anniversary of IPPF. It committed member associations to a series of far-reaching goals, including the empowerment of women, meeting unmet demand for contraception, the elimination of unsafe abortion and addressing the needs of the world’s young people, all under a practical framework of service delivery. Dr Mahler told the IPPF 40th anniversary convention in New Delhi that ‘unsafe abortions have assumed the level of a calamity’ and had to be addressed. At the landmark International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, Dr Mahler gave IPPF’s wholehearted support to the adoption of a rights-based approach for sexual and reproductive health, placing the woman at the centre of its Plan of Action. But he also sounded a warning about the need for national and international political will to find the resources to bring about what he called ‘a perfectly do-able miracle.’ Dr Mahler told the ICPD: ‘I strongly urge governments, NGOs and the donor community to build on this new foundation of cooperation and goodwill by turning the words of the Cairo Document into prompt action.’” IPPF. *IPPF honours the memory of Dr Halfdan T Mahler, former IPPF Director General*. December 16, 1016.

<https://www.ippf.org/news/announcements/ippf-honours-memory-dr-halfdan-t-mahler-former-ippf-director-general> (retrieved April 7, 2020).

⁶⁴⁶ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 39.

⁶⁴⁷ Ib., p. 40.

⁶⁴⁸ Ib., p. 40.

⁶⁴⁹ *Proposed Conceptual Framework of the Draft Recommendations of the Conference*. E/CONF.84/PC/11, April 26, 1993.

Supporting a Workable Partnership. Singh contended that “PrepCom II participants responded well to this proposal”⁶⁵⁰, claiming that a “large number of delegations saw the need for a real partnership between governments, NGOs and the private sector”⁶⁵¹. Singh referred to the *Report of the Preparatory Committee*, according to which “non-governmental organizations were seen not as substitutes for government action but as *partners* [our emphasis] acting as *catalysts for change* [Ib.], setting quality standards for population programmes and developing innovative approaches”⁶⁵². The seemingly non-threatening language in fact posited NGOs as governments’ *partners*, and assigned them the revolutionary political roles of “catalysts for change”, innovators and standard-setters.

After PrepCom II, the conference’s Secretariat began working on the draft final document. All national delegations and accredited NGOs were invited to make suggestions. WEDO, as per its habit, “prepared a revised set of proposals and submitted it to the Secretariat in November 1993. These along with the proposals offered by other NGOs”, deemed Singh, “were extremely useful to the Secretariat in preparing the final draft of Chapter XV, which was now entitled”, as it will remain in the final outcome document, *Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector*⁶⁵³. According to Singh, the influence of NGOs was “probably at its highest during PrepCom III, where many significant proposals made by them were incorporated in the Draft Final Document”⁶⁵⁴. The Women’s Caucus was, “again, among the most active lobbying groups”⁶⁵⁵. After PrepCom III, WEDO remained aggressively involved. It prepared its *Recommendations on Bracketed Text in the Draft Programme of Action of the ICPD* and distributed them widely to delegations “on behalf of 280 NGOs from 62 countries”⁶⁵⁶. At the Cairo conference, “the Women’s Caucus met daily at the NGO Forum from 9 to 10 am to review developments at the Conference and to plan strategies”⁶⁵⁷.

At the last stage of the preparatory process, as the Secretariat was formulating Cairo’s final draft document, a small group of “experts” exercised an influence that proved to be “of special significance” according to Singh. The Secretariat convened at a two day “informal meeting with a dozen advisers” at the Rockefeller Foundation in December 1993. The meeting, affirmed Singh,

“offered rather critical but, at the same time, quite helpful comments and suggestions on many parts of the first draft prepared by the Secretariat... Furthermore, since PrepCom II, the Secretariat has received dozens of comments and suggestions from NGOs and all of these were also carefully reviewed”⁶⁵⁸.

⁶⁵⁰ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 129. Singh quoted the *Proposed Conceptual Framework of the Draft Recommendations of the Conference*, which pointed out “growing acceptance in many countries of the positive contribution which non-governmental groups can make to the development and implementation of population-related activities”. Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 129.

⁶⁵¹ Ib., p. 129.

⁶⁵² Ib., p. 129, quoting *Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Population and Development on its Second Session*, E/1993/69, June 3, 1993, par. 56.

⁶⁵³ Ib., pp. 132-3. Chapter XIV on International Cooperation already contained a section on the “responsibilities of partners in development”, and another one entitled “Towards a new commitment to funding population and development”.

⁶⁵⁴ Ib., p. 134.

⁶⁵⁵ Ib., p. 133.

⁶⁵⁶ Ib., p. 133.

⁶⁵⁷ Ib., pp. 133-4.

⁶⁵⁸ Ib., pp. 49-50.

Cairo substantially contributed to defining the contours of the new partnerships politics that we will analyze in this thesis' part three. As Bella Abzug reckoned it and as already mentioned, partnerships were in the documents because "we" – the NGOs – "demanded it"⁶⁵⁹. Singh corroborated in clear terms:

"The unambiguous recognition of the crucially important role of NGOs and the concept of partnership in the Cairo Programme of Action came about because of the extraordinary active participation of NGOs in the Cairo process and the clear acceptance by most of the governments of the NGO contribution and potential in the population sector"⁶⁶⁰.

Singh conceded that "seen from a historical perspective, NGOs have had to work very hard to reach this level of recognition"⁶⁶¹.

The Cairo Conference resulted in a proclaimed "global consensus" joined by the 179 participating countries. Even the Holy See, leading opponent to critical parts of the agenda, joined the consensus⁶⁶². The individuals, experts, organizations and UN agencies we named in this section – Sai, Sadik, Fathalla, Abzug, Mahler, Sinding, IPPF, Rockefeller Foundation, WEDO, the Women's Caucus, International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC), CEPPIA, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP, World Bank... - and their like-minded partners, stood at the origin of Cairo's Copernican turn towards alleged "people-centeredness". The paradigms making up global governance's "people-centeredness" grew out of an irremediably individualistic and hedonistic Western anthropology. They still govern international cooperation, having integrated the SDGs, in particular goals 3 and 5⁶⁶³. The UN Secretariat and UN agencies once again demonstrated their whole-sidedness with "the partners".

4.2.6. Copenhagen: spelling out the social parameter of sustainable development

Redressing the evils of economic globalization?

Rio had spelled out the *environmental* parameter of sustainable development. Copenhagen's specific focus was the *social* parameter of sustainable development. It is significant that no conference specifically addressed the *economic* parameter of global governance's framework. Copenhagen generally qualified economic growth as either *sustained*⁶⁶⁴ or *sustainable*⁶⁶⁵. The eco-social(ist) conceptualizers of the sustainability concept interpreted it as semantically and ideologically closer to stabilization, equilibrium, zero growth or even degrowth than to growth. Sustainable development as a system supposed to balance out three parameters has remained conceptually and practically ambivalent ever since its formal "intergovernmental" adoption at Rio.

⁶⁵⁹ Peeters, Marguerite. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁶⁶⁰ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., pp. 121-22.

⁶⁶¹ Ib., p. 122.

⁶⁶² It was "the first time at a world population conference that the Holy See had agreed to join at least partially in the consensus." Ib., p. 69.

⁶⁶³ SDG 3.7: "By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes". And SDG 5.6: "Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences."

⁶⁶⁴ For example, *Report of the United Nations World Summit for Social Development*. Copenhagen, March 6-12, 1995. A/CONF.166/9. Decl., par. 6. This document will henceforth be abbreviated as *Copenhagen, Decl.*

⁶⁶⁵ For instance, *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, op. cit., par. 6.

The World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, March 6-12, 1995) was the first ever UN conference on social development. Copenhagen sought to focus international attention on what the socialist-leaning UN considered to be the negative side of economic globalization, which had accelerated at an unprecedented rate in the 1980s. It proposed to do so by making, in the words of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, “social development a major priority for the international community”⁶⁶⁶. Copenhagen pursued three main social goals within the sustainable development framework: expanding productive employment, the “eradication of poverty”⁶⁶⁷, social integration.

Copenhagen integrated the social (education and health) paradigms of Jomtien and Cairo, and the social rights developed in New-York and Vienna. It espoused Vienna’s rights approach and global governance’s priority focus on *women’s* rights. After Copenhagen, Beijing definitively consolidated gender equality (conceptually inclusive of Cairo’s reproductive health and rights) as the transversal priority of sustainable development’s social parameter. Istanbul elaborated the local implementation mechanisms for global governance’s social agendas. The social conferences all integrated their respective agendas in the sustainable development framework, thereby linking them to the framework’s environmental dimension.

Population growth identified as root cause of poverty

The UN saw population growth as a root cause, not only of environmental degradation, but also of poverty. Copenhagen included in its agenda “family planning” (for example in par. 15 b or par 37 e), “reproductive health” (for ex. commitment 5 d at the national level), the “empowerment of women” (for ex. commitment 5 b at the national level and 5 m at the international levels), the term “gender” (33 appearances), “various forms” of the family (par. 26 h). Building on the partners’ Cairo “gain”, Copenhagen integrated reproductive health care services in its primary health care approach (commitment 2 b at the international level). Resulting from the “energetic NGO presence at the official conference”⁶⁶⁸, the Social Summit consolidated and mainstreamed the “partnership” language of the previous conferences. It notably established that the responsibility for implementing the summit’s three main goals lied “chiefly at the national level with Governments *working in partnership with civil society* [our emphasis]”⁶⁶⁹.

In Copenhagen as in Rio, Vienna and Cairo, the Women’s Caucus’ combative lobbying yielded impressive results. Faced with opposition, the Women’s Caucus fiercely watched over the incorporation of the Cairo language in the Copenhagen documents. Abzug candidly avowed, in wording denoting her dictatorial attitude, “insisting upon” that “what has been agreed to in Cairo cannot be undone... We are fighting to see that in some places where they are attempting to change the language, that they [i.e. sovereign governments] *have to* [our emphasis] be committed to the Cairo language”⁶⁷⁰. Abzug likewise confessed the caucus’ influence in operating and maintaining *linkages*:

“We are trying to make sure that the provisions which have been put together in all these conferences are *linked* [Ib.] and they each have to be reaffirmed and they all *link* [Ib.] into

⁶⁶⁶ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶⁶⁷ The *eradication of poverty* is a global governance paradigm and a pillar of its framework. Following Copenhagen, the UNDP made poverty eradication its overriding concern in promoting sustainable human development. The paradigm reflects global governance’s utopianism.

⁶⁶⁸ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations’ world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 96. “An NGO ‘benchmark’ document was developed during the preparatory phase and circulated broadly as a standard of measurement of the Summit’s achievements” (Ib.).

⁶⁶⁹ Ib., p. 96.

⁶⁷⁰ Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

each other. All these conferences (human rights, population, social summit) deal with women as a major force and so we insist that they all be carried over. They complement each other and we have to repeat the language which was satisfied with and not have a whole re-discussion of the issues affecting women. It's only a small group and the Vatican that are trying to turn around. And they don't have much support"⁶⁷¹.

The caucus successfully *linked* gender equity to Copenhagen's social agenda. Abzug wanted, for instance, to "change the nature of power, till women share 50% of the political space, of the resources"⁶⁷². The caucus pressed for that at Copenhagen.

The Women's Caucus was a major agent in building global governance's "people-centered" agenda as a *holistic system*. It behaved as the main advocate of the *interconnectedness* of conferences and paradigms. It prevented any reopening of the discussion until the consensus was sealed at the end of the second wave.

A new and global social contract, fruit of "partnerships"

In his opening statement at Copenhagen, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali identified the task before the summit to be "nothing more nor less than to rethink the notion of collective social responsibility"⁶⁷³. He argued that "*a new social contract, at the global level* [our emphasis]" was "required, to bring hope to States and to nations, and to men and women around the world. That should be the focus of the World Summit"⁶⁷⁴. This contract would be the contract of the "global society in which we live"⁶⁷⁵. Boutros-Ghali also called the new social contract "a new planet-wide *pact* [our emphasis] of solidarity"⁶⁷⁶. His use of the juridically loaded words *contract* and *pact* denoted the UN Secretariat's will to grant the post-Cold War new global consensus - the framework of global governance - a *contractual, binding* character. Boutros-Ghali's expressions did not make it in Copenhagen's intergovernmental outcome documents and they were not transmitted over to subsequent conferences. However, they well described the UN Secretariat's mindset and the intent of global governance's agents.

Boutros-Ghali *linked* his new global social contract to global governance's partnerships system and its cooptation of transnational NGOs and businesses. Copenhagen's "social project", said the Secretary-General, took "account of the extraordinary capacity for mobilization of the non-governmental organizations, and the force for integration represented by private enterprise and investors"⁶⁷⁷. US Vice President Al Gore, who headed the US delegation at the Social Summit, went along with the Secretary-General's linkage. Gore remarked at the summit that Rio, Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing were "town meetings of the globe where individual citizens, NGOs and governments [were] working together to hammer out a new consensus"⁶⁷⁸. Gore added: "We are working now to create a more vital relationship between the government and the people"⁶⁷⁹. Gore thereby expressed the view that the *global* social contract would revitalize a relationship at

⁶⁷¹ Ib.

⁶⁷² Ib.

⁶⁷³ *Copenhagen Report*, op. cit., p. 125. Statement by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

⁶⁷⁴ Ib., p. 125.

⁶⁷⁵ Ib., p. 126.

⁶⁷⁶ Ib., p. 128.

⁶⁷⁷ Ib., p. 127.

⁶⁷⁸ Gore, Al. Statement at the Copenhagen Social Summit. March 1995. See <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/text-version/statements/govts.htm> (retrieved July 29, 2021).

⁶⁷⁹ Ib.

the *national* level that was, in effect, deeply in crisis in Western democracies by the end of the Cold War.

4.2.7. Beijing: establishing global governance's gender equality pillar

The “gender perspective”, aimed at reaching “gender equality” was the central and transversal theme, the driving principle and the main objective of the Fourth International Conference on Women held in Beijing, September 4-15, 1995. This agenda was that of gender feminists, not of sovereign governments. It was the partners’ specific “gain”⁶⁸⁰ and historic breakthrough at Beijing. There and then, the gender agenda became the object of an intergovernmental consensus. The word “gender”, absent from the UN Charter, had started making timid appearances at previous UN conferences⁶⁸¹ since the 1980s, thanks to the diligent agency of gender feminists. Beijing firmly established the gender perspective as a major pillar of global governance’s framework and the priority of sustainable development’s social equity parameter. No sooner was Beijing over than gender equality became a normative priority of international cooperation for the 21st century. Suffice it to observe that gender equality is the very object of SDG 5⁶⁸².

The gender anthropological and sociopolitical agenda

At Beijing, most governmental delegations understood *gender equality* as promoting women’s socioeconomic status. The postmodern, deconstructionist content of “gender”, publicly unmasked after Beijing, was largely hidden at the time. UN member states then fell victims of a grand semantic manipulation exercise. This exercise consisted, notably as in Cairo, in avoiding clearly defining the new terms introduced in the conferences’ drafts⁶⁸³.

⁶⁸⁰ In 1984, the Mexico Conference on Population still valued motherhood to some extent. Its recommendation 7 read: “Governments should provide women... with opportunities for personal fulfillment in familial and non-familial roles, as well as for participation in economic, social and cultural life, while continuing to give support to their important social role as mothers”. *Report of the International Conference on Population*. Mexico City, August 6 – 14, 1984. E/CONF.76/19. The gender agenda will deconstruct the role of women as mothers.

⁶⁸¹ Number of appearances of the word “gender” in the conferences’ outcome documents: Nairobi (16); Jomtien (1); New-York (2); *Rio Agenda 21* (18); Vienna (5); Cairo (55); Copenhagen (33); Beijing (272); Istanbul (60); Rome (9).

⁶⁸² SDG 5: “Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls”. And MDG 3 (2001-2015) was dedicated to “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”.

⁶⁸³ See *Beijing Report*, op. cit., Annex IV. The “statement by the President of the Conference on the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘gender’” provided no clarification. It read: “1. During the 19th meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women, acting as preparatory body for the Fourth World Conference on Women, an issue arose concerning the meaning of the word ‘gender’ in the context of the Platform for Action of the Conference. In order to examine the matter, the Commission decided to form a contact group in New York, with the Commission’s Rapporteur, Ms. Selma Ashipala (Namibia), as Chairperson. The Commission mandated the informal contact group to seek agreement on the commonly understood meaning of ‘gender’ in the context of the Platform for Action and to report directly to the Conference in Beijing. 2. Having considered the issue thoroughly, the contact group noted that: (1) the word ‘gender’ had been commonly used and understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage in numerous other United Nations forums and conferences; (2) there was no indication that any new meaning or connotation of the term, different from accepted prior usage, was intended in the Platform for Action. 3. Accordingly, the contact group reaffirmed that the word ‘gender’ as used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted and understood as it was in ordinary, generally accepted usage. The contact group also agreed that the present report should be read by the President of the Conference as a president’s statement and that the statement should be part of the final report of the Conference.” The word gender, however, had been used since the 1985 Nairobi women’s conference in its novel, ideological meaning. This author asked gender expert in Beijing why the “gender issue” was resolved by a non-definition. This is what she responded: “Part of the problem we face here is the language differences. The word ‘gender’ translates very differently in different languages. We have actually reissued the Spanish version of the Platform for Action in order to translate ‘gender’ as ‘genero’ instead of as ‘sexo’. I am sure you know that when societies go through a massive change, and certainly changes in women’s lives are part of that, language follows. And I think the word ‘gender’ is symbolic of society’s changes. Probably when you have so many

Gender's twin ideological seeds – feminist and homosexual – had been sowed in the mid-1950s⁶⁸⁴. Franco-American academic circles fleshed out the concept in the 1970s and 80s and articulated the gender vs. sex dialectics. By the end of the Cold War, gender had reached conceptual maturity. Gender supposedly *expanded* beyond the biological (sex) to include “socially defined roles”. This conceptual “enlargement” first appeared non-threatening. Judith Butler's 1990 *Gender Trouble* book laid out the gender revolution's radical facet. It became clear during global governance's third phase, that of implementation, that gender treated man and woman, femininity and masculinity, motherhood and fatherhood, marriage between a man and a woman, the family based on such a marriage, man and woman's spousal identity, our common human filial identity - all these constitutive and given features of a human being - as *social constructs* that would be discriminatory for both women and homosexuals, contrary to their civic equality and liberty, and therefore to be deconstructed by all possible means: semantic, educational, cultural, political and juridical. The gender seeds grew into a tree. The tree now extends its branches globally.

Since the 1970s, the agents of the gender revolution had pursued sociopolitical objectives. They started engaging politically to break what they considered to be the marginalization of “women's issues”. They wanted to achieve *social change*. They partnered with the UN during the UN's Decade for Women (1975-85), notably achieving the creation of UNIFEM in 1976 and the adoption of CEDAW in 1979⁶⁸⁵. They actively participated in the UN conferences in the 1980s. The purpose of Beijing's *gender mainstreaming* strategy was none other than to achieve global social change, a global gender equality revolution.

Women's NGOs acted as “fifth column” in second wave conferences and led Cairo-Beijing linkage

The gender feminist Kristen Timothy was one of the politically engaged intellectuals who participated in conceptualizing gender as socially constructed roles in the 1970s. She partook in the Beijing conference as Deputy Director of the UN Secretariat's Division for the Advancement of Women. In an article published in 2004, Timothy frankly admitted that “in all of the conferences of the 1990s prior to Beijing, women's NGOs acted as a *fifth column* [our emphasis] to bring gender into the negotiations”⁶⁸⁶: as a small minority of people undermining a bigger group (in our case the UN as an intergovernmental organization) *from within* to further an invading enemy's objectives. Just as pro-reproductive health Singh had reckoned the partners' manipulative ways at Cairo, pro-gender Timothy was not ashamed to expose the Women's Caucus' clandestine and subversive power-grab strategies. Timothy hailed the strategic efficiency of these NGOs in building intergovernmental consensus on controversial issues:

languages and so many groups with so many different views, the only solution is to have a kind of non-definition. The idea was that the term has to be used in different ways in different languages for different purposes.” See Marguerite A. Peeters and Jean Guilfoyle's September 2, 1995 interview with Kristen Timothy, in *Interactive Information Services*. Report 9 of October 18, 1995, item 2. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives.

⁶⁸⁴ This author exposed the history of the gender revolution in *The Gender Revolution – A Global Agenda – A Tool for Discernment*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2013. Translated from the original French version, published by Mame in 2013. John Money's distinction of *sex* and *gender* threw the seeds in 1955.

⁶⁸⁵ Bella Abzug seemingly had something to do with the creation of UNIFEM: “In the decade of women we did accomplish certain things: the creation of UNIFEM, the convention to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. Since that time, we have had a greater participation directly in the actual official conferences.” See Appendix E. Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit. Without using the word “gender”, CEDAW referred twice to the gender “stereotype” concept: to the “stereotyped roles for men and women” (Art. 5) and to “any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education” (Art. 10).

⁶⁸⁶ Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 55.

“Leading up to the Beijing conference, women’s NGOs succeeded in building effective strategies for reaching consensus on contentious issues at the various global conferences held during the early 1990s on the environment, population and social development”⁶⁸⁷.

Timothy praised “the tireless efforts of the Linkage Caucus organized by the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) under the leadership of Bella Abzug”⁶⁸⁸. Interestingly to be noted, the Women’s Caucus started calling itself the *Linkage Caucus* in Beijing. The name change signified the caucus’ determination to ensure the Cairo-Beijing nexus: the transmission to Beijing of its Cairo “gains” (universal access to sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights, elimination of “unsafe abortion”, sexuality education, various forms of the family, gender equality etc.). The caucus proved impressively successful⁶⁸⁹ at achieving this linkage.

In her statements above, the pro-gender scholar and UN official acknowledged: NGOs’ clear undermining intent; NGOs, not UN member states, were in the driver’s seat in the Cairo and Beijing consensus-building exercises; the issues that NGOs advanced were contentious: non-consensual among UN member states; NGOs had to “strategize” and manipulate to obtain an intergovernmental consensus on their controversial agenda; they achieved their “gains” *from within* intergovernmental processes. Consciously or not, Timothy thus proved that the proclaimed intergovernmental global consensus on the Cairo and Beijing agendas was an intellectual and political fraud, that these agendas were owned by like-minded NGOs and experts, not by UN member states as sovereign states and as nations.

The UN Secretariat’s ideological and political bias

The UN Secretariat nominated Gertrude Mongella, a gender feminist and a member of WEDO’s International Policy Action Committee, as Secretary-General of the Beijing conference. This nomination - following that of Strong and Sadik as Secretaries-General of Rio and Cairo respectively - illustrated once again the UN Secretariat’s bias in favor of “the partners’ agendas”. Months before Beijing, Mongella had appointed WEDO to act as an Expert Advisory Group on “consensus-building”⁶⁹⁰. Mongella’s appointment confirms Timothy’s remark about the consensus-building role of the Linkage Caucus, and highlights the UN Secretariat’s collusion with gender feminist NGOs.

UN intergovernmental bodies whose mandates were considered relevant to Beijing’s agenda similarly colluded with women’s NGOs. According to Timothy, UNIFEM helped NGOs strategize on how to influence governments: “Some of [the] strategies [of women’s NGOs] were developed in training courses organized by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Women’s Tribune Center on how to influence a UN conference”⁶⁹¹. As for the UNDP, it offered direct support to women’s NGOs and facilitated their network-building by sponsoring the feminist electronic “network of networks” - the so-called Beijing95-List. The bias of the UN system – the Secretariat, UN agencies, funds and programs,

⁶⁸⁷ Ib.

⁶⁸⁸ Ib.

⁶⁸⁹ Reproductive health appeared 45 times in the Beijing outcome documents, reproductive rights 14 times, sexual health 9 times and sexual rights 4 times.

⁶⁹⁰ The other two issues were: women and environment/development; increasing women’s participation in decision-making. A WEDO fact sheet issued months prior to Beijing.

⁶⁹¹ Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 55.

and ECOSOC- in favor of the NGO preset gender agenda became all the more obvious once opposition started arising. In the NGO accreditation process, the UN Secretariat discriminated against NGOs defending the family and traditional values⁶⁹².

The Women's Linkage Caucus' "coup"

Beijing addressed Bella Abzug's primary agenda, women's "empowerment" and gender equality. The results- and action-minded Abzug had decided that Beijing was to be a *pledging* conference, a conference of *action, commitments* and *budgets* allocated to women. She indicated before the conference that WEDO would *demand* from governments "accountability, transparency, enforcement and integration"⁶⁹³. Abzug did not want rhetorical hot air: she wanted actual *enforcement*, a juridically loaded word, semantically stronger than mere "implementation". She behaved as if the caucus were UN member states, and her agenda, hard international law.

WEDO and the Linkage Caucus encouraged gender feminists' direct participation in the national preparations for the conference and their contribution to writing national *governmental* reports. They ensured the inclusion of the strongest possible language on gender equality in Beijing's outcome documents⁶⁹⁴. They were present each step of the way from agenda-setting to monitoring implementation⁶⁹⁵. They acted as "consensus-builders". The alleged intergovernmental consensus on the Beijing gender agenda was genuinely owned solely by the gender feminist activists claiming to represent the world's women.

After the conference, Abzug particularly acclaimed paragraph 297 of the *Platform of Action*, which put governments under maximum pressure to implement Beijing, bound them to the UN - NGOs tandem and kicked off the monitoring process⁶⁹⁶. This paragraph reflected WEDO's

⁶⁹² Here again, Timothy candidly stated what happened: "Close to 2,000 organisations sought accreditation; nearly 1,500 were approved. The UN Secretariat screened the applications for NGO accreditation. In this process, many organisations purporting to have a 'family' agenda were initially held back if they did not explicitly show concern for women's issues since the Secretariat found that attention to family per se did not necessarily mean support for women's equality. Such groups included Focus on the Family and family organisations linked to Catholic and other religious groups". Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 56. Timothy also named "neoconservative groups such as Concerned Women of America and the Real Women of Canada" that were "new to the scene... The accreditation process opened the conference to NGOs of many persuasions, but proved to be a highly political and difficult exercise that consumed an enormous amount of time and energy in the lead-up to the conference. The conference Secretariat placed the names of NGOs that met the criteria for accreditation as laid down by the General Assembly before the Commission on the Status of Women. Accreditation became so contentious that it fell to the ECOSOC meeting in Geneva two months before the conference to make final decisions on the most controversial applications." Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 55.

⁶⁹³ Peeters, Marguerite. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁶⁹⁴ Other major NGOs got involved in the preparatory process. In September 1994, for instance, Amnesty International issued a document entitled *Equality by the Year 2000? Making recommendations ahead of Beijing*.

⁶⁹⁵ See Marguerite A. Peeters. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 5 of August 16, 1995, item 1. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives. Ahead of the conference, WEDO planned to organize a "Commitment Scoreboard" in Beijing at the site of the official UN conference as well as at the NGO Forum in Huairou and on-line, with icons symbolizing the major issue areas where WEDO expected action to be taken and a symbol to indicate whether governments pledged any resources to implement the initiative.

⁶⁹⁶ Par. 297 of the *Beijing Platf. for Action* read as follows: "As soon as possible, preferably by the end of 1995, Governments, in consultation with relevant institutions and non-governmental organizations, should begin to develop implementation strategies for the Platform and, preferably by the end of 1996, should have developed their strategies or plans of action. This planning process should draw upon persons at the highest level of authority in government and relevant actors in civil society. These implementation strategies should be comprehensive, have time-bound targets and benchmarks for monitoring, and include proposals for allocating or reallocating resources for

language and strategy, not that of sovereign governments. Abzug had announced that WEDO would call on governments “to meet with women’s organizations before the end of 1995 (the conference took place in September 1995) to determine national plans and resources needed to implement the agenda for equality”⁶⁹⁷. She affirmed that “civil society” – that is, by her definition, feminist grassroots movements and NGOs – was expanding its networks “to be able to have the *political power* to make the leaders responsive to their *demands*”⁶⁹⁸. The self-assigned political role of the Women’s Linkage Caucus now extended to acting as governments’ “watchdogs”) in their implementation of the “commitments” they supposedly made – that they made under the Women’s Caucus’ unrelenting pressure. The caucus forced governments to “own” their gender equality agenda and translate it into national policies and laws⁶⁹⁹.

No sooner was Beijing over than the UN Secretariat acted to ensure that gender equality would thenceforth become a transversal priority of international cooperation for the 21st century. In the implementation process, the hidden agenda quickly became more widely manifest. Opposition rose. In 2004, Timothy lamented that

“in the follow-up to the Beijing Conference, both at subsequent sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women and at five-year review of implementation, rifts that threatened to block adoption of a set of agreements at Beijing [were] re-emerging. The religious right and conservative governments [were] revisiting reservations entered to the Beijing Platform on issues such as reproductive rights, gender, sexual orientation, inheritance rights and land ownership, and even on what constitutes violence against women”⁷⁰⁰.

We contend, however, that in spite of rising opposition, the gender revolution continued to proceed forward in major ways. The gender *homosexual/LGBTQI* revolution came out of the Beijing gender *feminist* revolution, hidden as it was in the same gender deconstructionist seed. As history now showed, it unfolded extremely rapidly⁷⁰¹.

In 2010, the UN created a mega body⁷⁰² endowed with a gender equality mandate: UN Women. A consolidated institution was now charged with implementing the Beijing gender platform.

implementation. Where necessary, the support of the international community could be enlisted, including resources”.

⁶⁹⁷ Peeters, Marguerite. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁶⁹⁸ Ib.

⁶⁹⁹ The notion of “ownership of the agenda” will later be applied to governments, and future UN documents, in particular of the Secretariat, will use the phrase “national ownership” to signify that governments had to make the agenda of global governance their own and implement it, translating it in national policies and laws.

⁷⁰⁰ Timothy, Kristen. *Defending diversity, sustaining consensus: NGOs at the Beijing World Conference on Women and beyond*, op. cit., p. 56.

⁷⁰¹ One sign of this is the rapid succession of laws allowing same sex marriage. By July 1st, 2022, over 30 countries had laws allowing same sex marriage. The world’s major “democracies” count among them. In 2001: the Netherlands; in 2003: Belgium; in 2005: Spain and Canada; in 2006: South Africa; in 2009: Norway and Sweden; in 2010: Portugal, Iceland and Argentina; in 2012: Denmark; in 2013: France, Brazil, New Zealand, Uruguay, England and Wales; in 2014: Luxemburg and Scotland; in 2015: the United States, Ireland and Finland; in 2016: Colombia; in 2017: Australia, Germany and Malta; in 2019: Austria, Taiwan, Ecuador and Northern Ireland; in 2020: Costa Rica; in 2022: Chile and Switzerland. Arguably even more challenging is the widespread penetration of gender deconstructionism in the core content of education from kindergarten to university. The revolution is in a forward movement: its stages are increasingly radical. It has now been gearing towards transhumanism: the marriage between the human being and technology.

⁷⁰² UN Women became operational in 2011. Michelle Bachelet, former President of Chile, was its first Executive Director.

Finally, in spite of opposition, gender equality has remained a standing pillar of *the framework*, even consolidated all along global governance's implementation phase up to this day.

4.2.8. Istanbul: partnerships as a political principle integrated in the framework

The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements or Habitat II, or City Summit, (Istanbul, June 3-14, 1996)⁷⁰³ was preceded by Habitat I (Vancouver, 1976) and followed by Habitat III (Quito, October 17-20, 2016).

The partnerships' conference

Istanbul was known as “the conference of partnerships”⁷⁰⁴: partnerships between state and non-state actors for the exclusive purpose of realizing the UN’s post-Cold War global goals. Istanbul turned the operational collaboration between non-governmental and intergovernmental actors that had driven the global governance process from the onset into a *political principle*. There and then at the City Summit, partnerships were intergovernmentally endorsed as the object of a “consensus”⁷⁰⁵ and as a principle, that is, as a theoretical standard, as a political rule of conduct to govern, paradoxically, *international* cooperation (cooperation between nations and their governments). The partnership principle was the partners’ main “gain” at Istanbul.

The partnership principle was also the last major pillar of global governance’s conceptual framework. It was the pillar sustaining global governance as process, which will be the object of this thesis’ part three. By the end of 1996, the UN’s post-Cold War global consensus-building exercise was over. The revolution per se was over: the partners had set a systemic global agenda for the 21st century, and the global governance revolutionary process was entering its implementation phase. Istanbul recognized formal and organized partnerships to be the way to move “from agenda to action” – the UN’s watchword by the end of the conference process. As global governance’s primary agenda-setters, movers and shakers and stakeholders, non-governmental partners would also be the most driven implementors of the global agenda.

Local implementation of the global agenda

The Earth Summit had “recognized the proper management of human settlements as a prerequisite to the attainment of the overall goals for sustainable development”⁷⁰⁶. The City Summit’s stated purpose was to realize *sustainable human settlements*. Istanbul’s integration of human settlements in the sustainable development *framework* entailed the *linkage* of its agenda to those of all previous second wave conferences: not only Rio, but Vienna, Cairo⁷⁰⁷, Copenhagen and Beijing. At the revolution’s launch, Rio had introduced the paradigms that would become the specific gains of subsequent conferences, including sustainable human settlements. Rio foresaw their full

⁷⁰³ The preparatory process included three PrepComs, held from 1994 to 1996. PrepCom I in Geneva April 11–22, 1994; PrepCom II in Nairobi, April 24–May 5, 1995; PrepCom III in New York February 5–17, 1996.

⁷⁰⁴ Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place: United Nations' world conferences and civil society*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 101.

⁷⁰⁵ There were other “gains”, such as the adoption of the right to adequate housing, or that of “best practices”.

⁷⁰⁶ UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/47/180, p. 1. The UN General Assembly decided to convene Habitat II in that resolution.

⁷⁰⁷ For instance Istanbul recommended that “Governments at the appropriate levels, including local authorities, in partnership with other interested parties... develop and implement programmes to ensure universal access for women throughout their life-span to a full range of affordable health-care services, including those related to reproductive health care, which includes family planning and sexual health, consistent with the report of the International Conference on Population and Development”. *Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II)*. Istanbul, June 3-14, 1996. A/CONF.165/14, par. 136 f. Henceforth references to this report will be as follows: *Habitat Report* or *Istanbul Report*.

integration within the sustainable development framework. At the end of the revolution, Istanbul mutually integrated all the previous conferences' gains and agendas, then fully developed, within the framework of sustainable development⁷⁰⁸. Istanbul also advocated their integrated *implementation*, with a particular emphasis on that of Cairo and Beijing⁷⁰⁹. The Women's Linkage Caucus aggressively watched over these linkages.

Istanbul marked a turning point in global governance. It launched an operational *global to local movement* which proved extremely efficient in quietly establishing the new world order for the 21st century⁷¹⁰. "Think globally, act locally", "local action for global problems" were catchwords of the Istanbul process. The City Summit focused on the *local* implementation of the set *global* agenda – of Rio's *Local Agenda 21* as inclusive of the "gains" of subsequent conferences.

From global to local: local authorities as direct partners in global governance

The City Summit's conference process made two procedural innovations⁷¹¹. For the first time in the history of UN conferences, it opened its doors to the direct participation of mayors and local government representatives in the negotiation process, granting mayors the right to speak, but not to vote at the Main Committee (the intergovernmental committee) meetings. Istanbul also invited them to speak at the Plenary. This innovation transformed local authorities into significant partners of national governments in a global agenda common to both. Secondly, Habitat II established a formal mechanism called Committee II or the Partners' Committee⁷¹², through which not only local authorities but parliamentarians, businesses, NGOs, women's groups, trade unions, academies of science and engineering, religious groups, cultural societies, foundations and youths⁷¹³ could express their ideas, interact with government representatives and present to them their "commitments" towards the goals of the conference.

⁷⁰⁸ In the Istanbul Declaration, governments committed to "cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem". *Habitat Report*, op. cit., par. 10.

⁷⁰⁹ There are 60 appearances of "gender" (as already mentioned) and 17 of "reproductive" in the conference's report.

⁷¹⁰ At a press conference on June 13, 1996 in Istanbul, the mayor of Cologne, Germany said that "for the first time in UN history, local authorities had the right to speak; it is a historic event, the beginning of a new age where United Cities can work together with the UN. Cities want to be partners of the UN," he insisted. In the follow-up to Habitat, mayors who participated in Habitat intended to work with UNCHS, the UN agency on human settlements. "We would like to have an international structure in which cities can work with the UN," said the mayor of Cologne. The mayor of Accra, Ghana spoke of the post-cold war redefinition of religious and political paradigms. In his view the partnership concept was one further redefinition of how the world would work in the 21st century. He underscored how the new world order needed the participation of local governments. "We are now creating the relationships that will make new local-central governments work. This is a new idea," he said. The association of local authorities will put local governments 'on equal footing' with national governments. "Right now, we are not on equal footing." It will allow cities to "speak with one voice when it comes to speak to the UN". In Bursa, Turkey, the mayor was implementing Local Agenda 21 and recommended that local governments "change their mentality to be in a win-win configuration with NGOs." See Marguerite A. Peeters. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 35 of June 21, 1996, op. cit.

⁷¹¹ Governments accepted to change the rules in favor of partnerships by adopting rule 61 at the 1995 General Assembly "which allows all these partners, because of the nature of our human society today," to participate in UN conferences. Introducing this new rule was the initiative of Wally N'Dow who told this author in Istanbul: "There has never been a meeting where governments have accepted mayors to come in, in history. They were confronted with the reality of the end of the 20th century and the crisis of cities in every nation: big cities are social catastrophes today, and peace is being threatened." See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 35 of June 21, 1996, op. cit., item 1.

⁷¹² See *Habitat Report*, op. cit. Habitat II decided to allocate agenda item 10 on "the role and contribution of local authorities, the private sector, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, and other partners in the implementation of the Habitat Agenda" to Committee II. Committee II held 14 meetings, from 3 to 7 June and on 10, 11 and 13 June 1996 and submitted its report to the Conference.

⁷¹³ Examples of NGO participants are the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), United Towns Organization, World Association of Major Metropolises, Summit Conference of the World's Cities, The President's

In the report it submitted to the Main Committee, Committee II included hearings of the mayors who had, prior to the official conference, participated in the World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA, May 30-31, 1996), a parallel event that had gathered 500 pro-global governance mayors from around the world⁷¹⁴. WACLA had issued a Declaration which influenced Habitat II's Declaration and *Platform of Action* in several ways.

WACLA's Declaration focused both on the implementation of Rio's *Local Agenda 21* (global governance as content) and on "partnership with all vital forces" (global governance as process). It advocated decentralization (empowering local authorities) on the one hand, and centralization (centralizing local authorities in umbrella organizations partnering directly with the UN) on the other. Participating mayors asked that WACLA be considered "the sole interlocutor on behalf of cities and local authorities to negotiate policies concerning urban development and management of human settlements within the framework of global sustainable development"⁷¹⁵. Aligned with the UN's new global goals and established for the sole purpose of their implementation, WACLA, like the Women's Caucus in its respective domain, claimed exclusivity and representativeness, leaving no room for pluralism. WACLA led to the creation, in 2004, of an umbrella NGO of mayors' NGOs partnering with the UN: United Cities and Local Governments.

WACLA mayors viewed Istanbul as the beginning of a new age in which cities, united around the global sustainable development agenda, could work together with the UN as its *direct* partners. This direct relationship bypassed the national level. In a flagrant breach of subsidiarity, WACLA aimed at the local implementation of global goals, not at the consideration, at the international level, of locally determined objectives.

In the spirit of the City Summit, "local" meant not only the metropolis, cities and villages. It also meant *smaller* than these: the school, the marketplace, the workplace, the playground, your street, your apartment building... - all of which were to be transformed into *sustainable communities*. Local authorities, in a direct partnership with the UN, were to play a key role in this grand transformation at the level of grassroots communities. They would put their communities and citizens in a quasi-direct relationship with the partners and "experts" pulling the strings at the "global level", in ways that would bypass all the intermediary bodies that had remained independent from the global partnership system.

To ensure the fluidity of the global to local transmission chain established at Rio and definitively consolidated at Istanbul, global governance's partnership system aimed at a total cooptation of actors at all levels – global, regional, national, local, grassroots, individual citizen. It is through

Council on Sustainable Development, The World University of Sweden, Parliamentarians for Global Action, The Huairou Commission.

⁷¹⁴ Participants mainly came from four international organizations of mayors: IULA, Metropolis, Cités Unies and Citynet. The three first of these merged in 2004 to form the powerful United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), an umbrella organization of mayors, local and regional leaders that wields considerable power at the UN. The origins of the international municipal movement go back to the beginning of the 20th century with the 1913 establishment of the Union Internationale des Villes – UIV - in Ghent, Belgium. UIV's name changed in 1928 to the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), whose secretariat moved to the Hague in 1948, where it remained until 2004. Its founding President Bertrand Delanoë, mayor of Paris (2001-14) and LGBT rights activist, served two three-year terms (2004-2010). Delanoë used his presidency *inter alia* to mainstream Beijing's gender perspective in the organization. The UCLG achieved inclusion of Goal 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) into Agenda 2030. The UCLG increases the role and influence of local government and its representative organisations in global governance.

⁷¹⁵ World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities. *Declaration*. Istanbul 30-31, 1996, p. 10.

its practical partnerships network that the new world order would be globally implemented down to the individual citizen. Everywhere the revolutionary network did not encounter resistance, it performed according to its conceptualizers' plan. The break-out of the technological revolution in the mid-1990s coincided with global governance's entry in the implementation period. It massively facilitated the global to local implementation process, potentially putting any local citizen connected to the Internet in direct contact with global governance's multifarious transnational agents. It is not in this thesis' ambit to analyze this phenomenon.

Launching a global societal and political revolution

In a Habitat II official publication a year prior to the Istanbul conference, David C. Korten, an anti-liberal American political activist⁷¹⁶, member of the Club of Rome, articulated what would become the essence of Istanbul's partnerships revolution. He foresaw nothing short of a societal and political revolution to take place at Habitat, that would challenge the institutions of the 20th century. UN conferences previous to Istanbul, he contended, had "accepted as a given the institutions of the twentieth century"⁷¹⁷. But Habitat II had to behave differently, be "the first global conference of the twenty-first century"⁷¹⁸ by beginning "the global dialogue toward recreating human societies for the new era"⁷¹⁹: a global dialogue that would "engage civil society in its breadth and depth"⁷²⁰ and be "grounded in the experience... of those who have borne the major consequences of the failure of twentieth century institutions"⁷²¹.

Korten rightfully noted that "the breach between the people and their governments" had become a "great chasm"⁷²². The solution he conceived for what had then become a real and pervasive problem was, however, dangerously ideological. Korten was convinced that the time had come for "citizens" to lead and for their governments to "follow" – a proposal that could have sounded like a back-to-democracy call. By "citizens", however, Korten did not mean nations, nor the national citizens of modern democracies. He meant "representatives of a globalizing civil society"⁷²³, "civil society organizations that invariably gather... outside the official chambers"⁷²⁴ – in other words, something similar to what this thesis has called the global governance "partners". These citizens' groups, Korten noted, "want to define the problems and set the agendas instead of negotiating with their governments"⁷²⁵: they want, in other words, a direct and global political role for themselves, they want to *grab power*. Among them, he stated, "there have been

⁷¹⁶ David C. Korten was then President of the New-York based People-Centered Development Forum. Author of several books including *The Post-Corporate World*, he has been a proponent of a great turning to an ecological civilization. When at the Harvard Institute for International Development, he headed a Ford Foundation-funded project to strengthen the organization of national family planning programs. He worked as a Ford Foundation project specialist in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and later as Asia regional adviser on development management to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Korten collaborated extensively with NGOs. He returned to the US in 1992. At the Copenhagen Social Summit, Korten affirmed, "citizen groups" had rejected the official declaration "on the ground that its embrace of the neo-liberal economic system of growth, free markets, and free trade contradicted its professed commitment to eliminating poverty, unemployment and social disintegration". Korten, David C. *Reclaiming the Power of Civil Society*. In *Countdown to Istanbul*. United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. June 1995. Number 3, p.1. Some NGOs view the economic model embraced by governments as the real problem, "because that model inherently places corporate financial interests ahead of human interests" (Ib.). Anti-liberal NGOs in Copenhagen issued *The Copenhagen Alternative Declaration*.

⁷¹⁷ Korten, David C. *Reclaiming the Power of Civil Society*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁷¹⁸ Ib., p. 3.

⁷¹⁹ Ib., p. 3.

⁷²⁰ Ib., p. 3.

⁷²¹ Ib., p. 3.

⁷²² Ib., p. 1.

⁷²³ Ib., p. 1.

⁷²⁴ Ib., p. 1.

⁷²⁵ Ib., p. 1.

consequential efforts to identify the underlying causes of the malfunction”⁷²⁶. These groups would “engage from the grassroots in building true citizen *agendas for change* [our emphasis]”⁷²⁷. They would reclaim “the inherent power of civil society from economic and political systems ruled in secret”⁷²⁸. Being about the grassroots, the City Summit would offer a “natural venue” for sharing the principles of “progressive civic organizations”⁷²⁹. In Korten’s envisioned revolution, transnational “civil society”, “citizens”, NGOs or “people” would grab power from UN member states.

Let us make two remarks about Korten’s views: first, in the then prevailing “end of ideology” mindset, the political activist and Club of Rome member who himself worked for the Ford Foundation’s family planning programmes in the developing world seemed to assume that the revolutionary citizens’ groups were ideologically-free or ideologically “neutral”. Secondly, his wish that these groups lead and governments follow was largely fulfilled. Have not a majority of sovereign governments, even if at varying degrees, consented to the partners’ leadership and agenda during the revolution and ever thereafter, adopting and implementing their paradigms?

Korten expressed his conviction that his vision was in keeping with that of the official organizers of Habitat II. In effect, in the same publication’s editorial, Habitat II’s Secretary-General Wally N’Dow (UN Assistant Secretary-General, UN Centre for Human Settlements-Habitat) stated that the “spirit of inclusion” was “a guiding principle of the Habitat II preparatory process” and explained what he meant by “inclusion”: “Habitat II must be a conference of *partners* [our emphasis]”⁷³⁰. And so indeed it was.

Global civil society and global citizenship at Istanbul

Since the Social Summit, the UN had started using the phrase “civil society”. When asked to define civil society in an interview on June 6, 1995, Wally N’Dow responded in ways corroborating the convergence with Korten’s ideas that we just alluded to:

“Civil society includes everyone who is non-governmental, tremendous prestige NGOs, CBOs (community-based organizations)⁷³¹, professional groups, religious groups, youth groups, women’s movements, environmental movements. All these people are coming in like rivers to cover the big flood of demands for the social progress of mankind. The conferences of the UN and the world recognize increasingly that they must be engaged in preparing the future. In the past, only governments had the vision. They said: ‘we are the providers’. Individual citizens and their organizations were not invited to give their views. Today, with the challenges of the 21st century, I think it is perfect that people come in from civil society and talk about the future. It is a very important issue of human survival”⁷³².

⁷²⁶ Ib., p. 1.

⁷²⁷ Ib., p. 3.

⁷²⁸ Ib., p. 1.

⁷²⁹ Ib., p. 3.

⁷³⁰ N’Dow, Wally. *Editorial*. In *Countdown to Istanbul*. United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. June 1995. Number 3., p. 2.

⁷³¹ N’Dow mentioned “community-based organizations” as distinct from NGOs. A tension in fact appeared in Istanbul between NGOs and CBOs. The term CBOs was introduced in Agenda 21 (4 uses), then appeared in Cairo (1), Beijing (7) and Istanbul (27).

⁷³² See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 35 of June 21, 1996 (including quotes from a June 6, 1995 interview with Wally N’Dow by Marguerite A. Peeters), op. cit., item 11.

As all global governance advocates, N'Dow highlighted the “visionary” and even “Messianic” role of non-governmental actors and connected the exercise of this role to human survival.

In his statement at the conference, N'Dow used the expression “global civil society”⁷³³, which had appeared fourteen times in *Our Global Neighborhood* published a year prior to Istanbul. It is meaningful that the expression, absent from all previous UN conferences, appeared precisely at Habitat II: at the height of the revolution and a critical turning point for the new politics. It had become increasingly clear since Copenhagen that the UN attributed to this traditional political concept a new and different meaning, a globalist one, detaching the concept from the individual nations that civil societies respectively constituted. Without defining the term clearly, global governance understood by *civil society* its transnational non-state partners - much beyond NGOs, as N'Dow's quote above evidences.

The idea of all of us being “citizens of Planet Earth” (an abstract and nonexistent political entity) is connatural to that of global governance. The notion of “global citizenship” had surfaced sporadically over the course of the second wave conferences since Rio. The Baha'i International Community NGO, which believes in “global citizenship” as the way to global peace, strongly promoted this agenda at Habitat II. Claiming to be putting themselves at the service of the UN and NGOs, Baha'is penetrated several working groups during the negotiations. They largely distributed a button, worn by Wally N'Dow himself, reading: “I am a world citizen - The Earth is but one country and mankind its citizens – Habitat II - Istanbul”.

Best practices: another Istanbul “gain”

An important conceptual and practical outcome of Istanbul was the intergovernmental adoption of the “best practices” new paradigm⁷³⁴. This new paradigm entered global governance’s conceptual framework and semantic system at the time the revolutionary process was entering its implementation stage. It has spread pervasively since Istanbul, applied to a wide variety of domains⁷³⁵.

Best practices posit global governance’s “experts” as the world’s schoolmaster, and the world’s citizens, as their students. As Wally N'Dow put it in his June 6, 1996 interview, “This conference is a global classroom for people to learn practical solutions”⁷³⁶. The master, using his own criteria, identifies his best students and hands them medals. These are hailed as global governance’s best practitioners, whose most “innovative” and efficient performances in implementing the global norms are set as models and sources of inspiration for the rest of the class.

In traditional education (knowledge acquisition), the learner actively uses his reason to discern as a free person whether what he is being taught is true and real. In best practices, by contradistinction, the individual tends to be passive and to follow, without necessarily calling upon his reason and making his own free judgment, what the experts have established to be normative for him. Global governance’s best practices render people dependent on “global experts”, their “data” and statistics. They stifle people’s capacity to reflect independently from

⁷³³ *Habitat Report*, op. cit., p. 217.

⁷³⁴ Concretely, Istanbul launched an information bank providing models for practical things that have worked in the implementation of “sustainable human settlements”, disseminating experience in urban improvements, building data bases with indicators on how to measure a certain number of parameters (homelessness, crime, violence, the need for housing...).

⁷³⁵ See for example its application to gender in *United Nations Guidelines for Gender-Inclusive Language*. <https://www.un.org/en/gender-inclusive-language/guidelines.shtml> (retrieved February 6, 2022).

⁷³⁶ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 42 of September 3, 1996, item 1. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

the “experts”. Incidentally, for a few years now, “big data”, governed as it is by artificial intelligence and formatted by the global experts, has put itself at the service of global governance.

Women’s Linkage Caucus’ role at Istanbul

Wally N’Dow, determined to ensure the integration of the Cairo/Beijing agendas in that of Istanbul, appointed an advisory body to that end: the Huairou Commission⁷³⁷, also called the Super Coalition that gender feminist organizations had established at the Beijing NGO Forum. Counting WEDO and IPPF among its most influential members, the commission combatively engaged in the Istanbul process. The result was the inclusion of the Cairo and Beijing language in the Istanbul report⁷³⁸ and a strong *linkage* between demographic control and so-called healthy human settlements⁷³⁹. Let this serve as one more example that the non-state “partners”, and in particular those belonging to the Women’s Caucus, have been the real agents of the essential linkages that constituted global governance as systemic content.

In an article ran by the *Earth Times News Service* on June 15, 1996, the day after the closing of the City Summit, the ever-militant Bella Abzug exposed the Super Coalition’s post-Habitat strategy. Abzug declared the Women’s Caucus participants to be “loaded with new ideas and strategies for follow-up and implementation” as they left Istanbul “relatively satisfied with the Habitat Agenda”. Abzug planned an impressive series of “action strategies” to get the Habitat agenda “translated into action”. One of them was to watch over the Beijing-Habitat *linkage* “through the Huairou Commission, the Contract with the World’s Women campaign, the one-year Beijing anniversary report on government implementation, national meetings and action plan development for Beijing implementation, etc.” – in other words, not missing one single opportunity to seal the interlinkages that the Women’s Caucus itself had forged all along the conference process.

A decisive aspect of the Super Coalition’s strategy was to engage what the new politics now called “civil society” in the UN reform process that immediately succeeded the UN’s second wave conferences. The coalition’s objective was to ensure UN system-wide alignment along the new global “consensus”. Abzug revealed the Super Coalition’s determination to engage “in a challenging dialogue with UN agencies about post-Habitat plans, acknowledging that the UN needs to continue its reform agenda, and urging agency heads to continue to work with civil

⁷³⁷ The Huairou Commission was founded at the 1995 Beijing Conference NGO Forum as a “Super-Coalition” of women’s organizations concerned with implementing their social and gender feminist agenda at the grassroots level. The organizations included GROOTS International, Women and Habitat Network, International Council of Women and Women’s Environment and Development Organization. Wally N’Dow gave the “Super Coalition” its name and “commissioned” 50 of its women leaders to ensure the Beijing to Istanbul connection. It was the first time at Habitat II that an organized group of women had a central role to play in the human settlements arena. Since then, the Huairou Commission grew significantly as a global grassroots feminist organization. It became an important partner in global governance’s global to local movement. The Commission is now an active partner in “localizing” the UN’s 2030 agenda. See <https://huairou.org/> (retrieved February 6, 2022).

⁷³⁸ The Istanbul outcome document includes language such as reproductive health, reproductive rights, sexual health, gender (60 times), women’s rights or rights of women (188), family planning, abortion, non-discrimination... The Habitat language on reproductive health is actually referenced to Cairo, not to Beijing whose language is yet more liberal.

⁷³⁹ Federico Mayor, then UNESCO Director-General, said at a June 7, 1996 press conference in Istanbul that UNESCO’s “most important challenge” was “to substantially reduce demographic growth through education, thereby giving people the possibility of being masters of their own destiny. Everyday 254,000 babies are born. After a year this means 365 cities all around the world”. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 36 of June 24, 1996, item 3. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

society, each step of the way, in developing and monitoring policies”⁷⁴⁰. What “Battling Bella” here announced did take place. It is not within the purview of this thesis to demonstrate it.

Another, particularly impressive component of Abzug’s action plan was how she intended to “make use of the Habitat process of building partnerships with all the key stakeholders in our communities”. She announced the following initiatives:

“We [i.e. the Super Coalition, the Women’s Linkage Caucus] will convene meetings with our local authorities, private sector, and other relevant groups on the most pressing local issues to develop an implementation agenda. We will talk with Parliamentarians, and other representatives at different levels of government to discuss legislative strategies to implement Beijing and Habitat and bring our laws into full compliance with these agreements... We will do all this and more, because as usual, women’s work is never done”⁷⁴¹.

These planned initiatives exemplify how “the partners” themselves immediately became the first and primary users of the partnership principle to the benefit of their own agenda.

Global governance’s spiritual component revisited

The City Summit consolidated the spiritual and ethical components (“sustainable ethics”⁷⁴²) that had strongly emerged at the Rio Earth Summit. Two spiritual events took place in Istanbul: the Forum on Human Solidarity (June 8), and the second meeting of the Wisdom Keepers (June 4-7)⁷⁴³. The latter was co-chaired by Wally N’Dow himself. In his intervention, N’Dow promoted the philosophy underpinning the Baha’i religion, namely that of the emergence of a “consensual community” among religions as the only development that could bind all of humanity together. He spoke of a major effort then underway to “scan all the religions of the world”⁷⁴⁴ in that global unification perspective.

Several of the “spiritual leaders” who participated in the two spiritual events in Istanbul tended to divinize nature and to dilute or dissolve human identity in a sense of belonging to “Nature”⁷⁴⁵. There also seemed to be a belief that the new language and policies of the UN, that of global governance, were not human inventions but the result of a spiritual “awakening”⁷⁴⁶ – in a

⁷⁴⁰ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 37 of June 25, 1996, item 4 quoting excerpts of an article written by Bella Abzug on June 15 and ran by the Earth Times News Service. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

⁷⁴¹ Ib.

⁷⁴² See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 34 of June, 17, 1996, item 2, op. cit.. Dr. Hassan, an Egyptian MP, said at the Forum on Human Solidarity that in order to “build a high synergy society, changes in our ethics” must take place: “sustainable ethics” is what we need.

⁷⁴³ At the time of the Istanbul Summit, the three co-chairs of the Wisdom Keepers were Wally N’Dow, the very Reverend James Parks Morton of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, and Hanne Strong, wife of Maurice Strong. Mrs. Boutros-Ghali was honorary chair and Nitin Desai, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General, a member.

⁷⁴⁴ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 34, item 2, op. cit.

⁷⁴⁵ Dr. Hassan, for example, said that “the common perception of the self as I, not as part of nature, [was] the problem”. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 34 of June, 1996, item 2, op. cit.

⁷⁴⁶ At the 1996 Istanbul Summit, Dr. Hassan acknowledged that UN language was not yet fully understood by national governments officials. “It will take time,” she said, “like for sustainability, it took time, but now everybody knows what sustainable is”. When told her that the language was actually defined by the UN, she replied: “it will be infiltrated, yes.” She added that the UN “did not invent the language” it used, but that it “realized that it was the root of everything”. Therefore, an “awakening” took place. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 34 of June, 1996, item 4, op. cit.

spiritualist or *New Age* sense. The profound pessimism of the Wisdom Keepers' biocentric spirituality re-appeared in the Istanbul version of their *Declaration of the Sacred Earth Gathering*. The Wisdom Keepers claimed to hold "spiritual authority" on the basis that the survival of humanity and the Planet was at stake. Global governance's sustainable development agenda has held the same discourse, denoting the radically pessimistic source of its ethics.

4.2.9. Rome: sealing the system

By the last conference of the immediate post-Cold War series, the World Food Summit⁷⁴⁷ held in Rome, November 13-17, 1996, the agenda of global governance formed a coherent whole, integrating all the "gains" the partners had achieved over the four decades long process of UN conferences, first and second waves included. Through the *linkages* the partners had adroitly forged - of their controversial special interests to the real intergovernmental issues addressed at the conferences -, the "global consensus" now formed a closely knit package intermixing ideological elements with genuinely consensual socioeconomic, environmental and human rights objectives. Rome insisted on the *holistic* character of this package: this holistic perspective, itself object of a "global consensus", was Rome's specific feature and the revolution's last "gain". Rome sealed the holistic consensus, which would not be reopened thereafter even in spite of mounting opposition.

The main theme of the Food Summit was *food security*, a new paradigm – novel in the sense that the term was absent from the UN Charter, but not new as it had already been forged at the first World Food Conference in 1974⁷⁴⁸. The 1996 summit definitively integrated food security in the sustainable development framework⁷⁴⁹, thereby rendering it inseparable from environmental and socioeconomic security and from Cairo's revolutionary demographic approach. Rome emphasized that to achieve food security, the decisions of all earlier conferences had to be fully implemented⁷⁵⁰.

Rome stood at the juncture of global governance's revolutionary phase and the beginning of its third, implementation phase. At the time, the agents of global governance were putting maximal pressure on all actors – governments first – to honor the "commitments" they had made at all former conferences⁷⁵¹. The sense of global governance's leading agents at the time was that there still wasn't enough action behind the "global consensus"⁷⁵², and that action had to be taken "now".

The interconnectedness of the conferences' agendas had bearing on the content of "food security". That content had much further-reaching implications than providing food to the hungry. It was holistic and multifaceted. As per the UN doctrine, the way to "eradicate" poverty and food insecurity was to deal with what the UN considered to be their "root causes", in other words,

⁷⁴⁷ The Food Summit was held in conformity with FAO Conference Res. 2/95 of October 31, 1995. It was the first global gathering of heads of states and governments to address hunger and malnutrition.

⁷⁴⁸ The UN Charter promoted "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" in its preamble.

⁷⁴⁹ The root "sustain-" is present 96 times in the Rome document.

⁷⁵⁰ As Mr. de Haen (FAO Assistant Director-General, Economic and Social Department) explained to this author in an interview at the end of the Summit, "food security in the next generation can only be obtained through sustainable development". See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 51 of December 9, 1996, item 4.

⁷⁵¹ President Clinton had specifically asked the US delegation, headed by Tim Wirth, at the Food Summit to push for the implementation of all the previous conferences. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 51 of December 9, 1996, item 12. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives.

⁷⁵² See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 51 of December 9, 1996, item 12. Marguerite A. Peeters' archives.

prevention⁷⁵³. Uninterruptedly, global governance has singled out population growth as one of the main root causes of poverty and unsustainability. This served as justification for the *priority* global governance has granted, in the name of prevention, to family planning, reproductive health and rights, gender equality and other ideological agendas.

Prior to the Food Summit⁷⁵⁴, the partners – not UN member states - had worked at forging an explicit *linkage* between reproductive health and food security. The Conference Secretariat had issued 15 technical background papers on the “different dimensions of food security”. One of them, prepared by “eminent experts” with the collaboration of UNPFA, dealt with population growth: “Food Requirements and Population Growth”⁷⁵⁵. The document *enlarged* the definition of “populations”, considering them as composed of individuals “who do not just have fertility, mortality or migration characteristics at certain ages, but also have food energy requirements and change diets over time”. The Food Summit highlighted this extra dimension, thereby increasing “the magnitude of demographic challenges” for the UN⁷⁵⁶. As population growth increased food and energy demands, changes in food consumption would “weigh heavily on natural resources and the environment”, read the document. The aim of the UN was to achieve a “sustainable” world by 2050, when world population was predicted to “stabilize” as a result of the Cairo agenda’s global enforcement: “from a population and food balance perspective, the problem of achieving sustainable development needs to be resolved by 2050 and preferably, earlier”⁷⁵⁷.

⁷⁵³ A global governance paradigm, akin to another one, the “precautionary principle”.

⁷⁵⁴ James M. Sheehan observed the NGO input in the Summit: “The 1996 World Food Summit gave population and environment NGOs another chance to organize their forces. The Clinton administration worked closely with them, as State Department Undersecretary Wirth and his deputy Melinda Kimble made sure that even the radical fringe of the movement was intimately involved in crafting U. S. policy. The Administration relied heavily on the opinions of Dianne Dillon-Ridgley, president of Zero Population Growth (ZPG), and appointed her to the U.S. delegation to Rome... Just before the Summit, the FAO invited more than 200 NGOs to Rome on September 19-21, 1996 for yet another ‘consultation session’”. Sheehan, James M. *Global Greens. Inside the International Environmental Establishment*. Capital Research Center. 1998, pp. 112-113.

⁷⁵⁵ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 48 of October 11, 1996, item 1. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives. Following a meeting held at FAO in July 1996 and organized by FAO’s “Population Programme Service”.

⁷⁵⁶ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 54 of December 17, 1996, item 2. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives. Interview with Alex Marshall, Chief, UNFPA Media Services. When asked what kind of linkage UNFPA was strengthening or developing with the FAO at the Food Summit, Marshall responded: “Well, there are two very important issues. First, simply that population growth will be the greatest single contributor to increasing food needs in the next half century. Point two is that in poor countries and poor communities it is women who grow market, put the food on people’s tables. They are the food providers for the family. For both of these reasons, you have to pay attention to women’s rights and needs. And, if you add the concept that there is a right to reproductive health, then you have to observe that right and implement it for its own sake. But in doing so, you will also meet the goals of two very important issues: one is stabilizing population growth, and the other is increasing food supply”.

⁷⁵⁷ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 48 of October 11, 1996, item 1. Marguerite A. Peeters’ archives.

CHAPTER 5

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE'S IDEOLOGICAL DRIVE: HIJACKING POST-COLD WAR UNIVERSAL HUMAN ASPIRATIONS

Following the historical tracing of global governance's seminal and gestational stages made in chapters one and two, and of the revolution itself in chapter four, chapter five analytically revisits these chapters' findings as regards the weaving of global governance as systemic content. It takes stock of the *linkages* that the partners have operated from the onset between their own interests and the mandate of the UN, and of the *conceptual enlargements* that they have proactively crafted, with a view to conclusively establishing the ideological nature of the drive that has animated global governance's holistic process and the construction of its novel synthesis.

Chapter five exposes the partners' divisive interpretation of holism, people-centeredness and sustainability - the three salient and transversal features of global governance's "framework", common to each of its constitutive elements. It demonstrates how the partners' perspective, which imposed itself as dominant over that of UN member states and humanity as a whole, has hijacked (i.e. diverted from their originally intended destination) humanity's universal post-Cold War aspirations for an integrated or unified world vision centered on the human person and correcting modernity's abusive treatment of human, social and environmental concerns. This chapter identifies the main ideological components of the anthropology informing the dominant interpretation of the partners' hegemonic paradigms.

Chapter five further analyzes the connection between the global governance partners' ideological drive and Western postmodern deconstructionism. We define "ideological" as pertaining, not to the constructed rationalistic systems of modern ideologies, not to modern constructivism⁷⁵⁸, but to the dynamic postmodern logic of deconstruction. Postmodern deconstructionism carries along the residues of deconstructed modern ideologies. It is the culmination of all preceding ideological attacks against reality and truth.

5.1. Taking stock: the linkages that have woven global governance as systemic content

At the beginning of this chapter, it is useful to list in a grouped fashion the main ideological ingredients of global governance's novel synthesis that previous chapters have already identified in a dispersed fashion: internationalism/globalism (for instance, progressive replacement of the word *international* by *global*, the independent commissions' insistence on interdependence and on issues being common to all of humanity⁷⁵⁹, global problems, global solutions transcending all

⁷⁵⁸ Lorenzo Infantino, quoting Ortega y Gasset and Friedrich von Hayek, denounced "the extremism of Reason, which lost 'the awareness of its own limits' to the point of 'annulling other influences: will, feeling, the physical body. Individual and collective life have suffered in this way from the pathological attitude that Hayek called 'the abuse of reason', a 'philosophical vice' which propels the person affected by it towards social 'constructivism'. We have been led into this attitude by the 'rationalism of René Descartes and his followers', whose ideal Voltaire, his 'greatest representative', expressed in the following terms: 'If you want good laws, burn those you have and make yourselves new ones.'" Infantino, Lorenzo. *Individualism in Modern Thought – From Adam Smith to Hayek*. Routledge. 1998, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵⁹ "Growing interdependence" was a major theme of debate for the founders of the Trilateral Commission in the early 1970s. From there the commission rapidly moved to globalism. Most of the commissions' reports included the word "common" in their title, focusing on global interdependence: *Common Crisis*, *Common Security*, *Common Future*, *Common Responsibility*. The report of the Commission on Global Governance operates a significant shift to the word "global".

other levels); (neo-)Marxism of the members of the independent commissions and other main conceptualizers of global governance; liberalism, individualism, hedonism, radical feminism, genderism (promotion of artificial birth control as a right of women and young people, right to “safe abortion”, disassociation of sexual activity from marriage, sexual orientation...); population control; biocentrism and anthropological pessimism (trend to view all life forms as equal, and man as the predator, not as the steward or co-creator); alarmism and negativity (prominent in the ideas of *survival*⁷⁶⁰ of humanity and the planet, in global governance’s focus on their *problems*, in its promotion of *conservation* and *stabilization* as opposed to growth, in its anti-growth - both economic and demographic - or zero growth stance); pacifism (appeasement through denial of conflicts); negative view of nations, national identity and national sovereignty as obstacles to achieving the global agenda; a global ethic that divorced itself from traditional moral standards and “universal reason”⁷⁶¹...

Let us now recall in a synthetic fashion how the partners integrated these ideological agendas in the post-Cold War “global consensus”, thereby irremediably corrupting it from within.

Linkages has been a key word of the language proper to global governance’s revolutionary process all along⁷⁶². It has been by linking novel agendas and special interests to the mandate of the UN as defined in the Charter and claiming to thereby “holistically” and “qualitatively” *enlarge* this mandate that global governance came about. Chapters one, two and four showed that the partners have directed and remained in control of a linkages’ process that started at the very foundation of the United Nations and unfolded over the span of several decades, through the UN’s overall conference process (first and second waves) and the work of the independent commissions exposed in chapter two. For decades since the foundation of the UN until the end of the revolution, the transnational non-state partners have successfully integrated their priorities and perspective in the agendas of the UN, an international and intergovernmental organization. This integration is the *primary linkage* that this thesis addresses: the linkage that founds global governance both as content and as process.

The content of the partners’ lobbying efforts has historically been both *thematic* issues and *ideological* interests that have differed from the core priorities of the majority of UN member states, and from the universal values binding them together as expressed in the 1948 UDHR. It matters to this chapter’s purposes to distinguish the *themes* non-state actors can be credited to have introduced at and developed through the UN – concern for the environment, population issues and women’s social promotion being the three major ones⁷⁶³ – and their *ideological*

⁷⁶⁰ The theme of “survival” can be traced back to the late 1940s. In 1948, the American population control advocate William Vogt published *The Road to Survival*, a best-seller connecting population growth and environmental degradation. The book launched the neo-Malthusianism of the 50s and 60s. Vogt was the Director of the American IPPF branch from 1951 to 1962. He represented the IUCN to the UN until he died in 1968. Vogt was a precursor of the environmental movement. Another book also published in 1948 depicted man’s destruction of the environment: *Our Plundered Planet* by Fairfield Osborn (who was, like his father, under the influence of the eugenics movement). These two books influenced Paul Ehrlich’s *Population Bomb*.

⁷⁶¹ Expression used by Joseph Ratzinger, in reference to universal human rights, in his September 29, 2014 letter to professor Marcello Pera. Ratzinger, Joseph. *Libérer la Liberté. Foi et Politique*. Parole et Silence. 2018, p. 12.

⁷⁶² See the charts in Appendix A for observing the number of appearances of the root *link-* in the documents this thesis analyzes. The charts show, during the Cold War, the leadership of the independent reports and commissions (especially *The Limits to Growth*, the *Brandt report* and *Our Common Future*) over the first wave of intergovernmental UN conferences (where the feminist and population conferences took leadership over the other thematic conferences). By contradistinction, the root *link-* appeared by far in the greatest number of instances at the Rio environmental conference, followed by Istanbul, Cairo and Beijing.

⁷⁶³ Themes that either did not belong to the content of the UN Charter or that non-governmental actors had managed to integrate, or to give greater focus to, in the foundational document.

perspective on these themes. The themes, we contend, did need increased international cooperation. A key discovery of the preceding chapters, however, is that the perspective of those non-state partners that wielded the greatest influence in the way these themes⁷⁶⁴ were interpreted and addressed has consistently been ideologically driven. This chapter highlights the *historically original nexus* between the novel themes that the partners have linked to the agenda of international cooperation, and their ideological drive.

The soft/hard categories have been in vogue since the late 1960s, that is since the peak of the Western cultural revolution and the shift to postmodernity. As per these categories, as already noted, the issues that the UN Charter mandated the organization to pursue as a matter of priority were *hard*. By contrast, the partners' novel themes were *soft*⁷⁶⁵. Hard issues (such as law, security, finance, the economy...) more naturally stand on the side of reality and conform to objective, measurable and rational criteria than soft issues (such as culture, women's equality, environmental concerns, concerns of indigenous populations...), which more readily lend themselves to subjective interpretation, ideological drifting and manipulation.

5.1.1. Unbroken continuum in the ideologically-driven linkages process

Chapters one, two and four highlighted the linkages process' unbroken continuum and how the partners governed the dynamic that led to the constitution of global governance as systemic content. One "linkage" led to the next, the latest one integrating all previous ones, incrementally constructing a tight new whole. Never was the weaving interrupted during the two first stages of global governance's revolutionary process. Quite the reverse, the partners aggressively watched over their linkages and consolidated them each step of the way. Since the linkages consisted in the non-state partners' integration of *new* themes and *new* ideological perspectives in international cooperation, each single one of them contributed to distance the UN from its foundational perspective and from its international nature.

Quietly seaming the fabric of the new worldview through linkages during the Cold War

During the revolution's seminal and gestational stages, over the four Cold War decades, the partners' linkages dynamic quietly seamed the fabric of global governance as content. At the risk of a certain repetition, but in order to now have a synthetic view of the linkages that we have so far pinned in our thesis (in a far from exhaustive way) to illustrate the revolution's groundswell, let us recall some major milestones. Chapter one found the partners' remarkable contribution - when the UN Charter was being drafted – to *thematically* linking an organization that founding member states were creating primarily with the view of maintaining peace and security, to socioeconomic development, women's equal rights, human rights and NGOs' consultative contribution (Art. 71). Chapter one also identified the *ideological drive* of the spearhead partners who seminally linked their promotion of some of these novel agendas to their special interests: Virginia Gildersleeve's lesbianism, Eleanor Roosevelt's friendly connection to Margaret Sanger, or James T. Shotwell's internationalism, for example.

⁷⁶⁴ IUCN, WRI, WWF, Friends of the Earth, Maurice Strong for the environment; IPPF and Rockefeller for population; gender feminists and ecofeminist for women's issues.

⁷⁶⁵ The soft/hard categories have applied to a wide range of domains, including law, leadership, power, diplomacy, issues, computing, skills (CVs), drugs, services, costs... Characterized as "hard" has usually been what is objective, well-defined, structured, formal, organized, well-understood, stable, within the box – modern. Classified as "soft" has been what is subjective, human (as opposed to financial for example), less tangible, less easily charted or measured, informal, attitudinal, reflecting a particular mindset, outside the box – postmodern.

In the late 1940s, Julian Huxley linked nature conservation to UNESCO's educational, cultural, scientific and ethical mandate. By extension he linked a theme *external* to the UN mandate - the environment - to the UN's foundational objectives (peace, security, development, human rights). Huxley's *ideological drive* was at once neo-Darwinist, internationalist, population controller, eugenicist, spiritualist, atheistic humanistic. It would eventually evolve into *transhumanism*. Huxley ingrained his ideological perspective in the IUCN at its very creation. He also opened wide UNESCO's door to the political participation of NGOs and hybrid bodies. He thereby threw the seed of what would evolve into the partnerships' revolution, itself a linkage between governmental actors and non-governmental ones.

At the first major UN conference in Tehran in 1968, John D. Rockefeller and the IPPF, driven by hedonistic, individualistic and population control motivations, linked the UN human rights' mandate to the novel family planning theme. Tehran was groundbreaking. The partners would subsequently forge an impressive series of linkages between contraception (and the overall sexual revolution agenda) and the human rights, population, socioeconomic, environmental and humanitarian agendas of the UN. These transversal linkages, which the IPPF has historically championed at creating, have defined the ideological direction of global governance' entire process up to this day. The creation of the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1969 linked *population control* to the UN's mandate.

The Limits to Growth, introducing the notion of *sustainability* in 1972, linked environmental protection all at once to population stabilization, contraception, abortion⁷⁶⁶, "equilibrium", zero growth, a new global ethic, a globalist (global human and planetary problems) and holistic perspective. Under the defining influence of the IUCN and Maurice Strong in particular, the 1972 Stockholm conference started consolidating the linkages so far created, especially that between the environment and development, and to connect these linkages to the notion of a "framework". The 1980 *World Conservation Strategy* later and more specifically identified the sustainable development concept with a "framework". The two concepts would thenceforth become indissoluble.

The 1974 Bucharest conference linked the *population* theme (novel in the sense that the Charter does not specifically mention it, but ECOSOC's Commission on Population was established already in 1946) to *development planning* for the first time. More explicitly than Tehran, Bucharest, under the influence of the same influential lobbies as at Tehran, also linked population to the individualistic perspective of the Western sexual revolution: Bucharest attributed the "new right"⁷⁶⁷ to contraception ("to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children", Art. 14 f) to *couples and individuals*. It mentioned *abortion* for the first time. The 1975 Mexico conference then linked contraception (and indirectly abortion⁷⁶⁸) to the theme of women's status and rights, and the UN to feminism's radical second wave. The independent commissions of the 1980s linked the nascent global *sustainability* agenda to *security*, redefining,

⁷⁶⁶ Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*, op. cit., p. 113: "Thus 'birth control' is defined very broadly to include any method of controlling births actually practiced by a population, including contraception, abortion, and sexual abstinence".

⁷⁶⁷ A "new right" absent from the UDHR and that could not possibly ever be recognized as "universal" as it breaks from the moral underpinnings of a universal anthropology.

⁷⁶⁸ Mexico mentioned abortion twice, linking illegally-induced abortion to maternal mortality and morbidity. Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year. Mexico City, June 19 –July 2, 1975. E/CONF.66/34, p. 28 and p. 81.

“enlarging” and *softening* the concept at the core of the UN’s mandate. They also started linking the UN to globalism⁷⁶⁹.

One conference and independent commission after the other during the Cold War, the partners consistently interlinked nature conservation, contraception, population control, human rights, environmental protection, socioeconomic development, North-South cooperation, peace (pacifism), women’s social advancement and feminism, food and housing security, NGO participation. Their linkages were made to become the objects of intergovernmental endorsements in the conferences’ outcome documents. By 1989, the main ingredients of the emerging novel synthesis had been interlinked, both thematically and ideologically, under the umbrella concept of sustainable development.

Post-Cold War crystallization of interlinkages within a systemic global consensus

The post-Cold War revolution consisted in crystallizing, in six years’ time, the linkages patiently crafted during the Cold War into *the framework for 21st century international cooperation* – into a single framework, deprived of any alternative, into a consolidated system of interdependent new paradigms now becoming the object of a “global consensus”. Chapter four exposed how the partners – chief among them the Women’s Linkage Caucus and the IUCN as umbrella organizations - linked their special interests to the post-Cold War priorities of international cooperation. They solidly wove their agendas in the individual new holistic paradigms then imposing themselves as the pillars of the global framework.

Let us recall in synthetic fashion, far from any claim to exhaustivity, how the partners wove their interests in the fabric of the “new global consensus” then being built. Jomtien laid the groundwork for education to become an instrument of global social transformation in favor of the new *Weltanschauung*: it linked education to the novel paideia. New-York linked children’s well-being and rights to novel agendas and integrated them in a single, enlarged, holistic package. Rio crystallized the linkages between socioeconomic development, environmental protection, population stabilization, gender feminism, new lifestyles, new ethics, a novel spiritual perspective and a new participatory politics within the sustainable development system. Vienna crystallized the linkages between economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, the new rights approach, education, family planning, (sustainable) development and democracy. Cairo crystallized the linkages between population stabilization, the “liberation” and “empowerment” objectives of the Western sexual and feminist revolutions, contraception and abortion, the rights approach and the socioeconomic and environment objectives of sustainable development. Copenhagen crystallized the linkage between social development and the other parameters of sustainable development. Beijing crystallized the gender perspective, Istanbul the partnership principle, and Rome food security within the systemic framework.

The holistic new paradigms, fruit of linkages process

At a critical point of maturity in the linkages process and resulting from its dynamic as a fruit, the partners forged *new paradigms* expressed by means of a *novel language*. Sustainable development⁷⁷⁰, sexual and reproductive health, gender equality, various forms of the family, human security, to take only these examples, embodied the various components that the partners had craftily and patiently linked one to another over decades. They embodied both the *themes* that

⁷⁶⁹ The charts in Appendices A2 and A3 demonstrate their leadership in introducing the adjective “global” in the vocabulary of international cooperation.

⁷⁷⁰ Building on the nexuses thence far created, in particular between the environment, development and population control, the *World Conservation Strategy* introduced the *sustainable development* expression in 1980. The 1987 *Our Common Future* report would turn it into a more integrated paradigm.

the partners had interlinked (for example development and environment), and their linkage of these themes to their own *ideological perspective* (for example linking development/environment to neo-Marxism/biocentrism). As per global governance's narrative, the new paradigms *enlarged* the classical standards of international cooperation - those defined by the UN Charter. The reports of the second wave conferences qualified them as *holistic* - alternatively as *comprehensive, integrated, inclusive, enlarged, broadened...* Within the new paradigms, the tightly interlinked thematic and ideological components became indissoluble⁷⁷¹.

Sustainable development enlarged development as economic growth ("standard" – both modern and biblical – concept, or what we shall call the "former paradigm") by *linking* it to social and environmental parameters and mutually integrating the three components. *Global governance* "enlarged" the UN as an intergovernmental organization by integrating (linking it to) partnerships with non-state actors. *Human security* enlarged security by integrating human, social and environmental parameters. *Sexual and reproductive health* enlarged family planning by integrating sexuality education, AIDS prevention, "safe abortion", the diversity of sexual "lifestyles"... *The family under various forms* integrated, next to the family based on marriage between a man and a woman, families based on "same sex couples" among a host of other "choices". The *new rights* such as minority rights, women's specific rights, children's rights, the right to health, sexual rights, reproductive rights "enlarged" the rights contained in the UDHR⁷⁷². *Education for all* supposedly enlarged education as transmission of knowledge by integrating acquisition of life skills, lifestyles, values and attitudes. *Basic learning needs* (literacy) were enlarged by integrating programs in health, nutrition, population, agricultural techniques, environment, science, technology, fertility awareness... *Gender* "enlarged" sex by integrating socially constructed roles and furthermore enlarged sexual relationships between a man and a woman by integrating a rainbow of "alternative choices". Responding to the revolution's holistic dynamic, *integrated programs* enlarged individual projects throughout the UN system as of the early 1990s. Conceptual enlargement by the mere partners' fiat, presented as a natural and positive evolution, in fact betrayed the partners' abandonment of universal moral standards and their secularistic outlook: the new components, supposedly "enlarging" the old paradigms, integrated the partners' postmodern perspective.

5.1.2. Hijacking holism

This thesis adheres to the view according to which the seed produces the fruit, and in that sense seminally contains the fruit. The partners' ideological perspective corrupted the seeds that they threw in the Charter and in international cooperation during the Cold War. These corrupted seeds grew into the fruits reaped at the time of the revolution, in normative paradigms such as the ones we just listed above.

Chapters one, two and four provided ample evidence of how the partners, incrementally and determinedly, have interlinked, as examples, universal access to contraception, "safe abortion",

⁷⁷¹ As Rio Declaration's Principle 4 put: "In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it." *Rio Decl.*, *op. cit.*

⁷⁷² See interview with Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, WHO Director General, by Marguerite A. Peeters, in *Interactive Information Services*. Report 7 of October 13, 1995, *op. cit.*, item 2. Asked the following: "The WHO has just introduced the expression of 'health security' after having created that of 'reproductive health' and 'reproductive rights'. The WHO also often speaks of a 'right to health' that is not present in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The WHO is therefore creating a new human rights language," Nakajima responded: "We have redone the definition of reproductive health, which is very difficult to accept, but thanks to the opportunity given by the introduction of 'health security', I hope that this concept is going to be enlarged."

“technical” sexuality education not abiding by universal moral standards, the celebration of promiscuous lifestyles, the “diversity” of family forms, questioning our given sexual identity, sidelining parental authority... on the one hand, and human rights, environmental protection, climate change mitigation, poverty alleviation, rational population issues, civic education, health and maternal health, primary health care, women’s social advancement, socioeconomic development, elimination of violence against women, North-South solidarity, liberty, equality, equity, human dignity, compassion and other values on the other. We now come to a conclusion about the role of a flawed, secularistic anthropology in the global governance political revolution.

Another conclusion we are now apt to draw is the existence of a pattern within global governance processes, as per which the more ideologically controversial the agenda, the more its advocates have manipulatively striven to make it appear as “self-evident”, and the more they linked this agenda to the framework’s pre-existing elements, tightly weaving it (hiding it) in the overall system. Part three of this thesis will examine how this pattern relates to the pro-partnership language in the second wave conferences’ reports. It will evaluate the possibility of a direct cause to effect connection between the new politics’ ideological nature and its systemic use of soft, parallel, non-intergovernmental, informal processes. Have the transnational partners’ ideological agendas been the powerhouse of global governance’s *political* revolution?

We have also noted how during the revolution, the partners diligently finalized the new paradigms’ strategic *interlinkages*. They left none of them a monad, isolated from the others. They interlinked, for example, environmental concerns and social awareness, gender feminism and ecological thinking, reproductive health and food security, education for all and the deconstruction of gender stereotypes, sexuality education and children’s rights, sustainable development and global citizenship, women’s empowerment and access to “safe abortion”, new lifestyles and Earth spirituality, the new social contract and the new global ethic, human settlements and partnerships... All was in all in the holistic “framework”, classical and novel themes, genuinely consensual agreements and divisive ideological agendas. The second wave conferences’ global consensus was a holistic system whereby the new paradigms were all indissolubly interlinked, functionally interdependent and mutually reinforcing. It has by now become clear, however, that the agents of the revolution hijacked holism, humanity’s aspiration for a unified view of reality, a dominant transversal feature of the post-Cold War “new global consensus” alongside people-centeredness and sustainability.

Synergetic relationship between population control and sustainability

The sustainability paradigm, since its first emergence in *The Limits to Growth*, has been constitutively and uninterruptedly linked to population control through granting women access to contraception and abortion and “educating” young people to their alleged rights to such an access. The 1992 Earth Summit qualified as *synergetic* the relationship between sustainable development and population stabilization. The term “synergy” had appeared previously in the language of the global governance documents this thesis founds its analysis on, always in a context connected to family planning⁷⁷³. “Synergy” is semantically stronger than “linkage”. It suggests that the

⁷⁷³ See the *Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, development and peace* (Copenhagen, July 14 - 30, 1980), par. 143: “The health needs and problems specific to women must be met, particularly those related to the synergistic conditions of malnutrition, infections and the consequences of unregulated fertility.” *Jomtien Framework for Action*, par. 10: “The complementarity and synergistic effects of related human resources investments in population, health and nutrition should be recognized.” New-York Plan of Action par. 17: “There is an added benefit of promoting maternal and child health programmes and family planning together in that, acting synergistically, these activities help accelerate the reduction of both mortality and fertility rates, and contribute more to lowering rates of population growth than either type of activity alone”.

combined action of two or more forces produces an effect that is superior to the sum of their individual effects. Synergy is thus akin to holism. The synergetic sustainable development-population stabilization relationship would produce qualitatively superior effects than if both components functioned in isolation: population stabilization would *enhance* sustainable development. The congenital synergy of sustainable development and the ideology of the transnational population control lobby is an important conclusive point we have reached at this point of our thesis.

Since ideologically-driven agents took leadership in operating the linkages through which both the individual new holistic paradigms and the systemic global framework came about, we may now legitimately draw another important conclusion on the *binding element* holding the paradigms and their various components holistically together. The *inner logic* or *dynamic* making these components more than the sum of their individual parts has quietly transformed the paradigms' individual components by integrating in all of them the quintessence of the partners' ideological drive. To use the example we just mentioned above, the partners' ideological drive quietly "forces" sustainable development to integrate population control.

We recall from chapter one that Jan Christiaan Smuts, who had launched the idea of a preamble preceding the UN Charter and wrote the preamble's first draft⁷⁷⁴, had coined the novel *holism* paradigm at the beginning of the twentieth century. We now suggest a parallel between Smuts' holistic outlook on international cooperation and the globalism inherent in global governance as a holistic process. Smuts distinguished wholes (endowed with an internal structure and a function) from mere aggregates. Wholes were in his mind greater than the sum of their parts. They were synthesis, so intensely interlinking the parts as to alter their respective functions: the parts functioned *towards* the wholes, and the wholes ended up being as much in the parts as the parts were in the wholes. Likewise global governance's holism is dynamic and transformative. UN globalism *dissolved*⁷⁷⁵ the identity of UN member states in a whole that was more than their sum as individual components. Sustainable development dissolved the nature of growth in a new whole, just as the family in its various forms dissolved that of the family and so on.

The Western cultural revolution's basic linkage and disconnect

Chapter one established the West's cultural revolution as one of this thesis' fundamental determinant. The gestational stage of the global governance revolution historically coincided with the progressive downfall of Marxism-Leninism since the 1960s and the concomitant development in the West of a new, postmodern and neo-Marxist left⁷⁷⁶. Chapters one and two showed that the partners achieved global governance's foundational linkages between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, decades which precisely coincided with the Western social revolution's climax⁷⁷⁷.

The paradox of global governance's holistic linkages process is that, as it constructed its new systemic synthesis, it concomitantly operated fundamental and radical *disconnects*. Tehran's

⁷⁷⁴ See Russell B. Ruth. *A History of the United Nations Charter*, op. cit., p. 912.

⁷⁷⁵ An analogy could be drawn with the *solve et coagula* (dissolve and congeal) masonic formula. Masonic initiation is a series of mutations, of dissolutions and coagulations, destructuring and restructuring.

⁷⁷⁶ Mathieu Bock-Côté, showing in *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique* that Western leftists have detached themselves from Marxism-Leninism since the 1960s, used the expression "post-Marxist": "Le projet de la gauche post-marxiste et la démocratie diversitaire". Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multilatéralisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., pp. 19-22. Post-Marxist leftism consists for Bock-Côté in a new egalitarianism: "Un nouvel égalitarisme peut alors s'imposer : il faut viser une égalité substantielle, symbolique comme matérielle, entre les groupes victimisés et les groupes dominants" (Ib., p. 20). We in this thesis rather use the expression neo-Marxist with regard to the new left's Marxist legacy.

⁷⁷⁷ In the preface of *Eros and Civilization* (1955), Herbert Marcuse advocated nothing short of a social revolution.

1968 historic “linkage” of human rights to contraception and population control disconnected human rights from the transcendental source of universality that had implicitly informed the dominant interpretation of the UDHR in 1948 and its defense of the family. This break rooted embryonic global governance in ideology, and global governance has to this day not departed from it.

The Western cultural revolution had itself operated a series of linkages. It had *linked* so-called universal values – liberty, equality, rights, human dignity – to a secularistic package that was at once liberal/individualistic and Freudo-Marxist/hedonistic-collectivistic. By so doing, it in fact achieved a series of corresponding disconnects or even radical, violent civilizational breaks. It *disconnected* “universal values” from their rational, moral, or divinely revealed, sources and content. The latter stopped being *transmitted* to the young generations by way of education and culture. It hijacked “universal values”. The agents of the global governance revolution surfed on and globalized the Western cultural revolution’ linkages-disconnects process and produced a mosaic or collage of residues coming from the successive self-destructions of modern ideologies.

The Western shift to postmodernity was first and foremost a *cultural* revolution. The modern ethos has valued and empowered what was hard over what was soft, and the postmodern ethos, the reverse. In the ideological perspective of the postmodern ethos, reality⁷⁷⁸, truth, institutions, any form of authority, social, moral or religious laws and norms, the moral conscience, anything that is “given” and unchangeable by our individual free will such as our sexual identity or the male/female complementarity, the Creator, God... would be *hard*, in the negative sense of supposedly being authoritarian top-down impositions on individual and collective liberty. The core objective of the “soft” postmodern revolution was to “liberate” the individual and society from “hard” reality, “hard” truth and “hard” authority.

Without taking position on the debate between those thinkers who have asserted that we have entered the postmodern age (such as Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard) and those who have claimed that we now live in liquid, late or high modernity (Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens...), we have chosen to qualify global governance’s new politics as postmodern because global governance’s paradigms indisputably break from the law of nature, reason, rationality and rationalism, what Sartre called the “en soi”, national sovereignty, hierarchies, structuralism, growth, belief in progress, optimism, exact or positivist science, universal values and other basic tenets of modernity.

At the same time, we observe an ideological continuum between modernity and postmodernity. First, deconstructionism, we contend, is the other ideological side of the constructivism coin; regression, that of progressivism; pessimism, that of optimism; post-structuralism, that of structuralism; relativism, that of ideologies; irrationality, that of rationalism; the freedom to choose, that of metanarratives, and so on. Secondly, postmodernity further radicalizes modern secularization (and modernity’s faith-reason divorce, which contained the seeds of a drift towards irrationality). Thirdly, postmodernity’s dynamic ideological residues derive from modern ideologies. Lastly, modernity itself, although positing the Western model as “universal”, had itself broken from Greek universals and from Christianity, and postmodernity deepened that very rupture.

⁷⁷⁸ Let us observe that the advent of *virtual reality* would enable the individual to shun the personal commitment that actual reality constrained him to. « Avant qu’elle ne devienne notre destin, l’écrivain Elias Canetti a pressenti cette déréalisation du monde – ‘Une idée pénible : au-delà d’un certain point précis du temps, l’histoire n’a plus été réelle. Sans s’en rendre compte, la totalité du genre humain aurait soudain quitté la réalité’ ». Yannick Haenel, François Meyronnis, Valentin Retz. *Tout est accompli*. Grasset. 2019, p. 13.

To what extent did the soft themes, values and political processes of postmodernity invest the place of “authority” occupied by their modern counterpart and reverse the modern hierarchy between soft and hard? This thesis part three will analyze the political empowerment of the non-state agents of the global governance revolution and its consequences. It will also assess the degree to which the new political paradigms reflect the postmodern logic and deconstruct the authority of institutions, of government, of sovereignty, of universal moral standards.

5.2. The anthropology underpinning global governance’s “people-centeredness” paradigm

Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel prize for economics) and Mahbub-ul-Haq (Pakistani economist) had revolutionized the culture of development by introducing the new “human development” paradigm in UNDP’s first, 1990, *Human Development Report*. Their new paradigm radically shifted the focus of development from economic growth to a subjective notion defining human development as a “process enlarging people’s choices”⁷⁷⁹ – choices which may, in principle, be infinite and change over time. Although the term “people-centered” started appearing in the conference process only at the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit, the idea of focusing on individuals and their rights as opposed to both institutions⁷⁸⁰ and economic profit/growth started emerging in the global governance process as of the 1970s. It imposed itself in the UN’s post-Cold War “global consensus”. Along with “sustainability”, “people-centeredness” became a transversal feature of global governance’s paradigms in the 1990s.

Illustrating this assertion, Boutros Boutros-Ghali said in his Copenhagen intervention that the Social Summit was

“part of the process of profound reflection and debate on which the international community has embarked - about itself and its future, and about the role of the individual human being. As part of this collective *rethinking* [our emphasis], the international community has given a good deal of thought to the position of the individual human being. At Rio we debated the relationship between the human being and the environment. At Vienna we looked at the human being as the bearer of rights. The human person *as a collective being* [Ib.] was the theme of the Cairo Population Conference. And once more, the human person – this time through the rights and status of women – will bring us together next September, at Beijing”⁷⁸¹.

But what anthropology underpinned global governance’s alleged “people-centeredness” and its “rights approach”? As an introductory response to this question based on our findings so far, let us recall that people-centeredness has been defined as centered on people’s “needs” and “rights”, not on people’s inherent, inalienable dignity in the traditional sense, open to divine transcendence. What relationship did global governance establish between human beings and the environment, the economy, its global goals, the two sexes, the family? A proper interpretation of the people-centered paradigm necessitates several analytical angles. Our findings so far already answered some of these questions but it is necessary now to restate them in a synthetic fashion.

⁷⁷⁹ UNDP. Human Development Report 1990. *Concept and Measurement of Human Development*. UNDP. 1990, p. 1.

⁷⁸⁰ As a reminder, Bella Abzug, according to whom gender equality and reproductive health were “people-centered” agendas, wanted societies to “function for people and not for institutions alone”. Peeters, Marguerite. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

⁷⁸¹ *Report of the United Nations World Summit for Social Development*, op. cit., p. 125.

5.2.1. “People”, development, the environment

Among the global governance documents this thesis founded its analysis upon, the novel *people-centered* paradigm appeared for the first time in IUCN’s 1980 *World Conservation Strategy*: “Conservation is entirely compatible with the growing demand for ‘people-centered’ development”⁷⁸². This stance represented a major shift in the philosophy of the hybrid organization, which had then far focused exclusively on the conservation of nature, even to the detriment of human development⁷⁸³. The novel *sustainable development* concept, introduced for the first time in the same IUCN report, embodied IUCN’s historic “reconciliation” between nature conservation and “people-centered development”. To interpret what IUCN meant by both the latter expression and sustainable development, one must keep in mind the organization’s foundational and enduring indisputable priority focus on nature conservation. It is also necessary to examine how IUCN, and more broadly, global governance, apprehended growth, the third leg of the sustainable development stool.

Dominance of Marxist perspective in informing new paradigm’s approach to growth

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the majority of the transnational forces that have been exercising their influence at and around the UN in conceptualizing sustainable development and its environmental ethics were of the political and social leftist ilk: either affiliated to the Socialist International as were Willy Brandt, and Gro Harlem Brundtland herself, eco-socialist⁷⁸⁴, labour, social democratic, democratic (US)... These globalist socialists reacted against Reagan-Thatcher classical liberalism during a decade of accelerated economic globalization. Zero growth or even degrowth⁷⁸⁵ not infrequently integrated the nascent sustainable development discourse.

The historical dominance of a Marxist perspective in informing sustainable development’s approach to growth stifled the creativity of those who could have, independently from “the partners”, searched for a non-ideological reaction against modernity’s wrongdoings, against an absolutized, neo-liberal growth concept. Justice and environmental stewardship being universal values, the need to factor in social and environmental considerations in economic development following modernity’s social and environmental abuses was arguably the object of a genuine consensus in the late 1980s.

The socialist response, however, was ideological. Pitting people against economic growth (growth being ingrained in human nature, as opposed to “conservation”) was the object of no genuine consensus. It threw the baby (the rightful autonomy of development from ideological perspectives) away with the bath water (modernity’s abuses). Sustainable development’s anti-

⁷⁸² IUCN, UNEP, WWF. *World Conservation Strategy*, op. cit., Chapter twenty (“Towards Sustainable Development”), par. 6. Incidentally, the concept of “conservation” is itself anti-growth. Life is by definition dynamic and geared towards growth, development, evolution, reproduction, multiplication.

⁷⁸³ IUCN supported the protectionist “Yellowstone model” of nature conservation seeks to exclude human beings from natural reserves.

⁷⁸⁴ In the 1970s, the eco-socialist Barry Commoner responded to *The Limits to Growth* by incriminating capitalist technologies for environmental degradation (instead of demographic growth). Among other famous eco-socialists, let us name the East German Rudolf Bahro, the Australians Alan Roberts and Ted Trainer (the latter asked socialists to develop a system meeting *human needs* as opposed to the capitalist system of *created wants*), and James O’Connor who founded the journal *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* (CNS) in the late 1980s. The UN adopted a human needs and rights focus in the 1990s. Other similar trends were the *green socialists* and the *red greens*.

⁷⁸⁵ The French economist and philosopher Serge Latouche has been a promotor of de-growth, a concept that Haenel, Meyronnis and Retz decried: « Quant à la ‘décroissance’ prônée par Serge Latouche, elle apparaît aussi comme une aporie. Latouche et ses amis ‘décroissants’ rêvent d’une ‘sortie de l’économie’. » Haenel, Yannick et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 52.

growth stance hid an attack against the command of growth contained in the biblical revelation⁷⁸⁶. This attack manifested the environmental movement's underpinning secularism, atheism and/or spiritualism. Integral human development, by contrast, did incorporate growth as a universal objective and was the way to go.

The eco-socio-economic leftists exercising their influence at the UN in the critical years of the global governance revolutionary process tended to consider profit as evil in and of itself⁷⁸⁷, and economic growth *per se* as neo-liberal: a stance implying a dialectical opposition between people and economic growth. Let us recall how in his 1988 UN speech, the Marxist, collectivistic and globalist Gorbachev took a "people-centered" approach founded on "freedom of choice" as a "universal principle"⁷⁸⁸, and advocated the necessity "to begin searching for a fundamentally new type of industrial progress, a type that would correspond to the interests of all peoples and states"⁷⁸⁹. Without naming sustainable human development which then was a nascent concept, he did clearly promote a shift of focus away from growth to the collectivistic "people" and the environment: "The formula of development at another's expense is becoming outdated. In the light of the present realities there can be no genuine progress either by infringing the rights and liberties of man and peoples, or at the expense of nature"⁷⁹⁰.

The "demand for 'people-centered development'" that IUCN referred to and acknowledged represented an epochal change away from the abuses of modernity, but global governance's ideological interpretation of people-centeredness and sustainability corrupted the necessary shift.

Absolutization of equality

In 1987, British development economist Richard Jolly, introduced the concept of *human development* or development *with a human face* at the UN. The book he co-authored – *Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth* – came out in 1987, the same year as *Our Common Future*⁷⁹¹. While Brundtland consolidated global governance's "sustainability pillar", Richard Jolly, a leading pro-global governance economist, added "with a human face"⁷⁹², thereby consolidating the people-centered dimension timidly introduced by the *World Conservation Strategy*.

⁷⁸⁶ "God blessed them and said to them, 'Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground.'". *Book of Genesis* 1, 28. While the modern growth paradigm was objectionable because of its lack of consideration for social and environmental concerns, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, growth is a divine command and cannot be relinquished.

⁷⁸⁷ François Michelin in the book he co-authored with Ivan Levaï and Yves Messarovich denounced the dominant approach to profit regarding it as evil *per se*. He reminded us that profit comes from the latin *pro facere* which means *in order to do*. Hence the finality of profit is *service*. See Michelin, François. *Et Pourquoi Pas?* Grasset. 2002, p. 72.

⁷⁸⁸ Gorbachev asserted: "Freedom of choice is a universal principle and there should be no exceptions". Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the United Nations*, op. cit.

⁷⁸⁹ Ib.

⁷⁹⁰ Ib. Gorbachev said in the same speech: "International links will fully reflect the real interests of the peoples and reliably serve the cause of their common security only when at the centre of everything there is the human being, his concerns, rights and liberties." And: "In adopting these decisions of fundamental importance, the Soviet leadership is voicing the will of a people engaged in an in-depth renewal of its socialist society." Or again: "I should like particularly to mention the scientists, cultural figures, representatives of mass organizations and various churches and activists of what is termed *people's diplomacy*."

⁷⁹¹ Cornia, Giovanni Andrea; Jolly, Richard; Stewart, Frances. *Adjustment with a human face*. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1987.

⁷⁹² At the time this time is submitted, Richard Jolly, born 30 June 1934, is Honorary Professor and Research Associate of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex University, focusing on issues of global development and the role of the UN in global governance. Jolly had a lifelong association with the IDS, appointed a fellow at the institute already in 1969. He directed the IDS from 1972 to 1981 and moved from there to the UN. The IDS, a registered charity, counts among its main funders the UK Department for International Development, the Bill and

Jolly significantly contributed to the UN's shift from economic development to sustainable *human* development in the late 1980s. This shift became the object of the 1996 *Human Development Report – Economic Growth and Human Development* – produced under Jolly's leadership. The 1996 report came out in the immediate aftermath of global governance revolution and incorporated all of its "gains". It unequivocally connected "people-centeredness" to the Cairo and Beijing objectives (reproductive health and gender equality)⁷⁹³. Jolly's approach to people-centeredness included the arguably utopian goal of "eradicating" poverty (*poverty eradication* being a paradigm belonging to global governance's framework), notably through wealth redistribution⁷⁹⁴. Jolly founded his "people-centered" paradigm on an *absolutization of equality* that he had conceptually developed in the 1970s as Director of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex (1972-1981) – an institute founded on an egalitarian philosophy in 1966 by anti-growth economist Dudley Seers (Director 1967-72).

Biocentrism destabilizing the hierarchy between the people and other life forms

In line with the *World Conservation Strategy*, Jolly's human development paradigm and that of Sen and Mahbub-ul-Haq, Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration posited that "human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature". The Rio Declaration established sustainable development's "people-centeredness" as a pillar of global governance's "framework". Analysis reveals, however, the ambivalence of the dominant rationale governing this assertion. Not only did the philosophy underpinning sustainable development from the onset tend to put people and nature in the balance (considering the "survival" of humanity and the planet to be equally at stake), but humanity being considered nature's chief predator since the beginning of the so-called *Anthropocene*⁷⁹⁵, the balance tended to tilt in favor the environment. The documents this thesis analyzed were consistent in establishing a direct correlation between the growth of the human population and the acceleration of environmental degradation and climate change, the loss of biodiversity and endangering the future of "the Planet"⁷⁹⁶. A fundamental *anthropological pessimism*, focusing on the human being's *destructive* capacity more than on his or her *creative* vocation, has driven global governance's "people-centeredness".

The opening words of Rio's *Convention on Biodiversity* - "The Contracting Parties, conscious of the *intrinsic value* [our emphasis] of biological diversity..." – suggested a connection to IUCN's consistent *biocentrism* - the phrase "*intrinsic value*" belonging to the vocabulary of biocentrism, whereby all living beings possess inherent value, whether they are conscious or not – an intrinsic

Melinda Gates Foundation, the European Union, the Rockefeller Foundation, all of which have also been major supporters of global governance's reproductive health and rights. Jolly was made a Knight of the Order of St Michael and St George for his contributions to international development. A pacifist, he turned away from his Christian faith in the 1950s while engaged in humanitarian work in Kenya.

⁷⁹³ For example on p. 110: "The three variables in the CPM cover substantial ground-indications of nutrition and health for the population as a whole (underweight children), access to reproductive health services and a concrete test of access to health services in general (unattended births), and basic educational attainment plus information on gender inequality (female adult illiteracy)." UNDP. Human Development Report. *Economic Growth and Human Development*. 1996.

⁷⁹⁴ See for instance UNDP's *Human Development Report 1997 – Human Development to Eradicate Poverty*, of which Richard Jolly was the principal coordinator. The report promoted redistributive policies, a steady redistribution of entitlements, resources, land, wealth... towards poverty eradication.

⁷⁹⁵ The Anthropocene, begun at the time of the 18th century industrial revolution, is usually defined as the current geological epoch, in which human activities heavily impact the planet's ecosystems and transforms them at all levels (such as "anthropogenic climate change").

⁷⁹⁶ See also the 1982 *World Charter for Nature*. UN General Assembly Res. 37/7 of October 28, 1982, op. cit.

value interpreted in such a way as to abolish hierarchies between life forms⁷⁹⁷. Since its foundation, IUCN has tended to put the needs of nature above those of human beings. While to some extent, IUCN changed its perspective in its 1980 *World Conservation Strategy*, it did keep its entrenched nature conservation priority thereafter and rooted it in global governance's environmental ethics. As per this ethics, human beings would be but one element in the ecosystem. There would be no ontological or moral hierarchy between human beings and the other species⁷⁹⁸. Biocentrism has steadily contradicted the new politics' claim to people-centeredness or anthropocentrism. It has put people in a dialectical relationship with the environment and all life forms other than human. Environmental ethics has interpreted biological diversity's "intrinsic value" as a sort of absolutization of non-human life forms, that would have a radically independent existence deprived of any subordination relationship to man. Biocentrism reflects, as already alluded to, a secularistic rejection of creation theology which revealed the relationship to be ontologically hierarchical, and the whole of creation to be ordered to the good and happiness of man and woman, creation's stewards. Hence environmental ethics have for decades destabilized not only the modern relationship of man to nature, but more fundamentally the biblical perspective on this relationship⁷⁹⁹. They have remained an unclarified mixed bag until now.

5.2.2. Globalism, "people-centeredness", global citizens and secularism

"People-centeredness" vs. globalism

Global governance's *globalist* perspective has been in a non-avowed dialectical tension with its proclaimed "people-centeredness". Speaking at the Social Summit on behalf of the Commission on Global Governance of which he was a member, globalist Dutch Minister Jan Pronk⁸⁰⁰ argued that the summit's vision to put "people at the centre of its concerns and their entitlement to a healthy and productive life in harmony with the environment" – in other words, global governance's sustainable development platform - was "not a utopian dream" but amounted to a

⁷⁹⁷ Biocentric theoreticians include Peter Singer (*Animal Liberation*, 1975), Paul W. Taylor (biocentric egalitarianism ethic) and Catherine Larrère (ecocentrism). Biocentric ethic presents itself as nonhierarchical. It prioritizes the natural world. Global governance's biocentrism transpires in statements such as the following: "Increased ethical awareness in environmental and developmental decision-making should help to place appropriate priorities for the maintenance and enhancement of life-support systems *for their own sake* [our emphasis], and in so doing ensure that the functioning of viable natural processes is properly valued by present and future societies". *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992. AGENDA 21, par. 31.8.

<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf> (retrieved January 27, 2022).

⁷⁹⁸ Anti-speciesism has been another manifestation of this revolutionary priority, forbidding discrimination against species other than human and deconstructing the hierarchy between humans and all other species of "animals". Peter Singer popularized the term "speciesism" in his 1975 book *Animal Liberation* and largely contributed to founding the anti-speciesism movement, which had earlier origins in the 1960s and 1970s. See Singer, Peter. *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*. HarperCollins. 1975.

⁷⁹⁹ For instance, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912-2009)'s "deep ecology" concept (coined in 1973, one year after the Stockholm conference) entailed a complete break from an anthropocentric vision of ecology. Næss criticized human "chauvinism" whereby only human beings were granted moral dignity. He promoted the *inherent* value of all living beings irrespective of their instrumental value to human beings. Deep ecology is a social movement advocating changing human societies along its principles. Naess was inspired by Rachel Carson's 1962 *Silent Spring* best-seller.

⁸⁰⁰ Jan Pronk sought to steer the Dutch *Labour Party* (PvdA) more to the left. A globalist, Pronk has endorsed the views of *The Limits to Growth* since the 1970s. When Minister of Development Cooperation (taking office in 1973) in the cabinet Den Uyl, Pronk reoriented the development cooperation-policy of the Netherlands towards equal distribution of power and wealth in the world. In 1978 Pronk became Knight in the Order of the Netherlands Lion. In 1980 he became UNCTAD's Assistant Secretary-General and in 1985, Assistant UN Secretary-General. In 2000 and 2001 he chaired the UN climate conference. Pronk was on the board of Gorbachev's Green Cross International.

recognition “that the era of contending nation states [was] passing”⁸⁰¹. Pronk’s words implicitly opposed global governance’s “people” – the abstract global people collectively adept of the global platform - to the concrete peoples constituting “nation states”⁸⁰², differing in their politics, cultural identity and objectives. Pronk implied that global governance was best positioned to serve the “people” – better than nation-states.

The “people” as global citizens, not individual persons

It has been in the logic of a “global” agenda meant “to improve the quality of life of all people”⁸⁰³ (“people” in the singular) to be for “people” as a global entity, for “all people” as the Rio Declaration put it, for all the world’s citizens without exception⁸⁰⁴. In practice global governance has treated “the people” and individual human beings as absolute “global citizens”, that is as citizens cut from their national identity⁸⁰⁵ and from their identity as human *persons*, belonging to a family as the basic cell of society and made for interpersonal relationships (spousal, paternal/maternal, filial, fraternal) and love⁸⁰⁶. A secularistic perspective, in other words, has driven its “people-centeredness”. The world’s children, young people, students, women, indigenous people, LGBTs, ... have been global citizens with “rights”, assigned roles and responsibilities, even obligations as agents of change in favor of the global agenda in all its interdependent components.

Global governance resolved the tension between globalism and people-centeredness, not through abandoning the former and respecting subsidiarity, but through a collectivistic new global social contract, prioritizing the abstract global people over the concrete individual person, over the family, “peoples” as nations, concrete traditional human communities. This contract has been global governance’s conclusive response to the question raised at the beginning of this thesis:

⁸⁰¹ Speech by Minister Jan Pronk at the *World Summit for Social Development*, Copenhagen, March 7, 1995.

⁸⁰² Speaking from a different perspective, that of the numerical revolution, Haenel, Meyronnis and Retz interestingly reached a similar conclusion about the obsolescence of the nation : « La ‘Nation’ – la ‘République’ – le ‘Peuple’ comme sujet de l’histoire, de ces notions propres aux temps modernes, il ne reste à peu près rien à l’heure de l’instantanéité numérique, et à celle du règne planétaire du marché. Ne surnagent que des bribes, des débris et des miettes. » Yannick Haenel et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 342.

⁸⁰³ *Cairo Decl.*, Principle 5.

⁸⁰⁴ The expression “for all” was more present in *The Limits to Growth* and the reports of the independent commissions than in the first wave conferences. It became a central theme and paradigm in the second wave conferences, with 118 uses in the Habitat II outcome documents. The UN Charter did use the expression, applying it to “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” except in Art. 76 relating to the objectives of the Trusteeship Council and applying it to socioeconomic matters and to UN Members “and their nationals”: “d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals”. Likewise, the UDHR used the “for all” expression once, in its Preamble: “... Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”. “Peoples” is here in the plural and next to “nations”.

⁸⁰⁵ This trend could have Marxist origins. As Weiss pointed it out, “From the 1860s, Marxism was one manifestation of a growing Western tendency to view the human person as subjected to forces that were international or transnational in nature”. Weiss, Thomas G. et al. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, op. cit., p. 107.

⁸⁰⁶ Hannah Arendt in *The origins of totalitarianism* (1951) viewed love as antipolitical: “Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical forces”. This author, by contradistinction, has argued that the citizen needed to be reconciled with the person made for love, from which it has been divorced since the Enlightenment. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *The Citizen and the Person. Rebellion and Reconciliation*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2014. And Pope Benedict XVI in his *Caritas in Veritate* 2009 encyclical, affirmed: “Without truth, without trust and love for what is true, there is no social conscience and responsibility, and social action ends up serving private interests and the logic of power, resulting in social fragmentation, especially in a globalized society at difficult times like the present” (par. 6). Further in the same document, Benedict XVI referred to the “altogether new and creative challenge” that “charity and truth confront us with”: “It is about broadening the scope of reason and making it capable of knowing and directing these powerful new forces, animating them within the perspective of that “civilization of love” whose seed God has planted in every people, in every culture” (par. 33).

who are “we the peoples of the United Nations”? The peoples of the United Nations were no longer primarily the nations making up UN member states, themselves constituted by families as their basic cells and the individual persons making up these families. If they were still that juridically, in practice the peoples of the United Nations now became, during the revolution, first and foremost global citizens bound by a global social contract, even if they paradoxically never signed this contract, and even if this “contract” was, equally paradoxically, informal (in the guise of a soft “consensus”).

Secularistic people-centeredness: “liberating” “the people” from the law written on their hearts

Jean-Paul Sartre played a groundbreaking role in the postmodern revolution by affirming already in 1946 (in *L'existentialisme est un Humanisme*) that man was nothing other than what he made of himself, that man *constructed* himself through his own *choices* and decisions, that existence preceded essence. Sartre’s premises went through an explicit “liberation”, not only from what he called the “en soi”, but from God”. Global governance’s anthropological perspective owes a lot to the French atheistic existentialists, and its gender agenda in particular, to Sartre’s concubine, Simone de Beauvoir. The human being who rejected his or her given identity ended up constructing its identity in a Promethean fashion. David Halperin, referring to the queer, self-created “identity”, described it as “an identity without an essence”⁸⁰⁷. The phrase “identity without an essence” expresses well the ideological agenda not only of queer theory, but of postmodernity in general. Postmodernity paradoxically celebrates both radical ambivalence, liquidity, irrationality, perpetually changing choices, process on the one hand and on the other, the “dogmatic” or authoritarian affirmation of novel and Promethean identities, rejecting what is universally human, grounded in our created human nature (identity politics)⁸⁰⁸.

Chapters one, two and four have demonstrated the linkage that the global governance revolution has operated between its alleged people-centeredness and the secularistic anthropological outlook⁸⁰⁹ of the Western cultural revolution. The obsessive priority global governance has given since its inception to universal access to contraception, then “safe abortion”, “free choice”, the “autonomy”, “empowerment” and “rights” of individuals, “sexuality education”, “various forms of the family”, gender equality, its denigration of the institutions of marriage and the family reflect an individualistic-liberal, Freudo-Marxist, Nietzschean anthropology focused on a search for absolutized knowledge, pleasure and power. This anthropology, which constitutes the axis around which the entire global governance system has been revolving, paradoxically owes a lot both to Western liberalism which, as Patrick J. Deneen put it, “conceived humans as rights-bearing individuals who could fashion and pursue for themselves their own version of the good life”⁸¹⁰,

⁸⁰⁷ In *Saint Foucault, Towards a Gay Hagiography*, Halperin wrote: “Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence.”

⁸⁰⁸ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *The gender revolution. A Global Agenda. A Tool for Discernment*. Dialogue Dynamics. 2013.

⁸⁰⁹ Haenel, Meyronnis and Retz gave such a secularistic anthropology a modern origin, dating back in particular to the French Revolution: « La Révolution marque l’avènement de l’*homo democraticus*, et à travers elle, on assiste au triomphe d’une eschatologie laïque, l’‘Homme’ se sauvant dans et par l’histoire qu’il fait. » Yannick Haenel et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 126. The authors further explained: “Les Temps modernes avaient comme projet d’établir l’‘Homme’ à la place de Dieu, de le diviniser en le mettant au principe et à la fin de toute vie historique ». Yannick Haenel et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 170.

⁸¹⁰ Deneen, Patrick J. *Why Liberalism Failed*, op. cit, p. 1: “Opportunities for liberty were best afforded by a limited government devoted to ‘securing rights’, along with a free-market economic system that gave space for individual initiative and ambition. Political legitimacy was grounded on a shared belief in an originating ‘social contract’ to which even newcomers could subscribe, ratified continuously by free and fair elections of responsive representatives.”

and to socialism and its focus on *needs* instead of *wants*. It unhappily resolves the dialectical tension between the two through a synthesis that is at once individualistic and collectivistic-globalist. It imposed itself as the new self-evident, substituting the law written on all human hearts, universally recognizable in all human persons' conscience and reason.

The most ardent advocates of these agendas - such as Nafis Sadik, Mahmoud Fathalla and Bella Abzug... - have been proactive and assertive proponents of people-centeredness, of people's "needs and rights". In her concluding remarks at the Cairo Conference, for instance, evoking "historic" achievements, Sadik told the delegates: "The Programme of Action you are about to adopt places women and men, and their families, at the top of the international development agenda. It is a population action programme that puts people first"⁸¹¹. Bella Abzug's professed goal was

"to create a *people's civilization* in which the right to health, to be clothed and housed and fed and have peace are recognized. None of that is going to happen until we change the nature of power, till women have 50% of the political space, of the resources needed for the programs they now don't have"⁸¹².

Global governance's ideological interpretation of people-centeredness implied an opposition between the moral order, its authority and institutions (caricatured as "top-down" and oppressive) and people. People needed to be "liberated" from this moral order through a "bottom-up" approach that would be focused on their "needs", "rights" and "choices". Hence global governance's "people-centeredness" connects to the postmodern agenda of the Western sexual, feminist and homosexual revolution, which was the struggle of the "oppressed" against the "oppressor": women and homosexuals/LBGTs being the oppressed; men and what the jargon has called "heterosexuals", the oppressor. So understood, people-centeredness became an eminently anti-person revolt against the ontological nature of the human being, against personhood and the universal vocation of the human person to love.

In conclusion of this section on "people-centeredness", global governance's foundational nexus between its environmental and population control agendas, the biocentric underpinnings of its environmental ethics resulting in a shift of priority from the human being to the species humanity would be destroying, sustainable development's radically pessimistic anthropology, its deconstruction of the biblical notion of growth, its moral relativism and liberalism, its globally normative character threatening the independence of sovereign nations, its neo-pagan spirituality, its globalism and massive power shift to self-sufficient experts... all seriously jeopardized the existence of any real or genuine consensus on sustainable, "people-centered" development.

5.3. Postmodern deconstructionism hijacked post-Cold War universal human aspirations

The events of 1989-91 impacted all of humanity. The sudden and un hoped-for collapse of the Soviet regime and of communist totalitarianism happened against the backdrop of accelerating globalization. It awakened a historic hope that universal human aspirations could now at last be fulfilled. Although "aspirations" may sound as a concept lending itself to subjective interpretations, qualifying them as both "human" and "universal", that is, as conforming to what every human conscience can recognize as good and desirable, withdraws the possibility that it be

⁸¹¹ Singh, Jyoti Shankar. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 72.

⁸¹² Peeters, Marguerite. *Interview with Bella Abzug*, op. cit.

the object of contradictory interpretations. The UDHR itself used the term in its preamble (as it does, let us note in passing, the word *conscience*):

“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the *conscience* [our emphasis] of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest *aspiration* [Ib.] of the common people...”

Post-Cold War genuine human aspirations: correct the abuses of modernity

Where did humanity in its rich plurality of peoples want to go at the end of the Cold War? What were its genuine universal aspirations? The peoples who had suffered for decades under the brutal communist oppression hoped to self-determine as peoples endowed with a specific and irreplaceable cultural genius, and to participate as such in international cooperation and in globalization. They aspired to liberty, first and foremost religious liberty. They aspired, as did the peoples of the South, to a sound anthropology now also integrating what is genuinely universal in non-Western cultures. The world having seen the devastating effects of totalitarianism and abstract ideology, there was a deeply rooted aspiration to return to the human person and reality as they are, in their concreteness. The excesses of machismo on the one hand, and of feminism on the other generated a desire to recover harmonious relations between the sexes. Over 20 years after May 68, the negative fruits of the sexual revolution were starting to become apparent. The horrors of two world wars and the Cold War’s historic nuclear war threat generated a desire for lasting world peace and security, and for honoring the inalienable dignity of the human person.

There was a widespread sense that humanity had to find another approach to development, more respectful of the human person and of nature than that of communism on the one hand and of financial liberalism, wild capitalism and consumerism on the other. The modern flaws of individualism, abstract intellectualism, liberalism, utopianism... started being more acutely perceived and denounced, as were the hard modern *power-reason coalition* and its underpinning lop-sided anthropology, which tended to sideline the conscience (truth) and the heart (love), as opposed to non-Western cultures which have rightly traditionally valued them as central during the West’s “Age of Reason”⁸¹³. A growing sense of the unity of the human family, of universal brotherhood⁸¹⁴, international solidarity⁸¹⁵, justice, the role of women in the city⁸¹⁶, individual autonomy... quietly spread. More vividly aware of the equal dignity of all human beings⁸¹⁷, humanity wished for *universal access* to development, food, shelter, education, health care, work⁸¹⁸, to the “benefits of civilization”⁸¹⁹ and of “earthly goods”⁸²⁰. The hyper development of sciences during the modern age had resulted in an over ramification of scientific branches. This procured a fragmented view of reality. There was a desire to recover an integrated or “holistic” vision of life, to rediscover the interlinks between all that *is* and an integrated worldview.

⁸¹³ The West largely adopted a Nietzschean anthropology, giving preeminence to power and reason and little space to conscience and the heart/love.

⁸¹⁴ *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes*. Promulgated by his Holiness, Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, par. 38.

⁸¹⁵ Ib., par. 57. The Council Vatican II (*Gaudium et Spes*) identified the aspirations we listed above as *signs of the times* (GS, par. 4).

⁸¹⁶ Ib., par. 9, 52, 55, 60...

⁸¹⁷ Ib., par. 26; 73.

⁸¹⁸ Ib., par. 26.

⁸¹⁹ Ib., par. 9.

⁸²⁰ Ib., par. 69.

These aspirations were universal in the sense that they came from within the peoples, from within the conscience, reason and heart of all human persons themselves and conformed to what can universally be recognized as true and good. We even venture to assert that there was then a historic hope, conscious or unconscious, that a consensus on what is universal was what humanity had to head towards, and that such a consensus could be achieved under the right political leadership.

Hijacking led to confusion and unclarified coexistence

At the end of the Cold War, humanity stood ready for a historic liberation act: the definitive liberation from ideologies that had held captives the peoples across all parts of the world under their influence during the modern era. Humanity was poised to a positive “revolution”. A series of positive changes that the aspirations we just listed exemplify imposed themselves as necessary for the common good of humanity. The new people-centered, holistic and sustainable paradigms seemed to respond to these aspirations. This apparent correspondence helps explain the extreme rapidity with which global governance’s paradigms gained cultural and political traction. Global governance’s paradigms *de facto* globally imposed themselves in just a few years’ time.

The 1989-91 Kairos called for moral leadership grounded in a sound and universal anthropology, for an authoritative and creative vision responding to these aspirations, for a genuine participation of all nations. This thesis has found, however, that the global governance revolution it analyzes hijacked humanity’s genuine universal human aspirations at the end of the Cold War Kairos. The notion of hijacking implies the displacement of a group away from the direction corresponding to the passengers’ explicit, free and unanimous will. The hijackers, few in numbers, take control of the process and alter the set direction, conducting all passengers, who thereby become their hostages, where they did not want to go.

We have found that a minority of transnational non-state agents succeeded in achieving a “global consensus” on globally normative paradigms supposedly addressing some of the *themes* making up humanity’s universal and perennial aspirations at a historic hour of hope (the direction the world’s peoples then freely wanted to go), but driven by postmodern deconstructionism (hijacking). These partners ideologically framed and disfigured what was supposed to become humanity’s post-Cold War liberation act. They sacrificed the desire of peoples, especially from the former Soviet bloc and from the South, for self-determination.

Ideology has consistently marred the holistic, people-centered and sustainable post-Cold War framework of international cooperation and the search for a “way” that would offer the just alternative to both communism and radical liberalism. Sustainable development, which incorporated the flaws of both ideological systems, was implicitly presented as this *third way*⁸²¹. This third way was in a sense the synthesis of the worst of both worlds.

5.3.1. Collapse of modern ideological systems, and postmodern deconstructionism: what we mean by “ideological”

⁸²¹ Bill Clinton as a US democrat, and Tony Blair and Anthony Giddens as social democrats, engaged in a short-lived attempt to propose a so-called Third Way in the 1990s. This Third-Way was supposed to reconcile centre-right economic agendas with centre-left social policies and to avoid at once the abuses of right-wing neo-liberalism and left-wing state socialism and economic determinism. Some at the time presented sustainable development as the “third way”, the synthesis reconciling Marxism and capitalism and allegedly transcending ideology. Many others, in particular American Republicans, have denounced sustainable development’s Marxism. See for instance, Tom DeWeese: “We’ve been saying it for years - sustainable development is really just a disguised Marxism, with its top-down control of economic decisions, violation of private property rights and emphasis on Social Justice, a term, incidentally, coined by non-other than Karl Marx (so what was your first clue?).” <https://americanpolicy.org/2013/03/03/sustainability-marxism/> (retrieved May 29, 2020).

Let us revisit this thesis' definitions of "ideological" and "postmodern", with a view to now conclusively clarifying how this thesis interprets them. Our use of the word "ideological" in this thesis has pertained, not to rationalistically constructed systems, but to the residues of these systems which, not being edifices founded on what can universally be recognized as good, real and true, self-destructed as a domino over the course of modernity. The 1989 "end of ideology" proclamation was correct in that ideologies as rationalistically constructed systems were no more⁸²². We denounce this proclamation as dangerously misleading to the extent it was understood as the total disappearance of ideological components in societies and politics as if by magic and from one day to the next. Such an interpretation, foundational to global governance, was concomitant with the advent of the post-truth era. There has also been a lot of utopia in global governance's perspective, which has looked to the future with a view of transforming all societies. In *Ideology and Utopia*, the German classical sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) had distinguished the two concepts.

The Western new left's ideological process has been about *deconstruction* – the word Derrida appropriately used to describe the postmodern philosopher's attempt to deconstruct reality as it is, as attainable by human reason, in both its essence and mystery⁸²³. As already mentioned, his thesis adheres to the view that modernity was constructivist and rationalistic, while postmodernity has been deconstructionist, not only of past meta-theories, but primarily of what is real, rational and reasonable. Postmodern deconstructionism is therefore an organic emanation of modernity's ideological process.

Some classify the new-leftist movement unfolded since the 1960s as a late modernity phenomenon⁸²⁴, not a post-modern one. We have already laid out our arguments in favor of a post-modern qualification. But whatever the option chosen, modernity and postmodernity share a perspective whereby "reality" would be a matter of *construction*. This perspective differs from both the classical and biblical approaches, the former rooted in metaphysics, the latter declaring that what *is*, is divinely and lovingly *given*. The modern constructivist perspective is just as ideological and revolutionary as the postmodern deconstructionist outlook.

Residues of modern ideologies driving new paradigms

The debacle of one modern ideology after the next, of all past "-isms", left over heaps of waste. The residues, being ideologically-driven, deconstructed what *is*. They have dynamically nourished the transformation of ideologies as systems into the postmodern deconstruction process. We have observed it: residues of Marxism, socialism, collectivism, Darwinism, naturalism⁸²⁵, Nietzscheism, internationalism, egalitarianism, Freudism, Gramscianism, secularism, spiritualism, scientism, hedonism, sexual liberalism, individualism, eugenics, radical feminism, biocentrism, globalism and so on have been carried along by a powerful stream that

⁸²² Or what Karl Mannheim called "total ideologies". « On peut jeter une bâche sur toutes les idéologies des Temps modernes : elles sont entièrement caduques. Nationalisme, libéralisme, socialisme, ces conceptions s'écroulent sur elles-mêmes, tel un sac de toile sur le vide. Comme le dit Fernando Pessoa dans *Ultimatum* : 'Faillite des peuples et des destins – faillite totale !' » Haenel, Yannick et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

⁸²³ The French Christian existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel denounced the contemporary trend to reduce reality as a mystery to a technical problem. Global governance tends to approach all issues as technical problems.

⁸²⁴ Such as Mathieu Bock-Côté, Chantal Delsol, Rémy Brague...

⁸²⁵ Huxley expressed his paganism, naturalism and neo-Darwinism in the following, striking way: "There is no separate supernatural realm: all phenomena are part of one natural process of evolution. There is no basic cleavage between science and religion... I believe that [a] drastic reorganization of our pattern of religious thought is now becoming necessary, from a god-centered to an evolutionary-centered pattern." Huxley, Julian. *The New Divinity* in *Essays of a Humanist*. Chatto & Windus. London. 1964, p. 220.

has driven, at various degrees and in various ways, the partners' interpretation of global governance's new paradigms. This process paradoxically *constructed* "the framework" as a *postmodern* mosaic or collage of modern ideological stones coexisting with largely consensual and non-ideological components in a very instable ensemble. The partners were intent on carrying their ideological agendas forward through the new holistic paradigms they had contributed to forge.

The paradox is that the postmodern process, rejecting and deconstructing "systems" as per its defining logic, did itself usher in an integrated, dominant and systemic framework. As opposed to modern ideologies, however, the new global system was not fixed, rationalistically and institutionally developed, but dynamically procedural⁸²⁶. The new paradigms are themselves synergetic, holistic systems, as is global governance's conceptual framework, in which all is in all.

End of ideology did not mean disappearance of ideological agendas as if by magic

As already noted in chapter three, the "end of ideology" proclamation related to a plain negation of a double nature: first a negation of the state of civilizational and political decay that Western liberal societies found themselves in by 1989 (and of triumphant Western liberalism's own ideological content); and secondly a negation of even the possibility that the new paradigms might contain any ideological element (while they were powerfully driven by ideological residues, and predominantly by Marxist and neo-Marxist ones)⁸²⁷. As this thesis has so far emphasized, the misleading proclamation was instrumentalized in a combined strategic attempt, on the one hand to establish global governance's agendas as undisputedly *consensual*, and on the other to transfer the power to set these agendas to "global experts".

Let us recall the partners' coining of an attractive but deceptive novel language, their use of semantic manipulation to impose their new paradigms as *self-evident* and consensual - as "common sense", to use Gramsci's category - among all state and non-state partners and avoid an open and genuine debate on these paradigms' controversial content. The global postmodern post-truth agenda thus imposed itself as *the new self-evident*, substituting what had been proclaimed to be self-evident in the US Declaration of independence⁸²⁸, the law of nature, open to the law written on our hearts as understood in the biblical tradition⁸²⁹. One can only "consent",

⁸²⁶ « Comme l'a montré Zygmunt Bauman, nous sommes les témoins d'une métamorphose. Nous entrons progressivement dans une 'société liquide', qui regarde toute position acquise comme un figement à balayer... » Haenel, Yannick et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 34. « Mis en échec, le projet des 'Lumières'. Au lieu d'être les auteurs de leur destin, voilà les hommes agencés dans un processus. » Ib., p. 51.

⁸²⁷ The underlying assumption was that the categorically imperative global agenda transcended all ideological divides. Alternatively, there was a plain denial of the existence of conflictual ideological perspectives among governmental and non-governmental partners. Jomtien, for instance, coopted as new partners in education for all groups that clearly had incompatible perspectives, such as different political parties, families and teachers' unions, "religious bodies" and NGOs... as if its allegedly ideologically-free education for all agenda would have a neutralizing or unifying effect on the diverging perspectives of these groups.

⁸²⁸ July 4, 1776 US Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness - That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

⁸²⁹ Biblical examples are: "But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people" (Jeremiah 31:33); "Behold, the days are coming, declares the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant that I made with their fathers on the day when

a second Gramscian concept, to what is “self-evident”. The global governance revolution was a *hegemonic* process – a third Gramscian notion. The Western *cultural* revolution had produced *political* results. Political feminism, political lesbianism⁸³⁰, political environmentalism, political pacifism... - the partners’ political power grab -, started developing in the late 1960s and 1970s, at both the national and international levels. The partnerships that developed during the global governance revolution constituted *networks* of the like-minded⁸³¹, or to use a fourth Gramscian notion, an *alliance* of social forces, a *social block* through which the partners could acquire *hegemony*. UN member states often passively *consented* to the partners’ leadership. They were themselves coopted in partnerships. By and large, Western UN member states were then governing societies that had largely switched to the side of the cultural revolution. The power the West has wielded at the UN explains the successful hegemony of global governance’s partners.

5.3.2. *Scientistic global neo-absolutism*

Let us now pursue our analysis of how global governance’s strategic adherence to the post-Cold War end of ideology *Zeitgeist* and its associated denial of the experts’ ideological drive in forging the new paradigms led to a quiet transfer of political power to these experts. As mentioned in chapter three, the second wave conferences treated the “problems” they addressed as merely technical or pragmatic. Such a flawed reasoning quickly led to granting a political function to supposedly non-political technicians and experts, and to do so to the detriment of ordinary political decision-making processes at the international level and to the detriment of national sovereignty and of peoples’ will and values. Governmental and intergovernmental consultation of experts has always been used and was legitimate to the extent sovereign governments remained in control, with experts playing a mere consultative, non-political role. In order to contribute to the good that is common to the people, the use of expertise also had to be ideologically-free. Global governance’s self-sufficient experts, however, did pursue both ideological and political ambitions.

“Scientism” in the age of consensus science: a threat to modern democracy

It seems to have escaped political analysis that in spite of the post-Cold War end of ideology proclamation, the UN’s political absolutization of expertise was itself ideological: it was of a neo-

I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, my covenant that they broke, though I was their husband, declares the Lord. But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the Lord. For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more” (Jeremiah 31:31-34); “And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts” (2 Corinthians 3:3); “For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus” (Romans 2:14-16); “The law of his God is in his heart; his steps do not slip” (Psalm 37:31); “Listen to me, you who know righteousness, the people in whose heart is my law; fear not the reproach of man, nor be dismayed at their revilings” (Isaiah 51:7)...

⁸³⁰ The June 28, 1969 Stonewall Riots stood at the origin of the “gay liberation” political lobby in the US. Political lesbianism likewise arose in the US in the late 1960s.

⁸³¹ Networks conceptually imply common strategic and ideological objectives. They are by nature “like-minded”. The term like-minded is however absent from all the documents this thesis analyzes. It will appear in the aftermath of the revolution in the language of global governance and then also become a theme of scholarly research. See for instance a significant subtitle, *Coalitions of the like-minded can lead*, in an article by Maxwell A. Cameron, *Global Civil Society and the Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines*, in Cooper, Andrew F., English, John and Thakur, Ramesh. *Enhancing Global Governance. Towards a New Diplomacy*. United Nations University Press. 2002, p. 79.

scientistic, Spinozistic nature. Absolute trust was put in the self-proclaimed “global experts” to determine *for the “global people” and in the stead of national peoples* their political norms and values. This neo-scientism paradoxically emerged at a time modernity’s absolute trust in both science and in the capacity of reason to attain reality had been significantly shaken⁸³². Werner K. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle⁸³³ and Kurt Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems⁸³⁴ contributed to this destabilization. However what matters to this thesis’ purposes in the role of postmodern deconstructionism in the destabilization of reason and science. Further than modern ideologies, the postmodern tsunami alienated science from truth, the moral distinction of good and evil, and faith. A scientific “consensus” amongst “experts”, which differed from exact science, imperceptibly took over, distorting the nature of science itself and of its methods. The alternative to global governance’s neo-scientism was for the West to act according to its classical and biblical legacy and to approach socioeconomic and environmental problems in their relation to what is universally recognizable as reasonable, true, real, good, in an openness to what is transcendent.

A belief in the law of nature, in the capacity of reason to attain reality in its substantial content (truth consisting in an adequation between the intellect and a thing, as Thomas Aquinas defined it⁸³⁵) and a seemingly firm science-reason nexus characterized the modern age up to a certain point and was rooted in classical and Christian thought. These beliefs related to the Western notion of universality. To the limited extent and as long as they held firm during the modern period, the national people’s will and the values binding this people together politically ruled over the experts’ views. The national people and their representatives kept control over the potential political influence of experts. They, not experts and least of all “global experts”, were the ones democratically resolving issues on the national political desk and making policy and law according to their own anthropological, social, moral, philosophical, cultural, religious... outlook. Governments maintained their political independence from and their sovereignty over the qualified specialists that they merely *consulted* when needed.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, a dominant or even exclusive reliance on “expertise” to determine the way to resolve humanity’s “problems” integrated the *modus operandi* of international cooperation. It tended to reduce intergovernmental negotiations to a mere *consensus-building exercise* on agendas largely pre-established by “experts”⁸³⁶. Granted a *meta-authority* – an authority “transcending” the political power of those who legitimately held this power - the

⁸³² Referring to the cybernetic revolution’s capacity to reduce everything to “information” treated by way of algorithms, the authors of *Tout est accompli* observed: « Remarquons qu’au XXème siècle, la science elle-même renonce à toute représentation sensible, ou intuitive, au profit d’une saisie en termes de probabilités. Avec la théorie quantique, c’est la matière elle-même qui est dématérialisée. On examine la possibilité d’une occurrence, et non le phénomène en tant que tel. On décrit les particules par des ondes de probabilités, lesquelles ne renvoient à leur tour qu’à une présence hypothétique. » Haenel, Yannick et al. *Tout est accompli*, op. cit., p. 47.

⁸³³ Werner Karl Heisenberg (1901-76), a German theoretical physicist and one of the key pioneers of quantum mechanics, established “the uncertainty principle” in 1927, stipulating that the more precisely you know the position of a particle, the less precisely you can simultaneously know the momentum of that particle. In 1932, Heisenberg received the Nobel Prize in physics.

⁸³⁴ The Austrian-born logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel (1906-78) elaborated two theorems of mathematical logic relating to the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. Gödel’s findings, published in 1931, have been consequential both for mathematical logic and for the philosophy of mathematics. They strongly suggested the impossibility to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics.

⁸³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I q 21 a 2 c.

⁸³⁶ Global governance shares common features with what British sociologist and politician Michael Dunlop called “meritocracy”. In *The Rise of Meritocracy* (1958), Dunlop imagined an English society of which intellectual achievement and merit would have become the central tenets. Such a society would be divided between the power-holding elite and the disenfranchised class of the less merited.

“experts” demanded from all global citizens a servile obedience and a blind trust of a gnostic character⁸³⁷. The *consensus scientists* and “experts” at the helm of global governance have been the enlightened despots of our day. They have been absolute global rulers for “the global people”, without the national peoples. They have claimed to know people’s needs, rights, responsibilities and interests better than the people. The “experts” were not only the scientists from academia interacting with the UN⁸³⁸. They were mainly the powerful ideologically-driven transnational NGOs with “grassroots experience” that the UN had been partnering with all along the global governance process.

The “experts” abundantly used “sociological observations”, deprived of moral considerations, for social engineering purposes – to advance their own paradigms. They sociologically observed, for example, the “problem” of teenage and “unwanted” pregnancies. As the only solution, they imposed universal access to the full range of contraceptive methods, sexual and reproductive health, “safe abortion” and comprehensive sexuality education. They observed the problems of what they called “violence against women” and “domestic violence”. They resolved them by imposing their interpretation of women’s rights, women’s empowerment, gender equality, non-discrimination against women. Observing, as did Cairo, that “the contribution, real and potential, of non-governmental organizations” was then gaining “clearer recognition in many countries and at regional and international levels” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.1), they underlined the “importance” of affirming the “relevance” of the contribution of NGOs “in the context of the preparation and implementation” of their agendas (*Progr. of Action*, par. 15.1). The sociological observation of NGOs’ historic advancement in the early 1990s thus served the strategic purpose of further empowering family planning and population control NGOs at all levels and entrenching the gains of these NGOs in global governance. In reality, population control NGOs had *self-advanced*, whether national peoples wanted it or not. Youth and women adopted contraceptive behaviors influenced by these NGOs’ propaganda. The sexual revolution begot violence against women. Revolutionary processes often justify their efforts to consolidate their gains on the basis of the sociological changes that they themselves, not national peoples, had initially provoked. They rely on what sociologist Robert K. Merton first called *self-fulfilling prophecies*⁸³⁹.

Exclusion of pluralism: the system’s totalitarian seeds

“Pluralism”, a tenet of modern democracy, has not belonged to the vocabulary of global governance. The conferences replaced the modern concept with the postmodern “diversity” paradigm. The new politics has been celebrating “diversity”⁸⁴⁰ in all its forms: biological, cultural,

⁸³⁷ Hannah Arendt referred to Plato who wanted to withdraw from the polis and organize his Academy outside the city wall of Athens. Plato was interested in politics as a philosopher, not as a politician.

⁸³⁸ The conferences constantly sought, as Agenda 21 put it, to “improve the interface between science and decision-making, as well as the implementation of scientific results”. *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, op. cit., par. 31.4 e.

⁸³⁹ Sociologist Robert K. Merton is credited as coining the term *self-fulfilling prophecy* in 1948. Here’s how he defined it: “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation, evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error.”

⁸⁴⁰ Mathieu Bock-Côté considers the diversity concept as the historical horizon of our times and views *diversity* as a modern phenomenon: « Notre époque, lorsqu’elle cherche à définir son horizon historique, se réfère à l’éthos de la diversité identitaire... On célèbre périodiquement les années 1960-70, on s’y réfère spontanément pour marquer la naissance d’une civilisation différente de celle qui l’a précédée. On les associe à l’idéal d’une société progressiste, transnationale et multiculturelle, à la sensibilité contestataire portée par la mouvance contre-culturelle. L’idéal démocratique se serait ainsi régénéré. La distinction est à peu près la suivante : avant, le sexism, le patriarcat, l’homophobie, le racisme, l’intolérance, aujourd’hui, l’émancipation des femmes, des homosexuels, des immigrants, des groupes identitaires marginalisés, la reconnaissance des différences et la tolérance. Nous serions passés d’une civilisation à une autre. C’est le grand récit de la modernité : l’émancipation de l’homme passerait par l’extension de

“sexual”, lifestyles, individual and group choices... Diversity, as opposed to pluralism, belonged to “the framework”, which excluded ideological opposition to the global agenda: you can be “diverse” so long as you adhere to all the components of the framework. Diversity therefore made impossible the exercise of pluralism, which implies the freedom (of opinion, of conscience, of religion ...) to think outside the framework’s box and to challenge its ideological content. The diversity paradigm stipulated the pre-existence of a common mandate assigning the partners in global governance differentiated roles and responsibilities within a common framework. The system has been closed in upon the partners’ interpretation of the new paradigms because they have remained at the rudder of global governance. The new global partnership for sustainable development was established for no other purpose than to implement the agenda as they set it. It has remained exclusive of pluralistic interpretations of this agenda.

5.3.3. Hijacking post-Cold War universal human aspirations: de-hijacking yet to be done

By and large, the partners’ hijacking of the post-Cold War Kairos was hardly discerned. Even if often confusingly intuited, the fine line separating humanity’s universal aspirations and spontaneous bottom-up cultural evolutions from the global elite’s top-down and ideologically-loaded norms has gone largely under-perceived. The challenge of this discernment has remained inappropriately met since the end of the Cold War. By way of consequence, a majority became this elite’s *poputchiks, fellow travelers*⁸⁴¹, passively submitting to their Diktats, while a minority have been reactionary, wrongly rejecting the legitimate aspirations of humanity to new *themes* of international cooperation along with the global elite’s ideological agendas.

From nations’ non-engagement in the work of discernment ensued a pervasive malaise, massive confusion, manipulation on an unprecedented, global scale, the coexistence in unhealthy ambivalence of what is genuinely consensual and universal with divisive special interests, hegemonically imposed from the “global level” down to the grassroots. The challenge for people of good will has been to disentangle one from the other, to de-hijack the process that has now been holding international cooperation hostage for decades, to restart from the sovereign peoples, engaging on the path of a new development model conforming to the integral vocation of the human person. Such a “universally consensual” platform would just need to be *declared* just as human rights were declared universal in 1948. By contradistinction, the post-Cold War “global consensus” was “constructed”. Did it not fall to the West, with its rich classical and biblical, Judeo-Christian legacy, to lead the way in this respect? But by 1989, the West had largely squandered its legacy.

At the 1989 historic Kairos, the end of history and end of ideology myths blinded the sovereign governments making up UN member states. The West failed to challenge its own “model”. Yet as already remarked and as Patrick Deneen demonstrated it, then “triumphant” liberalism had in fact failed. If governments were to respond to their peoples’ authentic aspirations, if genuine democracy was to prevail, the root causes of liberalism’s failures as well as the post-Cold War

la logique égalitaire à tous les rapports sociaux et par la reconnaissance des identités qui ont été un jour ou l’autre marginalisées. Celles-ci surgiraient aujourd’hui des marges, affranchies d’un ordre politique et symbolique qui les refoulait. Il faudrait les accueillir : chacune enrichirait l’humanité. D’ailleurs, on le répète : la diversité serait une richesse. Le mythe vieilli d’une communauté politique unifiée s’effacerait devant la pluralité des appartenances, aucune d’entre elles ne se laissant enfermer dans une catégorie. La nation devrait se convertir au droit à la différence ou périr. » Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁸⁴¹ Poputchik (“one who travels the same path”) is the term coined by the Bolshevik revolutionary statesman Anatoly Lunacharsky to describe the irresolute supporters of the Bolshevik government. Leon Trotsky would later popularize it.

survival of other modern ideologies in residual forms⁸⁴² would have needed to be openly confronted. Had sovereign governments freely discerned the need to intergovernmentally address humanity's aspirations independently from the partners and kept control of the processes defining the multilateral agenda for the new era, they would have contained the scope of the ideological drift that did take place and the depth of the revolution's devastation. The outcome would have been more genuinely intergovernmental in nature, more pluralistic, more respectful of freedom, national sovereignty and the necessary hierarchy between the legitimate holders of political authority and those submitted to this authority.

⁸⁴² Deneen affirms that "Liberalism is the first of the modern world's three great competitor political ideologies, and with the demise of fascism and communism, it is the only ideology still with a claim to viability". Deneen, Patrick J. *Why Liberalism Failed*, op. cit., p. 5. Challenging his assertion, we contend that other modern ideologies, surviving in residual forms after 1989, notably Marxism and Nietzscheism, still wield critical influence.

PART THREE

THE NEW POLITICS: PARTNERSHIPS AS AN OPERATIONAL GLOBAL-TO-LOCAL POSTMODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The revolution within and the ambivalent coexistence regime it brought about

CHAPTER 6

CONSTITUTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS NEW PARTNERSHIPS POLITICS (1990-1996)

Having introduced the notion of hijacking and identified global governance's ideological drive, part three of our thesis now contends with this drive's role in the emergence of *partnerships as an operational, global-to-local postmodern political system*. It exposes the constitution of global governance *as process*: as a new politics of partnerships between governmental and non-governmental actors. It addresses how the historical and practical leadership of non-governmental actors since the beginning of the global governance process, retraced in chapters one, two and four, itself evolved into an intergovernmentally endorsed political principle – the partnership principle and into a systemic new politics. It uncovers the challenges that this “principle” represents for the basic tenets of democracy and an international order grounded in the recognition of what is universal.

The first part of chapter six offers a historical overview of each of the second wave UN conferences' specific contribution to the partnerships' revolution. It highlights the momentum towards the new politics until the Istanbul intergovernmental adoption of partnerships with non-governmental actors as a *political principle*. This chapter's second part analyzes the conferences' *rationale* for partnerships. Its third part identifies the multifarious actors that the conferences' reports coopted in the partnerships politics and the *roles* these reports attributed to each actor. It demonstrates the new political system's centripetal force and its dynamic cooptation of all possible partners in global governance, in an effort to leave none out and to submit all to the norms of the global elite.

The post-Cold War UN conferences recognized partnerships as *vital, essential or crucial* – three of the adjectives they used⁸⁴³ – to achieving their respective global goals. “Partnerships at all levels” (Jomtien Decl., Art. 7.) – that is, from the “global” to the international, regional, national, provincial, local levels, down to the grassroots - with the widest range of actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, whether the latter be formally or juridically constituted or not, and even direct partnership with “the people” and single individuals, was a watchword of the global governance process during its revolutionary phase, from Jomtien to Istanbul. The *exclusive* purpose of the new global partnership was to implement the conferences’ “global” goals and the partners’ ideologically-driven new world vision for the 21st century.

6.1. Historical unfolding

6.1.1. Three stages

⁸⁴³ For instance: “Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.1). Local authorities “play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to promote sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 28.1). “Trade unions are vital actors in facilitating the achievement of sustainable development in view of their experience in addressing industrial change, the extremely high priority they give to protection of the working environment and the related natural environment, and their promotion of socially responsible and economic development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 29.1).

The now generalized practice of partnerships between state and (inter-)governmental actors on the one hand and non-state, non-governmental actors on the other to achieve “globally-set” goals has a history. This history unfolded in three major stages.

Cold War informal collaboration between UN and agents of revolution

The first stage, addressed in chapter two, corresponded to the direct collaboration between the UN Secretariat and UN specialized bodies on the one hand, and NGOs and other non-state actors on the other during the first wave UN conferences. As noted, the nature of this collaboration was already political. Over the decades spanning the Cold War, the political relationship that the UN had developed with NGOs started quietly changing the *modus operandi* of an organization that was, by mandate, international.

The terms “partner” and “partnership” in their political sense were virtually absent from the first wave conferences. These words, however, had started appearing since the 1970s in the context of the *feminist agenda* of these conferences⁸⁴⁴ where, in the majority of cases, they described the relationship between men and women and were habitually associated with the qualifier “equal”. As opposed to the word “spouse” – anthropologically rich and precise, the word “partner” conveys a sense of anthropological undifferentiation. While “partner” and “spouse” first coexisted in the UN conferences’ reports, the former would eventually tend to replace the latter. Illustrative of its neo-Marxist roots, feminism prescribed a redistribution of domestic, social, political, economic *power* to attain *equality* between male and female partners. As feminism defined equality in terms of power, not of dignity, its male/female partnership concept was, to that extent, already a political notion. Feminism has played a leading role in the advent and consolidation of the new partnerships’ politics, to which it transferred its dynamic of undifferentiation, equalization and power redistribution.

Post-Cold War naming of informal collaboration: partnerships

The second stage of the partnerships’ process occurred over the second wave UN conferences (1990-1996), which gave a name – partnerships – to what had been the informal practice during the Cold War. *Naming* amounted to granting this practice a conceptual existence and recognizing partnerships the object of a formal intergovernmental consensus. One after the other, the conferences tightly wove the partnerships’ paradigm in the fabric of the post-Cold War “global consensus” then being built. Partnerships became a pillar and an indissoluble component of global governance’s systemic framework. These developments indicated the revolution’s full break-out. Also manifesting the entry in the revolutionary stage was the conferences’ very rapid and tentacular expansion of the scope and depth of partnerships. The conferences organized

⁸⁴⁴ The partnership concept had been introduced in the late 1960s. In its political sense, it appeared first in the independent reports and commissions of the 1970s and 80s. As already mentioned, *The Limits to Growth* quoted UN Secretary-General U Thant using the term “global partnership” already in 1969 (see footnote 254). The *World Conservation Strategy* used the term *partnership* once in reference to the partnership between conservation and development processes. The 1980 Brandt report made ample use of the term in its political sense (14), suggesting a socialist/social democratic origin of the novel concept. One of the two appearances of the term in *Our Common Future* is in a quote by David Bull from the influential Environmental Liaison Center, exposing the global governance new politics: “If the NGO community is to translate its commitment to sustainable development into effective action, we will need to see a matching level of commitment from the governmental and intergovernmental communities, in genuine partnership with NGOs” (par. 65). The term also appeared in the 1975 Mexico (3) and 1985 Nairobi (1) women’s conferences, but restricted to the men-women relationship. Mexico’s par. 335 included one additional use of “partnership” with the following meaning: “The host country and its capital city had been the scene of an epoch-making meeting during which hordes of sisterhood and brotherhood, of solidarity and partnership, had been forged.” The word “partner” is present in the documents of Stockholm (1), Bucharest (1), Mexico (25), Nairobi (4). In most of these cases, the word referred to man and woman as equal partners (in family responsibilities, decision-making, development, as spouses...).

partnerships into a new political system endowed with specific *mechanisms*⁸⁴⁵, empowering non-governmental actors and redistributing roles among governmental and non-governmental actors. Thus was birthed global governance as a new partnerships politics.

Partnerships as a political principle

The third stage of the partnerships' revolution, occurred at Istanbul, turned partnerships into a *political principle*, an irrevocable rule of conduct for all UN member states, whereby they bound themselves to partner with non-state, non-governmental actors in the implementation of global governance's agenda. The "partnership principle" was part of a formal intergovernmental agreement.

6.1.2. Introduction to the specific contribution of each conference to the partnerships' revolution

The nine post-Cold War conferences' specific contributions to the constitution of global governance's partnerships politics were manifold. They will appear over the course of this thesis' part three. Let us now, in an introductory manner, identify their most decisive inputs.

Jomtien and New-York: historic turning point

Jomtien's two main specific contribution to the new politics were to be the first conference to, on the one hand, formally *name* partnerships and on the other, to start articulating a political rationale in their favor. Jomtien established, *inter alia*, that in order to be "genuine", partnerships had to ensure the partners' *participation in all stages of the political process*. It is noteworthy that Jomtien only used the term "partnerships" in the plural, meaning partnerships *as a practice* - as opposed to partnership in the singular, meaning *as a paradigm*⁸⁴⁶. The Jomtien Declaration dedicated an entire article to "Strengthening Partnerships". Partnerships were at the heart of the education conference's agenda, which integrated them as a goal in itself and as a strategic priority for implementing *basic education for all*, Jomtien's specific contribution to global governance's conceptual framework. Jomtien promoted the establishment of governmental *mechanisms* to empower non-state partners and respect their "autonomy". It emphasized that each partner's "role" must be mutually recognized. It introduced the notion of a direct partnership with children and youth.

The Jomtien breakthroughs we just listed were historic. They manifested the turning point the global governance process was at immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall. All subsequent second wave conferences thenceforth used the term "partnership/s" in its political meaning. The Children Summit unequivocally promoted the practice of partnerships to implement children's rights. New-York, however, only *named* "partnerships" once (in the plural, as a practice), significantly applying the concept to children and youth, thereby consolidating one of Jomtien's revolutionary breakthroughs. New-York explicitly conceived its *Plan of Action* as common to governmental and non-governmental actors.

Rio: full break-out of partnerships revolution

⁸⁴⁵ James N. Rosenau, in a 2009 article *Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, addressed the "mechanisms of global governance" independently from what the post-Cold UN conferences had provided for. See Whitman, Jim, Ed. *Global Governance*. Palgrave MacMillan. 2009, pp. 15-35.

⁸⁴⁶ Art. 7 of the *Jomtien Decl.* Jomtien also dedicated a sub-section of its Framework for Action to "Building Partnerships and Mobilizing Resources" (section 1.6).

The partnerships revolution broke out in its full scope and depth at Rio⁸⁴⁷. The opening statement of the *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development* stated the main objective of the Earth Summit:

“Establishing a new and equitable *global partnership* [our emphasis] through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people working towards international agreements which ... protect the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system”⁸⁴⁸.

Rio’s defining contribution to the constitution of global governance as process was its launch of a “new global partnership”⁸⁴⁹ (in the singular, that is, as a framework or paradigm). The UNCED sealed the indissolubility, within a single political system, of sustainable development - global governance as systemic content - and of the new global partnership - global governance as systemic new politics, as process. Its new global partnership for sustainable development became *the political framework* that has thenceforth uninterruptedly governed international cooperation. Rio’s new global partnership turned the UN into the hub of a wheel comprising governmental actors, non-governmental actors and “the people” as *partners*. The UNCED’s tripartite political system would remain a permanent feature of the new politics which, incidentally, Jomtien had prefigured: “Together we call on governments, concerned organizations and individuals to join in this urgent undertaking” (Jomtien Decl., Art. 10.4).

The UNCED created a new category of partners in sustainable development “enlarging” the NGO category (the only category juridically entitled to a formal relationship with the UN): the “Major Groups”⁸⁵⁰. It promoted ways to mobilize these groups and developed “the means for moving towards real social partnership in support of common efforts for sustainable development” (par. 23.4). The amount of space Rio accorded to partnerships illustrated the prominent priority the UNCED gave to developing the *political mechanisms* that would ensure the global to local implementation of sustainable development.

⁸⁴⁷ The word “partnership” appeared 40 times in Agenda 21. Rio made ample use of the new politics’ language (words and expression such agenda, implement, monitor, surveillance, target, indicator, global consensus, governance, framework, mechanisms, system, network, role, empower, participation, sustainable, quality of life, change, for all, partnership, diversity, global, global level, at all levels, gender, health for all, education for all, reproductive health...). It introduced new paradigms such as participatory democracy, capacity-building, constituency, comparative advantage...

⁸⁴⁸ *Rio Decl.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1. In the context of the Covid 19 pandemic, the global partnership idea progressed with force. In his November 24, 2020 televised speech to the French people, Emmanuel Macron, for instance, stressed how the state and the people had one common agenda, each with its role to play: « Durant toute cette période, vous aurez un rôle central pour notre réussite collective... Nous ne sommes pas, vous n'êtes pas passifs durant cette crise. Nous avons tous un rôle à jouer... Mais je ferai tout ce que je peux pour me battre à vos côtés, pour vous protéger et réussir à maîtriser cette épidémie... Aujourd'hui, nous tenons ensemble... Demain, nous vaincrons ensemble. » Macron, Emmanuel. *Allocution télévisée*.

<https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/277390-emmanuel-macron-24112020-covid-19> (retrieved May 24, 2022).

⁸⁴⁹ “Global partnership” appeared three times in the Rio Declaration, with partnership in the singular, and five times in Agenda 21 (four times in the singular). It appeared again in Cairo (2) and Istanbul (2).

⁸⁵⁰ Agenda 21 devoted one of its four sections to “Strengthening the Role of Major Groups” in sustainable development: section III, comprising ten chapters (23 to 32): one introductory chapter (23. Preamble), followed by one chapter for each of the nine groups: 24. Global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development; 25. Children and youth in sustainable development; 26. Recognizing and strengthening the role of indigenous people and their communities; 27. Strengthening the role of non-governmental organizations: partners for sustainable development; 28. Local authorities’ initiatives in support of Agenda 21; 29. Strengthening the role of workers and their trade unions; 30. Strengthening the role of business and industry; 31. Scientific and technological community; 32. Strengthening the role of farmers.

Vienna: standstill

The recognition of NGOs and of their “role” as “partners” proved contentious at the Vienna human rights conference. This was due to the lead NGOs had often taken over governments in accusing states of their (alleged or real) human rights’ violations⁸⁵¹ and resulted in Vienna’s use of a relatively more conservative language as regards NGOs and partnerships than the other post-Cold War UN conferences. Vienna refrained from using the newly-coined expressions “Major Groups” and “new global partnership”. The word “partnership” appeared only once in Vienna’s outcome document (applied to indigenous people)⁸⁵². The human rights conference may have slowed the momentum of the global governance revolution, but it did not break it. We shall see that human rights NGOs successfully obtained the inclusion of pro-NGO language in the outcome document.

Cairo: all-out push to have partnerships “thrive”

In contrast with Vienna, Cairo made an all-out effort to power the partnership revolution forward. The population conference wanted partnerships to “develop and thrive” (Progr. of Action, par. 15.4). It dedicated an entire chapter of its *Programme of Action* to what Rio had first called *the non-governmental sector*⁸⁵³: a novel expression revealing the revolution’s powerful momentum since Rio. Cairo subdivided this “non-governmental sector” into two groups, the first being “not-for-profit” (local, national and international NGOs – in practice the main defenders of eminently controversial agendas), the second “for profit” - “the private sector” as the global governance documents had significantly called business enterprises since the 1970s.

Cairo introduced the notion of a *complementarity* between the role of NGOs and that of governments in achieving universal access to reproductive health, Cairo’s global goal. Cairo heavily insisted on the “essential” character of partnerships with NGOs as the most efficient agents in delivering the reproductive health agenda. It recommended to allow NGOs and their networks to play “a greater partnership role at all levels” (Cairo Progr. of Action, par. 15.11). Cairo was the first UN *population* conference that used the term “partnership” to qualify the NGO relationship with the UN and its member states. Beyond the “non-governmental sector”, Cairo, in the footsteps of Rio, recommended the broadest possible extension of partnerships, including to informal and grass-roots groups. Cairo, as would Beijing, focused more particularly on partnering with youth, women, NGOs and the private sector.

Copenhagen: introduction of “civil society” concept, consolidation of partnerships politics

A specific contribution of the Copenhagen Social Summit to the new politics was its introduction and ample use of the phrase “civil society”, absent from the first wave UN conferences⁸⁵⁴. The

⁸⁵¹ The situation can change, for instance as it did under the Trump administration which had no fear of accusing China of human rights violations.

⁸⁵² Vienna Decl. and Progr. of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 14-25, 1993. A/CONF.157/23. Progr. of Action, par. 32: “The World Conference on Human Rights recommends that the General Assembly proclaim an international decade of the world’s indigenous people, to begin from January 1994, including action-orientated programmes, to be decided upon in partnership with indigenous people.”

⁸⁵³ Chapter XV, entitled “Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector”. The Holy See expressed a general reservation on the entire chapter.

⁸⁵⁴ “Civil society” was absent from the reports of those first wave conferences figuring in Appendix A2. The phrase timidly appeared in the Vienna outcome document (*Progr. of Action*, par. 34 and 67), which qualified civil society as “pluralistic” (Ib., par. 67) and therefore seemed to stick to its traditional modern acceptation. In the Copenhagen report, where “civil society” appeared 27 times, the modern concept of pluralism (8 uses) coexisted with the postmodern paradigm of diversity (20 uses). Civil society remained an important concept in conferences subsequent to Copenhagen.

social conference gave this ancient democratic concept⁸⁵⁵ a new and globalist interpretation, relating “civil society” to global governance’s non-state, non-governmental partners. Without naming it as such, Copenhagen contributed to the conceptualization of a “global” or “transnational” civil society. Apart from this specific contribution to the revolution, the Social Summit consolidated the new politics’ principles and mechanisms introduced by previous conferences: the affirmation that the global goals could not be achieved by States alone; the insistence on the vital character of partnerships (in which it included “peoples” in the plural) and on their indissolubility with the global agenda; its cooptation and mobilization of non-state actors in the entire political process, from agenda-setting to surveillance; its creation of “mechanisms” to that effect through a dialogue between NGOs and governments; its emphasis on the partners’ “autonomy”; its advancement of a platform that was no longer intergovernmental but common to all actors; its empowerment of global governance’s most performing partners.

Beijing: recognizing gender feminists as agents of change

The UN Fourth International Women’s Conference acknowledged that feminist NGOs and groups had been “a driving force for change” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 26) – agents of the change at the core of its global gender agenda⁸⁵⁶, particularly efficient in its advocacy and delivery, and therefore to be empowered by all means. Beijing was in fact the only second wave conference to use the “agents of change” and “watchdog”⁸⁵⁷ terms. As an eminently action-oriented conference, it abundantly used the new politics’ language as regards implementation and monitoring⁸⁵⁸.

Istanbul: the “partnerships conference”

At the Istanbul City Summit, known as “the partnerships’ conference”, UN member states turned partnerships into a *political principle*. They formally adopted, and committed to apply, partnerships as a fundamental political doctrine, as a “framework” for international cooperation and as the most “democratic” way of implementing the global agenda. Of all the UN conferences, the City Summit made by far the greatest use of the new global politics’ language⁸⁵⁹. Istanbul incorporated the integrated⁸⁶⁰ “gains” of the entire UN conference process – the “gains” of global governance both as content and as new partnerships politics. Süleyman Demirel, President of Turkey and President of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements foresaw it at the beginning of the Habitat II conference: “We believe that this innovative concept of partnership, which emerged at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, will reach its peak, in concrete terms, at

⁸⁵⁵ Aristotle, who described man as a “political animal” (ζῷον πολιτικόν), described the Greek city-state (in which free citizens are equal under the rule of law) as a “political community” (κοινωνία πολιτική) governed by a common set of norms and a common ethos. The goals of this political community were human flourishing and common well-being (eudaimonia, τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ eu zēn). In the late Middle Ages, Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444) translated Aristotle’s *Politics* into Latin. The Florentine humanist philosopher was the first to translate κοινωνία πολιτική into *societas civilis*.

⁸⁵⁶ “Change” appeared 66 times in the Beijing report.

⁸⁵⁷ The first women’s conference (Mexico) had used “agents of change” four times, and Nairobi, once: the phrase belongs to the feminist agenda.

⁸⁵⁸ Beijing abundantly used words such as civil society, movement, groups, NGOs, private sector, local communities, community-based, actors, agents, consensus, governance, change, participation, inclusive, implementation, local, global, framework, accountability, transparency, comprehensive, holistic...

⁸⁵⁹ See Appendix A4. Istanbul made by far the greatest use of partnership (131), global partnership (2), NGOs (141), Agenda (283), social contract (2), governance (8), global (140, as already emphasized), framework (78), implement (245), mechanisms (73), network (42), alliance (6), comparative advantage (2), change (85), implement- (245), monitor (39), target (22), indicator (22), transparen- (37), accountab- (24), participatory democracy (3), best practices (39), holist (5), integrat- (99), linkage (39), change (85), civil society (36), community-based organization (27), private sector (99), stakeholder (4), Major Groups (1), constituen- (4), informal (36), association (46)... Istanbul was the only conference using “global civil society”, “agenda-setting”.

⁸⁶⁰ The root integrat- appeared 99 times in the *Istanbul Report*.

the Istanbul Conference”⁸⁶¹. Istanbul focused particularly on partnership with local authorities, in view of implementing Rio’s *Local Agenda 21*.

Rome: post-revolution implementation

UN member states’ adoption of the partnership principle finalized the realization of the revolution’s political objectives. At the Rome Food Summit, which took place just a few months after the City Summit, heads of State and Government or their representatives strictly applied Istanbul’s partnership principle in all of the seven commitments they made as well as in the actions they pledged to meet their objectives, using the following formula or a closely related variation⁸⁶²: “To this end, governments, in partnership with all actors of civil society, will...” Rome was already an implementation, post-revolution conference.

6.1.3. Partnerships in a centripetal dynamic after the revolution

This thesis does not address the third, implementation stage of the global governance process. It matters to the relevance of this thesis, however, to discern the phenomenal centripetal dynamic that partnerships were in after the revolution.

Through the implementation of the partnership principle, and helpfully surfing on the concomitant information technology revolutionary wave⁸⁶³, the new global consensus’ planetary spread took place expeditiously at the end of the second wave conferences.

Sealing of the global governance framework by 1996

We have already stated it: by 1996, global governance’s framework, which henceforth included the partnership principle as one of its pillars, was constituted and sealed. At various degrees and in diverse forms, all levels of political power everywhere then started applying the partnership principle, globally disseminating a new political culture.

After 1996, global governance expanded and consolidated existing partnerships, most remarkably with children and youth⁸⁶⁴ in a strategy to install its new *Weltanschauung* in the long term.

⁸⁶¹ *Habitat Report*, op. cit., p. 210.

⁸⁶² Variations include, after “Governments” (and often after “in partnership with all actors of civil society”): “with support of international institutions”, “in collaboration with the international and scientific communities, in both the public and the private sectors”, “in cooperation with the private sector and non-governmental organizations”, “in collaboration with the international community”, “individually and collectively, and in partnership with all actors of civil society”, “in cooperation with all actors of civil society, international and private financing institutions, and technical assistance agencies”, “in cooperation with the international community and all actors of civil society, as well as international and private financing institutions”... Only in two minor instances do governments act alone, independently from partners (par. 41/4.3 and 58/7.1). As Anita Anand noted it, Rome “stressed the importance of involving all concerned including government ministries, NGOs and the private sector, as well as the research and academic communities”. Anand, Anita. *Global Meeting Place. United Nations’ world conferences and civil society. In Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 103.

⁸⁶³ The communications revolution and new information technologies, UNFPA reckoned, made it “faster and easier to disseminate ideas and experiences among people. The participation of a wider set of actors is becoming essential to the provision of reproductive health information and services as well as to the promotion of advocacy and social mobilization initiatives.” UNFPA. *Partnership with Civil Society*. Technical Report N° 46. A Review of Progress since the International Conference on Population and Development. A Report prepared by the UNFPA for the NGO Forum on ICPD+5. The Hague, the Netherlands. February 6-7, 1999, p. 7.

⁸⁶⁴ The 1999 Cairo+5 conference in the Hague launched a new mechanism for involving youth in policy-making and partnering with them in implementing Cairo. Similar attempts to coopt youth as partners in the Cairo agenda took place at the 2011 Mexico World Youth Conference or in the 2018 UN’s *International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education – an evidence-informed approach* in which the UN used children and youth as agents of change in favor of its reproductive health and gender goals. The *Guidance* was endorsed by all UN bodies relevant to

Developing a tentacular reach, partnerships conquered new and more difficult territories such as businesses⁸⁶⁵, men (as partners in the feminist and population control agendas⁸⁶⁶), cultures and religions⁸⁶⁷. They took diverse forms, both informal and institutional⁸⁶⁸. When Kofi Annan became UN Secretary-General, he made it clear from the beginning of his first mandate in 1997 that he wanted to strengthen partnerships with all non-state actors.

Partnerships, an explicit goal of the two post-revolution successive “frameworks” of international cooperation

“Partnerships” have constituted an explicit goal of the two successive “frameworks” of international cooperation launched after the second wave conferences to ensure the effective and long-term implementation of their goals - the eight MDGs (2001-15) followed by the 17 SDGs (2016-30), both spanning over 15 years: Millennium Development Goal 8 and Sustainable Development Goal 17⁸⁶⁹, entitled *Partnerships: Revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable*

“sexuality education”, that is UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN WOMEN and WHO. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Reports 310 of October 1st, 2018, Report 311 of October 19, 2018, and Report 312 of October 24, 2018.

⁸⁶⁵ At the 1999 WEF, Kofi Annan aggressively reached out to business, urging it to become a UN partner in sustainable development. He then launched his *Global Compact* initiative. He asked business to act on nine principles drawn from the UDHR, the ILO fundamental principles on rights at work and the Rio principles on environment and development. The Compact currently counts over 10,000 companies. See <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/>

⁸⁶⁶ UNFPA, the WHO Division of Reproductive Health, the IPPF, the Population Council and their likeminded partners started, after Cairo, to coopt *men* as partners in the universal implementation of reproductive health and to investigate male methods of birth control.

⁸⁶⁷ At the “Cairo and Beyond – Reproductive Rights and Culture” conference held in Amsterdam in March 2004, the UNFPA launched a major strategic change in its relationship with *cultures and religions*: - “from foes to partners”. The aim of the new strategy was to turn cultures and religions into partners of the “reproductive health” agenda, by *changing them from within*. The initiative was that of the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Agnes van Ardenne, and of the UNFPA Executive Director Thoraya Ahmed Obaid. Incidentally, the Dutch government was UNFPA’s largest donor. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services* Reports 217 of March 17, 2004 and 219 of April 2, 2004.

⁸⁶⁸ In 1998 the UN Secretariat created the UN Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP), initially to serve as the interlocutor between the Secretariat, some 30 UN agencies and the UN Foundation, and then to promote UN partnerships and alliances with a variety of sources – companies, foundations, bilateral and multilateral donors to achieve the global goals. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 201 of August 8, 2003. Marguerite A. Peeters’ Archives. Ted Turner, the multibillionaire founder of Cable News Network, created the UN Foundation after he committed, in 1997, one billion dollars in support of UN programs, particularly in view of implementing the Cairo and Beijing programs of action. Another example is the Millennium NGO Forum which took place May 22-26, 2000 at UN headquarters in New-York, upon the suggestion of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan himself, three months before the heads of States and Governments’ Millennium Summit. The Forum represented a failed attempt to institutionalize the UN partnership with NGOs by constituting a “People’s Assembly” reflecting the Commission on Global Governance’s suggestion to create a “Civil Society Forum” next to the General Assembly. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 170 of June 2, 2000. Marguerite A. Peeters’ Archives. At the Millennium NGO Forum, Annan asked NGOs “to be both leaders and partners: where necessary, to lead and inspire governments to live up to your ideals; where appropriate, to work with governments to achieve their goals”. He also told them that they “bring to life the concept of ‘We the peoples’ in whose name our United Nations Charter was written.” *Secretary-General, addressing participants at millennium forum, calls for intensified ‘NGO revolution’*. UN Press release SG/SM/7411. May 22, 2000. Significantly, the Secretary-General’s millennium report was entitled *We the Peoples - The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*.

⁸⁶⁹ The MDGs primarily concerned assistance to developing countries. The SDGs, by contradistinction, are explicitly global in scope and purpose. Global governance partners regarded the shift as a major advance. Sir Richard Jolly, for instance, said of the SDGs in an interview by the UN News Centre in January 2015: “The SDGs are universal, which is a major advance. Instead of the North speaking to the South, we’re now really recognising that all countries need to take action for all peoples. Secondly, the SDGs are integrating sustainability and climate change. That again is a fundamental shift from the MDGs that I think was very important.” See *Climate Change and Sustainability Key to Future Development Agenda, Says Former UN Official*. February 25, 2015. <https://sidharamp.blogspot.com/2015/02/climate-change-and-sustainability-key.html> (retrieved May 24, 2022).

Development. Through the SDGs, let us underscore this, the partners' framework is set to govern international cooperation until at least 2030. The UN presents the SDGs as a globally normative development framework that incorporates all of the goals set by Agenda 21 and the other post-Cold War conferences.

The way the UN presents Sustainable Development Goal 17 demonstrates the direct continuum this goal inscribes itself in with respect to Rio and Istanbul:

"The SDGs can only be realized with strong global partnerships and cooperation. A successful development agenda requires inclusive partnerships - at the global, regional, national and local levels - built upon principles and values, and upon a shared vision and shared goals placing people and the planet at the centre"⁸⁷⁰.

Goal 17 is endowed with 19 targets, the largest number for any of the 17 SDGs. Targets 16 and 17 address "multi-stakeholder partnerships"⁸⁷¹ and targets 18 and 19, "data, monitoring and accountability"⁸⁷². As a definite sign of global governance's forward movement, the SDGs have the most elaborate and stronger *surveillance mechanisms* of all the frameworks previously adopted in terms both of the number of indicators (231) and of the technological means (big data and artificial intelligence) at the disposal of the elite at the helm of global governance⁸⁷³. Over the course of its decades-long process, global governance has kept on consolidating the mechanisms through which it surveils the implementation of its agenda.

6.2. Rationale for partnerships

6.2.1. Three steps: "mandatory" character of the global agenda; incapacity of governments alone to deliver it; imperative need for non-state partners to achieve the global goals

Jomtien's first articulation of three-step rationale

Emerging as the fruit of global governance's decades-long gestational period, Jomtien started articulating a rationale in three steps to justify the practice of partnerships. The education conference argued first that government authorities, at all levels, had an *obligation* to achieve the global goal of providing basic education for all: "national, regional and local educational authorities have a unique obligation to provide basic education for all" (Jomtien Decl., Art. 7). Thenceforth the conferences treated their respective "global goals", even if only the object of a soft consensus, as *mandatory* for governments. Secondly, Jomtien stipulated that the achievement of its global goal overcame governments' sole capacities: state authorities "cannot be expected to

⁸⁷⁰ <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/> (retrieved June 11, 2020).

⁸⁷¹ SDG 17.16: "Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries." SDG 17.17: "Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships."

⁸⁷² SDG 17.18: "By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts." SDG 17.19: "By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries."

⁸⁷³ On July 6, 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted a "global indicator framework". UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/71/313 on *Work of the Statistical Commission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* contains this global indicator framework, developed by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs).

supply every human, financial or organizational requirement for this task” (Ib.). Thirdly, the education conference concluded that the achievement of education for all necessitated “new and revitalized partnerships at all levels” (Ib.). Every word in this last phrase betrays global governance’s entry in its revolutionary period.

Uninterrupted consolidation of rationale during second wave conferences

Conferences subsequent to Jomtien each contributed in their own way and at various degrees to consolidating Jomtien’ three steps rationale. In an apparent logic, they interconnected: first, the affirmation of the “mandatory” character of the global agenda (sustainable development and its mutually integrated individual constitutive components)⁸⁷⁴; secondly the argument that the nature, scope, complexity, depth and urgency of the world’s socioeconomic, demographic and environmental challenges would “transcend” the capacity of governments alone (and relatedly even of international law⁸⁷⁵) to address them⁸⁷⁶; thirdly the conclusion that partnerships with the widest spectrum of non-state organizations and people globally were a *sine qua non* condition for the delivery of the global agenda at all levels. This tripartite rationale had been long prepared during the seminal and gestational phases of global governance. It would henceforth remain undisputed. This logic provoked a massive power transfer to the “global experts” devising the “global norms” for all to implement. National politicians had to accept that they could not anymore have a decision-making monopoly on “global issues”: the conferences stipulated that power-sharing was *imperative*.

The opening paragraph of Rio’s Agenda 21 affirmed: “No nation can achieve this [i.e. sustainable development] on its own; but together we can - in a global partnership for sustainable development” (par. 1.1) – a global partnership that was to coopt all States, an exponentially increasing number of non-state partners, and “people”. Cairo contended that “broad and effective partnership” was “essential” to “address the challenges of population and development effectively” (Cairo Progr. of Action, par. 15.1). Copenhagen declared that its goals and more broadly, those of the entire global governance process “cannot be achieved by States alone”

⁸⁷⁴ The word “obligation” is loaded with juridical connotations. The outcome documents generally, but not exclusively, use it in reference to international treaties. See for example Agenda 21, par. 39.5: “While ensuring the effective participation of all countries concerned, Parties should at periodic intervals review and assess both the past performance and effectiveness of existing international agreements or instruments as well as the priorities for future law making on sustainable development. This may include an examination of the feasibility of elaborating general rights and obligations of States, as appropriate, in the field of sustainable development, as provided by General Assembly resolution 44/228. In certain cases, attention should be given to the possibility of taking into account varying circumstances through differential obligations or gradual application...”. Gro Harlem Brundtland stated in Cairo: “In order to achieve a sustainable balance between the number of people and the amount of natural resources that can be consumed, both the peoples of the industrialized countries and the rich in the South have a special obligation to reduce their ecological impact” (*Cairo Report*, op. cit., p. 173). Istanbul read: “We reaffirm our commitment to the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing, as provided for in international instruments. In this context, we recognize an obligation by Governments to enable people to obtain shelter and to protect and improve dwellings and neighbourhoods.” *Istanbul Report*, op. cit., Par. 39.

⁸⁷⁵ For instance, *Agenda 21*, par. 8.27: “Environmental law and regulation are important but cannot alone be expected to deal with the problems of environment and development. Prices, markets and governmental fiscal and economic policies also play a complementary role in shaping attitudes and behaviour towards the environment.”

⁸⁷⁶ *Agenda 21*, par. 12.1: “Fragile ecosystems are important ecosystems, with unique features and resources. Fragile ecosystems include deserts, semi-arid lands, mountains, wetlands, small islands and certain coastal areas. Most of these ecosystems are regional in scope, as they *transcend national boundaries* [our emphasis]”. And Cairo: “Since demographic pressures, together with migration from disadvantaged areas to affluent States, are urgent problems, *transcending national frontiers* [Ib.], it is imperative that in the field of population control, global strategies and national plans work in unison”. *Cairo Report*, op. cit., p. 179 (Statement by Benazir Bhutto, then Prime Minister of Pakistan). And Beijing: “This Conference, therefore, *transcends politics and economics* [Ib.]. We are dealing with a fundamental moral issue”. *Beijing Report*, op. cit., p. 191 (Statement by Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan).

(Copenhagen Decl., par. 27) and demanded the full mobilization of all social actors. It qualified partnerships as a “crucial and essential requirement” for the implementation of its platform at “all levels” (Copenhagen Progr. of Action, par. 89). Beijing reiterated the crucial need for partnerships⁸⁷⁷ at all levels with the widest range of non-state actors, so as to mainstream its gender perspective. Istanbul not only enshrined partnerships as an “essential”⁸⁷⁸ condition for governments to fulfill their “responsibility” to achieve the global goals, but it extended this “responsibility” to non-state actors as a matter of principle. As Wally N'Dow put it: “We have adopted a global plan of action that puts the burden of action where it belongs. The international system cannot do the job alone. Cities cannot do the job alone. We are all in this together, and we must share the responsibility”⁸⁷⁹.

Partnerships now just as “mandatory” as global agenda

Over the course of the second wave conferences, partnerships rapidly imposed themselves as a practical imperative for governments - just as *mandatory*, “urgent” and “vital” as the agenda itself. The tripartite rationale developed to justify the partnerships revolution had a dogmatic character. The new politics imposed on governments, by mere fiat, the obligation to implement the global goals and to partner with non-state actors. Never was this double “obligation” - juridically and morally nonexistent - challenged and submitted to the will of national peoples. Never did national peoples question the identity of those who developed the rationale for partnerships, decided that the agenda was global and that it transcended governments’ capacity to deliver it.

6.2.2. Indissolubility of global governance’s content and process: one indivisible political system

Second wave conferences’ invariable integration of content and process

The second wave conferences invariably united and mutually integrated global governance’s content (*sustainable development* as an overarching paradigm and holistic platform, inclusive of all the conferences’ global goals)⁸⁸⁰ and process (the *new global partnership* as a holistic political

⁸⁷⁷ In his opening statement at the Beijing conference, for instance, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali affirmed: “As we go forward, the partnership between government and civil society will be *crucial* [our emphasis]”. He specified that the partnership now had to “extend into the implementation stage”. Incidentally, the Secretary-General included “the family” in the partnership that he said “must be mobilized at all levels”: the family must be mobilized to operationalize an anti-family agenda (one that includes the gender perspective, reproductive health and rights, safe abortion, sexual health and sexual rights...). *Beijing Report*, op. cit., p. 187.

⁸⁷⁸ See *Istanbul Report*, par. 33: “Partnerships among countries and among all actors within countries from public, private, voluntary and community-based organizations, the cooperative sector, non-governmental organizations and individuals are essential to the achievement of sustainable human settlements development and the provision of adequate shelter for all and basic services. Partnerships can integrate and mutually support objectives of broad-based participation through, *inter alia*, forming alliances, pooling resources, sharing knowledge, contributing skills and capitalizing on the comparative advantages of collective actions. The processes can be made more effective by strengthening civil organizations at all levels. Every effort must be made to encourage the collaboration and partnership of all sectors of society and among all actors in decision-making processes, as appropriate.”

⁸⁷⁹ *Istanbul Report*, p. 224. Istanbul was the most explicit: “The World Business Forum advanced the discussion on the responsibility of business for the sustainable and just development of societies. One of the main conclusions was that civilizing society so as to create a sustainable habitat was no longer the responsibility and function of the State alone, but a challenge for all societal actors, including enterprises and elected authorities” (Ib., p. 145). Since the second wave UN conferences, an increasing number of businesses started integrating their implementation of the global goals in their annual reports (often called sustainable development reports).

⁸⁸⁰ Sustainable development is global governance’s integrated platform – its content. As a holistic concept, it integrates the constitutive agendas of the entire UN conference process: global governance’s conceptual pillars, such as education for all, children’s rights, quality of life for all, women’s rights, reproductive health and rights, health for all, the new social contract, women’s empowerment, gender equality, sustainable human settlements, food security, the derivatives and conceptual ramifications of these pillars developed throughout the course of the global

regime, inclusive of the totality of “partners” and of the political processes through which global governance has been exercising effective power). The post-Cold War conferences thereby produced an indivisible and operational *global political system*. Partnerships became an indissoluble part not only of the global agenda as a whole but of each of its constitutive goals⁸⁸¹.

As a holistic paradigm, the new global partnership coopted all actors at all levels, from global to local, state and non-state, governmental and non-governmental, in the implementation of the global agenda. As a political regime, it developed its own set of principles, values, paradigms and operational mechanisms, expressing themselves by means of a specific language. Good governance, capacity-building, consensus-building, global consensus, facilitation, enablement, enabling environment, roles, capacity strengthening, empowerment (particularly of young people and women), participatory democracy, youth participation, Youth Parliaments, participation in decisions affecting one’s lives, global governance, best practices, watchdogs, agents of change, indicators of progress, surveillance mechanisms... are examples of global governance’s political paradigms, illustrating the new and global political language.

New political paradigms exclusively for the achievement of the global goals

From the onset of their practice, what eventually was called “partnerships” has been exclusively for the achievement of agendas that were absent from the mandate of the UN as set in the Charter. The outcome documents of all second wave UN conferences made it clear that partnerships and their derivative paradigms were for their respective and mutually integrated novel global objectives. They were unidirectional. What is more, they unequivocally established partnerships as a *sine qua non* condition for the delivery of these goals. In other words, since its origins and uninterruptedly thereafter, the global partnerships’ regime has never been pluralistic.

Rio launched its new global partnership for the exclusive purpose of implementing sustainable development. Agenda 21 described itself as “a dynamic programme” marking “the beginning of a *new global partnership for sustainable development* [our emphasis]” (par. 1.6). “Governance”, a paradigm that *Our Common Future* had introduced and appeared for the first time in an intergovernmental conference at the UNCED, was likewise “for sustainable development” (Agenda 21, par. 8.16.b.)⁸⁸². Agenda 21 introduced and abundantly used (154 times), as one of its key new political paradigms, the phrase *capacity-building* for no other purpose than to strengthen the partners’ “capacity” to implement sustainable development⁸⁸³. The Earth Summit’s

governance revolutionary process, from its seminal period all the way to the still on-going implementation and monitoring stages.

⁸⁸¹ Art. 7 of the *Jomtien Decl.*, for example, stated that partnerships were “at the heart” of Jomtien’s “expanded vision” of education for all.

⁸⁸² The phrase “governance for sustainable human development” entitled a UNDP normative publication (1997) published at a time when Gustave Speth was UNDP Administrator.

⁸⁸³ See for instance *Agenda 21*, par. 3.7 e: “Establishing a network of community-based learning centres for capacity-building and sustainable development.” Or *Agenda 21*, par. 3.12: “National capacity-building for implementation of the above activities is crucial and should be given high priority. It is particularly important to focus capacity-building at the local community level in order to support a community-driven approach to sustainability and to establish and strengthen mechanisms to allow sharing of experience and knowledge between community groups at national and international levels.” Or *Agenda 21*, par. 14.16: “This would require training and capacity-building to assume greater responsibilities in sustainable development efforts.” Or *Agenda 21*, par. 18.55: “Overall national capacity-building at all administrative levels, involving institutional development, coordination, human resources, community participation, health and hygiene education and literacy, has to be developed according to its fundamental connection both with any efforts to improve health and socio-economic development through water-supply and sanitation and with their impact on the human environment. Capacity-building should therefore be one of the underlying keys in implementation strategies. Institutional capacity-building should be considered to have an importance equal to that of the sector supplies and equipment component so that funds can be directed to both.”

participatory democracy paradigm – another major Rio contribution to the new politics - promoted public participation in decision-making, the participation of Major Groups, that of women⁸⁸⁴, youth⁸⁸⁵, indigenous peoples⁸⁸⁶... for the sole purpose of delivering sustainable development. Rio, Beijing and Istanbul in particular abundantly used the verb “strengthen” in connection to partnerships. They sought to strengthen partnerships⁸⁸⁷, the role of each partner⁸⁸⁸, the capacity of all partners to effectively deliver the agenda⁸⁸⁹ and the political commitment of all partners towards the global agenda⁸⁹⁰.

In Cairo’s two references to Major Groups⁸⁹¹, it is clear that the focus is unilaterally on the realization of universal access to reproductive health. In the first, Cairo referred to what it viewed as the need for cooperation between the “international community” - an entity deprived of juridical content, an expression absent from the Charter which the global governance revolutionary process has frequently used - and “non-governmental organizations and other Major Groups” in the strengthening of “capacity-building, the sharing and exchange of information and experiences, know-how and technical expertise” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.17 c) in order to follow-up on its *Programme of Action*. In the second, Cairo identified Major Groups as one among three partners in giving “the widest possible dissemination” to its *Programme of Action*, alongside governments and “organizations of the United Nations system” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.8)⁸⁹².

Istanbul’s partnership principle normatively sealed the interdependence and indissolubility of the global agenda and the new global partnership. It stipulated that the new politics and its constitutive paradigms were exclusively for sustainable development and its constitutive paradigms. A conceptual and practical interdependence has ever since characterized the relationship between global governance’s platform, agenda or conceptual framework on the one hand and, on the other, the political mechanisms through which the global platform was elaborated, became the object of a proclaimed global consensus, spread worldwide, and even to this day has kept on being advocated, implemented and monitored. Inevitably then, the new

⁸⁸⁴ *Agenda 21*, par. 24.7: “In order to reach these goals, women should be fully involved in decision-making and in the implementation of sustainable development activities”.

⁸⁸⁵ The UNCED equally strongly advocated the participation of youth, who then comprised “comprise nearly 30 per cent of the world’s population” (*Agenda 21*, par. 25.1): “It is imperative [our emphasis] that youth from all parts of the world participate actively in all [Ib.] relevant levels of decision-making processes because it affects their lives today and has implications for their futures” (*Agenda 21*, par. 25.2). Or: “The involvement of today’s youth in environment and development decision-making and in the implementation of programmes is critical [Ib.] to the long-term success of Agenda 21” (*Agenda 21*, par. 25.1).

⁸⁸⁶ “Indigenous people and their communities should be ... allowed to participate in national decision-making, in particular regarding regional and international cooperative efforts” (*Agenda 21*, par. 26.5 a).

⁸⁸⁷ *Jomtien Decl.* Art. 7 is entitled “Strengthening partnerships”. *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.15: “The objectives are: (a) To strengthen the partnership between Governments, international organizations and the private sector in identifying new areas of cooperation...”

⁸⁸⁸ *New-York Decl.*, par. 12: “Strengthening the role of women in general and ensuring their equal rights will be to the advantage of the world’s children.”

⁸⁸⁹ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.9: “Financial resources are also required to strengthen the capacity of national, regional, subregional and international institutions to implement this Programme of Action.”

⁸⁹⁰ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 3.8. “Political commitment to integrated population and development strategies should be strengthened by public education and information programmes and by increased resource allocation through cooperation among Governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and by improvement of the knowledge base through research and national and local capacity-building.”

⁸⁹¹ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.17 c and 16.8.

⁸⁹² *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.8: “Governments, organizations of the United Nations system and major groups, in particular non-governmental organizations, should give the widest possible dissemination to the Programme of Action and should seek public support for the goals, objectives and actions of the Programme of Action”.

regime granted absolute power to the few conceptualizers of the new paradigms and framework. Sustainable development, the new global partnership and their respective derivative paradigms are not proper to *international* cooperation. They belong to the global governance framework and to its globalist perspective.

6.2.3. Content and process stem from the same sources

Agents of revolution as content were agents of revolution as process

Chapters one, two and four of this thesis brought out how those non-state, non-governmental actors who stood at the origin of and have advocated for the novel global environmental, socioeconomic, feminist, population and human rights agendas and wielded critical influence in establishing the pillars of global governance's conceptual framework have also been the greatest advocates of partnerships and of the participation and empowerment of non-state, non-governmental actors. We now conclusively establish that global governance's content and process stem from the same sources. The agents of the revolution as content have been the agents of the revolution as political process. As in all revolutions, they have sought their political self-empowerment. They pushed for the intergovernmental endorsement of the new political paradigms, including partnerships.

Cause to effect connection between transnational agendas, ideology and the new politics

This thesis has highlighted the ideological load of the novel global agenda. From the evidence it has provided, it now deducts the existence of a nexus, or even a cause to effect connection between transnational ideological agendas, by nature conflictual, non-consensual, non-universal, and the advent of the new partnerships' politics - the political revolution which used *parallel* power-grab processes for the advancement of these agendas. These processes enabled "special interest" groups - the non-governmental partners - to circumvent intergovernmental control at the international level, and democratic control at the national level. These groups have been in the driver's seat not only in the formulation of the new agendas, but in the emergence of the parallel political mechanisms at its service precisely because they pursued ideologically divisive agendas. Hence this thesis now reaches the conclusion that the ideology driving some of these groups proved the powerhouse of global governance's political revolution. A related conclusion is the following: not only is global governance indivisible as content and process, but it is indissoluble from the ideological agendas of the leading non-state agents at the rudder of the new political regime.

The conferences' outcome documents reveal that the greater the non-governmental input in the formulation of a conference's agenda - as in Rio, Cairo, Beijing and Istanbul -, the stronger the pro-partnerships language in this conference's report, the more ideological was the platform, the less sovereign governments were its genuine authors. Eco-feminist lobbies (those belonging to the Women's Caucus) were a particularly aggressive force demanding change in favor of the new politics. The language is noticeably stronger when it comes to the participation of women in decision-making⁸⁹³.

Had the post-Cold War agenda of international cooperation been genuinely consensual and free of ideology among UN member states and the peoples they represented, the massive agenda-setting, decision-making, monitoring power transfer to a minority of transnational non-state

⁸⁹³ For example, *Agenda 21*, par. 24.1: "Effective implementation of these programmes will depend on the active involvement of women in economic and political decision-making and will be critical to the successful implementation of Agenda 21 [our emphasis]."

actors that effectively but informally happened would not have taken place: governments and peoples would have more genuinely “owned” the new agenda.

6.3. New actors

6.3.1. Identity of decision-makers in international organizations vs. power holders in global governance

An organization of sovereign member states

The UN Charter established the UN as an international organization, governed by its member states⁸⁹⁴. In conformity with the juridical nature of the organization, sovereign governments alone have decision-making authority in intergovernmental processes such as UN conferences and the policy or “normative” activities of intergovernmentally-created UN bodies⁸⁹⁵. UN member states held responsibility for the content and direction international cooperation was to take following the fall of the Berlin wall. The outcome documents of the post-Cold War conferences did state their “primary responsibility”⁸⁹⁶ to implement the “commitments” they then supposedly made. These statements founded themselves on what the partnerships revolution precisely transgressed: the juridical, international nature of the UN.

Leadership of non-state actors in global governance

In reality, not infrequently were sovereign governments *made to commit* to a global agenda for the 21st century and to a global partnership which, in virtue of their being qualified as “global”, were conceived *from above* the international level, as “transcending” the *international* nature of the UN.

Rio’s new global partnership coopted UN member states. It sought to transform them into one among three equal partners, the other two being “key sectors of society” on the one hand, and “people” on the other. Sustainable development and the new global partnership – a “multi-stakeholder” (for lack of a better word) agenda - paradoxically became the object of a proclaimed *intergovernmental* consensus and the framework for *international* cooperation in the 21st century. Meanwhile, “global experts” had become the real power holders in the global system they had set in place through international cooperation. The cooptation of sovereign governments in a political regime that ruled over them from within the UN is the revolution’s greatest achievement. Sovereign governments, acting self-destructively, jumped on a bandwagon leading them where the “peoples” they were supposed to represent (when they were democracies), may not have freely wanted to go.

⁸⁹⁴ Otfried Höffe argued that “The recognition of human rights amounts to a self-limitation of [sovereign states’] domestic sovereignty; the renouncement of violence limits the external sovereignty.” Höffe, Otfried. *A subsidiary and federal world republic: Thoughts on democracy in the age of globalization*. In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, op. cit., p. 200.

⁸⁹⁵ The UN General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC, all UN programmes, agencies and funds, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice.

⁸⁹⁶ In the *Copenhagen Declaration*, for instance, participating UN member states declared: “We acknowledge that it is the primary responsibility of States to attain these goals” (par. 27). Beijing, recalling governments’ “primary responsibility for implementing the Platform for Action” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 293), urged “national mechanisms and institutions for the advancement of women to participate in public policy formulation and encourage the implementation of the Platform for Action through various bodies and institutions..., and, where necessary, should act as a catalyst in developing new programmes by the year 2000 in areas that are not covered by existing institutions” (Ib., par. 294). And the *Istanbul Report* read: “Governments have the primary responsibility for implementing the Habitat Agenda” (par. 213).

6.3.2. “Primary”, agenda-setting or “governing” partners vs. new, implementing partners

The second wave of UN conferences launched an all-out effort⁸⁹⁷ to reach out to a maximal number of what Jomtien called “new partners” (*Framework for Action*, par. 28). Our thesis now distinguishes between global governance’s *primary* partners and its *new* partners. Let us clarify what we mean by both.

Primary partners: the visionary, like-minded “oligarchy”

We call *primary partners* the visionary or “enlightened”⁸⁹⁸ non-state, non-governmental actors, of which the preceding chapters gave the most prominent examples, who have stood at the helm of the global governance process and steered it from its internationalist origins through its globalist unfoldment. The *primary partners* were the architects of the new politics. Remaining in the driver’s seat all along the transmission chain, they ensured the “integrity”, consolidation and enforcement of the global agenda. They admitted virtually no input from outside of their ruling group. They have been global governance’s governing agents.

We have noted in chapters one and three that the effective power holders within the global governance process have been strikingly few in numbers: in that sense, we may call them global oligarchs, or global autocrats. A narrow globally ruling group constituted of strategically and ideologically like-minded individuals and organizations mutually coopting each other set in motion a self-serving global political regime. A few foundations, a few institutes, a few NGOs or hybrid organizations, a few UN officials, a few individuals have been leading the show. As stated in chapter three, by 1989, the primary partners had largely established the conceptual framework for the post-Cold War world order. In 1987, *Our Common Future* had laid out their objectives and platform and already incorporated the major “gains” they had incrementally achieved during the Cold War, whether embryonically (family planning, “reproduction”, “women’s rights”, climate change, gender, partnership...) or in a more conceptually mature form (naming “sustainable development” and conceiving it as a pre-integrated platform).

The implementing partners, serfs of the global elite, as numerous as possible

The governing partners coopted *implementing agents*, the *new partners*, once they had set the direction for post-Cold War global cooperation. The *enlargement* of the partners’ identity, number and role, exponentially beyond what had been the practice during the Cold War, historically took place during the second wave UN conferences. It was a trademark of the revolution. Time is here of the essence. The exclusive purpose of the enlargement was to implement the pre-set agenda. The new partners were to be, so to speak, the governing partners’ serfs. In contrast with the primary partners, the new implementing partners were to be as diversified and numerous as possible. Every individual, group, community and institution were to be potentially coopted. Like-mindedness was not a precondition, but ideological alignment would be requested no sooner would the new partners engage in implementing the global platform and thereby enter “the framework”.

⁸⁹⁷ An effort less noticeable at Vienna.

⁸⁹⁸ The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* considered that the challenges facing the post-Cold War world being “vastly more complicated than those that confronted the delegates in San Francisco”, these challenges demanded, according to them, “co-operative efforts to put in place a system of global governance better suited to present circumstances - a system informed by an understanding of the important transformations of the past half-century and guided by enlightened leadership”. Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 39. It is clear that the non-state actors which exercised conceptual and political leadership in the UN conference process had grabbed for themselves the role of “global civil society’s” representatives and by the same token, of global enlightened leaders.

6.3.4. Tentacular expansion of non-state partners at all levels during Jomtien to Rome revolutionary period

Let us now identify the new partners in global governance. States and governments, paradoxically, came first. Already during the Cold War, UN member states have been the first to *consent to* and *follow* non-state actors' normative leadership. This reversal of leadership demonstrates the revolutionary character of global governance's process. The second wave conferences, particularly Rio and Istanbul, in addition coopted *local authorities*. During the second wave conferences, political parties, governmental ministries and services, and national parliamentarians were coopted as well. The population conference, for instance, sought

“to foster active involvement of elected representatives of people, particularly parliamentarians, concerned groups, especially at the grass-roots level, and individuals in formulating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating strategies, policies, plans and programmes in the field of population and development” (*Progr. of Action*, par. 13.4 b).

The second wave conferences reached all out to new *non-state* partners. They all emphasized the “need” to aggressively expand partnerships across all sectors and at all levels. Depending on the theme they addressed, the conferences may have targeted certain categories of partners more than others. As examples, New-York focused more on children, Cairo on NGOs and the “private sector”, Beijing on women.

Jomtien pursued as an explicit priority to *expand* and *multiply* “partnerships at all levels” (*Jomtien Decl.*, Art. 7) with non-state, non-governmental actors for the purpose of implementing its global *basic education for all* goal. The Jomtien *Framework for Action* recommended, for instance, the consideration of a “*maximum [our emphasis]* use of opportunities” to “expand existing collaboration and to bring together *new partners* [*Ib.*]” for promoting basic education for all at the national level. By “new partners”, Jomtien meant:

“family and community organizations, non-governmental and other voluntary associations, teachers’ unions⁸⁹⁹, other professional groups, employers, the media, political parties, co-operatives, universities, research institutions, religious bodies, as well as education authorities and other government departments and services (labour, agriculture, health, information, commerce, industry, defence etc.)” (*Jomtien Framework for Action*, 1.6, par. 28).

Jomtien called for the mobilization of “the human and organizational resources these domestic partners represent” so that they “*play their parts* [our emphasis] in implementing the plan of action” (*Jomtien Framework for Action*, 1.6, par. 28). Among the other partnerships Jomtien advocated were, *inter alia*, partnerships between government and the private sector, or with “non-governmental organizations, the private sector, local communities, religious groups, and families” (*Jomtien Decl.*, Art. 7).

New-York’s *Plan of Action* started by specifying that it was common to state and non-state actors. It was

⁸⁹⁹ Education International (EI) is the largest and most influential union federation of teachers’ trade unions. As of February 8, 2022, it included 401 member organizations in 172 countries and territories. Education International is a major global governance player, adhering to the global agenda and lobbying for its integration in curricula from kindergarten to university. It contributes to the exponential production of “global citizens”, of “good global governance citizens”.

“intended as a guide for national Governments, international organizations, bilateral aid agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and *all other sectors of society* [our emphasis] in *formulating their own programmes of action* [Ib.] for ensuring the implementation of the Declaration of the World Summit for Children” (*New-York Plan of Action*, par. 1).

The summit urged “all forms of social mobilization” (*New-York Plan of Action*, par. 34 iv) to implement its goals. It more specifically recommended that “families, communities, local governments, NGOs, social, cultural, religious, business and other institutions, including the mass media... *play an active role* [our emphasis] in support of the goals enunciated in [its] Plan of Action” (*New-York Plan of Action*, Ib.). The fact that New-York, a supposedly intergovernmental conference, exhorted “civic groups” to prepare their own programme of action to implement its plan of action (just as Jomtien encouraged non-state partners to play their part in the implementation of its respective plan of action) signals the entry into the revolutionary stage of the global governance process.

Rio’s creation of Major Groups manifested the supreme priority the UNCED gave to organizing the new politics and enlarging - as formally as possible within the framework of a non-binding intergovernmental consensus - the scope of global governance’s implementing actors. As a reminder, the Major Groups, nine in total, were the following: women; children and youth; indigenous people; NGOs; local authorities; workers and trade unions⁹⁰⁰; business and industry⁹⁰¹; scientific and technological community; farmers. Beyond NGOs, the groups included categories of individuals or citizens which had not necessarily constituted themselves as NGOs; scientific and technological institutions and “experts”; economic actors; social actors; and local governmental actors. Apart from local authorities, none of the “Major Groups” were government. Following Rio, Cairo, Copenhagen and Istanbul used the Major Groups category. Global governance has maintained the category up to this day, even still enlarging it. On the occasion of the 2012 Rio+20 conference, for instance, the Major Groups category became “Major Groups and other stakeholders”⁹⁰². This continuing enlargement of the second leg of the new global partnership’s stool revealed the momentum the partnerships’ revolution has kept on gaining.

Within each of the nine Major Groups, Rio sought a maximal extension of partners. Beyond those NGOs enjoying formal ECOSOC accreditation, for instance, the UNCED aggressively reached out to what it called the “community of NGOs”⁹⁰³ at all levels (transnational, regional, national, local...). Rio viewed this “community” as “a global network that should be tapped, enabled and

⁹⁰⁰ When the UN was founded, trade unions fell into the NGO category. They in fact counted among the first NGOs that obtained an ECOSOC accreditation status in 1946 (World Federation of Trade Unions, the American Federation of Labour). See Willetts, Peter. *Consultative Status for NGOs at the UN*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., pp. 31-62. Rio’s “Major Groups” separated NGOs and trade unions.

⁹⁰¹ The UN partnership with business went through stages. Some businesses were precursors. In 1991, 48 top executives of multinational companies founded the Business Council for Sustainable Development, which in 1995 merged with the World Industry Council for the Environment to create the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). This happened at the initiative of Stephan Schmidheiny, a great advocate of sustainable development who had been Maurice Strong’s chief adviser for business and industry at the UNCED. At the WEF in Davos in 1999, Kofi Annan launched his Global Compact with business.

⁹⁰² The 2012 enlarged concept included local communities, volunteer groups and foundations, migrants and families, as well as older persons and persons with disabilities (See Rio+20’s outcome document “The Future We Want”).

⁹⁰³ The “community of NGOs” phrase will reappear in the closing statement of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Beijing: “The United Nations will intensify the close ties and working relationships that already exist with the community of non-governmental organizations at the global and national levels.” *Beijing Report*, p. 211.

strengthened in support of efforts to achieve [the] common goals” of sustainable development⁹⁰⁴. Encouraging an active political partnership with non-ECOSOC accredited NGOs is proof of how the new politics prioritized the enforcement of its agenda over abiding by the provisions of the Charter.

Beyond its Major Groups and to make sure that no actor was left out in the “new global partnership”, Rio also reached out to “informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements”⁹⁰⁵. It introduced the notion of “public-private partnership”⁹⁰⁶ and, as seen in chapter four, added a spiritual dimension to partnerships (Wisdom Keepers) that would re-emerge at Beijing (Shrine in Praise of the Feminine⁹⁰⁷) and Istanbul (Wisdom Keepers).

The transnational sexual and reproductive health lobbies (NGOs, individuals, academics, foundations, pharmaceutical industry...), colluding with the UN Secretariat and UN agencies (in particular WHO and UNFPA), were Cairo’s real governing agents. These non-governmental actors were adamant on maximizing global governance’s capacity to deliver Cairo’s contentious sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights agenda in all parts of the world. NGOs aligned on the IPPF ideology and the “private sector” (contraceptive and abortive industry), Cairo’s primary partners, sought to *enlarge* the scope of partnerships across the board so as to disseminate its *Programme of Action* as widely as possible globally.

Beyond Major Groups, Cairo reached out to a potentially illimitable host of non-state partners, whether formally constituted or not. It recommended, for instance, inviting local community groups, women’s organizations, immigrant and refugee support advocacy groups, youth organizations (which the new politics recognized as “increasingly becoming effective partners in developing programmes to educate youth on reproductive health, gender and environmental issues”, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.5), organizations of the aged, migrants, organizations of persons with disabilities and *informal* grass-roots groups “to participate with local, national and international *decision-making* [our emphasis] bodies, including the United Nations system, to ensure effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation” of the Cairo *Programme of Action*⁹⁰⁸. Cairo not only acknowledged but advocated the “greater recognition” at all levels of

⁹⁰⁴ *Agenda 21*, par. 27.3: “Non-governmental organizations, including those non-profit organizations representing groups addressed in the present section of Agenda 21, possess well-established and diverse experience, expertise and capacity in fields which will be of particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development, as envisaged throughout Agenda 21. The community of non-governmental organizations, therefore, offers a global network that should be tapped, enabled and strengthened in support of efforts to achieve these common goals.”

⁹⁰⁵ *Agenda 21*, par. 27.1: “Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21”.

⁹⁰⁶ *Agenda 21*, par. 34.26 b: “...funding of this activity through public-private partnerships should also be explored, as appropriate.”

⁹⁰⁷ At the Huairou NGO Forum held in parallel with the Beijing Conference, spiritualists and ecofeminists organized a number of pagan worship rituals. See Peeters, Marguerite. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 5 of August 16, 1995, item 2.

⁹⁰⁸ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.5: “The experience, capabilities and expertise of many non-governmental organizations and local community groups in areas of direct relevance to the Programme of Action is acknowledged. Non-governmental organizations, especially those working in the field of sexual and reproductive health and family planning, women’s organizations and immigrant and refugee support advocacy groups, have increased public knowledge and provided educational services to men and women which contribute towards successful implementation of population and development policies. Youth organizations are increasingly becoming effective partners in developing programmes to educate youth on reproductive health, gender and environmental issues. Other groups, such as organizations of the aged, migrants, organizations of persons with disabilities and informal grass-roots groups, also contribute effectively to the enhancement of programmes for their particular constituencies. These diverse organizations can help in ensuring the quality and relevance of programmes and services to the people they

both “formal and informal organizations and networks, including grass-roots movements” as “valid and valuable partners” for the implementation of sexual and reproductive health (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.4).

During the revolution, it became common practice in the conferences’ documents to associate States and non-state actors in a common partnership. Copenhagen promoted a “partnership involving States, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, especially voluntary organizations, other major groups as defined in Agenda 21, the media, families and individuals” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 89). Treating “civil society” as a “global” entity, Copenhagen coopted “all sectors”, “actors”, “organizations”, “participants” or “institutions”⁹⁰⁹ of this “civil society” as partners in the implementation of its global social agenda⁹¹⁰.

Copenhagen was ambivalent on whether its “civil society” paradigm included or excluded business enterprises - what the UN has called the “private sector”. When Copenhagen did include business in civil society, it specified it, as if this inclusion were not self-evident: “... in collaboration with civil society, including the private sector...” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 27.f). But Copenhagen more frequently put civil society and business in separate categories, as in this example: “strengthening the capacities of Governments, the private sector and civil society... to enable them to meet their specific and global responsibilities” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 17.g).

The agenda of Beijing’s primary partners – women’s organizations, feminist groups and networks, leading gender feminists - was to mainstream their gender perspective in all areas, at all levels and in all parts of the globe. Taking place at the height of the partnerships’ revolution, the women’s conference vigorously coopted all possible categories of actors in such an endeavor. It encouraged for instance:

“the active support and participation of a broad and diverse range of ... institutional actors ..., including legislative bodies, academic and research institutions, professional associations, trade unions, cooperatives, local community groups, non-governmental organizations, including women’s organizations and feminist groups, the media, religious groups, youth organizations and cultural groups, as well as financial and non-profit organizations” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 295).

Habitat II made by far the greatest use of the terms “partner” and “partnership”⁹¹¹. Its partnership principle encompassed the entirety of global governance’s partners - primary and new. Süleyman Demirel, President of Turkey and President of the United Nations Conference on Human

are meant to serve. They *should be invited to participate with local, national and international decision-making bodies, including the United Nations system, to ensure effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the present Programme of Action* [our emphasis].”

⁹⁰⁹ *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 37 (e): “Promoting cooperation among government agencies, health-care workers, non-governmental organizations, women’s organizations *and other institutions of civil society* [our emphasis] in order to develop a comprehensive national strategy for improving reproductive health care and child health-care services and ensuring that people living in poverty have full access to those services, including, *inter alia*, education and services on family planning, safe motherhood and prenatal and postnatal care, and the benefits of breast-feeding, consistent with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development.”

⁹¹⁰ For instance, *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 27: “the international community” (a vague expression deprived of substantial content), “the United Nations, the multilateral financial institutions, all regional organizations and local authorities, and *all* [our emphasis] actors of civil society”. Or *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 2: “both the State and civil society”.

⁹¹¹ Partner (77), partnership (131), global partnership (2).

Settlements (Habitat II) eloquently conveyed Istanbul's partnership spirit in his welcoming statement:

"The fulfilment of the aspirations and goals in the field of sustainable human settlements development requires the active participation not only of national Governments, but also of parliamentary bodies, local governments, regional and international organizations, the private sector, research and academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and individuals and intellectuals who feel responsible towards society. Habitat II offers a unique and invaluable occasion for all of these partners to undertake common commitments for achieving sustainable societies throughout the world. Now is the time for civil society to add its voice and resources to solving global, national and local problems"⁹¹².

Particularly geared towards the implementation of Rio's Local Agenda 21, the City Summit strategically focused on strengthening global governance's partnership with "local authorities", "community-based organizations" and "local communities".

Istanbul introduced the phrase "non-state actors" in the language of the UN conference process. This novel term, which Istanbul did not define, encompassed a much broader spectrum of actors than the "non-governmental organizations" mentioned once in the UN Charter. It is significant that it came out at the height of the partnerships' revolution, naming the wide variety of non-governmental actors that had been coopted in the global governance process all along. This thesis uses the term abundantly to characterize these actors.

6.3.5. Direct partnership with "the people": who are "the people" in global governance?

The UNCED's paradigmatic "new global partnership for sustainable development" was, let us recall, tripartite. Next to states and governments (and international organizations) as the first partner, and "key sectors of society" as the second partner (the nine Major Groups, any other "civil society organization" not included in these groups and informal grassroots movements), came "people" (in the singular), the third partner. The adoption of the new global partnership paradigm allowed for the general cooptation of all states, categories of non-state actors and people in a single partnership to implement all the components of the global framework.

"The people" in the singular: the third foundational leg of new global partnership stool
"People" was in the singular in the already quoted Rio Declaration's opening statement⁹¹³. So did it remain in the singular in the last principle of Rio's Declaration, which stipulated a cooperation "in good faith and in a spirit of partnership" between "states and people" in "the fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declaration" (*Rio Decl.*, Principle 27). It is noteworthy that while "states" were here in the plural, "people" remained in the singular. Other conferences of the second wave referred to "the people" in the singular as a partner in sustainable development. At the Copenhagen Social Summit, Poul Rasmussen, then Prime Minister of Denmark, revealingly declared that the summit opened "a new era of international cooperation *between Governments and people based on a spirit of partnership* [our emphasis]"⁹¹⁴. Habitat II stated that "sustainable human settlements development require[d] the active engagement of civil society organizations, as well as the *broad-based participation of all people* [Ib.]" (*Istanbul Report*, par. 181).

⁹¹² *Istanbul Report*, op. cit., p. 210.

⁹¹³ *Rio Decl.*, p. 1: "With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people."

⁹¹⁴ *Copenhagen Report*, p. 122.

A constructed, virtual global demos of nationally undifferentiated individuals

The conferences did not define what they meant by “the people”. Their use of the singular, however, represented a revolutionary break from the UN Charter and its opening words - “we, the peoples of the United Nations”. The Charter’s use of the plural – peoples – suggested, as already emphasized, a respect for the individual nations making up the *United Nations*: nations embedded in their respective cultures, and represented at the United Nations through their governments. In global governance’s semantic system, “people” in the singular does not mean “nations”. The second wave conferences made it clear that the term “people” equated in practice to all the world’s individuals seen as belonging to one single people, to some kind of fuzzy, new and global entity, a “global” people implicitly relating to the idea of a global citizenship and dissolving the identity of national peoples.

The second wave conferences not only promoted a direct partnership with different *categories of individuals* (women, youth, indigenous, minorities...), but they unequivocally established a relationship with individuals themselves, what we shall call *nationally undifferentiated individuals*, with a view to coopting them transnationally in the implementation of the global goals⁹¹⁵. While not explicitly referring to *global citizens*, the “global” conferences did instrumentalize these nationally undifferentiated individuals in a *direct* partnership for sustainable development, alongside the other partners⁹¹⁶, whether state or non-state. This direct partnership established the foundations of a normative practice of the new global politics: to bypass the national and local levels and reach out to single individuals directly in order to transform them into agents of social transformation in favor of the new and global *Weltanschauung*.

Let us provide three examples of how the conferences included nationally undifferentiated “individuals” in their long lists of partners. Cairo counted among its objectives:

“to increase awareness, knowledge, understanding and commitment at all levels of society so that families, couples, *individuals* [our emphasis], opinion and community leaders, non-governmental organizations, policy makers, Governments and the international community appreciate the significance and relevance of population-related issues, and

⁹¹⁵ The direct partnership with individuals has remained a constant feature of the global governance process up to this day. Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret dedicated the entire part (and three sub-chapters) of their *Covid-19: The Great Reset* book to “individual reset”, claiming that “For some, what starts as a change may end up as an individual reset” – a process that goes through “redefining our humanness”. Schwab, Klaus and Malleret, Thierry. *Covid-19: The Great Reset*. Forum Publishing. World Economic Forum. 2020, p. 211. Incidentally, in his *Dictionnaire du XXIème siècle* (definition of *epidemics*), Jacques Attali forewarned in 1998 that a global police, hence a planetary power, would be born out of epidemics.

⁹¹⁶ The word “individuals” appears in most conferences (see Appendices A2 and A4). See for instance *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 7.20 g: “Empower community groups, non-governmental organizations and individuals to assume the authority and responsibility for managing and enhancing their immediate environment through participatory tools, techniques and approaches embodied in the concept of environmental care.” Other examples are *Agenda 21*, par. 8.3, 8.21, 10.9, 14.18 c, 23.2, *Vienna Plan of Action*, par. 15 and 19, and *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 7.20, 13.4 b, 7.12 (“The success of population education and family-planning programmes in a variety of settings demonstrates that informed individuals everywhere can and will act responsibly in the light of their own needs and those of their families and communities”), *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.1 (“The significance of the International Conference on population and Development will depend on the willingness of Governments, local communities, the non-governmental sector, the international community and all other concerned organizations and individuals to turn the recommendations of the Conference into action”), *Istanbul Report*, par. 117 c (“Involve marginalized and/or disadvantaged groups and individuals in the planning, decision-making, monitoring and assessment related to human settlements development”), *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 62 objective 7.5 (“In implementing this Plan of Action, it is recognized that: (a) Individuals and households have a key role in decisions and actions affecting their food security”)...

take the responsible actions necessary to address such issues within sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.15 a).

Istanbul stressed that:

“Partnerships among countries and among all actors within countries from public, private, voluntary and community-based organizations, the cooperative sector, non-governmental organizations and *individuals* [our emphasis] [were] essential to the achievement of sustainable human settlements development and the provision of adequate shelter for all and basic services” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 33).

Another example from Istanbul was its insistence that:

“The local Agenda 21 framework emphasize[d] the need for local authorities to work in cooperation with all interested parties, including *individuals* [our emphasis], social groups and the private sector, to promote and implement effective strategies for sustainable development” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 103).

Global governance’s direct partnership with children and youth

The conferences’ direct partnership with children and youth has been particularly striking. In this case they bypassed not only the state at the national level, but parents and educators, directly submitting young people to the norms of the global elite, to their ideological objectives, priorities and “ethic”. Jomtien blazed the trail for this specific partnership. It recommended to treat the individual students as “partners in the instructional process” (*Framework for Action*, par. 31)⁹¹⁷. This partnering with young people in the instructional process did not occur in a vacuum. It was geared towards educating young generations to sustainable development, the fight against climate change, reproductive rights, sexual health, gender equality... Children and young people, as well as teachers and professors thereby became direct partners of global governance’s ruling elite. The partnership abolished the traditional hierarchy between the educating and the educated⁹¹⁸.

The global elite has also manipulated young people by coopting them as peer educators, particularly as regards sexuality education: for example to “raise awareness” about the “need” for condoms through street theater in developing countries, youth centers offering recreational activities (games), drama productions, puppet shows, sketches relating young people’s

⁹¹⁷ Jomtien dialectically opposed learners *as partners* to learners being “treated simply as ‘inputs’ or ‘beneficiaries’”. While the active, personal participation of learners in class is recognized as a prerequisite for any effective education since Socrates, treating students as *partners* reveals a trend to put them on a par with teachers and to abolish the hierarchy inherent in any education process, and therefore the very purpose of education.

⁹¹⁸ See Plato’s *Republic* (the first book on politics ever written), section VIII: « Lorsqu’une cité démocratique assoiffée de liberté a pour dirigeants de mauvais échansons et s’enivre en buvant de ce vin pur plus qu’elle ne devrait, alors, si ses gouvernants ne se montrent pas très complaisants à son égard et ne lui concèdent pas la liberté qu’elle demande, elle les punit en les accusant d’être d’abominables oligarques. Tous ceux qui sont soumis aux gouvernants, elle les insulte en les traitant d’esclaves volontaires et de gens de rien, alors qu’elle loue et honore au contraire, en privé comme en public, les gouvernants qui ont l’air de gouvernés, et les gouvernés qui ont l’air de gouvernants. Ne faut-il pas s’attendre à voir, dans une telle cité, la liberté s’étendre à tous les domaines, l’anarchie s’introduire au cœur des familles et, finalement, se manifester jusque dans le comportement des animaux ? Le père, par exemple, s’accoutume à se conduire en enfant et à craindre ses fils, le fils à vivre comme son père, sans respect ni crainte de ses parents afin, bien entendu, d’être un homme libre. L’étranger non domicilié tout comme celui de passage jouit des mêmes droits que les citoyens. A cela s’ajoutent quelques particularités du même genre. Le maître, dans une telle cité, craint ses élèves et les flatte, les élèves méprisent leurs maîtres et leurs pédagogues. D’une façon générale, les jeunes gens imitent leurs aînés et rivalisent avec eux en paroles et en actes. Quant aux vieux, ils s’abaissent à imiter les jeunes en se montrant enjoués et badins, de peur de passer pour désagréables et tyranniques. »

“experiences”, “testimonies” followed by interactive discussions, night cinema, youth camps, sports activities, music, dance, sale of materials for pleasure and relaxation⁹¹⁹...

Global governance’s direct partnership with children and youth dramatically consolidated itself after Jomtien. As a reminder, the one reference to partnerships in the Children Summit’s outcome documents applied to children themselves: “Among the partnerships we seek, we turn especially to children themselves. We appeal to them to participate in [the] effort” of the World Summit for Children (*Plan of Action*, par. 22). Rio built on Jomtien and New-York: “The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable development” (*Rio Decl.*, Principle 21). So important was it for the UNCED to partner with children and young people that they became one of its nine Major Groups, as was the case with other categories of individuals, most notably women.

The pervasive mainstreaming of global governance’s ethos and platform in school curriculum and education content has taken place in most countries, even if at various degrees, primarily in public schools, and by coextension also in private ones. This mainstreaming has derived, *inter alia*, from UNESCO’s operational partnership with national ministries of education and powerful education unions worldwide, first and foremost *Education International*. This partnership has escaped democratic control in those UN member states that are democracies.

The partnership with youth has also been of a political nature. It has treated children as a political tool, turning them into activists, as *citizens* in initiatives such as *Children or Youth Parliaments*⁹²⁰, young people haranguing world leaders about the state of the environment and climate change⁹²¹, or street demonstrating about these issues. The new politics linked its partnership with young people to “children’s rights”, a pillar of its conceptual framework. According to a certain interpretation of these rights, children and youth would be *equal citizens* who can make their own choices regarding sexual lifestyles, opinions, values and education contents, independently from parents and educators.

A new social contract at the global level, for virtual global citizens

The post-Cold War conferences built a “global consensus” meant to transnationally bind nationally-undifferentiated individuals together around common objectives, priorities and values. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave a name to this achievement at Copenhagen: “*a new social contract, at the global level*”⁹²². The expression betrays the global elite’s abusive assumption of the existence of a *global demos* – “the people”.

By mere fiat, Boutros-Ghali transferred to the “global level” a concept that historically marked the constitution of individual Western nation-states and belonged to the modern western democracy framework, national by its very essence. Let us incidentally remember that the Western cultural revolution had substantially emptied modern values from their universal content and reduced the social contract to its bare functional minimum. The political vacuum thus created at the level of Western societies was happily filled by the agenda of transnational pressure groups adhering to the values of the cultural revolution, and making national social contracts mute into a global social contract. A global social contract, common not only to all “States and nations” but

⁹¹⁹ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *The Globalization of the Western Cultural Revolution*, chapter six.

⁹²⁰ See for instance European Youth Parliament at <https://eyp.org> (retrieved November 9, 2021) or Children’s Parliament at <https://www.childrensparliament.org.uk> (retrieved November 9, 2021).

⁹²¹ As happened for instance at the 2002 Rio+10 Johannesburg Summit or more recently with Greta Thunberg at the UN Climate Action Summit on September 23, 2019, or at the WEF on January 21, 2020.

⁹²² *Copenhagen Report*, p. 125. Statement by Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the Social Summit.

to all “men and women around the world”⁹²³, would constitute the mandate of global governance as a global political regime. The global social contract would *transcend* the sovereignty of all states and nations (“peoples”) by submitting them all to its global norms: sustainable development, climate change, reproductive health, gender equality, partnerships, global ethics and other agendas that do not spring from UN member states and the individual nations that they are supposed to represent at the UN.

Boutros-Ghali’s abusive transfer of the social contract notion to the “global level” manifested an entrenched pattern dangerously jeopardizing national sovereignty. This pattern, however, never triggered any appropriate reaction on the part of UN member states. It called for an intergovernmental debate that never took place. The abuse would have needed to be redressed when it happened, at the time of the revolution. The global consensus was not a *new* social contract: no previous “social contract” ever existed at the “global level”. It was not a *global* social contract: the “global demos” was an artificial construct. It was not a *contract*: the consensus was soft and juridically non-binding. Global governance was no hard government. Furthermore, it was not a *social* contract: it did not stem from a free deliberation and choice of “the people”; it was not built bottom-up by “the people”. It was rather imposed top-down by the “global experts”. The new global social contract and the global demos were *virtual*: existing in the mind of the new global, hegemonic ruling class, not in juridical and legitimate political reality. Yet as this thesis demonstrates, the global social contract and the global demos (“the people” as the global elite constructed it and wanted it to be) paradoxically have been *operative* and prodigiously efficient in achieving global submission to the elite’s global norms.

Although the conferences’ outcome documents of both the first and second waves did not contain the phrases “global citizens” or “global civil society”, global governance has treated what the conferences called “the people” in the singular as such. In practice, it has endowed “the people” with individual rights (new rights and rights reinterpreted in the light of the cultural revolution’s agenda) on the one hand, and what Copenhagen called “global responsibilities” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 17.g) on the other. The alleged “global responsibilities” were to conform to, “internalize”, implement and advocate for the conferences’ global norms, paradigms, conceptual framework, language, goals, underpinning postmodern ethos.

“The people’s” cooptation has strategically taken place in a seemingly *participatory* and *empowering* way so that “global citizens” would *own* the global agenda and become engaged agents of change in its favor.

In their direct partnership with what we call “transnational individuals” or “nationally undifferentiated individuals” and with what the documents called “individuals” and “the people” in the singular, global governance’s primary partners have behaved as if the world’s citizens were their direct *subjects* – subjects, however, required to conform to the global norms, in reality as if they were their mere *objects*. They have either bypassed or instrumentalized intermediate levels and bodies (sovereign national governments, regional and local authorities, the family, parents, educators, churches...). When the political mechanisms set in place by the conferences to implement their respective agendas (we will address these “mechanisms”, that the conferences never defined, in the next chapter) provided for global governance’s relationship with individuals to go *through* national governments as intermediaries, governments, to the extent they played their “role” as partners in the new politics, have kept the global agenda substantially intact when transmitting it to their national people. In that sense, even when passing *through* governments,

⁹²³ Ib., p. 125.

global governance's global-to-individuals transmission chain could be considered as *direct*. Establishing a direct relationship with citizens, circumventing or “transcending” legitimate intermediary bodies is the trademark of totalitarian regimes.

The new global partnership also coopts “the peoples”, in the plural

In addition to coopting “the people” in the singular (the revolution’s artificial “global demos”), the new global partnership also coopted “peoples” in the plural – that is, either “nations” in the Western, Westphalian sense or, more frequently in the second wave conferences’ reports, indigenous communities.

The new global partnership regime has jointly coopted states/governments and “peoples” in the implementation of a common agenda, that of global governance. It thereby engineered a new, revolutionary type of relationship between national governments and their citizens: both directly and jointly subjected to the global regime, these two distinct actors became mutual partners for the exclusive purposes of implementing a global agenda that neither of them, but “global experts”, conceived. As it is in the nature of a partnership to treat its parties as equal, the new global partnership has practically put national governments and “the people” (“global citizens”) on a political par. It has tended to abolish the hierarchy between them and to deconstruct the notions of authority (both political and moral), representation and legitimacy as understood under the modern political synthesis. A surreptitious transfer of authority from national governments to the global elite occurred and became a fundamennt of the new politics⁹²⁴.

Let us provide three examples of the conferences’ use of “peoples” in the sense of “nations” as partners in global governance. Cairo contended that its impact would be “measured by the strength of the specific commitments made here and the consequent actions to fulfil them, as part of a new global partnership among all the world’s countries and peoples [our emphasis], based on a sense of shared but differentiated responsibility for each other and for our planetary home” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.15). In their Copenhagen Declaration, participating UN member states affirmed to have launched “a new commitment to social development in each of our countries and a new era of international cooperation between Governments and peoples based on a spirit of partnership [Ib.]” (par. 10). The *Beijing Platform for Action* stipulated that “only a new era of international cooperation among Governments and peoples based on a spirit of partnership [Ib.], … and a radical transformation of the relationship between women and men to one of full and equal partnership will enable the world to meet the challenges of the twenty first century” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 17). Noteworthy in these quotes is the coexistence of “international cooperation” (traditional concept, present in the UN Charter) with the “new global partnership” (novel paradigm, belonging to global governance’s framework).

The conferences considered “peoples” not only as partners in the global agenda but as its *beneficiaries*. As Cairo put it, “International cooperation and universal solidarity, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in a spirit of partnership, are crucial in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world”⁹²⁵ (again let us note a strange amalgam of the Charter and “partnership”). The conferences established the enforcement of the global agenda as a condition for the security of all peoples – their “security” as they “holistically” redefined the concept. Beijing for example affirmed that the “empowerment of women and

⁹²⁴ A 2001 OECD publication on governance is entitled *Citizens as Partners – Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making*. The government-citizen connection is viewed as one of “partnership”.

⁹²⁵ Cairo, Introduction to Chapter Two. This quote provides another example of “coexistence” - of the Charter which did not include partnerships, and of the new partnerships’ politics.

equality between women and men are prerequisites for achieving political, social, economic, cultural and environmental security among all peoples” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 41).

In the second wave conferences’ reports, the appearances of “people” in the singular were much more numerous than those of “peoples” in the plural⁹²⁶. Moreover, in several of these documents, “peoples” in the plural more frequently referred to indigenous peoples and tribes⁹²⁷, the latter constituting one of Rio’s Major Groups, than to peoples as nations according to the modern Western sense. In some documents, notably Agenda 21, the diversity of identities among indigenous peoples clearly “transcended” in importance the diversity of identities among the Western nations that became modern democracies. The postmodern global governance process, reversing modern hierarchies, gave political precedence to “discriminated against minorities” or “oppressed groups” (women, homosexuals, indigenous peoples, NGOs, immigrants, non-Western cultures...) over “dominant” groups (men, traditional family, sovereign governments, Western nations...).

Finally to be mentioned in this section on “peoples” is the UN Secretariat’s recurring reference, since the 1990s, to the UN’s opening words “We the peoples” to justify the partnerships revolution, giving “peoples” the meaning of transnational NGOs and other non-state actors.

6.3.6. Total cooptation: no actor left out of new global partnership: recapitulation

The second wave conferences’ tentacular and dynamic outreach to new partners in sustainable development represented a precipitate effort to operate an irreversible shift towards a global, all-inclusive, “holistic” political regime: the new global partnership, *alias* global governance or what this thesis has also called the *new politics*. They assumed sustainable development to be globally consensual and a common to all “mandate”. The only outsiders to the system would be those challenging these assumptions: political and ideological opponents, those resisting entry in the “framework”.

Among its three categories of partners – state, non-state, and the “people” -, the new global partnership left no actor out. Those we named in this section in a dispersed and fragmented way represent an impressive but non exhaustive list of partners identified in the outcome documents of the second wave conferences. For the sake of providing a recapitulative overview, let us name them in a grouped fashion.

Among the partners belonging to the first category (governmental, including intergovernmental), the conferences’ reports included, beyond the UN and all of its individual organizations (UN agencies, funds and programmes): all international organizations, all regional organizations, the “international community” whatever this concretely meant, bilateral aid agencies; national governments, their departments, institutions, services and mechanisms; national parliamentary bodies, legislative bodies, policy-makers, elected representatives of people, parliamentarians, political parties; provincial and local governments...

The partners belonging to the second category (non-state, non-governmental) made up the longest list. They were given scores of names. Istanbul, as already noted, generically called them “non-

⁹²⁶ See Appendix A4 for the number of uses of “peoples” in the various documents. In the *Istanbul Report*, for instance, “people” appears 236 times, while “peoples”, only 5 times.

⁹²⁷ The single reference to “peoples” in Jomtien pertains to indigenous peoples; New-York (0); Rio Agenda 21 (10, mostly indigenous and tribal, none as “nations”); Rio Declaration (0); Vienna (9 in the traditional sense); Cairo (18); Copenhagen (13 in traditional sense); Beijing (13); Habitat (5 while “people”, 241).

state actors”: civic groups, civil society groups, civil society organizations, civil society sectors, civil society participants, civil society actors, civil society institutions, civil society movement, all forms of social mobilization, all sectors of society, umbrella organizations, federations, community organizations, non-governmental associations, international, national and local non-governmental organizations and their networks, community of NGOs, voluntary associations or organizations, all nine Major Groups, other professional groups and associations, trade associations, employers, the private sector, cooperatives, the “cooperative sector”, foundations, financial organizations, non-profit organizations, the media, political parties, schools, universities, academic institutions, research institutions, cultural and religious bodies, communities, groups or institutions, local communities, faith-based organizations, local community groups, community-based organizations, women’s organizations, feminist groups, agents of change, opinion and community leaders, social groups, concerned groups, immigrant and refugee support advocacy groups, youth organizations, organizations of the aged, migrants, organizations of persons with disabilities, the family (under all its forms), families, grass-roots movements, informal processes and networks...

In the third category are both the people (individual global citizens) and peoples (nations and indigenous tribes).

6.4. New roles for all partners, according to what each does best at the service of the global goals

The second wave conferences treated their respective platforms as “mandates” that were common to governmental and non-governmental actors alike, at all levels. Chapter seven will more specifically address their supposed or constructed “mandatory” character. Let us for now consider how they assigned each actor a specific *role* to play in function of what the new political system considered them to do best at the service of its global goals. The new politics’ role assignment was in reality a *redistribution of roles* with respect to the roles each actor traditionally held in the modern democratic system. This redistribution in turn modified the relationship between governments, “civil society” and “the people”. It built a *new regime*, redistributing at the “global level” (for all governments and societies) political roles (powers) and defining the relationships between the new power holders.

The second wave conferences furthermore stipulated that there was a “responsibility” connected to each “role”. Their use of the term “responsibility” indicated the morally loaded character of the “commitment” that they requested from each actor. Let us examine their redistribution of roles.

6.4.1. Governments as enablers of change

Transformation of governments’ “primary responsibility”

As previously noted, the intergovernmental conferences through which the partnerships revolution took place emphasized that the achievement of their respective goals was *governments’ primary responsibility*. However, the conferences also set a clear condition for governments to fulfill this responsibility: that governments “enable” or “facilitate” the empowerment of NGOs and other non-governmental actors so that these non-state actors may in turn play their “role” in achieving the global agenda. Istanbul expressed the essence of governments’ “primary responsibility” as follows: that they “adopt and promote enabling policies to facilitate actions by individuals, families, communities” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 53) and other non-state, non-governmental actors in favor of sustainable development.

Governments to facilitate the empowerment of non-state actors to implement global goals

The “facilitating role” the new politics assigned governments pervaded the second wave conferences’ reports. New-York’s *Plan of Action*, for example, called on national governments to “encourage and assist provincial and local governments as well as NGOs, the private sector and civic groups to prepare their own programmes of action to help to implement the goals and objectives included in the Declaration and this Plan of Action” (*New-York Plan of Action*, par. 34 i). The *Rio Agenda 21* invited governments to “promote and allow the participation of non-governmental organizations” in “the conception, establishment and evaluation of official mechanisms and formal procedures designed to review the implementation of Agenda 21 at all levels” (par. 27.8). It further encouraged governments to “take into account the findings of non-governmental monitoring and review mechanisms in the design and evaluation of policies concerning the implementation of Agenda 21 at all levels” (par. 27.9.f). Cairo specifically recommended that governments facilitate individuals’ role in the achievement of reproductive health: that they “*make it easier* [our emphasis] for couples and individuals to take responsibility for their own reproductive health by removing unnecessary legal, medical, clinical and regulatory barriers to information and to access to family-planning services and methods” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 7.20). To mainstream the gender perspective, Beijing recommended that national governments encourage the active support and participation of “a broad and diverse range” of institutional actors other than governments (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 295). Istanbul best expressed the role the new politics assigned national governments within the global governance framework:

“Governments as enabling partners should create and strengthen effective partnerships [our emphasis] with women, youth, the elderly, persons with disabilities, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, indigenous people and communities, local authorities, the private sector and non-governmental organizations in each country” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 213).

These quotes make it clear that the role which the new politics assigned governments was a role of *enabling global partnerships*⁹²⁸. This novel role, given governments by agents external to the national political process, diverted them from their national governing role, which constituted their only legitimate mandate. Insofar as national governments behaved as global governance’s “enabling partners”, they acted as if they owed their mandate to the global elite, not to their respective peoples. Selling their sovereignty to this elite⁹²⁹, they then used the authority they legitimately held in virtue of the mandate they received bottom-up from their respective national “people(s)” to impose the global agenda on their peoples, in a top-down fashion. This process voided their mandate of its legitimate content and surreptitiously filled it with the global agenda.

The “enabling role” the new politics assigned governments reduced them to partners among other, more performing, partners. The global governance regime flattened, or rather reversed in practice, the hierarchy between governmental and non-governmental actors. It irremediably blurred the line separating what is government from what is not government. The partnership status that the new politics assigned governments tied them to a global political system under which they lost a significant part of their sovereign independence. Governments became instrumentalized “subjects” of this global regime, agents of global social transformation at the national and local

⁹²⁸ “In this way governments can become partners and sponsors of the people who are the main builders of their cities.” World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., par. 46.

⁹²⁹ The reports of the second wave conferences rarely mentioned national sovereignty, a concept antagonistic with their globalist perspective. See Appendices A2 and A4, showing a decline from the first to the second wave conferences in the use of the concept.

levels. Contributing to consolidating the global regime and to empowering NGOs as political actors in a globally-set and globally-implemented agenda, governments became the agents of their self-weakening. Their “enabling role” disempowered them and seriously jeopardize the exercise of their authority over non-state actors.

Governments’ novel “facilitating role” instrumentalized their authority

As often emphasized already in different contexts, the outcome documents of the second wave conferences made it explicit that what national governments were to “enable” and “facilitate” was *exclusively* the implementation, at the national and local levels, of a global agenda that neither governments nor the people they ruled over or represented took leadership in elaborating. This is another factor that largely contributed to stripping governments of their power and authority and put them in a subordinated position with respect to the global elite.

The revolution instrumentalized national governments’ authority to prompt not only all inferior levels of government but also all non-state, non-governmental actors and national citizens themselves to actively engage themselves in the transformational program contained in the “global mandate”. Such “enabling governments”, marching behind the revolution’s cheerleaders, became their most powerful - institutional - implementing partners. To the extent they put themselves at the service of the overlords at the helm of global governance, however, they stopped serving their own people.

6.4.2. Full political role given to non-governmental, non-state actors, within the “framework”

The already observed rationale, deriving from the “end of ideology proclamation”, according to which the “problems” of humanity and “the Earth” had become merely pragmatic and mainly needed experts and technicians to resolve them, remained undisputed over the span of the second wave conferences. As noted in chapters three and five, it resulted in granting “experts and technicians” a central political role. The conferences hailed NGOs in particular for their expertise and long grassroots experience. They deliberately turned a blind eye to the ideological content of the agendas and paradigms forged by the non-state partners. What is more, in the scientific name of the partners’ alleged “expertise”, they imposed their paradigms as the norms of international cooperation for the 21st century.

Acclaiming NGOs for their qualities, making them preferential partners in global governance, over sovereign governments

The second wave conferences’ reports acclaimed NGOs and other non-state actors for what they perceived as their special aptitude at delivering the global goals. The conferences hailed for example their “experience, expertise, energy and direct relationships with various constituencies” (*Jomtien Framework for Action*, par. 35), their “vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy” and their “credibility”, lying “in the responsible and constructive role they play in society” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.1), their “well-established and diverse experience, expertise and capacity in fields which will be of particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.3), their active political involvement “in virtually every area of socio-economic development, including the population sector”, their “long history of involvement and participation in population-related activities, particularly family planning” in a number of countries, their “strength and credibility”, lying “in the responsible and constructive role they play in society and the support their activities engender from the community as a whole” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.4).

The language of the conferences implied that non-state actors performed *better* than governments in the delivery of the global goals. Governments needed the “expertise”, “experience” and “credibility” that NGOs enjoyed because they themselves would lack these qualities and capacities. By way of consequence, as Agenda 21 put it, “The community of non-governmental organizations... offers a global network that should be tapped, enabled and strengthened in support of efforts to achieve these [i.e. ‘environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development’] common goals” (par. 27.3). NGOs, now in global governance’s view constituting a “community” (as if they were the equivalent of “nations”), were to be politically empowered. Their “roles”, “responsibilities” and “capacities” within the new global regime needed to be promoted and strengthened. UN member states had to recognize them as *preferential* partners in global governance.

The findings in chapters one, two and four revealed that the more politically and ideologically engaged the non-governmental partner was in the novel agenda, the more efficient this partner was in delivering this agenda, the more the new politics sought its participation and empowerment. Agenda 21, for instance, which largely stemmed from NGOs such as the IUCN and the WRI as exposed in chapter four, not only aggressively reached out to NGOs, but sought to realize their “full potential contribution” (par. 27.4) to its implementation. And as seen, Cairo made an all-out effort to make partnerships with NGOs (in lockstep with the IPPF) “thrive”. It can be deducted from these observations that the non-state actors that the global governance revolution empowered as a matter of priority have been the most ideologically-driven ones.

Non-governmental primary partners’ self-attributed political role within the new system

It is necessary to resort to the distinction we made earlier between the primary partners and the new, implementing partners, to properly interpret the *roles* the new politics gave non-state, non-governmental partners. At the cost of a certain repetition, it is here necessary to recall how the preceding chapters demonstrated the “primary partners” self-attributed political role in global governance as agenda-setters⁹³⁰, strategists, language-, consensus-, system- and framework-builders. The primary partners had secured for themselves a privileged position in their relationship with the UN Secretariat and other UN policy-makers by the time the second wave conferences were kicked off. They had already become so to speak irremovable within the new political system.

Even if not democratically elected, even if not institutionally or juridically established, even if operating only informally or by stealth, the primary partners have proven to wield *decision-making* and *executing* power within the global governance new political regime. Their power-grab constituted the essence of the revolution. We shall see in chapter seven how they managed to have governments set in place the operational mechanisms that would politically deliver the agenda that they themselves had forged.

Primary partners’ role inspired development of a political principle applicable and applied to implementing partners

The post-Cold War conferences extended to the new implementing partners the political role that the primary partners had grabbed for themselves during the Cold War. They called upon non-governmental actors to fully participate in “planning”, “policy-making”, “standard-setting”,

⁹³⁰ Some of the conferences explicitly recognized the input of non-state actors in setting their agenda. The Children Summit, for instance, recognized that its preparation had been a hybrid process: in the two years preceding the Summit, read its Plan of Action, “a set of goals for children and development in the 1990s have been formulated in several international forums attended by virtually all Governments, relevant United Nations agencies and major NGOs”. *New-York Plan of Action*, par. 5.

“decision-making”, “monitoring implementation”... Their invitation to such “participation” seemed to extend to all stages of the political process. We must underscore, however, that this extension occurred *after* the primary partners’ foundational agenda- and framework-setting stage. Time was of the essence. It was an invitation for the new partners to “participate” exclusively *within* the framework, *within* its semantic, conceptual, strategic and ideological boundaries, by then irreversibly established. The conferences advocated the new partners’ political participation and empowerment for the sole purpose of implementing the primary partners’ pre-set platform. Commitment to the pre-set agenda and capacity to deliver it were the new politics’ ruling criteria for coopting and empowering the new partners.

Participation and empowerment became values of the new ethics and principles of the new politics. They attractively coopted the new partners into becoming agents of change in favor of the new *Weltanschauung*. The new partners’ “empowerment” paradoxically subdued them to the ruling partners at the helm of global governance. By contradistinction, the more an actor ideologically challenged the agenda, the more it was in practice marginalized or altogether cast out of the partnerships’ regime.

Condition for partnerships to be “genuine”: full political participation in global governance process

Jomtien was first in fixing the principle according to which non-state actors were to participate in all post-agenda-setting stages of the political process so as to achieve the global goals, with governments “facilitating” their participation. The Jomtien Declaration set the condition for partnerships to be “genuine”. “*Genuine* [our emphasis] partnerships”, it affirmed, contribute to “the planning, implementing, managing and evaluating of basic education programmes” (Art. 7). Jomtien also stated that NGOs, in their partnership with governments, “might play roles in monitoring, research, training and material production for the sake of non-formal and life-long educational processes” (*Framework for Action*, par. 13). It can be deducted from these statements that, under the global governance regime, partnerships would be fake if they deprived non-state actors from playing a *real political role* and maintained the traditional hierarchy between them and governments.

This “condition” tied all actors of society to the global agenda, turned them into effective agents of change themselves.

All subsequent conferences persistently abided by Jomtien’s condition for partnerships to be “genuine”. Agenda 21 highly recommended, for example, that governments “review formal procedures and mechanisms for the involvement of [NGOs] *at all levels* [our emphasis], from policy-making and decision-making to implementation” (par. 27.6) and that NGOs be involved “in the conception, establishment and evaluation of official mechanisms and formal procedures designed to review the implementation of Agenda 21 *at all levels*” (par. 27.8). Agenda 21 also invited the UN system to

“review and report on ways of enhancing existing procedures and mechanisms by which non-governmental organizations contribute to policy design, *decision-making* [our emphasis], implementation and evaluation at the individual agency level, in inter-agency discussions and in United Nations conferences” (par. 27.9.a).

Vienna, a conference that was less prompt to politically empower NGOs, however did articulate its “appreciation” for the contribution of non-governmental organizations to human rights

standard-setting⁹³¹ and did praise the “important” or “major” role played by NGOs in the area of human rights: their role as “awareness-raisers” at all levels (*Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 82, 38); in the promotion and protection of all human rights (*Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 38); in “the conduct of education, training and research” in the field of human rights (Ib.); “in the effective implementation of all human rights instruments” (*Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 52).

Cairo used particularly strong language. It considered that NGOs “should have a *key role* [our emphasis] in national and international development processes” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.8). It repeatedly mentioned NGO involvement in political “*decision-making* [our emphasis]”⁹³². It recommended that NGOs assist national governments “in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of population and development objectives and activities” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.1). The population conference put governmental and non-governmental actors on a virtual par when it came to follow-up: implementation “must fully involve all relevant individuals and organizations, including non-governmental and community-based organizations” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.3). It sought “to promote an effective partnership between all levels of government and the *full range* [our emphasis] of non-governmental organizations and local community groups” not only in the discussion but in the “decisions” on “the design, implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation” of the Cairo program “in accordance with the general policy framework of Governments, taking duly into account the responsibilities and roles of the respective partners” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.7). This last quote exposed the new politics’ all-inclusive - “totalitarian” in that sense - outlook: “all levels of government”, “full range of NGOs...”, partnership in the *entire* political process relating to population, development and environment. Once again, this thesis here finds that the more controversial the agenda (the reproductive health and rights agenda in the Cairo case), the greater the new politics’ emphasis on the empowerment of the non-state, non-governmental actors at the origin of this agenda (the IPPF and NGOs of its ilk, which counted among the most efficient agents of population stabilization).

The new politics’ post-Cold War participation principle led to the creation and strengthening of “mechanisms” ensuring the full political engagement of non-governmental actors in view of achieving the global goals. Copenhagen, building on the “gains” of previous conferences, stressed the need for establishing such “mechanisms”. Beijing likewise recommended the establishment of “mechanisms” to involve NGOs and other non-state, non-governmental groups in, for instance, “government policy-making, programme design, as appropriate, and implementation within the health sector and related sectors at all levels” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 106 s).

Beijing viewed the “growing strength of the non-governmental sector, particularly women’s organizations and feminist groups” as a “driving force for change” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 26). The gender feminist conference named the key role the new politics attributed to non-state actors: to *drive change* – in other words, to be the leading agents of a *revolution*. Beijing additionally emphasized the “important advocacy role” NGOs have played “in advancing legislation or mechanisms to ensure the promotion of women” and in acting as “catalysts for new approaches to development” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 26).

“Civil society’s” educational and ethical role

In addition to the just listed political roles the second wave conferences assigned non-governmental actors (as planners, standard-setters, policy-makers, program-designers, advocates,

⁹³¹ *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 38: “While recognizing that the primary responsibility for standard-setting lies with States, the conference also appreciates the contribution of non-governmental organizations to this process.”

⁹³² For instance, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.5, 15.8, 3.3, 4.3b...

decision-makers, coordinators, implementors, managers, evaluators, watchdogs, awareness-raisers, agents of change...), the new politics attributed two major non-political roles to “civil society” (“global civil society”): an educational role, and an ethical role.

As will be more amply discussed in chapter seven, to ensure the *transition* to the desired change (the transition to sustainable development), the conferences envisioned a sweeping education reform: a worldwide alignment of educational contents on the ethos of global governance. They gave NGOs a role in this grand enterprise as *educators to sustainable development*. The UNCED, for instance, encouraged governments to “review government education systems to identify ways to include and expand the involvement of non-governmental organizations in the field of formal and informal education and of public awareness” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.10.e). Governmental partnership with NGOs in the field of education escaped the control of parents and the family, children’s primary educators, over the educational content their children would receive.

The UN and its primary partners in global governance conceived the post-Cold War global consensus-building effort as an attempt to counterbalance the global power of the market with the new global ethical norms and values embodied in sustainable development. In the mind of the socialist-minded proponents of this new world vision, profit tended to be considered as intrinsically corrupt, as ethically evil in itself. Civil society and more specifically the not-for-profit “sector”, by contradistinction, would by default be on the side of ethics, of what is humanitarian and altruistic. Assumed as it was to be on the side of “ethics”, “civil society” was set in dialectical opposition to business. Such a dialectical, Marxist reasoning explains why business tended to be excluded from global governance’s novel interpretation of “civil society”.

The title of the book which served as one of our sources in the preceding chapters and covered NGOs’ contributions to the UN’s second wave conferences, *The Conscience of the World*, eloquently illustrates the ethical role the promoters of global governance attributed to NGOs, its preferential partners. The new politics granted NGOs, experts, pundits, and other non-state and not-for-profit actors the most important, norm-setting and provider of ethics, role⁹³³.

In classical and modern democracy, the unifying ethical role that the new politics now attributed to NGOs and other non-state actors (what it called “civil society”) was that of the entire *demos*⁹³⁴ (either directly or through the modern contract of society). Under the new global partnership regime during the revolution, by contradistinction, the values for all participating actors (the state,

⁹³³ In a policy document, UNDP confirmed its normative exclusion of business from civil society, defining civil society organizations as “non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profits nor to seek governing power. CSOs unite [our emphasis] people to advance shared goals and interests. UNDP collaborates with CSOs whose goals, values and development philosophies accord with its own.” UNDP. *UNDP and Civil Society Organizations. A Toolkit for Strengthening Partnerships*. UNDP. 2006, p.3. UNDP’s definition corroborates the UN program’s tripartite political system and division of labor. It grants CSOs the noble role of “uniting” people. The UNDP definition also underlines *like-mindedness* as a condition for cooperation between a UN body and “civil society”. Like-mindedness, we remark incidentally, is a notion that proves the persistence of ideology in the post-ideology world global governance had asserted we have lived in since 1989. In the same policy document, UNDP identified the “variety of roles” that development CSOs accomplish. These roles include: “*Advocacy*: change public opinion with regard to a given issue. *Watchdog*: measure both progress towards commitment made at United Nations world conferences and to assess the current state of aid and development cooperation programmes. *Networking*: coordinating other CSOs that work in a particular sector. *Research*: research issues, which are important to the CSO, often linked to an advocacy function. Serve as *umbrella CSO*: perform a coordinating and representative function. *Federations*: CSOs in one area or sector federate together for goals they can best achieve through greater numbers.” Ib., p.4.

⁹³⁴ Even if in classical Greece, only adult men (about ten percent of the society) were citizens and constituted the *demos*.

the “private sector”, “the people”) came from the leading actors in transnational civil society⁹³⁵, in other words the global elite (NGOs such as AI, Green Peace, IUCN, WWF, IPPF etc.). Under this regime, business and the state had to internalize the values coming from those considered to be ethical because they were not on the side of profit. As we have by now understood, the values constituting the new global social contract did not come from “the people”, but from those transnational NGOs making up what the new politics now called “civil society”. The new politics’ exclusion of business from civil society reflects how it separated social groups one from the other according to the distinct *functions* or *roles* it attributed to each “sector” towards the realization of its global objectives.

6.4.3. The private sector as financial supporter and implementor of the global agenda

Rio made of “business and industry” one of its nine Major Groups - a new, implementing partner: “Business and industry, including transnational corporations, and their representative organizations should be full participants in the implementation and evaluation of activities related to Agenda 21” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.1). And: “Governments, business and industry, including transnational corporations, should strengthen partnerships to implement the principles and criteria for sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.7).

In spite of its anti-market stance and its tendency to exclude business from civil society during the second wave conferences, the new politics did assign the private sector a *specific* and *crucial role* within its framework: in providing jobs and income and increasing prosperity. Business represented a major force to tap into to achieve the socioeconomic objectives of sustainable development. For this to happen, however, the new politics requested from business to align its values and practices along sustainable development’s ethical perspective. Only when business would have changed its outlook and internalized the new ethics coming from “global civil society” could it become “ethical”, “responsible”, and a partner in global governance – and eventually then reintegrate “civil society”.

When buying the argument according to which they needed to internalize global civil society’s “values” so as to become ethical, both businesses and sovereign governments proved submissive to the global elite’s leadership. They failed to discern the ideology contained in the rationale granting this “elite” a monopoly over ethics. This rationale sprang from the crisis in which the universality concept found itself by 1989. In the preceding, modern political universe and in the Judeo-Christian civilization, governments, business, civil society associations, the people... were commonly bound together by what was then called “universal values”. The postmodern deconstruction of universal human rights, the common good, the law of nature destroyed societal unity and led to a shrunk definition of “civil society”, from which government and business were now excluded.

Ethical realignment of “the private sector”

While the Earth Summit encouraged a majority of Major Groups to participate in public *decision-making*, it interestingly did not do so with “business and industry”. This is indicative of Rio’s exclusion of business from the groups of actors deemed “on the side of ethics” and therefore entitled, as per the new politics, to participate in public decision-making. Quite the reverse, Agenda 21’s chapter 30 initiated a program⁹³⁶ for business and industry to realign their internal

⁹³⁵ In her book *The Third Force*, significantly published in 2000 by the CEIP, Ann Florini described “the rise of transnational civil society”.

⁹³⁶ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.10: “Business and industry, including transnational corporations, should be encouraged: a. To report annually on their environmental records, as well as on their use of energy and natural resources; b. To

decision-making processes along the exigencies of sustainable development. Business and industry were to, for instance, “ensure responsible and ethical management of products and processes from the point of view of health, safety and environmental aspects” and to “increase self-regulation, guided by appropriate codes, charters and initiatives integrated into all elements of business planning and decision-making” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.26).

Agenda 21 also instructed governments (in their novel “enabling role”) to:

“encourage the establishment and operations of sustainably managed enterprises. The mix would include regulatory measures, economic incentives and streamlining of administrative procedures to assure maximum efficiency in dealing with applications for approval in order to facilitate investment decisions, advice and assistance with information, infrastructural support and stewardship responsibilities” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.19).

Incidentally, the promotion of sustainable development was the exclusive focus of “public-private partnerships” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 34.26.b).

The Global Compact that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999, among other initiatives, would further spell out and codify business’ adjustment to sustainable development⁹³⁷. Global governance’s cooptation of business played a

adopt and report on the implementation of codes of conduct promoting the best environmental practice, such as the Business Charter on Sustainable Development of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the chemical industry's responsible care initiative.” *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.13: “Industry and business associations should cooperate with workers and trade unions to continuously improve the knowledge and skills for implementing sustainable development operations.” *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.16: “International and non-governmental organizations, including trade and scientific associations, should strengthen cleaner production information dissemination by expanding existing databases, such as the UNEP International Cleaner Production Clearing House (ICPIC), the UNIDO Industrial and Technological Information Bank (INTIB) and the ICC International Environment Bureau (IEB), and should forge networking of national and international information systems.” *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.22: “Business and industry, including transnational corporations, should be encouraged to establish world-wide corporate policies on sustainable development, arrange for environmentally sound technologies to be available to affiliates owned substantially by their parent company in developing countries without extra external charges, encourage overseas affiliates to modify procedures in order to reflect local ecological conditions and share experiences with local authorities, national Governments and international organizations.” *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.24: “Business and industry should establish national councils for sustainable development and help promote entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sectors. The inclusion of women entrepreneurs should be facilitated.”

⁹³⁷ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services Reports* 133, 179, 186, 200, 206, 207 on the Global Compact. As East German Georg Kell, whom K. Annan had designated as head of the *Global Compact*, told us: “Where we really had a problem until recently was with the business community. Of course, this difficulty has to do with the history of the UN. Until not too long ago, the business community was basically working against the UN, because the UN was viewed as an institution promoting regulation, state control, centralized control and was generally not viewed as making a case for business... With the arrival of Kofi Annan, there was a widely shared view here at the UN that we had to change our relationship with business, because the UN has been changing and the world has been changing. There is no longer an ideological battle about the right economic approach to development. There has been, let's put it like this, a growing convergence about what is the right thing to do.” See Peeters, Marguerite. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 133 of April 1, 1999. Interview with Georg Kell. Both the *Global Compact* and UNFIP became branches of the UN Secretariat, depending directly from the office of the Secretary-General and therefore escaping intergovernmental control. Many initiatives followed the Global Compact. In the book *Walking the Talk*, leading industrialists argued for the first time in 2002 that “not only is sustainable development good for business, the solving of environmental and social problems is essential for future growth” and that “a global partnership – between governments, business and civil society – is essential, if accelerating moves towards globalization are to maximize opportunities for all.” Holliday, Charles O., Schmidheiny, Stephan, Watts, Philip. *Walking the Talk. The Business Case for Sustainable Development*. Greenleaf Publishing. 2002, inner book

historic role in rallying a significant number of transnational corporations around the objectives of the UN conferences. In the late 1990s, many of them started issuing an annual sustainable development report.

Areas where “the private sector” naturally colluded with agents of revolution

There were areas in which business did not need realignment but already fully endorsed the UN conferences’ perspective. This was patently the case with the population control/sexual revolution agendas. The pharmaceutical industry was an obvious key strategic partner in the achievement of global governance’s contraceptive and abortive goals.

According to Singh, it was “at the beginning of the 1990s” that “UNFPA began to study the *role* [our emphasis] of the private sector in meeting contraceptive requirements”⁹³⁸. Cairo was the first UN population conference that addressed cooperation with the private sector. Cairo explicitly sought to “strengthen [our emphasis] the contribution” of the private sector “in the implementation of population and development programmes” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.16) and to *intensify* the partnership between Governments, international organizations, NGOs and what it called the non-governmental, “private, profit-oriented sector” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.13). In this partnership, Cairo assigned the pharmaceutical industry the role of “service delivery” and of “the production and distribution, within each region of the world, of high-quality reproductive health and family-planning commodities and contraceptives, which are accessible and affordable to low-income sectors of the population” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.15 b). The reproductive health agenda consolidated global governance’s partnership with business.

“Collusion” of pharmaceutical industry and transnational reproductive health NGOs

Cairo noted that “the profile of the donor community” had “increasingly been shaped by the growing presence of non-governmental and private-sector organizations” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 14.1). The population conference historically contributed to the forging of a historic and powerful alliance between the transnational pharmaceutical industry and transnational reproductive health NGOs. The purpose of this alliance was, *inter alia*, to finance the activities of population control NGOs (to multiply and intensify what the Rockefeller, Ford and MacArthur foundations, among others, had done up to then). Cairo specifically advocated the creation of *mechanisms* whereby family planning NGOs and the contraceptive industry could “exchange ideas and experiences in the population and development fields” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.17). After inciting governments to offer financial support to NGOs, it encouraged the private sector to do the same⁹³⁹. The private sector:

“should consider how it might better assist non-profit non-governmental organizations to play a wider role in society through the enhancement or creation of suitable *mechanisms*

cover. In the report she authored, *Building Partnerships, Cooperation between the United Nations system and the private sector*, Jane Nelson argued in favor of UN-business cooperation as an agenda for action. See Nelson, Jane. *Building Partnerships. Cooperation between the United Nations System and the Private Sector*. United Nations Department of Public Information. 2002.

⁹³⁸ Singh, Jyoti Shankar, *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, op. cit., p. 137.

⁹³⁹ Chapter XIV of the *Cairo Progr. of Action* dealt with international cooperation and the financial aspect of partnerships. It called on governments “to double the total global expenditures in population programmes and on donors to increase substantially their contribution” (par. 14.8). It recommended that the international community “increase the share of funding for population and development programmes commensurate with the scope and scale of activities required to achieve the objectives and goals of the present Programme of Action” (par. 14.11), and that international financial institutions “increase their financial assistance, particularly in population and reproductive health, including family planning and sexual health care” (par. 14.18).

[our emphasis] to channel financial and other appropriate support to non-governmental organizations and their associations” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.19).

History demonstrated that the creation of these “mechanisms” would rapidly evolve into defeatingly powerful alliances of the likeminded⁹⁴⁰ granting reproductive health agents a financial security ensuring their political hegemony even at times when major donor governments would slow down their support to population programs due to ideological opposition to the Cairo agenda⁹⁴¹. Global governance developed as an alliance of the ideologically-aligned, autonomously from intergovernmentally controlled processes.

6.4.5. Roles for transnational individuals

The new global partnership attributed each single individual making up the “global people” an active “role” to play in the realization of the global goals of sustainability, population stabilization, gender equality, new lifestyles, climate change mitigation... Copenhagen stated that “the aim of social integration” was “to create ‘a society for all’, in which *every individual* [our emphasis], each with rights and responsibilities, has an *active role to play* [Ib.]” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 66). Individuals would learn their “role” as practical “good global citizens” through “civic education”, the content of which would now be adjusted to the new global platform. Habitat recommended developing “education in citizenship to emphasize the *role* [Ib.] of individuals as actors in their communities” (*Copenhagen Report*, par. 180 c).

6.4.6. Mutual recognition of “roles” by governmental and non-governmental actors

The second wave conferences encouraged the *mutual recognition* of governmental and non-governmental actors’ specific “roles, responsibilities and special capacities”⁹⁴² in the implementation of the global agenda, conceived as common to both categories. They envisioned this mutual recognition to be achieved through *dialogue*:

“By 1995, a mutually productive dialogue should be established at the national level between all Governments and non-governmental organizations and their self-organized networks *to recognize and strengthen their respective roles* [our emphasis] in

⁹⁴⁰ Alliances of the likeminded owe a lot to Gramscian politics. As Chantal Mouffe explained it in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, “The Turin communists posed concretely the question of the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’: i.e. of the social basis of the proletarian dictatorship and the workers’ State. The proletariat can become the leading and the dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in *creating a system of alliances* [our emphasis] which allows it to mobilize the majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois State. In Italy, in the real class relations which exists there, this means to the extent that it succeeds in gaining the consent of the broad peasant masses”. Mouffe, Chantal. *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1979, p. 186. Gramsci’s *Notes on the Southern Question* (1926) contained the first appearance of his hegemony concept. Gramsci defined hegemony as a system of class alliance in which a “hegemonic class” exercised political leadership over “subaltern classes” by “winning them over.” Concretely, the Italian proletariat had to embrace other classes, such as the peasants, in a system of alliances through which it could then become hegemonic.

⁹⁴¹ These financial alliances of the likeminded will become increasingly critical to the implementation of Cairo. Melinda Gates became a key player. She organized a number of multistakeholder partnership events, as for example three international conferences on family planning in Africa (Kampala 2009, Dakar 2011 and Addis Ababa 2013). Among her partners were the European Commission, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UNFPA, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, USAID, Advance Family Planning Initiative...

⁹⁴² *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.2: “One of the major challenges facing the world community as it seeks to replace unsustainable development patterns with environmentally sound and sustainable development is the need to activate a sense of common purpose on behalf of all sectors of society. The chances of forging such a sense of purpose will depend on the willingness of all sectors to participate in genuine social partnership and dialogue, *while recognizing the independent roles, responsibilities and special capacities of each* [our emphasis].”

implementing environmentally sound and sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.7).

The mutual dialogue, recognition and strengthening of “roles” among all actors in the new global partnership was a leitmotiv running through the second wave conferences. They largely contributed to building the new regime.

Mutual recognition committed governments to empower non-state actors

The dialogue quietly reshaped the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors at the national level. It distracted governments from their real, given mandates. The mutual recognition process valued the *new roles* that the conferences – acting as a transcending “global authority” - gave governmental and non-governmental actors *over* the roles that they actually held as per their juridical mandates.

The new politics demanded from governments, when recognizing the “role” of non-state actors in global governance, to empower these actors⁹⁴³. Not infrequently during the revolution, which as of Vienna occurred under US President Bill Clinton’s first administration, the US led the way in this perspective. Let us give the revealing example of an interpretative statement by the US delegation to Beijing on the platform’s paragraph 26 which, read the US statement:

“recognizes the important role that non-governmental organizations play and the importance of working with them for progress. The United States recognizes the need for Governments to create an *enabling environment* [our emphasis] for non-governmental organizations and that such an environment is critical to the successful implementation of the Platform. The United States understands that Governments, in requesting that non-governmental organizations take action to implement the Platform, are thereby committing themselves to *facilitating* [our emphasis] the efforts of such organizations in this regard”⁹⁴⁴.

⁹⁴³ Following are some examples. *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 13.3: “The *role* of non-governmental organizations as partners in national policies and programmes is increasingly *recognized* [our emphasis], as is the important role of the private sector.” *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.1: “As the contribution, real and potential, of non-governmental organizations gains clearer *recognition* [Ib.] in many countries and at regional and international levels, it is important to affirm its relevance in the context of the preparation and implementation of the present Programme of Action.” *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.2: “In many areas of population and development activities, non-governmental groups are already rightly *recognized* [Ib.] for their comparative advantage in relation to government agencies, because of innovative, flexible and responsive programme design and implementation, including grass-roots participation, and because quite often they are rooted in and interact with constituencies that are poorly served and hard to reach through government channels”. *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 26 o: “Recognize that empowering people, particularly women, to strengthen their own capacities is a main objective of development and its principal resource. Empowerment requires the full participation of people in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of decisions determining the functioning and well-being of our societies”. *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 26: “Many Governments have increasingly *recognized* the important role that non-governmental organizations play and the importance of working with them for progress.” *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 60 c: “Include in their activities women with diverse needs and *recognize* that youth organizations are increasingly becoming effective partners in development programmes.” *Istanbul Report*, par. 198: “These innovative approaches should not only promote international cooperation but also include new forms of partnerships and cooperation involving civil society organizations, the private sector and local authorities. This implies *recognition* of complementary forms of decentralized cooperation and relations between and among local authorities and of their participation in international cooperation within the legal framework of each country, as well as their contribution to the process of defining human settlements policies. Governments, as well as bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, should commit themselves to encouraging cooperation between local authorities and to strengthening networks and associations of local authorities”.

⁹⁴⁴ *Beijing Report*. Interpretative statement on paragraph 26 of the Platform for Action, p. 172.

Clinton's administration fully endorsed Beijing's gender agenda and welcomed the *facilitating role* that the new politics assigned governments. The concept of *enabling environment* emerged for the first time in Rio Agenda 21⁹⁴⁵ and belongs to the political language of global governance. It basically means an environment facilitating the global governance partners' political empowerment.

Mutual recognition enabled non-state actors to hold governments accountable

The new politics' mutual recognition rule tended to be asymmetric. Governmental recognition of NGOs' role⁹⁴⁶ was more critical to the outcome of the revolution than the reverse process. Yet the latter was far from irrelevant. Non-state actors self-attributed a "monitoring" role, which UN member states formally-informally endorsed in the conferences' reports. Recognizing governments' new facilitating role in their own favor and the "commitments" they made to the global sustainable development goals, NGOs could then hold governments *accountable*. By the stage NGOs had become governments' "watchdogs", NGOs had acquired a non-negligible degree of practical authority over governments.

It was contrary to the global governance revolution's strategic objectives to request from transnational non-governmental actors to honor national governments' only legitimate "role" – to govern over their national people. It was rather in the logic of the revolution to deconstruct this "role" and its legitimacy by stealth.

Governmental and non-governmental actors' "complementary" roles within the framework

The mutual recognition by governmental and non-governmental actors of their respective "roles" within global governance's *framework*⁹⁴⁷ established a new political relationship between the two categories of actors. This new political relationship founded the new regime, whereby governmental and non-governmental actors became *complementary* to each other as partners at the service of the common global agenda⁹⁴⁸. What exclusively mattered under the new regime was their effective and efficient delivery of the global agenda, not the authority and power they legitimately held as per their given juridical mandate. In that sense, governmental and non-governmental partners became politically undifferentiated. Mutual recognition facilitated cooperation. Thus was woven an inextricable web of governmental and non-governmental

⁹⁴⁵ *Enabling environment* appeared three times in Rio Agenda 21, then in Cairo (2), Copenhagen (3), Beijing (5), Istanbul (3) and Rome (5).

⁹⁴⁶ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.1: "Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21". *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.4: "Formal and informal organizations and networks, including grass-roots movements, merit greater recognition at the local, national and international levels as valid and valuable partners for the implementation of the present Programme of Action".

⁹⁴⁷ Istanbul used the word "framework" to characterize the structure of a political system in which all actors, governmental and non-governmental, from the "global" to the local levels, participate in a partnership for sustainable development. Istanbul strongly advocated the development of "*frameworks for international cooperation* [our emphasis]" that "include the active participation of all levels of government, the private and cooperative sectors, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations in decision-making, policy formulation and resource allocation, implementation and evaluation". These frameworks were also to "include new and improved forms of cooperation and coordination between and among countries, multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies, international financial institutions, international organizations, and various organs and bodies of the United Nations system, including South-South, North-South and South-North exchanges of best practices". *Istanbul Report*, par. 197. The participants in the "Dialogue on how cities will look" at Istanbul likewise "recognized that sustainable human settlements provided the framework for the fulfilment of basic human rights and for the creative mobilization of human potential". *Istanbul Report*, p. 170. *Habitat Dialogues for the Twenty-first Century*.

⁹⁴⁸ Cairo, for instance, affirmed that NGO involvement would be "complementary to the responsibility of Governments to provide full, safe and accessible reproductive health services". *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.6.

partners in sustainable development, gender equality, reproductive health etc. Partnerships were systemic political interlinkages⁹⁴⁹ dynamically operating at all levels.

New politics' redistribution of roles becoming normative

In the revolution's immediate aftermath in 1997, the UN Development Programme, "after a comprehensive review of the literature on governance"⁹⁵⁰, issued a policy document entitled *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*. Although the publication slightly trespasses the time boundaries of this thesis, we deem it useful to mention its normative definition of governance at the end of this chapter. The definition corroborates this chapter's findings regarding the roles that the new politics assigned each category of partners, and the exclusion of business from civil society, the latter becoming the provider of values for both business and the state.

UNDP's definition is as follows:

"Governance includes the state, but *transcends it* [our emphasis] by taking in the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a *conducive* [Ib.] political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction – mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities. Because each has weaknesses and strengths, a major objective of our support for good governance is to promote constructive interaction among all three"⁹⁵¹.

UNDP's "definition", here applied to the national level, was transferrable to "global" governance: the state was then replaced by UN member states and intergovernmental processes, the private sector by transnational corporations, and "civil society" (as per its novel and shrunk definition) by "global civil society".

As of 1993 under the leadership of Gus Speth, a great advocate of the new global partnership, the UNDP self-attributed a "normative role" in governance within the UN system and had taken the lead in theoretically fixing the new politics' normative framework. The UNDP assigned to itself the "mandate" to assist countries in "building capacity for good governance". Since UNDP started doing so, it has consistently viewed the state, "civil society" and the private sector as three different "sectors"⁹⁵² of governance. The "normative" definition UNDP gave governance formalized the new global partnership as a tripartite system indissolubly uniting state, civil society and the private sector⁹⁵³ around the common sustainable development agenda. UNDP

⁹⁴⁹ The conferences recommended, as Agenda 21 formulated it, to ensure "the fullest possible communication and cooperation" between NGOs and "international organizations, national and local governments" and to encourage NGOs to "foster cooperation and communication among themselves" so that they "reinforce their effectiveness as actors in the implementation of sustainable development". *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.4.

⁹⁵⁰ UNDP. *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*. A UNDP policy document. 1997.

⁹⁵¹ Ib.

⁹⁵² For example: "Civil society constitutes a third sector, existing alongside and interacting with the state and market". UNDP. *UNDP and Civil Society Organizations. A Toolkit for Strengthening Partnerships*. 2006. Speth had been a great promoter of partnerships early on. In 1991, he chaired a US task force on international development and environmental security which produced the report *Partnership for Sustainable Development: A New US Agenda*.

⁹⁵³ UNDP's three main partners in global governance differ from those of the UNCED (states, key sectors of society and the people). UNDP included *the people* in civil society while the UNCED included *the private sector* in key sectors of society. UNDP's 1997 normative definition of governance represented a more mature conceptual stage of the global governance process. Scholars at the beginning of the 2000s picked it up: "Instead of states only, a triad of actors comprising (1) states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), (2) market forces and (3) civil society actors plays important roles in existing international and evolving global governance". Brühl, Tanha and Rittberger,

repositioned these three actors in their interrelations. The definition established that the tripartite new political regime – governance – was more encompassing than⁹⁵⁴, and transcended the state. The use of the verb “transcend” indicated the intent that *governance rule over the state*, and by extension that global governance rule over all the world’s states.

Governance’s governing over the state would be achieved by reducing the state to the status of an *enabling partner* of civil society and the private sector in the delivery of a global agenda common to the three of them and established by supra-national experts. The state’s new role was then to create a “conducive environment” to that end. It was that of a facilitator. The private sector’s role was to act as economic powerhouse, providing jobs and income. “Civil society’s” role was to promote “constructive interaction” between the partners, in other words to act as social engineers in favor of global governance’s revolutionary changes. All three partners would commonly submit to the rulings of the global elite who detained the leading political and ethical role in the new system.

The new politics claims to *unite* the three actors around a common agenda: the new global agenda and its ethics. But its redistribution of roles in function of what each does best to deliver this agenda in reality *divorces* them from what used to unite them under the previous world vision – that both of modernity and of the Judeo-Christian civilization. In the former system, business was not excluded from “civil society”, and NGOs (“civil society”) were not the provider of ethics. UNDP’s normative exclusion of business from civil society demonstrated the fragmentation of the modern contract of society that had occurred by the end of the Cold War. In the modern *Weltanschauung*, that of John Locke and of his contract of society, all individual and institutional components of a society – whether associations, enterprises, people, government - were bound together by the values and objectives they commonly chose. In the Greek and Judeo-Christian perspectives, the recognition of what is universal – of what is just, good, true, peaceful - and their common declaration of what all recognized as universal united all actors. The source of morality and ethics was a law written on all human hearts, recognizable by reason and conscience, not the Diktats of a few⁹⁵⁵.

CHAPTER 7

THE HARD CHARACTER OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE’S “SOFT POLITICS”: A GLOBAL CENTAUR REGIME

The global governance revolution happened by way of *soft power*. After exposing the second wave UN conferences’ rationale for the new partnerships’ politics, identifying the categories of actors that they coopted in the realization of their global goals, how they redefined these actors’

Volker. *From international to global governance: Actors, collective decision-making, and the United Nations in the world of the twenty-first century*. In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁹⁵⁴ This idea comes from James Rosenau’s 1992 *Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics* (in *Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics*. Ed. James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge University Press. 1992, pp. 1-29).

⁹⁵⁵ In his September 22, 2011 speech before the Bundestag, pope Benedict XVI reflected on the foundations of the liberal rule of law and referred to Saint Paul’s Letter to the Romans (2, 14 et seq.) which contains the two notions of conscience (which Benedict equates with a “docile heart”) and nature. He criticized the positivist interpretation of nature and reason which has become dominant since the middle of the 20th century, ushering in a situation he qualified as “dramatic”. See Ratzinger, Joseph. *Affirmer le droit et combattre l’injustice*. In *Libérer la Liberté*, op. cit., pp. 143-151.

roles and redistributed them in function of their supposedly “transcending” objectives, chapter seven now identifies the soft power techniques that global governance’s ruling partners used to operate the revolutionary changes they pursued as objectives, the political principles governing their techniques and these techniques’ capacity to effectively deliver (“enforce”) the global agenda. This chapter uncovers the hard, ruling side of global governance’s “soft politics” as well as its *transgressional* character vis-à-vis the norms of international cooperation as set by the UN Charter.

Global governance’s soft power politics has presented itself as *consensual* and *non-coercive*. This chapter however evidences how it has demonstrated to detain a decisive amount of hard capacity and has been coercing in ways proper to postmodern domination processes. Global governance’s power bears a resemblance to Gramsci’s hegemonic power. The Italian Marxist philosopher famously defined hegemony as “the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent”⁹⁵⁶. Gramsci used Machiavelli’s centaur metaphor and principle that “a prince must know how to use both natures [man and animal], and that one without the other is not durable”⁹⁵⁷. Gramsci, portraying Machiavelli as a Jacobin *avant la lettre*⁹⁵⁸, had also noted how the Jacobins practiced the Machiavellian principle by imposing themselves on opponents while *building consensus* on their platform and stimulating the “active intervention of the great popular masses as a factor of social progress”⁹⁵⁹. Global governance imposed its new worldview on potential opponents in the name of a global consensus. This chapter identifies global governance’s soft-hard nature: global governance as a centaur regime.

There is, however, a notable difference between the global governance revolution and Gramscian hegemony. The latter, Marxist, concept corresponded to the cultural hegemony of the ruling class (the bourgeoisie) over the powerless, who consented to be dominated by those in position of power. A revolution led by the proletariat was in order to overthrow the established order. In the global governance revolution by contradistinction, a minority of transnational, neo-Marxist, non-governmental (non-ruling) activists grabbed soft power to impose on those juridically and institutionally in power novel political paradigms crystallizing a cultural platform that had become hegemonic in the West since the late 1960s. Hence global governance’s hegemonic power – distinctively of a global scope - was in the hands of the revolution’s agents, not in that of the established order. The global governance revolution reversed Gramsci’s process.

The postmodern ethos that had become hegemonic in the West had intellectually prepared the ground for the ideas of global governance’ primary partners. This helps explain how these actors, even if a minority, could easily obtain the *consent* of many Western governments on their novel hegemonic platform. The way they then gained the alleged consent of non-Western governments was largely by resorting to manipulative techniques, among which semantic manipulation occupied a central place. As already noted in chapter five, all partners – both primary and those

⁹⁵⁶ The quotes of Gramsci and Machiavelli in this paragraph come from the following source: Boothman, Derek (University of Bologna). *The Sources for Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony*. In *Rethinking Marxism*. April 2008. Published on Research Gate. ([PDF](#)) *The Sources for Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony* ([researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227411177)) (retrieved January 8, 2022).

⁹⁵⁷ As quoted by Boothman, Derek, Ib.: Machiavelli 1950: 64. Q13§37; Gramsci 1971: 80, note 49. This dual nature represented for Gramsci “the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, of the individual moment and the universal moment (‘Church’ and ‘State’), of agitation and propaganda, of tactics and strategy etc.” (Q13§14; Gramsci 1971: 170, whose first draft, Q8§86, explicitly refers to Croce’s “Church and State” essay; see Croce 1946: 125-30).

⁹⁵⁸ As quoted by Boothman, Derek, Ib.: Q8§35.

⁹⁵⁹ As quoted by Boothman, Derek, Ib.: Gramsci 1995: 341.

consenting to be coopted in implementation - had provided the “social forces” sustaining the global governance “regime”.

7.1. A soft-formal politics

7.1.1. Is global governance a global political economy, or a real power regime?

Rio and Cairo used the expression “comparative advantage”⁹⁶⁰ in relation to the new politics’ division of labor among implementing partners and its organizational efforts to ensure coordination among actors, avoid duplication of work and assign each the role that it best and most efficiently performed compared to the other partners in view of commonly achieving global sustainable development. “Comparative advantage” is a term belonging to economic theory. Yet it is also political in the sense that the holder of a comparative advantage wields *power* over its partners. The use of the term in the two mentioned UN conferences suggests that global governance self-identified as a *global political economy*⁹⁶¹.

The Greek etymology of the word “economy” (*oikonomia*) combines the concept of “household” (*oikos*) and the verb “to manage” (*vēμοματι*). Incidentally, economics as a science started developing when the state began to be compared to a “household”. The term “governance”, which Rio introduced in the language of UN conferences⁹⁶², itself also suggests the idea of *consensual*

⁹⁶⁰ Comparative advantage appeared twice in Agenda 21 and three times in Cairo. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.4: “All agencies of the United Nations system have a key role to play in the implementation of Agenda 21 within their respective competence. To ensure proper coordination and avoid duplication in the implementation of Agenda 21, there should be an effective division of labor between various parts of the United Nations system based on their terms of reference and comparative advantages.” *Rio Agenda 21*’s other use had a clear economic meaning, par. 2.5: “An open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable multilateral trading system that is consistent with the goals of sustainable development and leads to the optimal distribution of global production in accordance with comparative advantage is of benefit to all trading partners.” *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 14.7: “Recipient Governments should strengthen their national coordination mechanisms for international cooperation in population and development, and in consultations with donors clarify the responsibilities assigned to various types of development partners, including intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations, based on careful consideration of their comparative advantages in the context of national development priorities and of their ability to interact with national development partners.” *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.2: “Despite widely varying situations in their relationship and interaction with Governments, non-governmental organizations have made and are increasingly making important contributions to both population and development activities at all levels. In many areas of population and development activities, non-governmental groups are already rightly recognized for their comparative advantage in relation to government agencies, because of innovative, flexible and responsive programme design and implementation, including grass-roots participation, and because quite often they are rooted in and interact with constituencies that are poorly served and hard to reach through government channels.” And *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.25: “Within their respective mandates and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 48/162, the Assembly, during its 49th session, and the Economic and Social Council, in 1995, should review the roles, responsibilities, mandates and comparative advantages of both the relevant intergovernmental bodies and the organs of the United Nations system addressing population and development”.

⁹⁶¹ Political scientists debate over the use of “international” or “global” to qualify the “political economy” field. See Baylis, John et al. *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford University Press. Seventh Edition. 2017. The book dedicated a chapter to “global political economy”: “International Political Economy (IPE) is a tremendously rich, exciting, and relevant field of study... Its vibrant debates centre on questions about power, asking what forms power takes in the global political economy, who or what exercises power, and with what political consequences” (p. 253). The trend is to shift to a “global” political economy: “Many rightly view the ‘T’ [in IPE] to be misleading. The field is not concerned with relations about states (the ‘international’); all of the processes of structural change are better considered to be global in scope, involving non-state and private actors as well as, or independently of, nation-states.” (Box 16.1, p. 254).

⁹⁶² *Our Common Future* had first used *governance* in reference to *local* governance. Agenda 21 used the term seven times, Cairo five, Copenhagen four, Beijing two, Istanbul eight and Rome one, not to mention the references to the *Commission on Global Governance* contained in these reports.

management more than of *hard government*⁹⁶³. In the 1960s, James Rosenau had coined the term “governance” in reference to a pattern of *managing* affairs on an international platform. The term has been in vogue ever since. Rosenau later exercised his influence on the work of the Commission on Global Governance, for which he contributed a paper entitled *Changing Capacities of Citizens, 1945-1995*⁹⁶⁴.

In his 1992 *Governance without Government: order and change in world politics* book (contemporaneous with the Earth Summit), Rosenau described how he viewed the difference between governance and government:

“Governance is not synonymous with government. Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to *systems of rule* [our emphasis]; but government suggests activities that are backed by *formal authority* [Ib.], by police powers to insure [sic] the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by *shared goals* [Ib.] that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a *more encompassing* [Ib.] phenomenon than government. It *embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms* [Ib.] whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants”⁹⁶⁵.

It is noteworthy that Rosenau viewed governance as more encompassing than government – as “holistic” although he does not use the UN conferences’ word. As our thesis has underscored, holistic paradigms transcend their constitutive parts: in synton with what the UNDP later asserted in its normative 1997 document, quoted at the end of last chapter (“governance includes the state but transcends it”), governance would *transcend* government: through this “transcendence”, it would deconstruct governmental institutions from within, in a way reflecting postmodernity’s anti-institutional, anti-authority stance. Rosenau’s 1992 book influenced the authors of *Our Global Neighborhood*, and Rosenau himself contributed to the work of the Commission on Global Governance. The report of the commission defined governance as follows:

⁹⁶³ Chantal Delsol observed the soft, managerial character of the governance concept: « La gouvernance, vocable nouveau indéfiniment ressassé depuis les dernières années du XXème siècle, répond au désir de consensus. Le mot, qui remonte au XIIème siècle (associé à certains types d’administration comme les baillages d’Artois et de Flandres), resurgit aujourd’hui pour nommer un autre type de gouvernement. Ou plutôt, un non-gouvernement, sous les traits d’une gestion-administration, ce qui apparaît clairement dans l’historique de son utilisation récente : les entreprises sont les premières à s’en saisir au milieu du XXème siècle. Puis elle concerne la ‘démocratie participative’ : les politiques urbaines, locales ou régionales – de nombreuses initiatives ont été mises en place dans les villes, qui peuvent prendre les noms de conseils de quartier, ateliers urbains, jurys de citoyens, etc. ; enfin les institutions internationales comme le FMI ou l’OMC ; puis habille l’espérance d’une politique mondiale : ‘Gouvernance mondiale’. Le succès contemporain de la gouvernance montre que nous sommes en train, sur le plan politique, non pas de changer de régime, mais de changer de monde : en dépit de certaines interrogations, tout laisse à penser que la politique sera remplacée par la gestion et l’administration, enfin essentiellement, par une technocratie. » Delsol, Chantal, *L’âge du renoncement*, Les Editions du Cerf. Paris. 2011, p. 208. In our view, Delsol failed to discern governance’s effective and potential ruling capacity.

⁹⁶⁴ In *Issues in Global Governance. Papers written for the Commission on Global Governance*. London. Kluwer Law International. 1995, pp. 1-57.

⁹⁶⁵ Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, eds. *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, op. cit., p. 4.

“Governance is the *sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage* [our emphasis] their common affairs. It is a *continuing process* [Ib.] through which conflicting or diverse interests may be *accommodated* [Ib.] and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as *informal arrangements* [Ib.] that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest”⁹⁶⁶.

The report relates governance and global governance to the notions of public-private, formal-informal, individuals-institutions joint management (as opposed to government), of an on-going consensual process, of a “global civil society” operating at all levels⁹⁶⁷. The new global partnership for sustainable development is in effect deprived of the defining features of what would make it a global government: of a juridically binding constitution or charter, of a juridically binding mandate (that would come from all the “citizens” of all UN member states), of formally constituted institutions, of a law-making capacity, of legitimate power, of revenue. *Our Global Neighborhood* specified that global governance was neither “world government” (which would be a new institution) nor “world federalism”. While deprived of a formal institutional structure, global governance is nonetheless *systemic*, as the following quote from the same report revealingly manifests:

“There is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a *broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances* [our emphasis]. Although bound to respond to the specific requirements of different issue areas, governance must take an *integrated approach* [Ib.] to questions of human survival and prosperity. Recognizing the systemic nature of these issues, it must promote *systemic approaches* [Ib.] in dealing with them”⁹⁶⁸.

In the book he co-edited *Governance without government*, James Rosenau defined global governance as “an order that lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global sphere”⁹⁶⁹. The conceptualizer of governance and by extension global governance did associate the two terms with the notion of “order”. A couple of years later, Rosenau provided this stronger definition for global governance: “systems of rule at all levels of human activity - from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”⁹⁷⁰.

⁹⁶⁶ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁹⁶⁷ *Our Global Neighborhood* described *global governance* as being “about a varied cast of actors: people acting together in formal and informal ways, in communities and countries, within sectors and across them, in non-governmental bodies and citizens’ movements, and both nationally and internationally, as a global civil society. And it is through people that other actors play their roles: states and governments of states, regions and alliances in formal or informal garb” (Ib., p. 225).

⁹⁶⁸ Ib., p. 4.

⁹⁶⁹ Rosenau, James. *Governance, Order and Change in World Politics*. In *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.

⁹⁷⁰ Rosenau, James N. *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*. Global Governance. Vol. 1, No. 1. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1995, pp. 13–43, p. 13. Winter 1995. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800099> (retrieved January 2, 2022). Rosenau pursued: “It is necessary to clarify that global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained. The United Nations system and national governments are surely central to the conduct of global governance, but they are only part of the full picture. Or at least in this analysis global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions” (Ib., p. 13). And he went on: “Governance... encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes the many other channels through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies

This thesis' understanding of governance and global governance retains from these definitions the hard-soft, formal-informal, governmental-non-governmental, sovereignty-bound vs. "sovereignty free"⁹⁷¹ actors, framework-process dialectical mixes, as well as the idea that global governance is a normative system ruling at all levels (from the "global" one to the grass-roots), performing purposive acts, pursuing common goals, establishing a transnational *order*⁹⁷², using command and control⁹⁷³.

It is clear from these authoritative sources that global governance, under the guise of being an evolving process of change, of being deprived of stable content, "liquid", recognizably postmodern, is nonetheless intended to have decision-making, ruling and control *power*⁹⁷⁴. It

pursued... To grasp the concept of control one has to appreciate that it consists of relational phenomena that, taken holistically, constitute systems of rule. Some actors, the controllers, seek to modify the behavior and/or orientations of other actors, the controlees, and the resulting patterns of interaction between the former and the latter can properly be viewed as a system of rule sustained by one or another form of control. It does not matter whether the controlees resist or comply with the effort of controllers; in either event, attempts at control have been undertaken. But it is not until the attempts become increasingly successful and compliance with them increasingly patterned that a system of rule founded on mechanisms of control can said to have evolved. True systems and control mechanisms, in other words, are founded on a modicum of regularity, a form of recurrent behavior that systematically links the efforts of controllers to the compliance of controlees through either formal or informal channels" (Ib., pp. 14-15). Rosenau insisted on the "purposeful nature of governance without presuming the presence of hierarchy" and highlighted the etymological roots of governance: "the term 'derives from the Greek 'kybenan' and 'kybernetes' which means 'to steer' and 'pilot or helmsman' respectively... The process of governance is the process whereby an organization or society steers itself, and the dynamics of communication and control are central to that process." (Ib., p. 14). Hosts of scholars provided their own definitions of global governance, manifesting the same type of soft-hard mix. To provide just one additional example from a Japanese scholar: "Global governance – defined as collective and concerted efforts to deal effectively with issues that go beyond the capacities of states, IGOs, NGOs and other actors to address them on their own – needs to cooperation of all stakeholders to overcome the absence of a central authority. The concept of partnership governed by mutual respect of independence and differences among each and every stakeholder may well represent such cooperative process. In reality, however, there are various obstacles to building partnership between actors of dramatically unequal power and wealth. The management of partnership among actors having different aims or operational styles is by no means easy. Nevertheless, partnership may have to be recognized as an imperative to create a shared vision and to maintain synergy in order to realize new visions." Kunugi, Tatsuro. *Building Global Governance Partnerships Among Governments, Inter-Governmental Organizations and NGOs*. Institute of Comparative Culture. Sophia University. Tokyo. ADMP Serie No. 35. 1999, p. 3.

⁹⁷¹ As already quoted in the introduction. Rosenau, James. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, op. cit., p. 36.

⁹⁷² Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1925-2019), referring to Rosenau, defined global governance as "any purposeful activity intended to 'control' or influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring at other levels, projects influence into that arena". Finkelstein, Lawrence S. *What is Global Governance?*, op. cit., p. 368. And: "Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what government is doing at home. This definition is concerned with purposive acts, not tacit arrangements. It emphasizes what is done rather than the constitutional basis for doing it". Ib., p. 369. Interestingly, Finkelstein had accompanied the US delegation to the 1945 San Francisco conference, participated in the founding of the UN and was for many years Vice President of the internationalist/globalist *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. In 1995 Finkelstein revealed himself as a global governance advocate.

⁹⁷³ Rosenau, James N. *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*. Global Governance. Vol. 1, No. 1. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1995, pp. 13–43, p. 13. Winter 1995. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800099> (retrieved January 2, 2022). The features we just listed are found in a number of later works on global governance, such as *The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance. International Political Economy meets Foucault*. Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Iver B. Neumann. Palgrave MacMillan. 2012. Or *Hybrid institutional complexes in global governance*. The Review of International Organizations. Kenneth W. Abbott. Benjamin Faude. April 28, 2021.

⁹⁷⁴ Here we disagree with the assessment made by French philosopher Marcel Gauchet, who believes that *governance* is deprived of *power*: Les gouvernants « ne sont plus là que pour veiller à la préservation de la règle du jeu et assurer la bonne marche du processus. Il leur revient d'opérer les arbitrages et de faciliter les compromis appelés par la dynamique du pluralisme des intérêts, des convictions et des identités. C'est ce déplacement par rapport à l'idée classique de gouvernement qu'enregistre le terme en vogue de 'gouvernance'. Il y a une grande ambition derrière la modestie qu'il affiche, celle d'une politique sans pouvoir, pas moins. Une ambition qui ne va pas sans un deuil non

detains power first by holistically comprising and operating through formal institutions and regimes “empowered to enforce compliance” (first and foremost national governments and the UN), secondly because the rulers in the new system – the primary partners – did effectively grab power for themselves in a system that, as per the own admission of global governance’s conceptualizers, “transcends” these formal institutions, and thirdly because global governance’s partnerships system granted it access to abundant human, social, economic and financial resources.

A commentator in lockstep with Rosenau argued that “Governments exercise rule, governance uses power”⁹⁷⁵. The remark is significant to the extent it appears to point to the absence of “rule” in the exercise of governance, which indirectly confirms our finding about the partners’ *unruly power-grab*. But the remark does not mean that governance does not rule. Quite the contrary, this thesis has demonstrated, and the quotes above have just confirmed, that global governance has *normatively* exercised its ruling, controlling power from the global to the local levels. Global governance has pursued, with unwavering determination, *enforcement* objectives.

Let us lastly observe that it is in the very nature of power to be hard. Governance and global governance are hard because they use power. In that sense, *soft power* is a delusive oxymoron. The shift to global governance, which did historically take place in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath, was a shift from the formal authority of sovereign governments to a global power, even if this power was in itself deprived of institutions of its own, of juridical, political and moral authority and legitimacy.

7.1.2. *Thriving on informality*

The *enlargement* of the UN relationship with non-member states actors from NGOs – the only group the UN Charter specifically named - to the revolution’s open-ended host of other non-state actors, whether juridically constituted or informal, identified in chapter six happened in a way that one could describe as “formal-soft”. This enlargement politically constituted global governance as this thesis understands it. It was the object of a *formal* intergovernmental consensus, a consensus consolidated conference upon conference from 1990 to 1996, and uninterruptedly thereafter⁹⁷⁶. The conferences’ consensual agreements, however, were juridically *non-binding* on UN member states.

Paradoxical situation: governmental “commitment” to transgressive process

The formal-soft process bespoke a paradoxical situation. The conferences’ reports repeatedly underscored the “commitment” of participating UN member states to engage in partnerships. The new partnerships regime, however, subversively redistributed a substantial amount of power belonging to sovereign governments to transnational non-governmental actors and violated the national sovereignty of UN member states. This situation confronted UN member states with three choices. The first was to remain passive and to turn a blind eye on these violations. The second was to redress them and recover control of the UN as the organization’s only legitimate power-holders. The third was to call for a new Charter, juridically transforming the UN into global

moins considérable, dont il nest pas sûr qu'il soit clairement assumé, celui de ce que permet le pouvoir, à savoir le façonnement dans le temps de la communauté humaine par la réflexion et la volonté. » Gauchet, Marcel. *La Démocratie d'une Crise à l'Autre*. Editions Cécile Defaut. 2007, p. 43.

⁹⁷⁵ Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. *Governance and Democratization*. In *Governance without Government*, op. cit., p. 250. Czempiel argued that he understood “governance” to mean the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done” (ib., p. 250).

⁹⁷⁶ *Inter alia*, through the adoption of the MDGs, then the SDGs.

governance, or at least to substantially amend the 1945 document to now include partnerships with non-state actors.

Had UN member states' "commitment" to partnerships been genuine, it would have led sovereign governments to opt for the third choice, because the new global partnership transgresses the UN's international nature. Their demonstrated reluctance to take such a major juridical step betrayed the ambivalent or ungenuine character of their "commitments" to the global partnership regime. Sovereign governments were not the primary authors of this regime. Opting for the first, self-destructive choice, governments consented to collaborate and get entangled with a system that dispossessed them of their independence, authority and power. They disengaged from their mandated responsibilities. As a result, the drifting process could only continue, and normative power keep on shifting to "participatory", unelected groups proactive in global policy-making and to the UN Secretariat. Governments' laxism gave these actors a free rein to pursue their objectives of global political and cultural transformation.

The paradox we just identified confirms the basic finding of this thesis about the historic influence that the transnational non-governmental elite exercised over sovereign governments during the UN conference process. But how did this elite, deprived of any legitimate "authority", manage to convince governments to commit to the new normative framework and partnerships' regime that it had taken the initiative to set?

Joseph Nye's soft power concept concomitant with revolution's break-out

The non-state actors' power-grab from sovereign governments at the UN during the conference process took place by way of what Joseph Nye was the first to name "soft power" in the late 1980s⁹⁷⁷: a power of "conviction" and "persuasion", an ability to influence by attraction and cooptation, as opposed to the power to coerce, notably with threats, military deterrence, payments, economic sanctions. What is the new global partnership, if not a cooptation regime?

Joseph Nye's conceptualization of soft power was concomitant with the breakout of the global governance revolution. It surfed on the wave of the post-structuralist, French theory cultural movement that had, since the 1960s, been valuing what was soft, informal, parallel, fuzzy⁹⁷⁸, seemingly non-threatening and had concomitantly discredited authority, dogma, anything formal, institutional, juridically binding, considered to be top-down. This cultural movement absolutized the individual's "freedom to choose".

Our Global Neighborhood, issued at the revolution's peak after the Cairo conference where NGOs had indisputably dominated over governments, praised soft power, without naming it, as the only form of *effective* leadership:

"The concept of dispersed [i.e. shared by the whole spectrum of actors, state and non-state] and democratic leadership should not be seen as contradictory. It draws its strength

⁹⁷⁷ The term *soft power* became common currency following a piece that Joseph Nye wrote in *Foreign Policy* in 1990 (Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Soft Power*. Foreign Policy N° 80. Autumn, 1990, pp. 153-171) and the publication of his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Books. New-York. 1990). Nye continued to develop the concept in *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics* (PublicAffairs. 2004). His conceptual elaboration of soft power in the late 1980s immediately preceded and succeeded the global governance revolution. This historical convergence is striking. Incidentally, Joseph Nye has been a member of the *Trilateral Commission* and chaired its North American branch. He was on the Board of Directors of the *Council on Foreign Relations*. In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Nye to the Foreign Affairs Policy Board under the second Obama administration.

⁹⁷⁸ Fuzzy is a word that the current postmodern pop culture often uses.

from society as much as the state, from solidarity much more than from authority. It operates by persuasion, co-operation, and consensus more often than by imposition and fiat. It may be less heroic, but it is the only form of leadership likely to prove effective”⁹⁷⁹.

This quote manifests that the new politics posits its own version of soft power and its global ethics as qualitatively superior to hard power and to the authority deriving from this hard power’s juridical legitimacy, thereby degrading the latter in a typical postmodern, deconstructionist fashion. Furthermore, such a reversed hierarchy assumes the ideological neutrality of the power of conviction. Without question, soft power would be at the service of self-evident, commonsense, consensual agendas. Global governance’s promotion of soft power implied a plain denial of the existence of any ideological drive in its exercise.

The agenda of a process making certain ideological perspectives appear common sense for all members of society, to the point of rendering impossible or senseless any alternative view (such as currently seems to be the case with global governance’s integrated sustainable development agenda) comes from Gramsci’s cultural hegemony by consent. It is therefore highly significant that in a 2002 *The Guardian* article, Joseph Nye acclaimed Gramsci: “Political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do”⁹⁸⁰. Isn’t that precisely what the partners have done during the global governance revolution, determining the *framework* of international cooperation for the 21st century?

Nye further explained in a 2012 *Wall Street Journal* article that with soft power, “the best propaganda is not propaganda”⁹⁸¹. Nye thereby implicitly admitted the *manipulative* side of soft power, in other words the fact that the power to convince forces people’s consciences and encroaches upon personal freedom. In a free world, by contrast, people independently use their reason and conscience in their search for what is real and true. To awaken their ability to do so has traditionally been regarded as the purpose of education. Global governance’s ideological agendas have made its use of the power to convince all the more manipulative.

The revolution’s agents’ soft power techniques for manipulative purposes

Global governance’s soft power manifested itself in its abundant and manipulative use of processes such as dialogue (“constructive dialogue”, “participatory dialogue”), consensus-building⁹⁸², awareness-raising, advocacy, education reform, Children or Youth Parliaments, peer education, gender training, capacity-building, negotiation skills, informal discussions, social transformation, good governance, governance from below, power with, participation in decisions affecting one’s lives, bottom-up/grass-roots participation, decentralization, broad-based consultation, Chatman House rules, participatory democracy, facilitation, round table talks,

⁹⁷⁹ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., pp.38-39.

⁹⁸⁰ Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Why Military Power is No Longer Enough*. The Guardian. March 31, 2002. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/31/1> (retrieved November 9, 2021).

⁹⁸¹ Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *China’s Soft Power Deficit - To catch up, its politics must unleash the many talents of its civil society*. The *Wall Street Journal*. May 8, 2012.

⁹⁸² Chantal Delsol described the consensual process as follows: « Le système du consensus... porte l’idée sous-jacente selon laquelle le conflit ne doit pas demeurer, même latent. Il cherche par la discussion et la persuasion à effacer l’adversité et l’altérité des opinions, à dégager, non une opinion majoritaire, mais une opinion commune à tous sans exception. Les opinions contraires qui subsistent sont refoulées et les désaccords restants étouffés ou peut-être plus ou moins inconscients. C’est la liberté de penser par soi-même qui perd sa valeur face à la nécessité d’une société parlant d’une seule voix, même si cela n’a pas été obtenu par contrainte ». *L’Age du Renoncement*, op. cit., p. 190.

guidelines⁹⁸³, codes of conduct, best practices, enablement, enabling environment, empowerment (women's and youth's in particular), inclusive partnerships, non-state actors involvement, civil society power, values clarification, internalization, an "attractive" new global ethics, media campaigns, long-term processes of change⁹⁸⁴, network-building, coalition-building, system-building, linkages, win-win, weaving webs of likeminded partners, cooptation, synergies, semantic manipulation... These postmodern techniques correspond to and name the *political paradigms of global governance as process*.

Semantic manipulation, a Gramscian technique, has figured prominently among the techniques the partners have used to force a consensus on their global agendas. The partners created an attractive novel and global language. This language was ambivalent: subject to a diversity of contradictory interpretations. Ambivalence was strategic. Its purpose was to hide hard ideological agendas and circumvent a genuinely open intergovernmental debate. We will revisit semantic manipulation at the end of chapter eight.

It is through such seemingly non-threatening processes that the global elite convinced governments and "the people" to adopt agendas that represented its own interests, not those of national peoples⁹⁸⁵. With incontrovertible success, soft power-holders have steered the intergovernmental/non-governmental partnership tandem's handlebars, making sovereign governments behave as their fellow travelers.

Principles of soft power techniques as used by global governance agents

A set of interconnected principles governed how the agents of the global governance revolution used their *soft power* political paradigms.

The main principle has already been identified in preceding chapters. It consisted in putting global governance's political paradigms at the exclusive service of global governance's novel agendas – not of what is just, true, good, nor of what corresponds to national peoples' will. The conferences promoted dialogue, empowerment, capacity-building, awareness-raising, facilitation, good governance etc. for the exclusive purpose of achieving sustainable development, gender equality, quality of life for all, reproductive health etc. This principle *framed* all participants in soft power, *constraining* their liberty, submitting them to the ruling globalist elite's normative exigencies. Such framing was therefore *hard*. Soft power techniques such as dialogue or gender training were attractively but delusively presented as free, "open", participatory, empowering. In reality they were steered in a single direction.

⁹⁸³ New-York for example used a language suggesting that it respected the freedom of all actors. Its Plan of Action, par. 1, stated: "This Plan of Action is intended as a guide [our emphasis] for national Governments, international organizations, bilateral aid agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and all other sectors of society in formulating *their own programmes of action* [Ib.] for ensuring the implementation of the Declaration of the World Summit for Children." But it was clear that the new global political system framed all actors. After the revolution, UN documents started using the word "ownership", which sounds respectful of autonomy but in fact meant ownership of the global agenda.

⁹⁸⁴ For instance, *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 293: "The Platform for Action is part of a continuing process [our emphasis] and has a catalytic effect as it will contribute to programmes and practical outcomes for girls and women of all ages."

⁹⁸⁵ An issue we do not address in this thesis, but should be looked at, is the degree to which the new, postmodern politics has integrated political science in the past decades, giving the new paradigms a scientific and "neutral" appearance.

A second principle was to strategically present the soft power paradigms as *win-wins*, as “mutually productive” or “mutually beneficial”⁹⁸⁶ for governmental and non-governmental actors alike. Such an appealing presentation was deceptive. Soft power paradigms were unidirectional. They clearly did not serve the interests of national peoples and their governments. By contradistinction, they politically benefitted the few who had unilaterally set the direction that all were to follow.

A third principle related to the global-to-local scope of the global governance revolution. It consisted in applying the soft power political paradigms at all levels with a view to realizing, mainstreaming and prioritizing the global agenda down to the local level in all countries and to organizing the new political system down to the grassroots. The soft processes through which the global consensus was first built at the international level had to be replicated at the national and local levels. To the extent soft power techniques did deploy their outreach globally, the inexorable joint effect was worldwide cultural and political harmonization and conformity to the global dictates on the one hand, and on the other, the quiet dissolution of national sovereignty and cultural identity.

A fourth principle was for global governance’s soft power paradigms to engage participants in an *on-going political process of change*. The conferences intended awareness-raising, facilitation, education, training, dialogue... to be “continuous”, to be *in a dynamic*: to be a patient, perseverant, laborious power transfer and transformative process. Even in domains or in geographical regions where the global governance revolution had initially encountered resistance, a sustained exercise of soft power would eventually yield results in terms of ideological alignment and long-term social transformation⁹⁸⁷. Social science techniques were put at the service of power-grab.

A fifth principle derives from global governance’s “post-ideology” foundational myth. It was, as already noted, to assume soft power in its various forms not to pursue ideological objectives, to be ideologically neutral. In global governance’s post-truth universe, however, the power to

⁹⁸⁶ See for instance *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.14: “By acknowledging the contribution of the private sector, and by seeking more programme areas for mutually beneficial cooperation, Governments and non-governmental organizations alike may strengthen the efficiency of their population and development activities”.

⁹⁸⁷ Vienna recognized standard-setting to be States’ “primary responsibility”, but emphasized “the importance of *continued dialogue* [our emphasis] and cooperation between Governments and non-governmental organizations” (*Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 38).

“convince” concretely amounted to social engineering⁹⁸⁸, propaganda⁹⁸⁹, manipulation on a historically unprecedented - global-to-local - scale⁹⁹⁰.

Lastly, the soft power processes were to lead to the institution of *political mechanisms* facilitating a quiet power transfer from sovereign governments over to nationally-operating transnational agents of global governance. This chapter will later expose and analyze these mechanisms. The mechanisms allowed the “global experts” to substantially contribute to national and local policy-making, positing themselves in the stead of the national and local people or their representatives. They reshaped the relationship between the two categories of actors.

Soft power, “hard” achievements

Anywhere it has exercised its influence since the beginning of the second wave conferences, global governance’s soft power regime has replicated the concatenation of semantic, conceptual and procedural/political changes that it had operated first at the UN conferences. There and then, the global governance revolution irreversibly altered the language, objectives, content of international cooperation as established by the UN Charter. The verifiable and phenomenal degree of penetration of the novel language in all countries, in all strata of societies, has evidenced global governance’s capacity to deliver - effectively, efficiently, rapidly, globally-to-locally. Its governing, “enforcement” capacity, has differed by its “soft” nature from a hard, institutionally-established, juridically governing authority, but has proven to be a power of comparable efficacy. It would bypass the purview of any study to offer a comprehensive exposition of the transformational changes that the global governance revolution has spurred worldwide. Let us take a quick bird’s eye view on some of its achievements.

⁹⁸⁸ *Social engineering* is a phrase first coined in 1894 by Dutch industrialist J. C. Van Marken who claimed that specialists were needed for handling human challenges, just as technicians are needed to address technical problems. Social engineering later came to mean large scale social manipulation in social psychology and political science. Kevin Mitnick, a famous hacker, popularized the expression in the information technology domain in the 1990s.

⁹⁸⁹ In a book first published in 1939, biologist, sociologist and social activist Serge Chakotin described political propaganda techniques and their effects on the psychology of the masses. Chakotin observed propaganda to at times be “a shrewd combination of persuasion and menace”. Chakotin, Serge. *The Rape of the Masses. The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda*. Routledge Revivals. 2017. First Published in Paris (*Le Viol des Foules*. Editions Gallimard. 1939), p. 154. Chakotin quoted Hitler at the 1936 Nuremberg party congress as exclaiming: “Propaganda brought us into power, propaganda has since enabled us to remain in power, and propaganda will give us the means of conquering the world” (Ib., p. 174). Chakotin contended that the “characteristic of the age in which we are living is... a diminution in the real influence of collectivities on public life: they are growing more and more into docile instruments in the hands of usurpers, dictators, who unscrupulously make use of their more or less intuitive apprehension of psychological laws, together with their control of the formidable technical equipment afforded by the modern State, to manipulate the individuals composing a people by a method which we have called psychological rape.” (Ib., p. 35). Already in 1939, Chakotin noted that a characteristic of the crowd as well as of the masses was “the preponderance of any emotional over any intellectual appeal” (Ib., p. 42). Lastly, Chakotin rightly observed that “The first thing needed in a popular movement like the Socialist movement is optimistic energy and thirst for action. The great failing of many democratic leaders is to take too little interest in the state of mind of their followers, to be always inclined to dwell too much on criticism; it does not occur to them that this excess of criticism often paralyses not only the masses but the militants” (Ib., p. 269).

⁹⁹⁰ Chantal Delsol relates the weakening of convictions and of the idea of truth to that of democracy, and both to the advent of the consensus practice as a substitute to democratic debate: « L’affaiblissement et l’effacement de l’idée de vérité entraîne nécessairement l’inutilité de la démocratie, puisque celle-ci repose à la fois sur l’importance de la vérité et sur la difficulté à la saisir. Avec l’éclipse des visions du monde et des convictions, le débat sur la direction à prendre par la société se dissipe naturellement. Il est normal que le consensus soit appelé pour remplacer le débat, en l’absence désormais d’enjeux vérifiables. » Delsol, Chantal. *L’âge du renoncement*, op. cit., p. 186. And : « En l’absence de dogmes, l’accord s’obtient autour de la seule finalité qui désormais s’impose à tous : la recherche de la concorde. L’éthique de la discussion selon Habermas requiert l’équivalence des vérités morales : la vérité est remplacée par une prétention à la validité » (Ib., p. 187).

Already as the second wave conferences were enfolding, the paradigms of the soft global regime started spreading globally like wildfire, to the remotest areas of the globe. At various degrees, the new paradigms have integrated a critical number of international, regional, national and local political institutions, the policies of governmental Ministries, national laws, societies, the content of media and publicity campaigns, the entertainment and cultural industry, business practices and codes of conduct, employers' ethical charts, the norms, values and activities of the associational world, academic curricula and textbooks from kindergarten to the post-graduate levels worldwide... Global governance's paradigms have informed constitutional reforms and new national constitutions⁹⁹¹. They renamed existing ministries and governmental programmes⁹⁹². The global governance revolution multiplied its partners in a tentacular fashion at all levels: from the multinational corporation to the small local business, from umbrella organizations of local authorities to the mayor of a remote village in Africa, from international education trade unions to the local school in Latin America... The revolution set in place operational mechanisms integrating the input of NGOs in international, national and local (inter)governmental decision-making. Through its novel anthropological paradigms, the new regime globalized the Western sexual revolution and its corresponding destruction of morality, families, cultures and religion: a destruction of a hard and violent nature. Postmodern deconstruction is hard to the extent it destroys our given identity, reality as is.

More than ever, over 25 years after the revolution, global governance's paradigm shifts govern us. Good governance, sustainability, "people-centeredness", "Planet" protection, new lifestyles, sexual and reproductive health, gender equality, partnerships, participatory democracy, facilitation, the celebration of diversity, quality of life and well-being for all, women's empowerment, the non-discrimination principle, children's rights and empowerment, all of global governance's ethical values, norms, political practices developed over the course of its revolution now impact every institution and community, in one way or another, down to one's local social circles, school and health care centers, town hall meetings, jobs, private conversations... Global governance's platform has *de facto* been implemented arguably almost as if it had been in compliance of hard international (or "global") law.

This thesis has shown the depth of the fundamental changes that soft global governance achieved *within* the institutional, hard power structures of international cooperation, imposing on these structures new agendas coming *from without* its legitimate decision-making processes. To significant extents and in radical ways, the revolution *reinterpreted* (and successfully imposed its reinterpretation of) the mandate of international institutions, the roles of sovereign governments,

⁹⁹¹ Most constitutions adopted or amended after the global governance revolution contained some of its language. Let us provide four examples. Art. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted by the National Assembly in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, on April 2, 1997 reads: "The Republic of Poland shall ... ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development". The Polish Constitution was one of the first fundamental laws referring to such a "principle". South Sudan's Constitution of 2011 integrates sustainable development, gender, cultural diversity among other new paradigms. The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia's consolidated text as of 15 January 2014 includes three mentions of gender (Official Gazette Nos 56/90, 135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10 and 5/14 (Edited and translated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia). The Belgian Constitution, following a 2007 amendment to its Art. 7bis reads: "Dans l'exercice de leurs compétences respectives, l'État fédéral, les communautés et les régions poursuivent les objectifs d'un développement durable, dans ses dimensions sociale, économique et environnementale, en tenant compte de la solidarité entre les générations."

⁹⁹² A majority of developing countries now have ministries including the term gender, in replacement of what used to be Ministries of Women or of Women's Affairs.

be centralized, institutionalized, but it is *performative*. We shall also see that global governance's underpinning ethics conferred on the soft regime a *virtual power-authority*: a power deprived of legitimate authority but imposing itself as if it were an authority, in the name of "global values".

7.1.3. Conferences' promotion of dialogue, awareness-raising and education: examples of soft but efficient transformational power

Let us now illustrate the new politics' use of soft power with the analysis of two techniques that the second wave conferences abundantly promoted: dialogue and awareness-raising/education.

"Dialogue" as a grand social engineering exercise

The second wave conferences orchestrated a major *dialogue* exercise among participants in the new global partnership. They variously qualified this dialogue as "continuous", "constructive", "open", "mutually productive" or "participatory". Such wording appealed both to non-Western cultures and to the new postmodern Western culture which had substituted what it perceived as any form of top-down imposition with bottom-up "dialogue" since the 1960s. However, the unequivocal purpose of the conferences' "dialogue" was not to promote an open debate among participants in the global partnership, but to align all partners along the global goals: "dialogue" amounted to social engineering.

The conferences intended the dialogue to take place across the board, between all governmental and non-governmental partners in sustainable development, at all levels. Agenda 21, for example, promoted dialogue: between UN member states; between all Governments and non-governmental organizations and their self-organized networks; between local non-governmental organizations and local authorities; between local authorities, citizens, local organizations and private enterprises; between the youth community and Government at all levels⁹⁹³; between governments and rural communities; between national and local government, industry, science, environmental groups and the public; between official organizations and groups of non-governmental organizations; between trade, development and environment communities; between the actors involved in urban development; between business and industry and employees and the public; between the scientific and technological community and decision-makers and the public; between the scientific and technological community and society as a whole...

Agenda 21 encouraged dialogue between all these actors in order to: *build consensus* on sustainable development among all actors at all levels⁹⁹⁴; *encourage partnership* in activities aimed at sustainable development at all levels; *facilitate coordination* among implementing actors⁹⁹⁵; *prioritize* sustainable development on the agenda of all actors⁹⁹⁶; *weave the new*

⁹⁹³ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 25.4: "Each country should, in consultation with its youth communities, establish a process to promote dialogue between the youth community and Government at all levels and to establish mechanisms that permit youth access to information and provide them with the opportunity to present their perspectives on government decisions, including the implementation of Agenda 21".

⁹⁹⁴ For instance, at the local level, to adopt a local Agenda 21 (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 28.3).

⁹⁹⁵ For "achieving better integration among national and local government, industry, science, environmental groups and the public in the process of developing effective approaches to environment and development" (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 8.2) or to "facilitate non-governmental coordination in implementing national policies at the programme level" (Ib., par. 27.10 a).

⁹⁹⁶ The *Rio Agenda 21* unambiguously stated that the new global partnership committed "all States to engage in a continuous and constructive dialogue... keeping in view ... that sustainable development should become a *priority* item on the agenda of the international community" (par. 2.1).

politics' system of roles, responsibilities, skills and capacities⁹⁹⁷; channel the inputs of NGOs or youth to governmental policy-making⁹⁹⁸; develop "a common value framework between the scientific and technological community and society as a whole" (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 31.10 b)...

The examples in the two preceding paragraphs demonstrate the scope and depth of the "dialogue" launched at the UNCED. In the Earth Summit's aftermath, this dialogue was deployed at all levels, from global-to-local, in its full amplitude. The conferences geared the "dialogue" towards the exclusive purpose of advancing a holistic agenda "sealed" or set in stone by the primary partners. Such framing corrupted the nature of dialogue, transforming it into a grand social engineering exercise. The "dialogue" did not allow any reopening of the "consensus", any ideological challenging of the framework as a whole, nor even in any of its individual components. Convinced through "dialogue", national and local governments were coopted and instrumentalized as *partnerships enablers*, as agents of national and local social transformation, as national and local consensus-builders on the global agenda⁹⁹⁹, as agents of transmission of this agenda down to the local communities¹⁰⁰⁰.

Awareness-raising and education to mobilize all sectors

The conferences emphasized the role of education ("holistically" understood, as including what they called *informal* and *non-formal* education beyond the formal curriculum) and awareness-raising in producing the long-term changes they pursued as objectives. The *transition* to sustainable development demanded a radical political, cultural, ethical and ideological adjustment on the part of all actors. The conferences advocated partnering in a special way with the media¹⁰⁰¹ and the education sector as "awareness-raisers" in order to produce this adjustment. They viewed education as "a key factor in sustainable development" (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.2)¹⁰⁰², provided education was reoriented in the new direction. The new worldview had to conquer young people so that they willingly enroll as agents of change in its favor.

⁹⁹⁷ Dialogue should "lead to an identification of skill gaps, institutional capacities and capabilities, technological and scientific requirements and resource needs to enhance environmental knowledge and administration to integrate environment and development". *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 37.5.

⁹⁹⁸ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.10: "Governments should take measures to: a. Establish or enhance an existing dialogue with non-governmental organizations and their self-organized networks representing various sectors, which could serve to: (i) consider the rights and responsibilities of these organizations; (ii) efficiently channel integrated non-governmental inputs to the governmental policy development process; and (iii) facilitate non-governmental coordination in implementing national policies at the programme level". Or *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 25.4: "Each country should, in consultation with its youth communities, establish a process to promote dialogue between the youth community and Government at all levels and to establish mechanisms that permit youth access to information and provide them with the opportunity to present their perspectives on government decisions, including the implementation of Agenda 21".

⁹⁹⁹ The *Rio Agenda 21* established that each state "should", as "an important aspect of overall planning", "seek internal consensus at all levels of society on policies and programmes needed for short- and long-term capacity-building to implement its Agenda 21 programme" and specified that "this consensus should result from a participatory dialogue of relevant interest groups" (par. 37.5).

¹⁰⁰⁰ The *Rio Agenda 21* furthermore requested national governments to "encourage and enable partnership and dialogue between local non-governmental organizations and local authorities in activities aimed at sustainable development" (par. 27. 10b).

¹⁰⁰¹ See for instance *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 5.13, 7.54.b, 8.11, 24.3.i, 36.10.e... Global governance even assigned a monitoring role to the media: "Demographic, socio-economic and other relevant information networks should be created or strengthened, where appropriate, at the national, regional and global levels to facilitate monitoring the implementation of programmes of action and activities on population, environment and development at the national, regional and global levels" (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 12.6).

¹⁰⁰² Cairo viewed education both as a "factor in the development of well-being through its links with demographic as well as economic and social factors" and as a "means to enable the individual to gain access to knowledge, which is a precondition for coping, by anyone wishing to do so, with today's complex world".

Rio pioneered the process that re-oriented education towards sustainable development. Agenda 21 plainly stated its objective “to promote broad public awareness as an essential part of a global education effort to strengthen attitudes, values and actions which are compatible with sustainable development” (par. 36.9). Rio realistically foresaw that the “commitment and genuine involvement of all social groups”, which it deemed “critical to the effective implementation” (par. 23.1) of sustainable development, would not happen spontaneously. It therefore emphasized the “need to activate a sense of common purpose on behalf of all sectors of society” (par. 27.2). It identified the task of “forging such a sense of purpose” as “one of the major challenges facing the world community” (Ib.). Rio attributed this awareness-raising task not only to education but to “all sectors”¹⁰⁰³. It even conferred a special responsibility to governments as awareness-raisers¹⁰⁰⁴, thereby consolidating the *role* global governance attributed governments as national consensus-builders on the global agenda.

In a similar vein, Cairo considered that “greater public knowledge, understanding and commitment at all levels, from the individual to the international [were] vital to the achievement of [its] goals and objectives” (i.e. sexual and reproductive health) (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.11). “In all countries and among all groups,” Cairo therefore emphasized, “information, education and communication activities concerning population and sustainable development issues must be strengthened” (Ib.). Proving extremely imaginative in this respect, Cairo mentioned a

“range of communication channels, from the most intimate levels of interpersonal communication to formal school curricula, from traditional folk arts to modern mass entertainment, and from seminars for local community leaders to coverage of global issues by the national and international news media” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.13).

Awareness raised to the global experts’ “knowledge”: enlightened despotism revisited

The new politics interlinked *information* about, and *knowledge* of the global agenda on the one hand, and *commitment* to the same on the other¹⁰⁰⁵. The holders of “knowledge” were the primary partners: the few technocrats at the helm of global governance, who coined the new paradigms, the builders of the conceptual framework. They stood at the source of global governance’s education and awareness-raising exercise. The “knowledge” of these enlightened despots was to be transmitted to all categories of ignorant implementing partners standing at the receiving end of “knowledge” – be they professors, students, the general public, the media, governments, NGOs, the private sector, international organizations other than the UN...

¹⁰⁰³ As already quoted, *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.2: “The chances of forging such a sense of purpose will depend on the willingness of all sectors to participate in genuine social partnership and dialogue, while recognizing the independent roles, responsibilities and special capacities of each”.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See for instance *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 10.9: “Governments at the appropriate level, in collaboration with national institutions and interest groups and with the support of regional and international organizations, should launch awareness-raising campaigns to alert and educate people on the importance of integrated land and land resources management and the role that individuals and social groups can play in it.” Or *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 24.3 I, urging governments to establish “programmes to eliminate persistent negative images, stereotypes, attitudes and prejudices against women through changes in socialization patterns, the media, advertising, and formal and non-formal education”.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Our Global Neighborhood* emphasized the importance of knowledge to construct global governance: “Effective global governance ... will not be achieved quickly: it requires an enormously improved understanding of what it means to live in a more crowded, interdependent world with finite resources.” Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 6.

For the ignorant to *commit* to sustainable development and to participate in its implementation as useful partners, they had to be convinced of the need to *change* their values, lifestyles and perspective. The unenlightened had to be enlightened. They had to become “aware” of the issues, problems and solutions that “the experts” had identified and developed. They would then “recognize” the necessity to engage in the global partnership. The technocrats exercised over them a despotic *power of conviction*. As advocated and practiced, awareness-raising did not actively engage people’s conscience and reason, as free and independent individual persons or institutions. It demanded blind trust in the experts: a servile attitude. The ignorant behaved as passive pupils of “those who knew”. This manipulative, social engineering process undermined freedom of conscience. It uncovered global governance’s gnostic character.

The passivity requested from the “pupil-partners” at the learning stage contrasted with the active engagement that the revolution demanded from them once it came to implement the technocratic norms. Once their “awareness” had been risen, it became a categorical obligation for the learners to “commit”, “participate” and act on the experts’ “knowledge”. The conferences’ call for their participation was phrased in terms conveying the impression that the process was bottom-up¹⁰⁰⁶. It was, in reality, eminently top-down. The experts’ “knowledge” was supposedly at once scientifically indisputable and ethically imperative. All global governance’s educational paradigms applied the same gnostic and scientific logic. “Best practices”, for instance, was conceived as a process whereby the best implementors of the global agenda became models for all partners to follow. “Gender training” assumed the gender perspective to be undisputedly ethically imperative.

The long-term global inculcation of the new worldview would best be achieved by educating the young generations in the sustainable development ethics. The second wave conferences threw the seeds of a major education reform for the 21st century. Cairo for example instructed to “improve [our emphasis] the content of the curriculum so as to promote greater responsibility and awareness on the interrelationships between population and sustainable development; health issues, including reproductive health; and gender equity” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.5 c)¹⁰⁰⁷. In the conferences’ perspective, adapting the content of school curriculum to the global objectives represented a qualitative “improvement”. In various degrees, in many parts of the world¹⁰⁰⁸ and in ways that have escaped democratic control, ministries of education rapidly adapted public educational content in the revolution’s immediate aftermath. The conferences’ awareness-raising and education reform platform was devoid of a pluralistic perspective. Global governance’s

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Our Common Future* already underlined the need for such a participation of all: “The environment is the business of everybody, development is the business of everybody, life and living is the business of everybody. I think the solution will be found in encouraging mass environmental literacy so that there can be democratic and literate decisions, because if decisions are taken by a few without the incorporation of the opinion of the masses, the NGOs especially included, the likelihood is that the situations will not succeed. They will be imposed from above, the people will not respond positively to them, and the project is lost before it is launched”. Of course, the source for the “mass environmental literacy” are the experts. World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Frame in par. 37, quote by Joseph Ouma, Dean of School of Environmental Studies, Moi University, WCED Public Hearing, Nairobi, 23 Sept 1986.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Implementing the Cairo vision, UNESCO published *Education 2030. International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education – an evidence-informed approach*, a 2018 update to a first edition released in 2009. The Guidance represents the “policy” of global governance in the area of sexuality education. Its real authors are “experts” selected from within the powerful networks, governmental and non-governmental, that have held international cooperation hostage since the Western sexual revolution of the 1960s. The Guidance was endorsed by all UN bodies relevant to “sexuality education”, that is UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN WOMEN and WHO.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Either Western countries, already in line with the novel perspective, or non-Western countries deprived of strong democratic institutions and/or previous to global governance’s pressure and financial blackmail.

pressure in favor of education reform has been a historic propaganda exercise, unprecedented in its global scope and in the depth of changes in educational contents that it involved.

7.2. The soft regime's "enforcement" strategies

We have by now conclusively understood that the new regime's soft power politics, operating under the guise of facilitation, guidance, dialogue or awareness-raising, of mere recommendations and non-binding resolutions, had both an enforcement or coercive *intent* and a governing, ruling or executive¹⁰⁰⁹ *capacity*. Its *power with* or *horizontal power* (the power of supposedly "equal" partners) was in critical ways a *power over* institutional and hard processes, *from within* them: a power *over*, hence a type of *government* – not the mere "management" suggested by the use of the term *governance*.

Global governance's soft power became the "new hard" in two major ways. On the one hand, it operated through and instrumentalized hard power: the power of the UN as an intergovernmental organization, bound by a hard juridical mandate, as well as the power of all those institutions coopted in global governance, themselves likewise bound by their respective mandates (other international organizations, regional organizations, national governments and their ministries, health and education institutions worldwide etc.). On the other, it had as clear intent to bind and commit all actors, governmental or not, to its normative global agenda. The global governance revolution brought about a paradoxical situation.

Following the logic of the former, juridical order, global governance would have teeth only to the extent its platform penetrated international law. By the end of the revolution, this extent remained limited. Even if the non-state actors that have led the global governance process since its seminal stage have played an inspiring role in the creation of new hard law instruments¹⁰¹⁰, the creation of international law instruments does exclusively fall within the responsibility of sovereign governments. To try and render its global governance platform *enforceable*, the revolution mainly went through channels other than international law.

The consensuses of the various conferences were juridically non-binding statements of intent. Governments had no juridical obligation to implement the conferences' "recommendations"¹⁰¹¹ and soft UN "resolutions" that were mere suggestions or advices, not hard mandates, prescriptions or injunctions. Yet the new partnerships' politics pursued globally normative ambitions. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997-2006) called the post-Cold War "global consensus" a *normative framework*¹⁰¹². A UN reform document under Kofi Annan's leadership would even

¹⁰⁰⁹ It is not by chance that Kofi Annan, in his reform package, used the term "executive powers" in reference to the reform of the UN Secretariat. He decided to create in his secretariat "a *cabinet-style* decision-making mechanism (with stronger *executive powers* than the present Senior Management Group) to improve both policy and management". He wanted for himself "a *higher level of managerial authority* and flexibility." *In larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary General. 21 March 2005. A/59/2005, par. 191.

¹⁰¹⁰ Non-state actors had an impact on the content of CEDAW, CRC, FCCC, CBD...

¹⁰¹¹ The Cambridge English Dictionary, for instance, defines "recommendation" as "a suggestion that something is good or suitable for a particular purpose or job". See

[RECOMMENDATION | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary](#) (retrieved March 7, 2021).

¹⁰¹² The phrases "normative consensus", "normative framework" as relating to the synthesis built over the second wave conferences would frequently appear in UN Secretariat's documents following the revolution. These documents emphasized the "normative work" of the UN. An example is the following: "The historic United Nations conferences and summits held in the 1990s helped build a comprehensive normative framework around these linkages for the first time by mapping out a broad vision of shared development priorities. These laid the groundwork for the Millennium Summit to set out a series of time-bound targets across all these areas — ranging from halving

call the new global partnership “global normative alliances”¹⁰¹³. The global governance revolutionary process proved so efficient in building the normative consensus, implementing it and monitoring its implementation that it demonstrated detaining a highly efficient enforcement capacity, arguably, as already observed, comparable to that of hard law¹⁰¹⁴.

7.2.1. Formal-informal mechanisms structuring the new partnership politics

The construction of the global partnership regime demanded a political restructuring. This restructuring took place formally-informally through the institution of what the conferences called *mechanisms* - without, as usual, defining what they meant by that.

Mechanisms to facilitate or institute restructuring of decision-making

The second wave conferences instructed international organizations and governments to create *mechanisms*¹⁰¹⁵ so as to *facilitate* or even *institute*, in all countries and at all levels, the *restructuring* of decision-making that the global governance process had surreptitiously operated since its beginnings within UN processes: the unilateral political empowerment of non-state, non-governmental actors for the achievement of the global agenda. It is significant that the controversial Cairo conference used the semantically strong verb “*institute*” to characterize the act of creating such mechanisms¹⁰¹⁶. The verb suggested, not that the mechanisms became institutions, but that they were to be firmly established, organized and set in operation. It indicated a will to *enforce* the global agenda. It also illustrated the organized, quasi-instituted or even dictatorial side of global governance’s “soft power”.

Political restructuration through the development of “mechanisms” was Agenda 21’s stated overarching goal: to “*improve or restructure* [our emphasis] the decision-making process so that consideration of socio-economic and environmental issues [i.e. sustainable development] is fully integrated and a broader range of public participation [i.e. new global partnership] assured” (par.

extreme poverty to putting all children into primary school, all with a deadline of 2015 — that were later crystallized into the Millennium Development Goals (see box 1).” *In larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, op. cit., par. 28.

¹⁰¹³ *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance*. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society Relations. A/58/817. June 22, 2004. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Reports 224 of August 10, 2004, Report 225 of August 17, 2004, Report 226 of August 27, 2004 and Report 227 of September 3, 2004.

¹⁰¹⁴ In an article entitled *Effectiveness of the Beijing Conference in fostering compliance with international law regarding women*, the gender feminist scholar Rebecca J. Cook affirmed: “The effectiveness of the Beijing Platform can be assessed by its ability to develop ‘soft’ normative standards from which more explicitly binding rules of international law will emerge. While one must guard against the assumption that binding law must be the ultimate outcome of a UN conference, it remains true that softer, less determinate normative developments are a necessary precursor for the emergence of more concrete norms of binding law.” Cook, Rebecca J. In *United Nations-sponsored World Conferences. Focus on Impact and Follow-up*. Edited by Michael G. Schechter. United Nations University Press. 2001, p. 79.

¹⁰¹⁵ Uses of the word *mechanism* in the second wave conferences: Jomtien (8), New-York (3), *Rio Agenda 21* (221), *Rio Declaration* (0), *Forest Principles* (2), Vienna (11), Cairo (32), Copenhagen (31), Beijing (75), Istanbul (73), Rome (19) uses of the word “mechanisms”. And in the first wave conferences: Tehran (0), Stockholm (12), Bucharest (0), Mexico (8), Copenhagen (16), Mexico (2), Nairobi (15).

¹⁰¹⁶ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.4: “For such partnerships to develop and thrive, it is necessary for governmental and non-governmental organizations to institute appropriate *systems and mechanisms* [our emphasis] to facilitate constructive dialogue, in the context of national programmes and policies, recognizing their distinct roles, responsibilities and particular capacities.” See also opening statement by Boutros-Ghali at Cairo: “But the United Nations also instituted operational structures to assist States in their population policy” (*Cairo Report*, p. 156). Or *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 7.17: “Governments at all levels are urged to institute systems of monitoring and evaluation of user-centred services with a view to detecting, preventing and controlling abuses by family-planning managers and providers and to ensure a continuing improvement in the quality of services.”

8.3). To these combined ends, which made up the new global partnership for sustainable development – global governance’s overall agenda -, Agenda 21 urged countries to “develop or improve *mechanisms* [Ib.] to facilitate [Ib.] the involvement of concerned individuals, groups and organizations *in decision-making* [Ib.] at all levels” (par. 8.3.c)¹⁰¹⁷. In its chapter on NGOs, Agenda 21 provoked society, governments and international bodies all at once into developing “*mechanisms* [Ib.] to allow NGOs to play their partnership role responsibly and effectively [Ib.]” (par. 27.5). It invited the UN system to “review and report on ways of enhancing existing procedures and *mechanisms* [Ib.] by which non-governmental organizations contribute to policy design, decision-making, implementation and evaluation at the individual agency level, in inter-agency discussions and in United Nations conferences” (par. 27.9.a). Agenda 21 pressured governments to “involve non-governmental organizations in national *mechanisms* [Ib.] or procedures established to carry out Agenda 21, making the best use of their particular capacities” (par. 27.10.c), and to “take into account the findings of non-governmental monitoring and review *mechanisms* [Ib.] in the design and evaluation of policies concerning the implementation of Agenda 21 at all levels” (par. 27.10.d)¹⁰¹⁸. The Rio recommendations regarded the other Major Groups¹⁰¹⁹, not only NGOs: each country and the United Nations were, for example, to “support the promotion and creation of *mechanisms* [Ib.] to involve youth representation in all United Nations processes in order to influence [Ib.] those processes” (par. 25.7)¹⁰²⁰.

To sum up, the purpose of mechanisms that Agenda 21 (and subsequent conferences in its wake) advocated was unilaterally to empower all non-state partners and restructure decision-making entirely in their political favor. By contradistinction, the mechanisms consolidated governments’ *facilitator role* under the new regime. Rio as all subsequent conferences viewed the restructuring as a political improvement and qualitative jump.

Cairo added the word *systems* to *mechanisms*. The population conference recommended the joint institution, by both governmental and non-governmental organizations, of “*systems* and *mechanisms* [our emphasis] to facilitate constructive dialogue in the context of national programmes and policies, recognizing their distinct roles, responsibilities and particular capacities” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.4). Cairo thereby indicated a will to organize the new politics into a *system* – that is, a “regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole”¹⁰²¹. The regular interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors to implement the Cairo agenda had as imperceptible effect to dilute or dissolve the identity of national governments as sovereign actors, independent of transnational NGOs.

¹⁰¹⁷ And *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 8.21 d: “Mechanisms for appropriate involvement of individuals and groups in the development and enforcement of laws and regulations on environment and development”.

¹⁰¹⁸ And Ib., par. 27.12: “The organizations of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations and forums, bilateral programmes and the private sector, as appropriate, will need to provide increased financial and administrative support for non-governmental organizations and their self-organized networks, in particular those based in developing countries, that contribute to the monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 21 programmes, and provide training for non-governmental organizations (and assist them to develop their own training programmes) at the international and regional levels to enhance their partnership role in programme design and implementation”.

¹⁰¹⁹ As for example to “take active steps to implement … measures to strengthen… women’s bureaux, women’s non-governmental organizations and women’s groups in enhancing capacity-building for sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 24.3b).

¹⁰²⁰ Another example is the following: “Governments should undertake the following activities… b. Promote regional cooperative mechanisms to address regional needs for sustainable development. Such regional cooperative mechanisms could be facilitated through public/private partnerships and provide support to Governments, industry, nongovernmental educational institutions and other domestic and international organizations, and by strengthening global professional networks” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 31.4.).

¹⁰²¹ See [System | Definition of System by Merriam-Webster](#) (retrieved August 10, 2021).

Mechanisms to coopt and bind new partners, recommendations formulated as Diktats

The installation of mechanisms was also to *ensure the commitment* of the implementing partners (the new non-state partners) to the global agenda and their active participation in its implementation. Underlining how “essential” the “support and participation of major groups as defined in Agenda 21” were to the success of the implementation of its *Programme of Action*, Copenhagen, seeking to “ensure the commitment of these groups”, stated that “they must be involved in planning, elaboration, implementation and evaluation at both the national and the international levels” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 100). “To this end”, Copenhagen specified, “mechanisms [our emphasis] are needed to support, promote and allow their effective participation in all relevant United Nations bodies, including the mechanisms responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Programme of Action” (Ib.). Istanbul likewise advocated “establishing *agenda-setting participatory mechanisms* [Ib.] enabling individuals, families, communities, indigenous people and civil society to play a *proactive role* [Ib.] in identifying local needs and priorities and formulating new policies, plans and projects” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 182 h).

To ensure the compliance of international and national actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, with the alleged “mandates” of the conferences, the conferences set in place *reporting mechanisms* which they at times also applied to non-governmental agencies. The Children Summit in particular, urging “all international development agencies - multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental” to “examine how they can contribute to the achievement of [its] goals and strategies”, requested them “to *report* [our emphasis] their plans and programmes to their respective governing bodies before the end of 1991 and periodically thereafter” (*New-York Plan of Action*, par. 35. I).

The conferences’ language reflected the intense pressure the revolution’s agents put on international organizations, governments and societal actors to establish “mechanisms” that would politically empower non-governmental actors. The soft “recommendations” to do so amounted to real Diktats. Governments were engineered into taking initiatives doomed to disempower them.

The formal-informal mechanisms constructed a power-sharing regime

The mechanisms were formal-informal operational and structured processes. They were formal in the sense that their creation necessarily was the object of an actual decision on the part of governments or international organizations; informal in that their establishment and exercise took place through a “constructive dialogue” between (inter)governmental and non-governmental actors, circumvented formal and/or democratic decision-making and did not necessarily take on an institutional form.

When put in place, the mechanisms have constructed the partnerships’ regime and rendered it operational. The mechanisms engineered a new type of relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors at the international, national and local levels. They gave the non-state actors involved in sustainable development the political space to act as effective policy designers, decision-makers and monitoring agents alongside governments. As seen in chapter six, they organized the new political system in such a way that governmental and non-governmental partners mutually “recognized” their specific “roles”, “responsibilities” and “capacities” in relation to the global agenda. They activated a *sense of common purpose* between the two categories of “partners”. They facilitated their mobilization and guaranteed their “full potential contribution” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.4) to the global political process. All in all, the mechanisms ensured soft power holders a practical enforcement capacity.

The mechanisms were *power-sharing* mechanisms. They quietly proceeded to a power redistribution of a historic nature and scope. They allowed transnational vectors of the global agenda, at the service of the global elite, not of individual nations, to directly impact national and local governmental policies without their influence being in any way submitted to people's democratic control, in any of the UN member states that were democracies. They dramatically weakened sovereign governments, democratic ones more than authoritarian ones, and imperceptibly reduced their capacity to govern: a development this thesis has already often observed. Sovereign governments collaborating in the institution of the recommended "mechanisms" became instruments of their self-weakening. They behaved as slavish vassals of the overlords at the helm of global governance, submitting to their Diktats, not as sovereign authorities and representatives of their respective people's will. Certainly not all governments were impacted in the same proportions. It was easier for global governance to impose its will on governments that heavily relied on foreign aid (the G77), were democratically weak and unaware of global governance's hidden agendas in the early 1990s. But it can be argued that the US, the world's strongest democracy, has been profoundly divided internally between upholders of American sovereignty and globalist democrats who in fact have counted among the leading agents of the global governance revolution¹⁰²².

As all other processes of global governance's new politics, its *mechanisms* rested on the utopian assumption of the existence of a "consensus" among all governments and "global civil society" on the global agenda, as if this agenda only contained technical solutions to pragmatic problems¹⁰²³. This foundational assumption served to justify the mechanisms' power transfer to those technocrats deemed most able to deliver the global agenda. The "mechanisms", however, allowed ideologically-driven non-governmental groups to integrate their globalist perspectives in national and local policies.

7.2.2. *The ruling transcendence of what is "global"*

Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of *soft power* in the late 1980s, also contributed to generalize the term *globalism*. Incidentally, we find interesting the soft power/globalism convergence in this American political scientist's thought. In Nye's view,

"Globalism, at its core, seeks to describe and explain nothing more than a world which is characterized by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances. It attempts to understand all the inter-connections of the modern world - and to highlight patterns that underlie (and explain) them"¹⁰²⁴.

Nye's definition applies to global governance, in the sense that the new global partnership is a worldwide network of connections. To properly interpret it, it is useful to remember that already in 1971, Nye had argued, together with Robert O. Keohane, that "World politics is changing, but our conceptual paradigms have not kept pace. The classic state-centric paradigm assumes that

¹⁰²² This has been reflected in the language and policies of the US State Department for decades.

¹⁰²³ Chantal Delsol speaking from her philosophical perspective likewise observed: « Le système du consensus s'établit dans un monde sans métaphysique ni anthropologie, mais où l'homme doit affronter à main nue les problèmes concrets ». Delsol, Chantal. *L'âge du renoncement*, op. cit., p. 189.

¹⁰²⁴ Nye, Joseph. "Globalism Versus Globalization". *The Globalist*. April 15, 2002. www.theglobalist.com/globalism-versus-globalization/ (retrieved February 9, 2022). Nye specified in the same article: "In contrast, globalization refers to the increase or decline in the degree of globalism. It focuses on the forces, the dynamism or speed of these changes. In short, consider globalism as the underlying basic network, while globalization refers to the dynamic shrinking of distance on a large scale."

states are the only significant actor in world politics and that they act as units”¹⁰²⁵. Nye and Keohane strongly believed already then that “a transnational paradigm” was “taking over”¹⁰²⁶ the state-centric paradigm, as Cenap Cakmak observed it. Paraphrasing Nye and Keohane, Cakmak commented “the state-centric paradigm has proven to be inadequate in analyzing the nature of world politics on the grounds that states are not always in a position to win in confrontations with other actors”¹⁰²⁷.

This thesis’ understanding of globalism, however, focusses on the abstract *absolutization* of what the global governance revolution artificially constructed as “global”. Global governance’s globalism posits what is “global” as transcending all other levels. In a “global system”, a superior or transcending instance - the “global technocrats” producing the so-called global agendas, goals and norms – governs, in a top-down fashion, all “inferior” instances, including intergovernmental decision-making. Globalism has been, as all -isms, an ideology.

Global governance’s globalism has had dramatic political consequences. It has dangerously jeopardized the respect for the sovereignty, identity, autonomy and freedom of national governments that is inherent in international relations. It has thereby quietly undermined the juridical and legitimate basis for international cooperation. It dealt a fatal blow to sovereign governments’ independence from the constraints of normative frameworks that would “transcend” their authority, and to the subsidiarity principle.

Leadership of the independent commissions, and of environmentalism and feminism in globalism
A globalist groundswell was gaining historic momentum as the Cold War was reaching its end. This groundswell was manifest in *Our Common Future*¹⁰²⁸, global governance’s programmatic document for the revolutionary Rio summit. The Cold War independent commissions reports presented in chapter one had exercised a marked leadership in advancing globalism¹⁰²⁹ over the UN intergovernmental conferences. The globalist project was primarily that of a limited number of leading politicians, experts, ideologues and groups exercising their influence at the UN, not of the sovereign governments making up UN member states.

In the 1990s, the intergovernmental process walked in the globalist trail blazed by the independent reports of the 1970s and 80s. The second wave conferences brought the shift from internationalism to globalism to a point of no return. The globalist elite then proactively exercised its influence upstream, in the conferences’ early drafts. The henceforth-called “global problems” of humanity and “the Planet” provided the themes for the second wave of UN conferences. The word “global” now prominently appeared in their outcome documents¹⁰³⁰. The political consequences of the historic semantic shift from “international” to “global” have remained inadequately analyzed and addressed to this day.

The appearance of a “global level” in the UN conference process never was in itself the object of an intergovernmental debate. It happened by stealth, under the influence of a handful of globalists.

¹⁰²⁵ Nye, Joseph S. and Keohane, Robert O. *Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion*. International Organization. Vol. 25, Issue 3. 1971, p. 721.

¹⁰²⁶ Cakmak, Cenap. *Civil Society Actors in International Law and World Politics: Definition, Conceptual Framework, Problems*. Croatian International Relations Review. Vol. 13. N° 48/49. 2007, pp. 93-107, p. 95.

¹⁰²⁷ Ib., p. 94.

¹⁰²⁸ Let us recall that *Our Common Future* used “global” 236 times, including in the expressions “global level” (6) and “global ethic” (1).

¹⁰²⁹ We have already emphasized these independent reports’ abundant use of the adjective *global*. See Appendix A3.

¹⁰³⁰ Likewise, the appearances of the word *global* in the second wave conferences has already been noted. See Appendix A4.

The 1972 Stockholm conference was the first to introduce the adjective “global” in the language of UN conferences. The 1980 Copenhagen second women’s conference was the first to use the notion of a “global level”¹⁰³¹. Since then, a juridically nonexistent, constructed or virtual *global level* had been coexisting in the majority of the conferences’ reports with the classical *international* perspective proper to international cooperation.

While socialism and the women’s movement (first wave feminism) had been at the forefront of *internationalism* even before the creation of the UN, the environment and second wave feminism spearheaded *globalism* at the UN¹⁰³². The environmental conferences assumed that “the environment”, its “problems” and their “resolutions” were by nature “global”¹⁰³³ – involving the entire world. Rio, 20 years after Stockholm, was of all the conferences the one that made by far the greatest use of the adjective “global”¹⁰³⁴. The globalist logic quickly gained the other domains addressed in the conference process.

Post-Cold War conferences granted a “global” character to increasing number of issues

The post-Cold War conferences did recognize that humanity’s socioeconomic, environmental, demographic, humanitarian, security, human rights and other “problems” manifested themselves diversely according to regions. Their emphasis, however, was heavily on the “global” character of the challenges they then identified as confronting the “global community”¹⁰³⁵ and “the Planet” as a whole. The number of challenges they qualified as “global” went expanding over the course of the conference process, setting a pattern that has remained unreversed until now. Examples of what their reports treated as “global” issues or threats were: human rights abuses, drug abuse, environmental degradation, climate change, population growth, educational challenges (including sexuality education), the “unmet need” for reproductive health, “domestic violence”, gender inequality, refugee crisis, poverty, hunger and food insecurity, epidemics, all forms of racial discrimination, various forms of intolerance, organized crime, illicit arms trade, trafficking in women and children, ethnic and religious conflict, civil war, terrorism, all forms of extremist violence, xenophobia, politically motivated killing, genocide¹⁰³⁶...

¹⁰³¹ Following Copenhagen which used the *global level* expression five times, the 1984 Mexico population conference used it eight times and the 1985 Nairobi women’s conference, once. Uses in the second wave conferences: Jomtien (2), *Agenda 21* (29), *Forest Principles* (2), Cairo (5), Copenhagen (1), Beijing (2), Istanbul (4), Rome (4). See Appendices A2 and A4. Three examples are: *Jomtien Framework for Action*, par. 49 6: “Governments, organizations and development agencies evaluate achievements and undertake comprehensive policy review at regional and global levels. (2000-2001)”; *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 87: “By international and intergovernmental organizations, especially the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at the global level”; and *Rome Decl.*: “We will pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development policies and practices in high and low potential areas, which are essential to adequate and reliable food supplies at the household, national, regional and global levels”.

¹⁰³² *The Limits to Growth* had used “global level” once, in reference to pollution, but the expression was absent from the Stockholm report.

¹⁰³³ The outcome documents of the second wave conferences refer for example to the “global environment”, the “global ecosystem”, the “global biodiversity”. But the other issues, such as population, were also called “global”. See *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.1 or par. 1.10, and Cairo’s Statement by Gro Harlem Brundtland.

¹⁰³⁴ For instance: *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 4.3, 13.1, 18.1; *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 35; *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.2...

¹⁰³⁵ For instance *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 5: “Trade and capital flows, migrations, scientific and technological innovations, communications and cultural exchanges are shaping the global community. The same global community is threatened by environmental degradation, severe food crisis, epidemics, all forms of racial discrimination, xenophobia, various forms of intolerance, violence and criminality and the risk of losing the richness of cultural diversity.”

¹⁰³⁶ Examples are *Jomtien Framework for Action*, par. 50 (educational challenges), *New-York Plan of Action*, par. 24 (drug abuse), *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 2.20 (environmental challenges), par. 35.3 (global problems of environment and development), par. 35.15 (scale of changes), *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 23 (refugee crisis), *Cairo Progr. of Action*,

Global problems need global solutions: global governance by “global experts”

Once a “problem” was labelled as “global”, it logically called for a “global solution”, which could only be devised by “global experts”. A power-grabbing purpose has animated global governance’s driving globalism.

In a video entitled *Freedom and Revolution*, Hannah Arendt observed it was

“not surprising that despotism, the return to the age of enlightened absolutism which announces itself already in the course of the French revolution became the rule for nearly all the revolutions that followed and became dominant not only in practice but in revolutionary theory”¹⁰³⁷.

And so was enlightened despotism the rule for the global governance revolution. The second wave conferences’ dogmatic decree that the *problems* of both humanity and “the Planet” had now become global¹⁰³⁸ served to justify the pressure put on sovereign governments to adopt the “solutions” developed by the self-appointed global technocrats. The conferences addressed the so-called “global issues” from within the global experts’ conceptual and ideological framework, in which all issues and paradigms holistically interconnected. Such framing made it difficult for implementing actors, first and foremost national governments, to address the so-called global issues in their sovereign capacity, independently from the *framework* and the ideology that often proved to be attached to it.

The conferences presented as “global” the systemic responses they constructed to “problems” they had qualified as “global”: their platforms for action¹⁰³⁹, the “consensus” they proclaimed to

par. 1.2 (global climate change), *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 69 (violence, including domestic violence, organized crime, illegal drugs, illicit arms trade, trafficking in women and children, ethnic and religious conflict, civil war, terrorism, all forms of extremist violence, xenophobia, politically motivated killing, genocide), *Istanbul Report*, par. 5 (human settlements) and par. 10 “global environmental degradation”, *Rome Decl.* (hunger and food insecurity).

¹⁰³⁷ Arendt, Hannah. Freedom and Revolution. 1968 intervention. <https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=freedom+and+revolution+Hannah+arendt&ru=%2fvideos%2fsearch%3fq%3dfreedom%2band%2brevolution%2bHannah%2barendt%26FORM%3dHDRSC3&view=detail&mid=09281E34EB22E2B239709281E334EB22E2B2397&&FORM=VDRVSR> (retrieved February 9, 2022). In the same intervention, Arendt opined that Anglo-Saxon pragmatism prevented the post-revolutionary generations in the US from thinking about the revolution and adequately conceptualizing its experiences.

¹⁰³⁸ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.1: “The opportunity ... to mobilize human and financial resources for global problem solving has never been greater”. And *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11. 13: “Coverage of global issues by the national and international news media”. *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 17: “While these problems are global in character and affect all countries...”. *Istanbul Report*, par. 5: “Recognizing the global nature of these issues, the international community, in convening Habitat II, has decided that a concerted global approach could greatly enhance progress towards achieving these goals”. *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 1: “...diverse paths to a common objective - food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels in order to organize collective solutions to global issues of food security”. *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 59 (m): “Raise the global profile of food security issues through UN system-wide advocacy and sustain the World Food Summit commitments to world food security”.

¹⁰³⁹ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 301: “The regional commissions of the United Nations and other subregional/regional structures should promote and assist the pertinent national institutions in monitoring and implementing the global Platform for Action within their mandates”. *Istanbul Report*, par. 1: “Adopts the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and the Habitat Agenda: goals and principles, commitments and global plan of action, which are annexed to the present resolution”. And *Istanbul Report*, par. 14: “To this end, we pledge our support for the successful implementation of the Habitat Agenda and its global plan of action.”

exist on these platforms¹⁰⁴⁰, the paradigms, norms, agendas, strategic priorities¹⁰⁴¹, conceptual frameworks, goals, actions¹⁰⁴², initiatives, efforts, programmes, endeavors¹⁰⁴³ ... making up these responses. It went largely unnoticed that the experts' ready-made "global solutions" imperceptibly but considerably shrunk the mandate sovereign governments had received from their respective peoples to make national policies representing their national will on issues impacting individual nations first.

The UN *international* conferences started calling themselves *global* conferences¹⁰⁴⁴ by mere fiat. They recommended the creation of "global" databases, global scientific assessments and projections, global labelling systems, global inventories, global scientific and technological information networks, global indicators of sustainable development¹⁰⁴⁵. They advocated the maintenance and updating of a global directory of consultants and advisers. They called "global" the mechanisms set in place to monitor progress towards their goals¹⁰⁴⁶. They recommended recruiting experts at the global level¹⁰⁴⁷.

The conferences were to usher in "global progress towards sustainable development" (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 2.2), "global social order" (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 69), "global peace"

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Rio Agenda 21* "reflects a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level on development and environment cooperation" (par. 1.3). Or *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.2: "There is an emerging global consensus on the need for increased international cooperation in regard to population in the context of sustainable development, for which Agenda 21 provides a framework."

¹⁰⁴¹ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 336: "To strengthen their support for actions at the national level and to enhance their contributions to coordinated follow-up by the United Nations, each organization should set out the specific actions they will undertake, including goals and targets to realign priorities and redirect resources to meet the global priorities identified in the Platform for Action."

¹⁰⁴² *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 36: "The World Conference on Human Rights ... reiterates the objectives established on global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development set forth in the Rio Declaration".

¹⁰⁴³ The *Jomtien Framework for Action* described the education for all initiative as a "global endeavor" (par. 48).

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 251: "The strategic actions needed for sound environmental management require a holistic, multidisciplinary and intersectoral approach. Women's participation and leadership are essential to every aspect of that approach. The recent United Nations global conferences on development..."

¹⁰⁴⁵ *New-York Plan of Action*, par. 10: "We will work for a global attack on poverty". *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 4.3, 13.4, 14.68, 14.70, 16.24, 19.24, 19.27, 40.6 b... *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 36: "reiterates the objectives established on global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development set forth in the Rio Declaration". *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 7.25 recommends the immediate establishment of "global, regional and subregional facilities for the procurement of contraceptives and other commodities essential to reproductive health programmes of developing countries and countries with economies in transition." *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 28: "Our global drive for social development". *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 231 (d) "... reiterate the objectives established for global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development".

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Jomtien Report* (preface to third printing): "Subsequently, UNESCO took over this responsibility on behalf of the International Consultative Forum on Education for All, the global mechanism established to promote and monitor progress toward the Jomtien goals". See also *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 14.59: "The appropriate United Nations agencies and regional organizations should: a. Strengthen the Global System on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of PGRFA by, *inter alia*, accelerating the development of the Global Information and Early Warning System to facilitate the exchange of information."

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Istanbul Report*, par. 228 (d): "To facilitate the global exchange of information on adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development by, *inter alia*, exchanging information on best practices and encouraging research activities on sustainable approaches and methods concerning building materials and construction technology. And *Istanbul Report*, par. 228 (h): "To maintain and update a global directory of consultants and advisers to supplement the skills available within the United Nations system and, where necessary, to assist in the recruitment of experts at the global level, including those belonging to developing countries and countries with economies in transition."

(*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 18)¹⁰⁴⁸, quality of life *for all*, education, health, food security for all... – “for all” equating with “for the global people”.

Finally to be mentioned in this long list of examples illustrating the inroads of globalism in the UN conferences after the fall of the Berlin wall was the attribution of the adjective “global” even to international law. Agenda 21 made this attribution to the conventions on climate change and biological diversity¹⁰⁴⁹ and suggested that treaty-making take place at “the global level” (par. 39.1 c)¹⁰⁵⁰.

While the adjective “global” has no legitimate juridical application, it may, however, be correctly applied in its geographical acceptation. Socioeconomic and environmental challenges may be geographically present in most or even all regions and countries of the world, even if their concrete local manifestations and specificities may greatly differ. Such challenges do require increased international cooperation, exchange of knowledge and know-how, solidarity. They necessitate the input of competent specialists. National sovereignty, however, must always be respected and the subsidiarity principle, always have priority. The global governance process grossly transgressed these basic principles.

Global political mobilization of all actors: a global regime

In the mind of the global governance agents, the transition to sustainable development required more than global agenda-setting experts. As preceding chapters have evidenced, the “transition” needed a “global partnership for sustainable development” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 1.1, 2.1), “a new global partnership among all the world’s countries and peoples” (*Cairo progr. of Action*, par. 1.15) – a global governance *regime* coopting not only all states, but the global “people”, a “range of actors from local to global” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 3.5), the Major Groups, the “community” of NGOs’ “global network” (Ib., par. 27.3), various “global constituencies”¹⁰⁵¹, international organizations which several of the conferences started calling “global organizations”¹⁰⁵² as of Rio. The conferences’ platforms required the mobilization of all actors globally. They started qualifying these actors as “global” and conferring on them “global responsibilities”¹⁰⁵³.

What is “the global level”? A virtual meta-power operating within and through established institutions

We have said it: the global governance revolution did not formally, juridically institute a global government. Even if, over the course of its long process, global governance did put in place a not

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 18: “Local, national, regional and global peace is attainable and is inextricably linked with the advancement of women”.

¹⁰⁴⁹ See *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 37.7 a.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 39.1 c: “At the global level, the essential importance of the participation in and the contribution of all countries, including the developing countries, to treaty making in the field of international law on sustainable development”. There is no shortage of advocates for the creation of “global law”, a topic which has been the object of ample academic debate. The attempts to formally create a “global law” have failed.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Istanbul Report*, par. 228 (h): “Other partners, such as the academies of science and engineering and the foundations, also welcomed the novelty of the experience and stressed its value in bringing new global constituencies together.”

¹⁰⁵² *Rio Agenda 21*, par 17.56, for instance: “States, with the support of international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global...”. Or Ib., par. 17.131: “International organizations, whether subregional, regional or global...”. Or Ib., par. 38.8 d: “To encourage interaction and cooperation between the United Nations system and other intergovernmental and non-governmental subregional, regional and global institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of environment and development.”

¹⁰⁵³ See *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 17 g.

insignificant number of institutions¹⁰⁵⁴ serving its novel agendas, the postmodern and therefore anti-institution new politics has not primarily been about new institutional structures. The global governance revolution set in motion a normative, operational and delivering regime locking sovereign governments within its conceptual and political framework, a system of partnerships wielding effective enforcement power, even if only being a *virtual* order, deprived of juridical substance and “hard” legitimacy. UN member states contributed to the installation of the global centaur regime by formally-informally recognizing its system during the second wave conferences.

As *Our Global Neighborhood* formulated it, global governance has been about “a new vision”¹⁰⁵⁵. Global governance has in practice spread a new political culture. The new vision consisted in “working together” and granting what it called “the NGO sector” a more “central place in the structures [our emphasis] of global governance than has been the case”¹⁰⁵⁶. We note, incidentally, the report’s use of the word “structures”, evoking some kind of quasi-institutional ambition. Arguing “the state ha[d] lost its exalted status”¹⁰⁵⁷, the report connected global governance to a new type of leadership or “enlightenment”¹⁰⁵⁸, one taking place

“at every level - in local and national groups, in parliaments and in the professions, among scientists and writers, in small community groups and large national NGOs, in international bodies of every description, in the religious community and among teachers, in political parties and citizens’ movements, in the private sector and among the large transnational corporations, and particularly in the media”¹⁰⁵⁹.

The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* granted “the non-governmental sector” a “special responsibility”¹⁰⁶⁰ to *drive change* within the international system. They went as far as affirming that international civil society (by which they meant “NGOs, the business sector, academia, the professions, and especially young people”¹⁰⁶¹) must “prevail on governments”¹⁰⁶² in this respect. By mere fiat, they equated international civil society with “We the peoples of the United Nations”. *Our Global Neighborhood* tended to reduce governments to followers of such as global civil society¹⁰⁶³. It advocated “adapting” the “principle of sovereignty” to the new global agenda¹⁰⁶⁴: adapting “the principle that a state has supreme authority over all matters that fall within its territorial domain”¹⁰⁶⁵, “the cornerstone of the modern interstate system”¹⁰⁶⁶ by accepting that “in

¹⁰⁵⁴ UNFPA, UNIFEM, NGLS, UNEP, the Global Environment Facility, the Commission on Sustainable Development (later become High Level Political Forum), UN WOMEN, the Human Rights Council, the International Criminal Court... The agencies created together with the UN or shortly thereafter addressed “classical” socioeconomic themes, explicitly or implicitly contained in the Charter: food, education, health...

¹⁰⁵⁵ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ib., p. 34. *Our Global Neighborhood* proposed that NGO representatives “be accredited to the General Assembly as ‘Civil Society Organizations’... and convened in an annual Forum of Civil Society” (Ib., p. 345).

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ib., p. 38.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ib., p. 355.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ib., pp. 355-356.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Ib., p. 352.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ib., p. 352.

¹⁰⁶² Ib., p. 352.

¹⁰⁶³ “Governments *can be made to initiate change* [our emphasis] if people demand it. That has been the story of major change in our time; the liberation of women and the environmental movement provide examples.” Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 352.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ib., p.71. “It is now more difficult to separate actions that solely affect a nation’s internal affairs from those that have an impact on the internal affairs of other states, and hence to define the legitimate boundaries of sovereign authority” (Ib., p. 70).

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ib., p. 68.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ib., p. 68.

certain fields” – particularly, but *far from exclusively*, “in respect of the global commons” - “sovereignty has to be exercised collectively”¹⁰⁶⁷. But isn’t “collective sovereignty” a self-defeating concept, an oxymoron? The logic of global governance has been to submit “We the peoples-as-nations of the United Nations” to “we the peoples-as-global-civil-society of the United Nations”¹⁰⁶⁸.

The virtual global order has operated as a meta-power regime. It has politically ruled *over* the juridically established international order with which it has been coexisting, and *within* and *through* which it has operated, leaving legitimate international mandates standing. The “power” was that of the self-appointed, self-serving¹⁰⁶⁹, mutually coopted and like-minded technocrats who had positioned themselves at the helm of global governance over the decades spanning its revolutionary process. This thesis has provided a sense of how few in numbers was the globalist oligarchy making up the substance of global governance’s enlightened leadership. This minority has exercised its power through the new politics’ soft processes (governance, facilitation, consensus-building, constructive dialogue, best practices, awareness-raising campaigns...). It succeeded in *convincing* international institutions, sovereign governments, national peoples, local authorities and all the non-state actors at all levels coopted in the global partnership. Its top-down rule was deprived of a formal, nominative and legitimate mandate received “bottom-up”, that is from national governments. Its agenda, applicable to all down to the local level, has enjoyed a practical political hegemony over the juridical foundations of the UN as an international organization. The “global experts” have remained without a name and a face to the majorities: their anonymity compounded the virtual or “phantasmagoric” appearance of the abstract “global level”.

Over the course of the revolution, governments turned into “partners” among a variety of other non-governmental “partners” in global governance. The “equality” intrinsic to the partnership concept suggested that the new political system was horizontal. In reality the elite has governed in a pyramidal way.

7.2.3. Five other “enforcement” strategies of the soft politics

Apart from the soft power techniques already exposed in this chapter and the ruling “transcendence” of what was abusively posited as “global”, the agents of the global governance revolution have used a number of other strategies to try and enforce the global platform. We identified five of them. The first has been to ensure the incremental consolidation of an intergovernmental “consensus” on their agendas over several decades; the second, to use a *prescriptive* language to formulate what were in essence mere recommendations; the third, to insist in a lopsided way on the “autonomy” of NGOs from governments (and to never mention the independence of governments from NGOs); the fourth, to abusively transform the soft global consensus into a “global mandate”, transcending existing juridically-established mandates; and

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ib., p. 70.

¹⁰⁶⁸ “Save for rare glimpses of what might be - as during Dag Hammarskjöld’s Secretary-Generalship - the people of the world never developed a sense that the UN was theirs. It did not belong to them”. Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 226. Dag Hammarskjöld was UN Secretary-General from 1953 till 1961. A Swedish diplomat who cooperated with several socio-democratic administrations in his country, he once described his function as UN Secretary-General as that of a “secular pope”. We observe an analogy between OGN’s “collective sovereignty” concept and the language of the European Union, which distinguishes between *state sovereignty* and *sovereign competences*, which can be jointly exercised. Ultimately, however, a state without the ability to make sovereign decisions becomes only nominally sovereign.

¹⁰⁶⁹ “Authority” etymologically comes from the Latin *augere*, which means “to increase”. The global elite self-empowered. It did not draw its “authority” from a legitimate source.

the fifth, to advocate a “mandatory” new global ethic, provider of “legitimacy” and “authority” to the new politics.

Incremental consolidation of a consensus become quasi “binding”

The first two parts of this thesis have exposed how, over the two UN conference waves that this thesis studied (1968-1996), the agents of global governance have labored at ensuring the incremental consolidation of an intergovernmental agreement on the novel concepts and ideological goals that they - not UN member states - had put on the UN agenda and had mutually integrated into a systemic platform. They ensured, in a remarkably unbroken continuum, the transmission of this platform in its “integrity” from the first wave conferences to the second and all the way to the SDGs. UN member states intergovernmentally consented to this transmission. They reaffirmed, each step of the way, their “commitments” to implement the increasingly integrated goals of the conferences. The uninterrupted consolidation of their agreements arguably produced the equivalent of customary international law. At a certain point in the process, it became virtually impossible to back out of the “commitments” repeatedly and collectively made over decades. The consensus had become, so to speak, binding on UN member states, now caught, as it were, in the trap dug by transnational non-state actors.

A prescriptive language going beyond “recommendations”

The UN conferences did not formulate their juridically non-binding “recommendations” as if they were mere “advices” or “counsels” to UN member states. They rather used the *prescriptive* mode. They furthermore addressed their “prescriptive recommendations” not only to governments - “Governments *should...*”¹⁰⁷⁰ -, but directly also to all non-state, non-governmental actors coopted in the new global partnership - “NGOs *should*”¹⁰⁷¹. The conferences demanded *commitment* on the part of all actors, not only governmental, to implement their respective goals and to *monitor* and evaluate implementation in an “effective and efficient” way (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.25 a). Such demands, repeated conference after conference, incrementally generated a sense of “obligation”.

The charts in Appendix A show the leadership of the environmental and feminist conferences, followed by those on population, in the use of compelling language. Analysis reveals that the more a conference contained the expression “governments commit” or “governments should”¹⁰⁷², the strongest, in fact, was the non-state, non-governmental pressure on governments to commit to implement the goals of the given conference, the less did these goals genuinely come from governments, and the more controversial was its agenda. Such was the case in the three thematic areas we just mentioned. The charts show how the use of constraining words and expressions, of a language geared towards enforcement and surveillance, markedly increased and diversified itself in these three areas during global governance’s revolutionary phase. Words, roots of words and expressions such as “oblig-”, “execute”, “commit”, “must”, “should”, “have to”, “implement”, “monitor”, “follow-up”, “mechanisms”, “surveillance”, “target”, “indicator”, “accountability”, “authority”, “responsibility”, “leadership”, “empower”, “institutional strengthening”, “institutional capacity”, “institutional mechanisms”, “capacity building”,

¹⁰⁷⁰ Agenda 21 contained the verb “should” 1,400 times, and Cairo, 562 times. The expression “governments should” appeared 72 times in Agenda 21 and 60 times in Cairo. To compare with the first wave conferences, Stockholm used “should” 284 times and “governments should”, 89 times, and Bucharest, “should” 106 times, and “governments should”, 8 times.

¹⁰⁷¹ To take only the example of *Rio Agenda 21*, the document is replete with sentences containing the phrase “NGOs should” (par. 1.3, 7.78, 11.19...) or injunctive recommendations to governments specifying that they “should”, “in cooperation with NGOs...” (par. 3.7, 6.27, 9.12, 11.13, 16.23...).

¹⁰⁷² Stockholm used “commit-” 140 times, Mexico 1975, 249. Stockholm used “should” 284 times, Bucharest 106 times, Mexico 1975, 595, and Nairobi, 752.

“capacity strengthening”, focal points, mainstreaming, “national machineries”, “accountability mechanisms”, “strong political commitment”¹⁰⁷³, effective, efficient, urgent, vital, “immediate”, accelerate, “framework”... are examples of a terminology expressing the conferences’ firm resolve to deliver their respective global goals. Beijing championed the use of such language, confirming once again the leading contribution of gender feminists to the new politics¹⁰⁷⁴.

Lopsided insistence on “autonomy” of NGOs from governments, but not of governments from NGOs

In chapter six’s section on “roles”, we noted the new politics’ “prescription” to governments that they should empower NGOs so as to allow them to “play their part” in the achievement of the global goals. In a related rule, the second wave conferences stressed the need for governments to respect the *autonomy* or independence of non-state, non-governmental partners as they play their “role”. The first wave women’s conferences (Mexico 1975 and Nairobi 1985) had introduced the autonomy concept, however applying it to women, not to NGOs. The second wave conferences considered respect for the “autonomy” of NGOs just as vital to the realization of the global goals as partnerships themselves.

Jomtien recommended that governments establish “*policies and mechanisms* [our emphasis] that strengthen [NGOs’] capacities and recognize their autonomy” (*Framework for Action*, par. 35). Rio insisted that “independence is a major attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the precondition of real participation” (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.1). Cairo, using even stronger language, virtually prescribed *guaranteeing* that (inter)governmental partnerships with NGOs and other non-state, non-governmental groups would honor the latter’s “full [Ib.] autonomy”¹⁰⁷⁵. In their Beijing Declaration, UN member states explicitly recognized as “important” to the effective implementation and follow-up of the conference’s *Platform for Action* the “participation and contribution of all actors of civil society, particularly women’s groups and networks ..., with full respect [Ib.] for their autonomy” (par. 20). Obeying the new politics’ inner logic, the conferences¹⁰⁷⁶ put their autonomy rule at the exclusive service of the global agenda. Non-governmental actors were to exercise their alleged “autonomy” within the global governance framework’s impassable boundaries. Opponents to any component of the “framework” were *de facto* outsiders to the system - and by way of consequence, were deprived of any autonomy within the system.

¹⁰⁷³ For example, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1. 15: “strength of the specific commitments”.

¹⁰⁷⁴ For example, *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 196: “National machineries for the advancement of women have been established in almost every Member State to, *inter alia*, design, promote the implementation of, execute, monitor, evaluate, advocate and mobilize support for policies that promote the advancement of women. National machineries are diverse in form and uneven in their effectiveness, and in some cases have declined. Often marginalized in national government structures, these mechanisms are frequently hampered by unclear mandates, lack of adequate staff, training, data and sufficient resources, and insufficient support from national political leadership”.

¹⁰⁷⁵ See for example, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.8: “Governments and intergovernmental organizations, in dialogue with non-governmental organizations and local community groups, and in full respect for their autonomy, should integrate them in their decision-making and facilitate the contribution that non-governmental organizations can make at all levels towards finding solutions to population and development concerns and, in particular, to ensure the implementation of the present Programme of Action. Non-governmental organizations should have a key role in national and international development processes.” And *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.11: “Governments and donor countries, including intergovernmental organizations and international financial institutions, should ensure that non-governmental organizations and their networks are able to maintain their autonomy and strengthen their capacity through regular dialogue and consultations, appropriate training and outreach activities, and thus play a greater partnership role at all levels.”

¹⁰⁷⁶ It is substantially through these conferences that the new political language globally spread.

The autonomy narrative, dominant in the conferences' reports, was a myth to be debunked. The reality was that the new politics assigned non-governmental actors a "global mandate" external to their own mandate. Illustrating their interference in NGOs' self-government, the conferences made frequent direct recommendations to NGOs. For the exclusive purpose of achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive health, for instance, Cairo urged NGOs: to "strengthen their interaction with their constituencies"; to "ensure the transparency of their activities"; to "mobilize public opinion"; to "participate in the implementation of population and development programmes"; to "actively contribute to the national, regional and international debate on population and development issues" (*Progr. of Action*, par. 15.12). The submission of non-governmental actors to the Diktats of the global elite blatantly contradicted, or fundamentally subverted, the modern "autonomy principle".

The second wave conferences demonstrated a correlation between their degree of ideological load and their level of insistence on NGOs' "autonomy" and empowerment. Population control and gender feminists NGOs in particular wanted to ensure for themselves a free rein in implementing their strategically ambivalent paradigms in light of their ideological interpretation after Cairo and Beijing. Furthermore, the dialogue mechanisms that the conferences had set in place allowed "autonomous" NGOs to engineer governments into aligning themselves along their non-consensual interpretations. NGOs could thereby impose their interpretations on national peoples in the implementation phase.

UN member states' political reliance on NGOs in matters pertaining to global governance's agendas was manifest in the practice, developed over the course of UN conferences, to include NGO representatives on their national delegations to intergovernmental processes, as already observed in chapter four. This practice blurred the political line separating NGOs from governments. It allowed NGOs to directly influence governmental positions. It even became the object of explicit recommendations. Cairo for example recommended that governments "include representation of non-governmental organizations on country delegations to regional and international forums where issues on population and development are discussed" (*Progr. of Action*, par. 15.12).

The logic of the democratic freedom of association principle implies that NGOs, if they are to be autonomous from governmental institutions, should be financially independent from them. The enforcement of the conferences' global goals, however, necessitated not only the political, but also the financial empowerment of global governance's most performing agents as well as the preservation of their "autonomy" at all costs. To enforce reproductive health and rights, Cairo's transcending priority, the population conference explicitly suggested that governments, intergovernmental organizations and international financial institutions make available to NGOs - "if feasible and if requested" - "adequate financial ... resources" in view of their "effective participation ... in the research, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of population and development activities", "in a manner that will not compromise their full autonomy" (*Progr. of Action*, par. 15.10).

The conferences' insistence on "autonomy" was lopsided. Their concern for the "autonomy" of non-governmental partners was not matched by any equivalent interest for the sovereignty, authority and power of national governments nor for the autonomy and independence of national peoples from the non-state global enlightened despots. The conferences gave non-state, non-governmental actors a virtual carte blanche in steering the partnership with governments in their own direction. Unhindered by (inter)governmental processes in virtue of the conferences' "autonomy rule", NGOs took independent initiatives that ended up impacting these

(inter)governmental processes. They behaved as the “informal executing branch” of the global governance political system.

On the rare occasion the conferences applied their autonomy rule also to sovereign governments, they framed the exercise of this autonomy. Jomtien, for instance, while seeking to help poor countries “implement their own *autonomous* [our emphasis] plans of action”, immediately specified that these allegedly autonomous plans of action had to be “*in line with* [Ib.] the expanded vision of basic Education for All” (*Framework for Action*, par. 45). This only confirms that in the new politics’ perspective, whoever joins the partnership does so within a pre-established framework and for the exclusive purpose of implementing an agenda set by global governance’s primary partners. This agenda, by “transcending” national sovereignty, threatened its exercise. If the universal value of freedom was to be safeguarded, a complete recovery of governments’ autonomy and independence from the Diktats of NGOs, in other words of national sovereignty, was in order.

Abusive transformation of the soft global consensus into a “global mandate”, transcending all juridically-established mandates

The chief achievement of the revolution was to grant global governance’s soft, juridically non-binding consensus the name, the practical status, the “moral authority”, the “legitimacy” and the virtual weight of a hard, enforceable *mandate*. A mandate is an official, authoritative command, an injunction, an order or a judicial precept given by a legitimate authority (mandator) to a person, organization or state who is bound to obey the mandate (mandatary).

Mandate is thus a juridically loaded term. The juridically binding UN Charter, authored by the organization’s founding member states (mandator), gave UN institutions (mandatary) their mandate. UN individual agencies, programmes and funds also received their mandate from their respective constitutions¹⁰⁷⁷, authored by their respective founding member states and themselves conforming to the Charter. Now the conferences provided all “equal partners” – all governments, all Major Groups and the global “people”¹⁰⁷⁸ - with what they abusively called a common “mandate”. In an ambivalent soft-hard mix, they treated the soft global platform as practically “binding” *on all partners*, not only *governmental* as in hard law, but also on *non-governmental* actors. Such a novel type of coercion betrays the advent of what could reveal itself to be a postmodern form of dictatorship, granting unlimited power to a group of governors who would not justify in any way their claim to rule over legitimate power holders in the international, national and local governmental systems.

¹⁰⁷⁷ These themselves were to be in accordance with the UN Charter. Arguably this was not always the case. UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNEP pursued ideologically driven goals absent from the UN Charter.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Agenda 21 took for granted the existence of a “consensus” on sustainable development that would be shared by all actors, governmental and non-governmental, at all levels, and transcending them all. As read *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.7: “Governments, business and industry, including transnational corporations, should strengthen partnerships to implement the principles and criteria for sustainable development.” And *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 31.1: “The present chapter focuses on how to enable the scientific and technological community, which includes, among others, engineers, architects, industrial designers, urban planners and other professionals and policy makers, to make a more open and effective contribution to the decision-making processes concerning environment and development. It is important that the role of science and technology in human affairs be more widely known and better understood, both by decision makers who help determine public policy and by the general public. The cooperative relationship existing between the scientific and technological community and the general public should be extended and deepened into a full partnership.” In the real world, such a consensus, resting on the end of ideology myth, is utopian and nonexistent.

The Cold-War conferences had started using the word “mandate” to characterize their respective platforms¹⁰⁷⁹. Such a use became more explicit in the second wave conferences¹⁰⁸⁰, culminating in Beijing. The conferences amalgamated their agendas, inclusive as they were of the novel paradigms, with the mandate contained in the UN Charter. In an ambivalence that has been global governance’s trademark, they made their “mandate” emanate from the soft UN resolutions that assigned the conferences their objectives, and from the soft “global consensus” built and proclaimed to exist on these objectives¹⁰⁸¹.

Gertrude Mongella, Secretary-General of the Fourth World Conference on Women, put it in clear terms at the end of the Beijing conference: “We now have in our hands the mandates for which we have been working; our legitimate basis to demand change”¹⁰⁸². In this revealing statement, Mongella, a gender feminist and a WEDO member, equated the Beijing “consensus” (on gender equality) with “mandates”. She dogmatically affirmed that the alleged Beijing “mandates” had given gender feminists (“we”) “legitimacy” to “demand change” (using a Bella Abzug expression) from governments and other institutions. Beijing would have given gender feminists the “mandates” to achieve their revolutionary objectives.

As per the global governance logic, the mandate now abusively became the global agenda (the platform of the UN conferences taken both individually and collectively), the mandator, the global norm-setting elite operating at a level qualified as “global”, and the mandatary, all governmental and non-governmental implementing partners, including “the people”¹⁰⁸³. The preceding chapters spelled out the content of global governance’s alleged “mandate, the identity of the governing authority giving the “mandate”, and that of the actors to whom the “mandate” is given.

The new global partnership moved forward confidently and steadily in the name of its self-assigned and self-proclaimed “mandate”. It became clear and was tacitly accepted by the last of the post-Cold War conferences that the soft and integrated global consensus on sustainable development had given the UN its “mandate” for the 21st century, and that this alleged mandate

¹⁰⁷⁹ Especially the women’s conferences of Mexico (2) and Copenhagen (12).

¹⁰⁸⁰ Appearances of the word *mandate* in the second wave conferences: New-York (2), Rio Agenda 21 (15), Vienna (13), Cairo (8), Copenhagen (2), Beijing (46), Istanbul (26), Rome (8). See for example *Cairo Progr. of Action* (preamble chapter two, p. 11): “In addressing the mandate of the International Conference on Population and Development and its overall theme, the interrelationships between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and in their deliberations, the participants were and will continue to be guided by the following set of principles...” Or *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.5: “The 1994 Conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on development issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered in isolation.” And statement by UN SG Boutros-Ghali at Cairo: “And it is the human being, through the status and condition of women, that will bring us together next year in Beijing. This concern is quite obviously to be found here today in Cairo, through the mandate assigned to us by the International Conference on Population and Development” (*Cairo Report*, p. 157). *Istanbul Report*, par. 211 g: “Encourage the involvement of all interested parties at the local level in the formulation of local measures, programmes and actions necessary to implement and monitor the Habitat Agenda, and national plans of action through, *inter alia*, local Agenda 21 processes, as mandated by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development”.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.1, for example, stated that “The mandate of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development emanates from General Assembly resolution 44/228”.

¹⁰⁸² *Beijing Report*, p. 212.

¹⁰⁸³ Governmental and non-governmental actors, whether they be juridically established institutions or informal processes. The mandate’s recipients were not only UN member states and international organizations, but NGOs, the other eight “Major Groups”, the media and education sector, diverse informal processes at all levels, “the people”, individuals (“global citizens”). Sustainable development became all these actors’ common “mandate”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.4, for instance, refers to “institutions mandated... to carry out Agenda 21”.

was to drive UN reform¹⁰⁸⁴. Never has this “new mandate”, notwithstanding it was produced by way of manipulation and social engineering, ever been challenged thereafter.

When they were juridically constituted, the actors in the new global partnership to whom global governance attributed a “mandate” in a top-down fashion already held their own mandates. Their respective constituents had given them, in a bottom-up fashion, their legitimate mandates. These were codified in national constitutions and laws in the case of democratic governments, or in bylaws in the case of non-governmental actors. As for “the people”, the world’s individuals, they received their “mandate” from their own conscience as free persons, and as citizens, from the laws of their respective countries, provided these laws were just.

What relationship did the new politics establish between its alleged “global mandate” and the juridically-established mandates of national governments and of international, regional, national and local organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental? The conferences’ reports reveal a two-pronged strategy: first, to operate *within* existing mandates without changing them; secondly, to adapt existing mandates when politically possible.

Let us look at the first, more insidious, strategy. The second wave conferences requested UN, regional and sub-regional organizations, national institutions at all levels to play an active role, “within their mandates”, in the implementation of their respective goals¹⁰⁸⁵. The new politics has similarly taken it for granted that the NGOs, the private sector and civic groups it coopted as partners would freely, out of self-determination, incorporate the global “mandate” in their respective mandates. The formulation “within their mandates” rested on the conferences’ assumption that the content of the novel global mandate was in an ideological continuum with the given institutions’ pre-existing juridical mandates. We have shown this not to have been the case. The formulation was therefore manipulative. When Beijing, for instance, emphasized the UN Secretary-General’s responsibility “for the mainstreaming of a system-wide gender perspective in all activities of the United Nations, taking into account the mandates of the bodies concerned” (*Platf. for Action*, par. 326), it denied that gender was an agenda that ideologically conflicted with the mandate that the UN Charter had given UN institutions. Either the UN Secretary-General respected the UN’s foundational document, or he was complicit in assigning the UN a new mandate by stealth, in the name of a soft consensus.

The formulation “within their mandates” also revealed that in many instances, the revolution’s strategy was not to formally abolish and replace the mandates of existing, juridically established institutions – first and foremost the UN Charter¹⁰⁸⁶. The “transcending” “global mandate” was to penetrate, inform or reform existing institutional mandates *from within*¹⁰⁸⁷, that is,

¹⁰⁸⁴ And so it effectively happened, as Kofi Annan’s two successive waves of reform manifested. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Reports 75 to 83 (first wave) and 224 to 227 and 253 to 255 (second wave, under the leadership of Fernando Henrique Cardoso).

¹⁰⁸⁵ For instance, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.16, or *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 301.

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 28: “Our global drive for social development and the recommendations for action contained in the Programme of Action are made in a spirit of consensus and international cooperation, in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

¹⁰⁸⁷ *New-York Plan of Action*, par. 2: “Individual countries and groups of countries, as well as international, regional, national and local organizations, may use this Plan of Action to develop their own specific programmes in line with their needs, capacity and mandates”. And *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 35 iii: “The governing bodies of all concerned agencies are requested to ensure that *within their mandates* [our emphasis] the fullest possible support is given by these agencies for the achievement of these goals”. All relevant UN bodies have “an important role *within their respective ... mandates* [lb.] in supporting and supplementing national efforts” to implement Agenda 21 (*Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.20). *Istanbul Report*, par. 230: “*Within their mandates* [lb.], subsidiary bodies of the Economic and Social Council, such as the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Commission for Social Development, the

instrumentalizing them without juridically changing them, so as to realize itself *through* them. This strategy implied a sort of denial of the radical break that the revolution did operate vis-à-vis these mandates. When a government or organization politically or ideologically resisted instrumentalization, the revolutionary power-grab process moved forward nonetheless, treating their mandates as irrelevant, or seeking to override them by reaching out directly to their respective constituents.

Let us now take a look at the second strategy, which more clearly betrays the absence of thematic and ideological continuum between the supposed global mandate and existing mandates. The conferences demanded that the institutional mandates of implementing organs, starting with those of the various ECOSOC commissions charged with following up on the UN conferences, be “reviewed”, “revised”¹⁰⁸⁸, “modified”¹⁰⁸⁹ or “clarified” so as to fully comply with the post-Cold War global agendas¹⁰⁹⁰. The international conferences’ “global priorities” demanded a “realignment” of priorities by each UN specialized agency¹⁰⁹¹. Legal and regulatory frameworks had to be reviewed and “adjusted”, as Istanbul put it, to “the principles and commitments of the Global Plan of Action” (*Report*, par. 78. c). Conversely, institutional mandates had to be “strengthened” when they did conform to global governance’s platform. Institutions “mandated” to implement the agenda had to be given “authority, resources and accountability mechanisms”¹⁰⁹²: strong words from Beijing, loaded with moral and political content, demonstrating once again the special role of the UN’s women conferences, alongside environmental conferences, in the advent of global governance.

A particularity of Beijing was its recommendation to create a new gender equality *mandate* for “all” national ministries - not only ministries for women: “the mandate to review policies and programmes from a gender perspective and in the light of the Platform for Action”, locating “the responsibility for the implementation of that mandate at the highest possible level”, and

Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Population and Development, should give due regard to human settlements issues, as set out in the Habitat Agenda.” Or *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 41 b: “International organizations, including FAO, will, according to their respective mandates....”. The global agenda should even inform treaty bodies: *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 325, for example “Within their mandate [Ib.], other treaty bodies should also take account of the implementation of the Platform for Action and ensure the integration of the equal status and human rights of women in their work”. Or *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 61 (d): “Invite relevant treaty bodies and appropriate specialized agencies of the UN to consider how they might contribute, within the framework of the coordinated follow-up by the UN system to the major international UN conferences and summits, including the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993, *within the scope of their mandates*, to the further implementation of this right.”

¹⁰⁸⁸ For example, *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 10.18 a: “Governments with the help of international organizations should review and, where appropriate, revise the mandates of institutions that deal with land and natural resources to include explicitly the interdisciplinary integration of environmental, social and economic issues”, in other words to align themselves along Agenda 21’s holistic perspective.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *Istanbul Report*, p. 161: “The representative of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) began by reminding the delegates that the mandate of UNEP had always been focused on the human environment and that the mandate had been modified and sharpened by Agenda 21, which had set tasks for the United Nations in promoting progress towards a more suitable future”.

¹⁰⁹⁰ For example, *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.25, *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 95 f, *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 313 and 318, *Istanbul Report*, par. 224.

¹⁰⁹¹ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 336: “To strengthen their support for actions at the national level and to enhance their contributions to coordinated follow-up by the United Nations, each organization should set out the specific actions they will undertake, including goals and targets to realign priorities and redirect resources to meet the global priorities identified in the Platform for Action.”

¹⁰⁹² The Beijing conference dogmatically affirmed that the gender agenda demanded that “national, subregional/regional and international institutions should have strong and clear mandates and the authority, resources and accountability mechanisms needed for the tasks set out in the Platform for Action” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 291).

establishing and/or strengthening “an inter-ministerial coordination structure to carry out this mandate, to monitor progress and to network with relevant machineries” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 204 e). Beijing formulated this “recommendation” as if it were an injunction. It attempted to impose its alleged “global gender equality mandate” on all governmental ministries worldwide – a project that, history showed, was met with an undeniable degree of success.

Beijing also invited governments to “create a *national machinery* [our emphasis], where it does not exist, and strengthen, as appropriate, existing national machineries, for the advancement of women at the highest possible level of government”, “based on a strong political commitment” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 203 b)¹⁰⁹³. The document specified that the national machinery “should have clearly defined *mandates and authority* [Ib.]” (Ib.). The “national machinery” paradigm brings the formal-informal “mechanisms” advocated in the other conferences a step further towards institutionalization. This paradigm is proper to the UN’s feminist conferences. It was introduced by the 1975 Mexico conference, the first of the series, and used uninterruptedly by all following women’s conferences¹⁰⁹⁴. The other thematic conferences did not use the concept.

The revolutionary role that the conferences assigned sovereign governments - as partners in global governance and facilitators of change in the favor of the novel global agenda at the national and local levels - has diverted governments from focusing on honoring the mandate that the people they govern had given them. The content of the global mandate, ideologically-loaded as it was, may well have been at odds with what a majority of national peoples would self-determinedly have wanted. The new, unilateral politics, however, shunned providing for a mechanism through which the alleged “global mandate” would be submitted to national peoples’ will. Instead, it has steadily moved forward in its propaganda - in its “awareness-raising” and “education” campaigns – so as to try and win a critical mass of “global citizens” over to its worldview. These are signs of global governance’s dictatorial character.

Mandatory soft new global ethic, provider of “legitimacy” and “authority” to the new politics
The charts in Appendix A reveal a manifest increase of the number of appearances of the words “ethic-al” and “values” from the first wave conferences with respect to the second. The new politics established itself on a self-proclaimed “legitimacy”, that of a novel and global ethos (ἦθος): on an integrated and seemingly coherent set of ethical convictions on the lifestyles that the conferences aimed at rendering globally normative in the 21st century.

The conferences’ ethics did not emanate from what the West used to call “universal values”, from the traditional moral framework that had been the bedrock of Western civilization and belonged to the mandate of Western democratic institutions, from what had, consciously or not, governed the ethic of international cooperation for decades since the UDHR. The new ethic flew neither from the Greek notion of universals nor from a biblical moral perspective. In fact, it evinced from its synthesis and vocabulary the very notions of good and evil, which had been present in all

¹⁰⁹³ And: “National machineries for the advancement of women have been established in almost every Member State to, *inter alia*, design, promote the implementation of, execute, monitor, evaluate, advocate and mobilize support for policies that promote the advancement of women. National machineries are diverse in form and uneven in their effectiveness, and in some cases have declined. Often marginalized in national government structures, these mechanisms are frequently hampered by unclear mandates, lack of adequate staff, training, data and sufficient resources, and insufficient support from national political leadership” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 196).

¹⁰⁹⁴ Use of the *national machinery* expression in the conferences: 1975 Mexico (6, and twice *international machinery*); 1980 Copenhagen (24); 1985 Nairobi (7, and once *international machinery*); Rio Agenda 21 (1, specifying that the national machinery was “for women” in par. 5.53); and Beijing (15, and once *international machinery*).

traditions, even if under different forms. The elaboration of the *global* ethics had not involved a study of what all cultures, with now (in the post-colonial era) a focus on non-Western ones, would have to contribute to what is genuinely humanly universal. Global governance's ethics rejected modernity's basic tenets (notably reason, law of nature, progress, growth, nationhood, sovereignty, hierarchies, authority, institutions...), accused of being responsible for modernity's abuses.

We have observed it: the global ethics was postmodern and deconstructionist. Through performative language, it transformed reality into a text to be interpreted in the light of what has been its supreme value: the individual's freedom to choose, even one's interpretation of language. Its axiological relativism has celebrated the diversity of interpretations as all equal in value, be they ontologically, morally, semantically contradictory. It has therefore systematically shunned clear definitions, content, reality, the concept of being, good and evil, truth, objective moral standards, transcendence, divine revelation, God. Global ethicists wiped out any reference to those traditional or universal values which were capable of uniting societies: surfing on Western secularization and its concomitant civilizational decay, they easily and quietly created a *tabula rasa*.

The global ethics founded itself on the sociological observation of *problems*. It was pessimistic at the root. Its primary foundation stone was an alarmist outlook on the state of humanity and the Planet. For decades since the late 1960s and notably since *The Limits to Growth*, the "experts" had made a hopelessly dismal assessment of the state of the world. The "problems" of humanity and of "planet Earth"¹⁰⁹⁵ would have attained such scope, urgency and gravity by the late 1980s as to put their very "survival"¹⁰⁹⁶ at stake. The conferences presented their agenda for the 21st century as a global socioeconomic and environmental *survival* program for both humanity and the Planet. As per the experts' self-serving rationale, the new globally normative framework would be the only way to survival. There would be no viable alternative to the global platform.

This thesis has found it often to be the case that the independent reports expressed the intentions of the globalist elite more explicitly than the conferences' outcome documents. *Our Common Future* and *Our Global Neighborhood* used the expression "global ethic" (one and six references respectively). The phrase however did not appear in the conferences. Brundtland's programmatic 1987 report ventured to state that our survival was contingent upon the adoption of a global sustainable development ethos:

"The issues we have raised in this report are inevitably of far-reaching importance to the quality of life on earth - indeed to life itself. We have tried to show how human survival and well-being could depend on success in elevating sustainable development to a global ethic"¹⁰⁹⁷.

Our Common Future thereby established the foundational nexus between survival, sustainable development and the global ethic.

Our Global Neighborhood presented the global ethic as the needed binding component of a global civil society and of the global governance system as a whole, in other words as a global social contract:

¹⁰⁹⁵ See *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 35.2, for instance.

¹⁰⁹⁶ The root "surviv-" appeared 9 times in Agenda 21, "urgen-" 25 times and "accelerat-", 31 times.

¹⁰⁹⁷ World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., Chapter 12, par. 2.

“An important consequence of the emergence of a global neighbourhood is that national civil societies have begun to merge into a broader global civil society. Groups of many kinds are reaching out and establishing links with counterparts in other parts of the world. Without the objectives and limits that a global ethic would provide, however, global civil society could become unfocused and even unruly. That could make effective global governance difficult”¹⁰⁹⁸.

The global governance process artificially constructed a global ethical *categorical imperative*¹⁰⁹⁹ transcending that of universality as traditionally understood and obliging all actors, not only governments, to participate actively in the achievement of the sustainable development agenda in its integrity. This “ethical obligation”, imposing itself as mainstream, as a matter of absolute and “global” political priority, provided global governance with a *meta-authority*. It paradoxically revealed soft global governance’s *dogmatic* character. The paradox is that the postmodern global ethics, by its very nature deconstructionist of any system, of any stable content, of any framework and authority, ended up imposing itself as a *universal framework of principles*¹¹⁰⁰ to be respected by everybody (not only governments) at all levels. No matter how incoherent and utopian this endeavour could appear at first glance, this thesis has demonstrated that the global ethics has been ruling with great efficacy. It takes on the character of “decisions of the gods” that would be validated by the global elite’s ability to enforce these decisions.

Let us repeat it: the post-Cold War new global agenda has ethically *bound* not only governments but all non-governmental “partners” and “the global people”. Anyone applying the global norms would be on the side of ethics. The most efficient in delivering the global agenda, whether state or non-state, would be both an ethical model and a political best-practice, to follow. Anyone challenging the new values, resisting entry into the “framework”, ideologically opposing the agenda - be it in the name of the universal good and evil moral categories -, any unengaged actor, any performer of bad practices would be cast out of the system as unethical. In the new system, non-state partners such as AI, Greenpeace, the IPPF, the experts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), any performer of “best practices” have acquired transnational political and ethical “legitimacy” and “authority”. This supposed “legitimacy” helped justify their political empowerment, even if this empowerment not infrequently meant that these transnational non-state actors in practice posited themselves “above” individual sovereign governments. The new ethics legitimized partnerships in a neo-authoritarian way, by mere fiat. At this point of our thesis, we realize that global governance’s soft, non-threatening appearance has been a myth to be debunked.

As already emphasized in chapter five, the new global ethic has been *scientistic* at the root. The “experts” have called the shots on what was ethically and therefore politically imperative. The experts’ ethical system pervaded the documents of global governance. Its interconnected components wove the fabric of the global ethic: equity, equality, inclusion, non-discrimination,

¹⁰⁹⁸ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 55. Independently from processes directly related to the UN, the dissident Catholic Swiss theologian Hans Küng (1928-2021) had drafted the *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic*, with a view to charting an ethic common to all religious traditions. The declaration was adopted by the Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993, concomitantly with the UN’s second wave conferences. The first meeting of the Parliament of the World’s Religions took place in Chicago in 1893. The 1993 meeting celebrated the centenary of the informal organization aiming at creating a global dialogue of faiths.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Emmanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) *categorical imperative* corresponds to an absolute and unconditional requirement that must be obeyed in all circumstances. Kant’s categorical imperative is justified as an end in itself.

¹¹⁰⁰ See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 241 of July 29, 2005. Kofi Annan’s *In Larger Freedom* report unambiguously, repeatedly emphasized that the global conferences of the 1990s were the framework within which intergovernmental cooperation was henceforth to take place.

the “for all” paradigm, free choice, sustainability, green behavior, tolerance, compassion, respect for the rights of minorities or “oppressed” categories (women, indigenous, children and youth, homosexuals...), the celebration of diversity under all its forms (from biodiversity to the diversity of sexual lifestyles), solidarity, transparency and accountability (with respect to the delivery of the global agenda)... Not only did these “values” impose themselves, but so also did the experts’ ideological interpretation of these values according to the perspective we identified in chapter five and in this chapter.

The 1948 UDHR did use the *morality* concept:

“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting *the just requirements of morality* [our emphasis], public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (Art. 29/2).

The so-called “global ethic”, in step with procedural ethics and with the sexual revolution’s liberal anthropology, divorced itself from morality by dismissing the notions of good and evil, reality and truth, what is universally inscribed in the heart and conscience of all human beings, respect for the family based on marriage between one man and one woman and respect for the sacredness of human life from conception to natural death. It has hailed population control through universal access to reproductive health as ethically imperative for environmental reasons. The new “ethic” has plainly been in a tug of war with traditional and universal morality.

7.3. Global governance transgressing the UN Charter

This thesis has identified the two major ways in which the revolution broke away from the UN Charter and the UDHR: the ideological break (from universality to deconstruction) and the political break (from an international organization to a global partnership). In addition, it achieved a complete change of thematic focus (from security to socioeconomic and environmental issues).

Ideological break from the UN foundational documents

In the mind of a majority of UN founding members, the international organization would, in 1945, be endorsing a set of values then recognized as universal. The 1948 UDHR embodied the value system dominating the post-World War II world¹¹⁰¹ of international cooperation. The UDHR *declared* what was recognized as universal in 1948. As Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz noted it, “The laws contained in [the Universal Declaration] are undoubtedly understood as pre-political and founded on the universal nature of man”¹¹⁰². Hence to a large extent, even if it did not specifically mention God, the Declaration could then be interpreted as in accordance with what conformed with human *reason* and *conscience* (two terms the Declaration did use and reflected its underpinning anthropology) as well as with the divine law written on all human hearts (with the biblical tradition)¹¹⁰³. To the extent the Declaration was interpreted in such a genuinely

¹¹⁰¹ At least the Western world and those parts of the non-Western world under its influence as colonies. But the signatories also counted China among other Asian countries (Burma, India, Thailand, Philippines...) and Iran among other countries with an Islamic majority (Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Ethiopia).

¹¹⁰² Professor Mazurkiewicz continued: “Since the very beginning, the Catholic Church emphasized the natural character of human rights, and at the same time pointed to the significant weakness of the Declaration, which is the lack of reference to God who is the guarantor of human dignity”. Mazurkiewicz, Piotr. *Taking Human Rights Not Too Seriously*. Studia Polityczne. December 2019, p. 48.

¹¹⁰³ The notions of truth, good, conscience, reason, love and heart are also present in one form or another in all cultural and religious traditions.

universal way, it had indeed endowed the UN with a significant degree of “moral authority”, with a legitimacy of a moral order, almost since its foundation.

Between 1945 and 1989, the Western cultural revolution (a fundamental determinant of our thesis, as established in chapter one) markedly broke from the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and modern (to the extent modernity still held on to reason and the law of nature) foundations of universality, and so did, in its footsteps, the new global partnership for sustainable development¹¹⁰⁴. By the end of the Cold War, the terms truth, reason, conscience, good and evil, the law of nature, the common good had largely fallen by the wayside both in the language of Western societies and that of international cooperation. The interpretation made of universal values - freedom, equality, human dignity and rights – had to a large extent been cut from their rational, moral, transcendent, divine source and their inherent connection to what is true and good. The revolution had destroyed the trust in the ability of the human reason and conscience to recognize and declare what is universally true and good¹¹⁰⁵. “Universal values” then became the object of contradictory interpretations and socially divisive. National social contracts gradually adjusted to the novel interpretations, to the point of decreeing even what is morally evil to be socially desirable and eventually signing the divorce act between freedom and truth. The postmodern freedom to choose became their new binding element and, as just seen, the cornerstone of global governance’s ethic.

Globalism’s political break from the UN Charter

The economic and social cooperation between member states that the UN Charter envisioned in its Article 55 respected the inter-national character of such a co-operation and therefore the primacy of nations, aiming at their “friendly relations” and at their “self-determination”¹¹⁰⁶. The Charter did not propose any integrated agenda for such a cooperation. Anything global (agenda, consensus, partnership, governance, goals, objectives, level, ethic, democracy, citizens/hip, community, environment, peace, conference, platform....) was absent from the UN Charter. Treaties, conventions, international organizations¹¹⁰⁷, international negotiations and their outcomes such as the UN conferences’ reports, international cooperation are juridically established as “inter-national”. To qualify them as “global” in the conferences’ reports was plainly abusive.

The imposition of a decisively *globalist* outlook on post-Cold War *international* cooperation radically broke away from the Charter’s perspective. The adoption of a “global agenda” transcending national boundaries, understood as a “global framework” for the 21st century, largely set by “global” experts and technicians (two terms which do not even appear in the Charter),

¹¹⁰⁴ It is noteworthy that the phrase “universal values”, associated as it was to the Western modern synthesis, was absent from all the UN documents this thesis founded its analysis on.

¹¹⁰⁵ Although Habermas argued that universality could not be so easily dispensed with, the German philosopher proposed a discourse ethics that shifted the focus to discussion: « Au lieu d’imposer à tous les autres une maxime dont je veux qu’elle soit une loi universelle, je dois soumettre ma maxime à tous les autres afin d’examiner par la discussion sa prétention à l’universalité. Ainsi s’opère un glissement : le centre de gravité ne réside plus dans ce que chacun souhaite faire valoir, sans être contredit, comme étant une loi universelle, mais dans ce que tous peuvent unanimement reconnaître comme une norme universelle ». Habermas, Jürgen. *Morale et communication. Conscience morale et activité communicationnelle*. Cerf. Paris. 1986, p. 88.

¹¹⁰⁶ “Cooperation” appeared only once in the Charter, in Art. 55, and co-operation, six times. The opening sentence of Art. 55 read: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote...”

¹¹⁰⁷ The paradoxical expression “global intergovernmental institutions” would later appear, attempting an impossible synthesis of globalism and international cooperation. See for example Kofi Annan’s report, *In larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, op. cit., par. 21.

“ethically mandatory” for all UN member states as well as for all non-state actors while ideologically breaking from “universal values”, turning governmental and non-governmental actors into equal partners, each assigned a “role” and required to “commit” to implement the global agenda, itself provided with targets and indicators of progress, with follow-up, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms in which, at this stage too, it gave a role to NGOs: all these features of the global governance regime were totally foreign to the spirit of the UN Charter.

Moving radically away from the UN’s foundational priority

The UN was founded primarily “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, as read the Charter’s first sentence, to promote and safeguard international peace and security¹¹⁰⁸. The global governance revolutionary process diverted the organization from its foundational priority, radically shifting its focus to a global socio-economic, environmental and human rights agenda for the 21st century¹¹⁰⁹. The new global agenda in turn contributed to redefine the traditional concept of security by “enlarging” it through the inclusion of human, social, food, housing, health, environmental... parameters. Furthermore, global governance had an ideological perspective, absent from the Charter or only contained therein in a seminal way through the input of certain individuals or NGOs, on its novel focus for the UN. The mandate the Charter had given the UN did not include the environment, climate change, family planning, gender equality, sustainable development, quality of life for all, poverty eradication, population stabilization, sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights, couples and individuals, non-discrimination, unmet needs, “safe abortion”, freedom of choice, family in its various forms, cultural diversity...

Transgressive across the board

Global governance has exercised its power with little concern for respecting universal moral laws and the basic rules of democracy as well as of international cooperation. The revolution has transgressed the UN Charter (the UN’s international nature and mandate, and its Article 71 in particular), national sovereignty, the principle of self-determination, the “power by the national people for the national people” democratic principle, the financial and political independence of NGOs from governments and intergovernmental or supranational organizations, institutional mandates, the authority of government over citizens and over NGOs, the authority parents and educators naturally hold over children. Its partnership principle transgressed, *inter alia*, the political hierarchy between governments and “civil society” as well as the Church and state separation principle (turning Church and State into “partners” that would allegedly be “equal”). Globalism not only transgressed the subsidiarity principle, it reversed it.

Global governance’s unforgivably constraining “framework” has violated the freedom of speech, of association, of initiative, of conscience, of religion (through the alleged transcending “authority” to its postmodern ethos). *Framing* corrupted the nature of the “dialogue” and “participation” that the conferences advocated. It threatened the content of education and cultural identities. Eminently transgressive was global governance’s abundant use of semantic manipulation, calling, for example, its new global partnership for sustainable development a

¹¹⁰⁸ Stanley Meisler relates: “When the Dumbarton Oaks conference was announced, Roosevelt, meeting reporters in his shirtsleeves on a warm day, explained what he had in mind: If some aggressor ‘started to run amok and seeks to grab territory or invade its neighbors,’ the new organization would ‘stop them before they got started’”. Peace and security is what Roosevelt had in mind. Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations. A History*, op. cit., p. 3.

¹¹⁰⁹ Preamble of the UN Charter, first sentence: “To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”. The three other ends of the UN as established by the UN Charter preamble are: “To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”; “To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”; “To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.

“mandate”. Plainly rogue was how the partners flouted established rules of procedure (such as ECOSOC’s NGO accreditation rules) to grab political participation in the conferences. Global governance has been resting on what has been a series of interconnected foundational transgressions.

This thesis argues that the various transgressions of the global governance revolutionary process are *hard in nature*. Their objects were hard: hard law (UN Charter and its mandate), the universal moral law and its civilizational role, institutional mandates, universal human institutions such as marriage and the family, the language-reality nexus, legitimate human and political hierarchies, democracy’s foundational values (freedom, equality, human dignity, universal rights). The revolution’s achievements were to deconstruct or destabilize all of the just-listed. These, as already noted, were *hard* achievements.

At the end of this chapter on the hard character of global governance’s soft politics, at the risk of a certain repetition, we limit ourselves to recalling how the new politics transgressed UN Charter Article 71. As seen in chapter one, the first landmark in the global governance revolutionary process was the insertion of Article 71 in the UN Charter - the first lobbying success of non-governmental organizations. As Peter Willetts put it:

“In 1945 the first significant success of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in influencing the United Nations system was to obtain two major amendments to the proposed Charter. Art. 71 was added to provide for consultation arrangements with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the promotion of human rights was written in as one of the purposes of the UN. But NGOs failed to win any provision for their involvement in the work of the General Assembly or the Security Council; NGOs were seen as being ‘non-political’. In practice, economic and social questions could not be separated from any aspect of politics”¹¹¹⁰.

UN Charter Article 71 juridically established the boundaries of the UN-NGOs relationship¹¹¹¹. The partnerships revolution transgressed the provisions of the article in three major ways: by undermining the political hierarchy between sovereign governments and NGOs; by moving the relationship of the UN with non-state actors beyond NGOs; and by transforming the nature of this relationship into an effective and performing political collaboration which no longer was merely consultative.

7.3.1. Destabilizing the political hierarchy between consulter and consultee that Article 71 provided for

Article 71 limited the UN-NGOs relationship to ECOSOC “consultation” of NGOs on matters within the competence of the council. It is in the nature of the consultative process to honor the *hierarchy* between the consulting actor (consulter) and the actor being consulted (consultee). The former is the decision-maker. It has the sovereign liberty of disposing as it wishes of the latter’s advice. By fixing the relationship between the UN and NGOs as one of consultation, Article 71 in principle ensured the supremacy of the consulter - ECOSOC as an intergovernmental body, hence of ECOSOC member states as sovereign governments - over the consultee - NGOs.

¹¹¹⁰ Willetts, Peter. *Consultative status for NGOs at the UN*. In *The Conscience of the World*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹¹¹¹ As a reminder, UN Charter Art. 71 established the following: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”

In practice, however, the bureaucrats in the UN Secretariat's DESA and in the secretariats of ECOSOC's various commissions – interfered in the relationship in a way that jeopardized the supremacy of intergovernmental processes over NGOs. Their “consultation” of NGOs rapidly evolved into the development of a direct, preferential, mutually empowering operational relationship with a few leading non-governmental actors. The relationship was an agenda-setting one. It politically preceded the input of UN member states in intergovernmental processes and bypassed intergovernmental control. It was a political relationship, not merely a consultative one. In incremental, surreptitious ways, the relationship gained independence from UN member states and intergovernmental processes. It thereby transgressed the mandate of UN secretariats, supposed to behave as *secretaries* of their respective member states, as their “confidential officer”¹¹¹², defending their sole interests. It undermined the hierarchy between governments on the one hand and on the other, the UN Secretariat (and the NGOs it “consulted”). A commonality of views, language and strategic ideological and political objectives developed. The relationship ushered, at the end of the Cold War, in the partnership paradigm¹¹¹³. Hence this paradigm, which would become the matter of an alleged intergovernmental “consensus”, did not come from governments themselves: another paradox.

In contrast with the hierarchy between consulting and consulted actors inherent in the consultative process, partnerships rested on the premise that all parties, governmental and non-governmental, were *equal* in power within the framework of the new political economy. Within that framework, they were differentiated in terms of their roles, but supposedly not of their political weight. The new politics inherited from feminism, as a ruling principle, the attainment of equality through a *power redistribution*. Within the framework of global governance, the power-sharing exercise of historic scope that took place during the second wave conferences effectively would have raised non-state, non-governmental actors to the status of “equal partners” of governments while lowering governments to the status of “equal partners” of NGOs. The equality assumption, however, was abusive to the extent that non-state actors in practice took the lead over governments in setting the global agenda and became hegemonic.

Global governance’s historic power redistribution presents political challenges that, we argue, have remained largely unidentified, undiscerned and inappropriately addressed up to now.

7.3.2. Violating the Charter’s provision limiting the UN relationship with non-state actors to NGOs

As a reminder, ECOSOC’s first official definition of an international NGO eligible to consultative status was “any international organization that is not founded by an international treaty”¹¹¹⁴. One notes the institutional (“international organization”) and juridical (“not founded by an international treaty”) aspects of this definition. As demonstrated in this thesis’ part one, already during the Cold War, actors who did not match that profile – individual political actors, independent “experts”, national foundations, non-accredited NGOs... - interacted directly with UN bureaucrats, exercising an upstream political influence on the agendas submitted to

¹¹¹² “Secretary” derives from Medieval Latin *secretarius*, which meant “confidential officer”, “person entrusted with secrets” (*secretum* meaning “secret”).

¹¹¹³ In his 1962 influential book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) explained scientific theory, not as proceeding linearly from an unbiased accumulation of all available data, but as driven by paradigm shifts. The expression *paradigm shift* became commonly used thereafter.

¹¹¹⁴ ECOSOC Res. 288 (X) of February 27, 1950.

intergovernmental processes. The already then transgressional practice escaped intergovernmental redress.

The distinctive features of the revolutionary period were on the one hand to exponentially enlarge the UN relationship with non-governmental actors to an open-ended number and diversity of such actors (as listed in chapter six) and on the other, to transform the Cold War collaboration practice into an intergovernmentally-endorsed political paradigm - partnerships.

The second wave conferences went all out to coopt a maximal number of players, whether institutionally or juridically constituted or not, whether governmental or not, whether international, national or local, in its paradigmatic new global partnership for sustainable development. This transgressive partnership became the priority of international cooperation in the 21rd century. NGOs became one among scores of other categories of partners. Rio's Major Groups category, let us recall, reduced NGOs to one subgroup among a series of other actors henceforth recognized as indispensable partners and political actors¹¹¹⁵. Beyond Major Groups, the revolution reached out as far as it could, to informal groups, "global civil society"¹¹¹⁶, religious groups, "the people", individuals themselves... in an effort to mobilize virtually everyone on the planet to achieve the transformation it pursued as an objective. A wide variety of new terms appeared, in a semantically unclarified coexistence with non-governmental organizations, such as civil society organizations, global civil society, community-based organizations, non-state actors...

The partnerships revolution plainly flouted ECOSOC's accreditation rules, made exclusively for NGOs. Agenda 21, for instance, decreed that "any policies, definitions or rules affecting access to and participation by non-governmental organizations in the work of United Nations institutions or agencies associated with the implementation of Agenda 21 must apply equally to all major groups" (par. 23.3). The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) that the UNCED established to follow-up on Agenda 21 followed this transgressive rule, which became the *modus operandi* thereafter, when the commission would be replaced, in 2013, by the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, and in the framework of the SDGs.

As Jing de la Rosa reckoned it:

"While formal consultative arrangements are important, there are other ways to participate in the work of UN agencies... Given the many different mechanisms established to participate in international conferences, many NGOs have paid less attention to 'formal' status arrangements and have focused greater attention on informal arrangements. Formal relations are not, in most cases, a precondition for closer collaboration"¹¹¹⁷.

¹¹¹⁵ Diverse categories of citizens not having constituted themselves as NGOs (women; children and youth; indigenous people; workers; farmers); institutions and/or experts within them (scientific and technological community); economic actors (business and industry); and social actors (trade unions).

¹¹¹⁶ See Clark, Ann Marie, Friedman, Elisabeth J. and Hochstetler, Kathryn. *The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society. A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women*. World Politics 51. October 1998, pp. 1-35. In this article, the three scholars developed "the concept of global civil society to provide a theoretical foundation for a systematic empirical assessment of transnational relations concerning the environment, human rights, and women at the global level" (Ib., pp. 1-2). In their study, they found "evidence of a deepening society of global NGOs" (Ib., p. 34), that "the construction of a global society [was] under way but [was] far from complete" (Ib., p. 5).

¹¹¹⁷ de la Rosa, Jing. *The United Nations Responds: Institutional Adaptation and Reform*. In *Whose World is it Anyway?*, op. cit., p. 292. Jing de la Rosa was administrative assistant of UN NGLs, a reproductive health consultant

7.3.3. Enlarging the role of non-governmental actors from consultation to a full political role

The third major way the revolutionary process transgressed Article 71 was by transforming the function of non-governmental actors into a full political role within the global governance framework.

This thesis' part one described how NGOs and other non-governmental actors, from the very foundation of the UN and during the entire Cold War period, played a role that went far beyond Article 71's provisions for mere consultation. The operational collaboration they developed with UN bureaucrats delivered substantial political results, starting, let us repeat it once again as is here necessary, with the insertion not only of Article 71 but of human rights, women and other social concerns in the Charter. Over the course of the first wave conferences, non-governmental actors led the process of integrating environmental, feminist and population control agendas in the UN platform and introducing a new language, a language absent from the UN's foundational documents, which would eventually become common currency among member states and societies worldwide down to the grassroots. During the Cold War, the UN conferences mainly used the words *consultation* and *collaboration* to characterize what was in reality already a practical political partnership between the UN and NGOs.

Chapter four demonstrated how the integrated socioeconomic, environmental, demographic and human rights platform that non-state, non-governmental actors had elaborated under the aegis of the UN during the Cold War became the object of an intergovernmentally-endorsed global consensus and was expanded and consolidated into global governance's conceptual framework for the 21st century during the second wave conferences. These post-Cold War conferences transformed a practice, operational since the beginning of the global governance process, into political paradigms and mechanisms formally recognizing the "role" of non-state, non-governmental actors in global governance, and themselves objects of an intergovernmental "consensus".

As evidenced in chapter six, the post-Cold War partnership revolution assigned non-state, non-governmental actors, whether ECOSOC accredited NGOs or not, whether juridically constituted or not, whatever their non-state status, an outright and full-fledged political function in the new global partnership for sustainable development: a role that included participation in agenda-setting, policy-making, decision-making, consensus-building, implementation and all the way to monitoring, surveilling and evaluating the agenda's implementation. The post-Cold War conferences advocated the full exercise of this role. In *overt violation of Article 71*, they *de facto* recognized non-state actors as "vital", "essential", "crucial" and equal partners of governments in the achievement of the global goals.

A final transgression of Article 71 is to be mentioned. It is the fact that the new interaction between non-governmental actors and the UN went beyond matters within the competence of ECOSOC¹¹¹⁸, beyond ECOSOC itself and beyond the very mandate of the UN as defined by the

and community health specialist at Columbia University, a WHO reproductive health consultant. She conducted a major survey for UNFPA of NGO follow-up to Cairo while on the staff of WEDO.

¹¹¹⁸ UN Charter Art. 62 did open the possibility for ECOSOC to "make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, *and related matters* [our emphasis] and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned." It provided for ECOSOC to "call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences *on matters falling within its competence* [Ib.]."

Charter. The global governance agenda, some of its themes, its priorities, its systemic framework, its conceptual pillars, its ideological components, its novel language, its political mechanisms were absent from the UN Charter. The environment was not within ECOSOC competence until the post-Rio creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development¹¹¹⁹. Neither was the revolution's redefined security concept, enlarged as it now was to its socioeconomic and environmental agendas¹¹²⁰. It has become routine for the intergovernmental processes of UN agencies, the UN General Assembly and even the Security Council to interact with "civil society". The new global partnership has *transcended* ECOSOC and the UN itself in its attempt to coopt not only all the organs of the UN but all international, regional, national, provincial and local organizations.

The conferences' two ruling criteria to validate partnerships - political and ideological adherence to their respective goals on the one hand (like-mindedness), and capacity to deliver them on the other - superseded in practice the provisions of UN Charter Article 71 and the intergovernmentally-established formal accreditation ECOSOC procedures and rules. The two practical criteria we just identified are interdependent: the more ideologically-driven the actor, the more motivated and politically engaged this actor is likely to be, and the greater its delivering capacity. The phrase "like-minded" names the relationship that has existed among global governance's primary partners since the start of the process. It will only appear in the language of global governance in the revolution's aftermath¹¹²¹. But the conferences did use words such as "network" and "alliance", which presuppose strategic and ideological like-mindedness¹¹²².

7.3.4. Undenounced transgressions

Global governance's processes were in a formidable momentum at the historic post-Cold War moment. We have said it: the revolution achieved its objectives at thunderlight speed, in six years' time. By its end, it had become extremely difficult for sovereign governments to back out of partnerships if they were to follow the sustainable development course they had multilaterally engaged in, under the partners' proactive leadership. UN member states never addressed nor denounced global governance's foundational transgressions. They never even acknowledged them. They have complacently regarded as politically innocuous the partners' use of soft power and social engineering techniques such as those enumerated at the beginning of this chapter. Yet

¹¹¹⁹ UN Charter Art. 68 instructed ECOSOC to "set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions". The environment *per se* is neither social nor economic, but the sustainable development paradigm connected the environment to socioeconomic concerns.

¹¹²⁰ Environmental security, food security, water security, human security, health security, land security, sustainable energy security, contraceptive security...

¹¹²¹ See for instance the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society Relations established in February 2003 by Kofi Annan to make a sweeping assessment of the UN-civil society relations. The panel was chaired by former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Its report, entitled *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance*, advocated the creation of "like-minded" groupings, "likely parties" brought together by the UN "to incubate ideas and actions" (p. 33, par. 51). The report recommended that the UN bring actors together on issues they agree on - issues aligned along the global norms established by the UN and its direct policy-making partners in the preceding decade. The new political mechanism was to make it easy to systematically avoid political opposition to the special agendas of like-minded partners, to allow these partners to effectively implement their agendas without being hindered by democratic control. See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 226 of August 27, 2004.

¹¹²² Istanbul enjoined all actors to *network* and form *alliances* among themselves so as to more efficiently implement the common global agenda, each according to its "comparative advantage", in a "complementary" way: "Partnerships can integrate and mutually support objectives of broad-based participation through, *inter alia*, forming alliances, pooling resources, sharing knowledge, contributing skills and capitalizing on the comparative advantages of collective actions" (*Istanbul Report*, par. 33).

the partners have used them with defeating efficiency to operate changes that ended up substantially transforming and impacting governmental decision-making. Not only have legitimate power holders tended to turn a blind eye on soft power's phenomenal inroads in political decision-making at all levels, to overlook or downplay these threats, but they even were often been complicit.

If the shift over to the partnerships' regime were to have occurred in a transparent, open manner, it would have necessitated, in view of the magnitude of the changes it implied and as already mentioned, that UN member states rewrite the UN Charter. We have noted how their alleged "commitment" to partnerships contrasted with their reluctance to operate any significant change to the formal rules governing the UN relationship with non-state, non-governmental actors so as to adjust these rules with the partnership practices. In the wake of the Earth Summit¹¹²³, ECOSOC launched a review of the consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations. The process lasted four years and produced ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 of July 25, 1996¹¹²⁴, adopted a few weeks after the Istanbul "partnerships' conference" and valid to this day. The changes Resolution 1996/1 operated with respect to the two previous ECOSOC arrangements¹¹²⁵ did not match any of the real changes that had effectively taken place in the UN relationship with non-state actors. *Inter alia*, the new resolution allowed the accreditation of regional and national NGOs, while the previous one only allowed applications from international NGOs. An exponential growth of NGO applications to ECOSOC status followed.

ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, as the previous ECOSOC resolutions addressing the UN-NGO relationship, remained within the framework of the UN Charter. It stucked to the "NGO" category that Article 71 had created: it did not use any of the new political language (Major Groups, civil society, informal groups, community-based organizations, "the people", partner, partnership and so on...). The 1996 resolution also stucked to NGOs' *consultative* status that the Charter had provided for. Even if the resolution did acknowledge the importance of NGO participation in the *implementation* of the conferences¹¹²⁶, it did not grant non-governmental actors any of the political functions that the second wave conferences had given them as per the new partnerships' politics: agenda-setting, negotiating, decision-making, monitoring... The 1996 resolution also did not grant NGOs what they wanted as a matter of priority, namely General Assembly accreditation.

¹¹²³ Rio Agenda 21, par. 38.44: "Procedures should be established for an expanded role for non-governmental organizations, including those related to major groups, with accreditation based on the procedures used in the Conference. Such organizations should have access to reports and other information produced by the United Nations system. The General Assembly, at an early stage, should examine ways of enhancing the involvement of non-governmental organizations within the United Nations system in relation to the follow-up process of the Conference."

¹¹²⁴ ECOSOC Res. 1996/31. *Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations*. ECOSOC 49th plenary meeting. 25 July 1996.

¹¹²⁵ ECOSOC Res. 288 X (B) of February 27, 1950 had codified the ECOSOC-NGO relationship first. ECOSOC Res. 1296 (XLIV) of 1968 slightly amended these initial arrangements.

¹¹²⁶ ECOSOC Res. 1996/31. Part VII, par. 53: "Non-governmental organizations without consultative status that participate in international conferences and wish to obtain consultative status later on should apply through the normal procedures established under Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated. Recognizing the importance of the participation of non-governmental organizations that attend a conference in the follow-up process, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall draw upon the documents already submitted by that organization for accreditation to the conference and any additional information submitted by the non-governmental organization supporting its interest, relevance and capacity to contribute to the implementation phase. The Committee shall review such applications as expeditiously as possible so as to allow participation of the respective organization in the implementation phase of the conference. In the interim, the Economic and Social Council shall decide on the participation of non-governmental organizations accredited to an international conference in the work of the relevant functional commission on the follow-up to and implementation of that conference."

In 1996, the same ECOSOC member states that had joined a global consensus on the new global partnership for sustainable development did not want to officially enlarge their collaboration with non-state actors other than NGOs, nor did they want to broaden NGOs' consultative function to a political role. This parallel and contradictory governmental behavior once again betrayed the fact that UN member states were not the real authors of the two revolutionary enlargements. UN member states at various degrees all do cherish their sovereignty. Even if in the context of a soft, non-binding consensus, they accepted to share a critical amount of power with non-state actors, they wanted to preserve their sovereignty, the international character of the UN and their legitimate power as its official decision-makers.

CHAPTER 8

AN AMBIVALENT GLOBAL COEXISTENCE REGIME, DESTABILIZING DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Chapter seven identified the Machiavellian, “centaur” nature of global governance as a soft-hard global political system with a capacity to enforce its platform even if through “soft” means. It exposed how UN member states consented to being entangled in the revolutionary system and failed to strongly and efficiently assert their sovereignty during the UN conference process, which belonged, by the juridical nature of the UN, to the realm of international cooperation. And so it happened that, in six years’ times, the revolution established the new, global political regime *within* international cooperation.

This last chapter of our thesis now demonstrates how global governance’s partnerships politics used the post-Cold War pro-democracy Zeitgeist driving international cooperation during the second wave conferences to impose itself *in the very name of democracy*. This pro-democracy Zeitgeist, however, masked a deeply-rooted malaise stemming from the profound crisis that liberal democracy found itself in by 1989, notwithstanding the end of history of proclamation. The new politics’ socialist, globalist and postmodern agents, instrumentalizing the crisis to their benefit, presented the new global partnership and its ethics as remedying the degradation of democratic participation, representation and values marring Western democracies. They transferred democratic principles to a juridically nonexistent “global level”. They constructed an artificial global *demos* and global social contract. They wove global governance in the fabric of democracy, and democracy in the fabric of global governance, indissolubly blending the two together. A new symbiosis emerged, profoundly altering the nature of modern democracy while keeping intact the façade of existing national democracies. A hybrid regime ensued. This regime tied the novel and domineering interpretation of democracy to adherence to the new postmodern ethos and its reinterpretation of democracy’s foundational principles and values.

Just as the global governance revolution occurred in the name of democracy, so did it in the name of the UN Charter and the UDHR. This chapter revisits the previous chapters’ finding that it took place *within* the institutions of international cooperation, radically transforming their mandates without formally abolishing them. Plainly denying the existence of any break between the UN’s foundational documents and the new global partnership for sustainable development, the revolution’s agents rather presented the new paradigms and its overall new order as a natural emanation and enlargement of the old ones and of the former order. Benefiting from the crisis of universality and legitimacy that grew out of these concepts’ divorce from their traditional ontological and anthropological sources, they could easily impose their constructed “new universality” and “new legitimacy”. The fact they did not formally abolish the institutions of the past but operated within them produced what we call in this chapter a *ruling global coexistence regime* or a *ruling hybrid regime*.

This last chapter conclusively highlights the specific and decisive contribution of the global governance revolution to the destabilization of both modern democracy and the international order based on nation-states that had developed since the treaty of Westphalia and was reflected in the UN Charter. It emphasizes the neo-absolutist, neo-Hobbesian and pyramidal ways in which global governance has operated. Global governance’s ruling partnership principle, as opposed to democracy’s freedom of association, of expression, of religion and of conscience, offers no guarantee against tyranny, dictatorship and totalitarianism. Chapter eight ends by underscoring

the role of semantic manipulation in destabilizing the former order and constructing a dangerously instable new order with ambivalent, “liquid” paradigms.

8.1. In the name of democracy

In spite of the leading role that the United States played in the creation of the United Nations, the root “democra-”¹¹²⁷ does not appear in the UN Charter, and neither does the rule of law. Among the founding members of the UN were a number of countries then opposing democratic principles such as multiparty free elections or civil and political rights and liberties: not only the USSR, one of the Allied Big Four, and Soviet Socialist Republics (Byelorussia SSR and Ukraine SSR), USSR satellite countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland), but countries that were either an Islamic state (Iran), or had Islam as a state religion (Egypt, Iraq), or had a secular Moslem majority (Turkey, Syria). “Democra-” does appear once, however, as does the rule of law, in the UDHR¹¹²⁸, adopted by the UN General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, a couple of years after the big powers had entered the Cold War¹¹²⁹.

8.1.1. Post-Cold War pro-democracy Zeitgeist

Contrasting with the absence of consensus on democracy in 1945, democracy and democratization became priorities of international cooperation after 1989¹¹³⁰.

Democracy, a post-Cold War priority of international cooperation

A pro-democracy Zeitgeist inspired and drove international cooperation roughly through the entire second wave of UN conferences¹¹³¹. These conferences, attended by over 180 UN member states, made of the promotion and strengthening of democracy¹¹³², democratization, the transition to democracy, the development of democratic institutions¹¹³³, education to democracy¹¹³⁴... not

¹¹²⁷ The Charter does mention self-determination twice and constitution- (constitutional processes), five times. Such was the post-Cold War pro-democracy mindset that in the Vienna Declaration, participating UN member states did (abusively) connect the UN Charter to democracy and the rule of law: “Considering the major changes taking place on the international scene and the aspirations of all the peoples for an international order based on the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, peace, democracy, justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism, development, better standards of living and solidarity,...”

¹¹²⁸ UDHR Preamble: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” And Art. 29/2: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of ... meeting the just requirements of ... public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”

¹¹²⁹ With 48 of the then 58 UN member states voting in favor of General Assembly Res. A/RES/217 (III) [A] (Paris, Palais de Chaillot, December 10, 1948). China counted among the signers, as well as a number of Moslem countries (Iran, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt...).

¹¹³⁰ Mathieu Bock Côté saw it this way: “Cette théorie englobante de la modernité n'est jamais loin d'une théorie de la fin des idéologies, qui auraient toutes capitulé devant le mouvement démocratique, ou d'une théorisation de la fin de l'histoire, annonçant la fin des contradictions politiques dans les sociétés occidentales et leur prochaine conversion à une humanité administrée, pacifiée”. Bock-Côté, Matthieu. *Le Multiculturalisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

¹¹³¹ Appearance of democra- in second wave conferences: *Rio Agenda 21* (5, in par. 2.6, 3.2, 27.1, 33.14a.iii, 38.2); Vienna (17); Cairo (26); Copenhagen (27); Beijing (24); Istanbul (33); Rome (3).

¹¹³² For example, *Vienna Decl.*, par. 8: “The international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world”.

¹¹³³ For example, *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 82: “The promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the support for democratic institutions and the empowerment of women...”

¹¹³⁴ Reflecting the consensus of post-Cold War Conferences, the *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 79 called on “all States to include human rights, democracy ... and rule of law as subjects in the curricula of all learning institutions in formal

only consensual objectives¹¹³⁵ but explicit priorities¹¹³⁶ of post-Cold War international cooperation. They saw democratization as indisputable “progress”¹¹³⁷. The countries now joining such a consensus included countries that were then still communist (China, Cuba, North Korea...), former Soviet Republics and satellite nations, Islamic countries, countries with Islam as state religion and secular Muslim majority states - they too affected by the post-Cold War democratization tide. At Cairo for example, Amre Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt affirmed: “Yes, the varied pattern of global cultural evolution may have been successful in the degree of international consensus on democracy as a better political system and free enterprise as a preferable or more effective economic approach”¹¹³⁸.

Liberal and social democrats alike joining the pro-democracy consensus

Liberal democrats and social democrats, socialists or former communists alike enthusiastically joined the then widespread “consensus on democracy”. A democratic revolution seemed well on its way to sweeping the world in 1991-92. The implosion of the Soviet regime surfed on what the liberal democrat Samuel Huntington described in 1991 as *democracy's third wave*¹¹³⁹. Needless to say, Huntington interpreted this third wave, as well as his “end of history” argument, in the light of his liberal creed.

Concurrent with Huntington’s proclamation was that of socialists, social democrats or a close ideological equivalent. Such were the participants in the 1991 Stockholm Initiative who, in their *Common Responsibility in the 1990s* report, recognized “democracy and human rights to be truly universal values”¹¹⁴⁰. They reckoned:

“The past years saw not only the revolutionary transformation of Eastern Europe, but also, over the decade, the democratic breakthrough in practically all of Latin America. In other parts of the world, demands for greater democracy have developed into strong forces. In Asia, authoritarian regimes have been shaken and forced to political reforms. In Africa, many countries are reassessing and reforming political systems that were instituted after the struggle for independence was won”¹¹⁴¹.

and non-formal settings”, and to include democracy in human rights education (par. 80). Vice versa, the conferences viewed progress in education as assisting the promotion of education (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.2).

¹¹³⁵ For example, *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 25: “We heads of State and Government are committed to a political, economic, ethical and spiritual vision for social development that is based on human dignity, human rights, equality, respect, peace, democracy, mutual responsibility and cooperation, and full respect for the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of people.” Or *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 10.3...

¹¹³⁶ The *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 66 for instance recommended that “priority be given to national and international action to promote democracy, development and human rights”.

¹¹³⁷ *Vienna Progr. of Action*, par. 9: “The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that least developed countries committed to the process of democratization and economic reforms, many of which are in Africa, should be supported by the international community in order to succeed in their transition to democracy and economic development.” Or *Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 67: “Progress has been noted, as shown in ... the spread of democracy....”

¹¹³⁸ *Cairo Report*, p. 189.

¹¹³⁹ See Huntington, Samuel P. *Democracy's Third Wave*. The Journal of Democracy, 2 (2), pp. 12-34. 1991. And Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Huntington distinguished three major waves of democracy. The first (1828–1926) started with “Jacksonian democracy” in the US (suffrage granted the majority of white men), the second with the Allied victory in World War II and the third, with the 1974 Portuguese Carnation Revolution. Huntington underlined the Catholic identity of three fourth of the third wave democracies. He linked this fact to Vatican II’s opposition to totalitarianism. The third wave’s swell was unprecedented.

¹¹⁴⁰ The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 32.

¹¹⁴¹ Ib., p. 32.

A few years later, in their 1995 report *Our Global Neighborhood*, the globalist members of the Commission on Global Governance - a number of them the same as those of the independent commissions of the 1980s and early 1990s, including the Stockholm Initiative - likewise qualified the post-Cold War surge in democracy as a “tide of democratization”¹¹⁴² and acclaimed “the spread of democracy” as “one of the most heartening trends of recent years”¹¹⁴³. They asserted that there was “no ideal more dominant than that of democracy” on the threshold of the 21st century¹¹⁴⁴. They even affirmed the existence of “a consensus that democracy, *whatever form it may take* [our emphasis], is a *global entitlement* [Ib.], a right that should be available and protected for all”¹¹⁴⁵. By alluding to the existence of diverse forms of democracy, they distanced themselves vis-à-vis the “Western model” of liberal democracy.

Democracy: now a coexistence regime hosting diverse and contradictory interpretations

By the end of the Cold War, it was clear that the word *democracy* was diversely and conflictually interpreted. The three main interpretative options were: national vs. globalist, liberal vs. neo-Marxist, Western vs. non-Western. As an illustration of how the revolution resolved the conflict between the latter options, let us cite the Moslem Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt and President of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, who applied the democracy concept to the Cairo negotiations:

“This Conference brings together peoples of different civilizations, cultures and religions whose laws should be respected. Hence, there is no way other than through the interaction of opinions in an atmosphere of democracy to find a common denominator that unites us within this richly diverse gathering”¹¹⁴⁶.

Mubarak paradoxically emphasized both respect for the diversity of the world’s cultures and religions on the one hand, and the need for consensus or “a common denominator” on the other. He implicitly but clearly established the global consensus’s transcendence of national laws. Interestingly, he conceptually tied democracy to the global consensus.

In addition to the three conflicts over the meaning of democracy that we just mentioned, this chapter evidences the emergence of a fourth type of interpretative conflict: that of modern democracy vs. the paradigms of the new postmodern partnership politics, which the revolution installed, let us repeat, *in the very name of democracy* while in effect, as we shall see, the global partnership politics deconstructs modern democracy’s basic tenets from within. All in all, democracy had, by the end of the Cold War, become an unstable concept, “enlarged” to novel, revolutionary interpretations, “holistically” containing even mutually destructive contents.

Socialist leadership in linking new politics to democracy

The socialist and social democratic proponents of the global partnership politics took leadership in *linking* the new politics to democracy and to the historic democratization tide taking place at the beginning of the 1990s. By the end of the Cold War, former communists and globalist

¹¹⁴² “The recent tide of democratization has swept away many autocratic systems and several leaders who had clung to power for too long.” Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood.*, op. cit., p. 58.

¹¹⁴³ Ib., p. 57.

¹¹⁴⁴ Ib., p. 67.

¹¹⁴⁵ Ib., p.62.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Cairo Report*, p. 162.

socialists ardently supported at once democracy¹¹⁴⁷ and the partnerships' revolution¹¹⁴⁸ through which global governance came about. The authors of *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, who belonged to this ideological category and entertained direct working relations with high-ranking UN officials or were themselves decision-makers within the system at the time - Willy Brandt, Maurice Strong, Nafis Sadik among others - proved among the most power-wielding advocates of global governance.

Our Global Neighborhood, issued in the aftermath of Rio, Vienna and Cairo, intertwined democracy and democratization with global governance's globalist objectives. Its authors identified the "foremost challenge" of the post-Cold War generation to be the mobilization of the "collective power of people [our emphasis] to shape the future" so as to "make life in the twenty-first century more democratic, more secure, and more sustainable [Ib.]"¹¹⁴⁹. As this thesis has evidenced, they understood the "collective power of the people" ("people" in the singular) as a transnational or "global" force. They linked democratization to a "new vision that can galvanize people everywhere to achieve higher levels of co-operation in areas of common concern and shared destiny"¹¹⁵⁰. This new "vision" was the one that the post-Cold War conferences were in the process of elaborating: not a national or international vision, but a "global" one. The report asserted that post-Cold War democratization raised "the prospect of a strengthened commitment to the pursuit of common objectives through multilateralism"¹¹⁵¹.

Since socialists and ex-communists - not liberal democrats - stood at the origin of the transformative linkage, it is useful to consider Gorbachev's stance on democracy as expressed in his December 8, 1988 UN speech and before the Soviet leader's stance, that of the authors of the *Communist Manifesto* and of Lenin.

Gorbachev's promotion of democratic "diversity"

In the speech we just mentioned, Gorbachev assimilated his perestroika with democratization¹¹⁵². In the Soviet leader's view, "the profound *democratic* [our emphasis] reform of the entire system

¹¹⁴⁷ Jacques Attali, although himself not directly involved in the UN conferences process, is a prominent example of a socialist defending at once democracy and global governance/global government. The back cover of *Demain, qui gouvernera le monde ?* (Fayard, 2011) read: "Quel pays, quelle coalition, quelle institution internationale aura les moyens de maîtriser les menaces écologiques, nucléaires, économiques, financières, sociales, politiques, militaires qui pèsent sur le monde ? Un jour, l'humanité comprendra qu'elle a tout à gagner à se rassembler autour d'un gouvernement démocratique du monde, dépassant les intérêts des nations les plus puissantes, protégeant l'identité de chaque civilisation et gérant au mieux les intérêts de l'humanité. Un tel gouvernement existera un jour. Après un désastre, ou à sa place. Il est urgent d'oser y penser, pour le meilleur du monde."

¹¹⁴⁸ To give but one example of Gorbachev's adamant support of global governance as the "new world order", let us quote from the speech he delivered at Lafayette College (Easton, Pennsylvania) on October 19, 2011, entitled *Perspectives on Global Change*. The former Soviet leader regretted that "the opportunities that existed after the end of the Cold War ... were not used properly", that "deterioration" took place "where there should have been positive movement toward a new world order." But, he continued, "we still are facing the problem of building such a world order. We have crises: we are facing problems of the environment, of backwardness and poverty, of food shortages. All of these problems are because we do not have a system of global governance." See [Gorbachev: Pushing New World Order, World Government - The New American](#) (retrieved July 17, 2021).

¹¹⁴⁹ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 1.

¹¹⁵⁰ Ib., p. 1.

¹¹⁵¹ Ib., p. 1. The report added: "The world community seemed to be uniting around the idea that it should assume greater collective responsibility in a wide range of areas, including security - not only in a military sense but in economic and social terms as well - sustainable development, the promotion of democracy, equity and human rights, and humanitarian action".

¹¹⁵² Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the UN*, op. cit.: "Under the badge of democratization, restructuring has now encompassed both politics and the economy, and spiritual life and ideology." And "In moving towards such bold

of power and government is the guarantee that the overall process of restructuring will move steadily forward and gather strength”¹¹⁵³. Beyond the USSR, the Soviet leader observed a “surge towards independence, democracy and social justice” in the world. He hailed these developments as “very profound social changes for the better”. His enthusiasm for democratization extended globally: “The idea of the democratization of the entire world order has turned into a mighty socio-political force”¹¹⁵⁴.

Gorbachev did not interpret democratization as a universal alignment of the USSR and all countries along Western liberal democracy. Quite the contrary, he implicitly challenged the Western democratic model as not being universal. He alluded to the need for *diverse* interpretations of democracy:

“The self-assertion of the world’s *diversity* [our emphasis] makes untenable attempts to look down on others and teach them one’s own democracy, not to mention the fact that democratic values made for export often lose their value very quickly. Thus, it is a question of unity and diversity”¹¹⁵⁵.

The Soviet leader’s use of the notion of “diversity” is interestingly concomitant, as already noted in chapter one, with the process then birthing global governance’s diversity paradigm¹¹⁵⁶ as a substitute for modern Western pluralism (i.e. a type of “diversity” that does fully respect the *identity* of the different parties). In a striking parallel, the Soviet leader promoted *tolerance* of democratic “diversity”. He advocated “respect for other people’s views and stands, tolerance, preparedness to see phenomena which are different not necessarily as bad or hostile, the ability to learn to live side by side while remaining different and agreeing with one another not on every issue”¹¹⁵⁷. As an alternative to Western liberal democracy, Gorbachev arguably had in mind some form of globalist, green socialist democracy: his post-1991 behavior has ascertained both his globalism and his eco-socialism.

Marx’ democratic framework for the communist revolution

To interpret Gorbachev’s pro-democracy stance, it is useful to keep two factors in mind. The first is backwards-looking: it is the democratic framework that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had given the communist revolution in their 1848 *Communist Manifesto*. “The first step in the revolution by the working class” was in their view “to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling

revolutionary transformations, we understood that there would also be errors, that resistance would now occur, that the novelty would engender new problems. We foresaw the possibility of breaking in individual sections.”

¹¹⁵³ Ib.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ib. Gorbachev added: “Hundreds of millions of people, be it in the East or in the South, in the West or in the North, new nations and states, new social movements and ideologies have moved to the front of the historical stage. In large-scale, not infrequently stormy people’s movements, the surge towards independence, democracy and social justice is expressed in all its many aspects and contradictions.”

¹¹⁵⁵ Ib.

¹¹⁵⁶ Global governance’s diversity paradigm was born and developed in the Western New Left’s breeding ground. As Bock-Côté explained it: « C’est dans le paradigme antidiscriminatoire que prend forme la question de la diversité. Si l’histoire occidentale apparaît pour la gauche multiculturelle comme un dispositif d’exclusion systématique des minorités, il faut conséquemment entrer en lutte contre les discriminations qui affecteraient les groupes subordonnés rassemblés sous le parapluie théorique de la diversité. Il faut rompre les hiérarchies de la société, démanteler les structures discriminatoires, reprendre à neuf l’ordre social, l’aplatir pour mieux le rebâtir, le déconstruire pour mieux le reconstruire. Il faut imaginer une nouvelle société sachant revisiter la démocratie comme une idée authentiquement révolutionnaire qui à travers la question de la diversité, permettrait de créer une société désaliénée, authentiquement égalitaire. » Bock-Côté, Mathieu. *Le Multiculturalisme Comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., p. 167.

¹¹⁵⁷ Gorbachev, Michael. *Speech to the United Nations*, op. cit.

class, to win the battle for democracy [our emphasis]”¹¹⁵⁸. In his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx admitted that the *transition* from capitalism to communism (that is, to “proletarian democracy”) would go through a period of dictatorship. Marx explained:

“Between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the *revolutionary transformation* [our emphasis] of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political *transition* [Ib.] period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat”¹¹⁵⁹.

Almost 70 years later, Vladimir Lenin espoused Marx’ goal of “winning the battle of democracy”. In his famous 1917 pamphlet *The State and Revolution*, Lenin argued that democracy was impossible in a capitalist system¹¹⁶⁰. A revolution was in order to attain proletarian democracy. The blatant paradox of the Marxist rationale was, as history tragically made evident, that the communist revolution never led to democracy. The Soviet Union violated all principles of democracy, starting with popular sovereignty and political freedom and equality. The communist revolution stopped at dictatorship, totalitarianism and the gulag as its final horizon. This paradox teaches humanity a useful lesson about the need to verify the solidity of pro-democracy discourses and to identify the conditions guaranteeing true freedom and equality: a lesson that can be applied to the “pro-democracy” global governance revolution.

Marxism’ connatural nexus with internationalism and globalism

The second factor to keep in mind to interpret Gorbachev’s 1988 pro-democracy stance is forward-looking. It regards the undividedly pro-global governance objectives that Gorbachev, heir to Marx, would pursue after his resignation from Soviet leadership in 1991. The post-Cold War *globalism* of Gorbachev, other former communists and socialists worldwide organically developed out of the *internationalism* connatural with Marxism. In Marxist theory, the “battle for democracy” was by nature an international one. It went through the abolition of nationality. Socialist democracy would come about as a result of the organized actions of an international working class enfranchising all human beings.

This thesis suggests a parallel with global governance. The transnational globalist elite, though incomparably inferior in number than the international working class, grabbed power and sat in the driver’s seat of the partnerships’ revolution through which global governance came about. This elite assumed the quiet evaporation of national identity and sovereignty, nations and national citizenship, and therefore of modern liberal democracy. It furthermore used Marx’s “transition” and “transformation”¹¹⁶¹ concepts to describe its grand project: a “transition” from development

¹¹⁵⁸ Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *The Communist Manifesto*. 1848. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm> (retrieved February 11, 2022).

¹¹⁵⁹ Marx, Karl. *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. <https://us.politsturm.com/marx-on-the-dictatorship-of-the-proletariat/> (retrieved February 11, 2022).

¹¹⁶⁰ Lenin concluded a famous lecture he delivered on the state at the Sverdlov University on July 11, 1919 in this way: “This machine called the state, before which people bowed in superstitious awe, believing the old tales that it means popular rule, tales which the proletariat declares to be a bourgeois lie—this machine the proletariat will smash. So far we have deprived the capitalists of this machine and have taken it over. We shall use this machine, or bludgeon, to destroy all exploitation. And when the possibility of exploitation no longer exists anywhere in the world, when there are no longer owners of land and owners of factories, and when there is no longer a situation in which some gorge while others starve, only when the possibility of this no longer exists shall we consign this machine to the scrap-heap. Then there will be no state and no exploitation. Such is the view of our Communist Party”. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/jul/11.htm> (retrieved December 26, 2021).

¹¹⁶¹ In *The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet*, which was the *Synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda* distributed on December 4, 2015 (UN document A/69/700), Ban ki-Moon made of “transformation” the UN’s watchword for the 15 following

as growth to sustainable development, from national sovereignty to global governance, from both the modern liberal value system and the biblical one to its neo-Marxist, postmodern and post-biblical novel ethic.

The constructed global “transition” the global elite did operate vastly differed from the end of history transition that Western liberal democrats then predicted would naturally unfold after 1989.

The second wave conferences wove democracy in the fabric of global governance

As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, over their course since Rio, the conferences one after the other firmly wove democracy and post-Cold War democratization objectives on the one hand, and the new global partnership for sustainable development on the other, into each other and in the fabric of global governance. We shall now see how the second wave conferences established democracy as a precondition for the realization of sustainable development and of all its constitutive global goals. Vice versa, they viewed both the new global platform (education for all, children’s rights, sustainable development, women’s rights, sexual and reproductive health, social development, gender equality, right to adequate housing, food security...) and the new political paradigms (partnerships and the new global partnership, good governance, global governance, global consensus, women’s empowerment, youth empowerment, NGO capacity-building...) as enhancing democracy.

By the mid-1990s, democratization had acquired a dual global character: not only had it become after 1989, in the Beijing’s assessment, “a worldwide movement” (*Platf. for Action*, par. 15)¹¹⁶², but the new politics put democratization at the service, not of national peoples, but of global governance.

8.1.2. Transferring democratic principles and values to the “global level”

The second wave conferences amalgamated the modern concept of democracy with the postmodern new politics, resulting in a quiet mutation of the conceptual content of democracy. A new paradigm, embodying this new content, ensued: *participatory democracy*¹¹⁶³.

A new paradigm: participatory democracy

In the opening sentence of its chapter on “Strengthening the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations: Partners for Sustainable Development” (chapter 27), Agenda 21 introduced the participatory democracy¹¹⁶⁴ political paradigm, which had been absent from all previous UN conferences’ outcome documents and independent reports we analyzed in this thesis. The timing of this novel concept’s appearance in international cooperation was revelatory: it was

years: “Transformation is our *watchword*” (par. 4). It is in his view humanity’s current *mission*: “We are called upon to embrace change” (par. 4). And our common *duty*: “This generation is charged with the duty of transforming our societies” (par. 157). Ban ki-Moon saw transformation as global governance’s *objective* and humanity’s obligation: “Transformation is our aim. We must transform our economies, our environment and our societies. We must change our mindsets, behaviours and destructive patterns” (par. 159). Education and culture have an essential role in the envisioned transformation: “We must mobilize the power of culture in the transformative change we seek” (par. 132). The *Sustainable Development Goals* and their targets themselves were described as “transformational” (par. 4).

¹¹⁶² Beijing added: “A worldwide movement towards democratization has opened up the political process in many nations, but the popular participation of women in key decision-making as full and equal partners with men, particularly in politics, has not yet been achieved”. *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 15.

¹¹⁶³ The *participatory culture* paradigm, in particular as developed by Henry Jenkins, is the cultural equivalent of a new civilization both valuing and redefining participation.

¹¹⁶⁴ The participatory democracy paradigm has widely penetrated the political language at all levels. It gives its name, for instance, to one of the four policy committees of the powerful umbrella organization *United Cities and Local Governments*.

contemporary with the adoption of sustainable development and the new global partnership as the object of a “global consensus” at the Earth Summit: contemporary with the full break-out of the global governance revolution.

Agenda 21 used the concept just once¹¹⁶⁵. While it did not define it, it explicitly related participatory democracy to the political participation of NGOs, which was then at a moment of exponential growth¹¹⁶⁶. Agenda 21 underlined the “vital role” of NGOs in the “shaping and implementation” of participatory democracy¹¹⁶⁷. The UNCED’s linkage between democratic participation and transnational NGOs implied a redefinition of the modern democracy’s participation principle. Its participatory democracy paradigm meant neither a national people’s participation in free democratic elections, all votes counting equally, nor the free participation of every single individual in the world in global governance’s decision-making processes, nor that of every existing state. It did not mean the participation of democratically elected officials who would be representing the world’s “people”. Global governance’s “participating” and ruling transnational NGOs were not democratically elected, nor were they representative of any society.

Like the UNCED’s other political paradigms, such as its “new global partnership”, “governance” or “capacity-building”, participatory democracy was to serve no other purpose than the achievement of sustainable development – hence a global, not a national, agenda. Participatory democracy conceptually crystallized the UN’s decades-long partnership practice with the NGOs that had effectively participated in sustainable development since its origins. What differentiated participatory democracy from these other paradigms, however, was that it nominatively, explicitly related the new politics and its *global agendas* to *democracy*.

Born within the new politics’ framework, Rio’s participatory democracy was conceptually indissoluble from the political *empowerment*¹¹⁶⁸ of all non-state, non-governmental partners in sustainable development. The goal was for these actors to *participate in their full capacity* to the achievement of the global platform – a goal in view of which Rio had introduced the new “capacity-building” paradigm. The *Istanbul Report* confirmed Rio’s nexus between the participatory democracy and empowerment/capacity-building paradigms by affirming that “capacity-building would be needed for developing participatory democracy”¹¹⁶⁹. Incidentally, we note that *empowerment* corresponds to the act of *giving power to*. In the new politics, sovereign governments, the legitimate power holders, are the power givers, and non-governmental actors, the power recipients. Non-state actors having themselves conceptualized the empowerment paradigm, they were the engineers of their own empowerment: they were power-grabbers.

Participatory democracy presented as the type of democracy needed for the 21st century

¹¹⁶⁵ The *Istanbul Report* contains three mentions.

¹¹⁶⁶ Willetts, Peter. *The Growth in the Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The Growth in the Number of ECOSOC NGOs*, op. cit. The chart shows a significant rise in numbers as of the 1970s, and an exponential one as of the 1990s.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.1: “Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they play in society. The nature of the independent role played by non-governmental organizations within a society calls for real participation; therefore, independence is a major attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the precondition of real participation.”

¹¹⁶⁸ *Istanbul Report*, par. 179: “Empowerment and participation contribute to democracy and sustainable human settlements development.”

¹¹⁶⁹ *Habitat Dialogues for the Twenty-first Century. Istanbul Report*, p. 177.

Rio's participatory democracy paradigm textually reappeared at the revolution's conclusive hour in 1996, in the conference report of the City Summit. The description that the summit's president, Süleyman Demirel, President of Turkey, made of participatory democracy semantically matched Rio's new global partnership in terms of advocating the participation of all possible state and non-state actors in the implementation of sustainable development¹¹⁷⁰.

The post-Cold War conferences put a democratic label on the joint participation of all governmental and transnational non-governmental partners and of nationally-undifferentiated individuals in the implementation of a common and global agenda. They linked and amalgamated democracy to global governance as content and as process. The conferences' democracy-global governance linkage achieved a consequential break. The linkage disconnected democracy from its classical and modern content by tying it to globalism and its radical re-interpretation of participation and "people power".

Notwithstanding the consequences of this historic rupture, never did sovereign governments, in their multilateral negotiations, openly challenge the democracy-global governance linkage. Demirel connected, in a cause to effect relationship, the post-Cold War democratization tide and what he called "the need for increased participatory democracy": "As a natural consequence of the general trend of democratization in the world, the need for increased participatory democracy is gathering greater importance"¹¹⁷¹. This sentence suggests that, by 1996, the revolution's agents already plainly equated *participatory democracy* with *democracy*. They viewed their paradigms as categorical imperatives to which there would be no alternative.

Only Rio and Istanbul used the "participatory democracy" new political paradigm in their final reports. The conferences, however, pervasively emphasized "participation" of all transnational partners in global governance as essential to the achievement of the global agenda. They did not – let us underscore - apply "participation" to national citizens: they did not use the concept in its traditional modern democratic acceptation. The post-Cold War UN conferences surreptitiously transferred a foundational democratic value and process – participation - from the national level to a "global one", and from the national people to transnational non-governmental actors "participating" in global governance. This transfer weakened the legitimate power of national democracies.

Construction of an artificial global demos, at an inexistent global level

"Participatory democracy" conceptually distinguishes itself from "democratic participation" according to both its classical (direct democracy) and modern (representative democracy) understandings. It deceptively uses the notions of demos, democracy and democratic participation¹¹⁷² for purposes fundamentally differing from those of democracy

¹¹⁷⁰ See Statement by Süleyman Demirel, President of Turkey and President of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II). *Istanbul Report*, p. 210.

¹¹⁷¹ Ib., p. 209.

¹¹⁷² This author presented a paper *Participatory Democracy in the New Europe: A Critical Analysis* at an American Enterprise Institute conference entitled "Nongovernmental Organizations: The Growing Power of an Unelected Few," held in Washington on June 11, 2003. This is how Chantal Delsol described participatory democracy: « L'organisation de la société se ferait... à travers des réseaux multiples et locaux, négociant des normes, et non plus par des lois votées par les assemblées représentatives. On voit ici une rationalité qui se défait – la belle ordonnance de l'Etat souverain et de ses institutions mitoyennes et dérivées. Une sorte de joyeux désordre apparaît : de multiples assemblées informelles, des comités, des dialogues de partenaires, le tout de façon horizontale et non plus verticale comme auparavant, polycentrique alors que la politique de la souveraineté était monocentrique. Ce type d'organisation prend le nom de 'démocratie participative', laissant entendre que la démocratie classique a failli à la

The definition of democracy is rule or government (*κρατία*) by the people (*δῆμος*), either at the level of the polis (*πόλις*) in the case of classical democracy, or of the nation, in that of modern democracy. The Greek inventors of democracy applied their political system to the polis, a small community of no more than 6,000 individuals. What has been called “democracy” in modern times was the application of the Greek concept to a political entity of the size of the nation-state (“indirect democracy”, as it came to be called, and as opposed to the Greek “direct democracy”). The Greeks would never have used the word “democracy” to qualify indirect democracy. As per the modern understanding of democracy, the *demos* is a nation, a sovereign national entity holding power over government and legislator and whose participation exclusively takes place at the national level. Representation mechanisms ensure popular sovereignty - in Lockean political philosophy, the people’s free consent to political power and this power’s continuous exercise within the terms of the people’s social contract. National citizens’ political participation is foundational to modern democracy and to the legitimacy of national democratic governments.

The *demos*, and therefore democracy and democratic participation, are inapplicable to the international level. They are least of all so to a fictitious “global level”¹¹⁷³. The conferences’ constructed “global level” is totally disconnected from sovereign nations, as opposed to what is inter-national. Yet Rio and Istanbul clearly applied the participatory democracy paradigm to a “global level”, as did the other conferences apply *participation* of non-state actors to this global level. The second wave conferences attempted to lay the foundation stones for an nonexistent “global demos”. They transgressively assumed “the people” (in the singular, as in Rio’s tripartite new global partnership) to be some kind of global entity. As seen, the conferences directly coopted nationally-undifferentiated “individuals” in the implementation of their respective global goals. Without naming them as such, they treated “individuals” as if they were global citizens *subjected* to their global norms, as serfs of the global system. “The people” as *implementing* agents, however, did not *govern* the global partnership. “Participatory democracy” was not power by the people for the people: it was rule by the global elite. Global governance’s participatory democracy transgresses democracy’s foremost fundament - government by “the people”.

The real, power-holding participants in “participatory democracy” were neither national individual citizens nor an artificial “global demos”. They were those actors we identified in chapter six as global governance’s primary partners, few in numbers, many of which were transnational NGOs, some of which were what Demirel called “individuals and intellectuals who feel responsible towards society”¹¹⁷⁴: the overlords at the helm of global governance. In the name of democracy and democratization, the new politics induced governments to partner with groups which do not in any way constitute, represent or equate with “the people” as “the nation”.

Eloquently suggesting global governance’s use of semantic manipulation, participatory democracy suggested abidance by and promotion of the democratic principles of participation, freedom and self-determination, participatory democracy. The new paradigm has however proven to steer people’s participation in a single programmatic direction, pre-established by the global elite. Such framing was antithetical to freedom. This was particularly evident in the area of sexuality. The conferences encouraged people’s participation “in decisions affecting their lives” in this domain, but exclusively within the ideological framework of sexual and reproductive

participation : soit que la représentation ne suffit pas pour véritablement participer, soit que le système représentatif a été perverti avec le temps. » Delsol, Chantal. *L’Age du Renoncement*, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

¹¹⁷³ The construction of a global demos, of a global democracy, of global law has been the subject of much academic speculation.

¹¹⁷⁴ *Istanbul Report*, p. 210.

health. In the name of their “participation in decisions affecting their lives”, the world’s individual women, children and youth were in fact coopted as social activists for the revolution. Their ideological and political subjection as global governance’s agents of change took place in the very name of their self-determination. The “participation” of “the people” in participatory democracy was therefore factitious, leaving out people’s will, conscience and reason. Global governance’s “participatory” mechanisms would stall no sooner would people use their self-determination *against* sustainable development, reproductive health, gender equality or any other normative pillars of its global framework.

The promotion of the new participatory democracy paradigm represented a strategic attempt to *legitimize* the new politics by conferring on it a semblance of the legitimacy inherent in democratic processes. Participatory democracy, however, was deprived of what has granted modern democracy its legitimacy¹¹⁷⁵, notably power vested in the national people. Rio’s new political paradigm manipulatively served a quiet usurpation of power, authority and legitimacy by an elite at the helm of a global regime deprived of juridically established branches of government. There are no executive, legislative and judicial branches in global governance, no separation of powers, no checks and balances as in a modern democracy¹¹⁷⁶. The global elite tends to concentrate all powers into its own hands.

Confluence of historical factors favoring the adoption of new democratic paradigm

A confluence of historical factors and paradoxes favored global governance’s pro-democracy stance and its concomitant manipulation of the concept in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall.

One paradox was the proclamation of a consensus on democracy vs. the coexistence of diverse, conflicting interpretations of the concept, rendering the actual content of the alleged “consensus” very thin, and that of “democratization”, uncertain. We have seen earlier in this chapter that while many in the West assumed the existence of a unilateral consensus on Western modern liberal, constitutional and representative democracy, ex-communists and socialists worldwide, actively involved in post-Cold War multilateral agenda-setting, held different - globalist and therefore utopian - views on “democracy”. International intergovernmental cooperation in the early 1990s did not openly address the then existing ambivalence, thereby creating a vacuum ready to be filled by others.

A second paradox was internal to Western democracies. At the very hour many assumed the definitive victory of the Western model, the reality was that many Western democracies, especially European, then found themselves, even if at various degrees, in a state of inner debilitation manifesting itself through a democratic fatigue, a “democratic deficit”, a shrinking of

¹¹⁷⁵ Lawyers, social scientists, philosophers understand the term *legitimacy* differently. Lawyers understand legitimacy as *legal validity*. The social scientist Max Weber conceived legitimacy as the *belief in legitimacy* of the relevant social agents. Philosophers and moralists view legitimacy as what is morally rightful.

¹¹⁷⁶ Although a global governance advocate such as Otfried Höffe argued: “The United Nations is close to a world republic by another aspect, too: its organs are submitted to the principle of separation of powers. The General Assembly somehow resembles the legislative power. Admittedly, the General Assembly can adopt nothing but recommendations, most of which are not legally binding, excepting those on the budget and assessed contributions, for instance. The Secretary-General has certain (although narrow) executive powers. The Security Council has more executive power and is the only UN organ that has the character of a public enforcement capacity... Concerning the third power (the judiciary power), there is at least the International Court of Justice and further specialized tribunals. However, none of these tribunals disposes of any enforcement power.” Höffe, Otfried. *A Subsidiary and Federal World Republic: Thoughts on Democracy in the Age of Globalization*. In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

pluralism¹¹⁷⁷, a fragmentation of national social contracts, a joint crisis of political participation and representation, a crisis of authority and a connected institutional crisis, a loss of credibility of both government and political parties¹¹⁷⁸, a profound crisis of what the West used to call “universal values”. The triumphant West threw a blind eye on the cracks in its own system, on the concatenation of political ills provoked by its moral capitulation vis-à-vis its philosophical, moral and religious legacy. The implosion of Western contracts of societies, partly due to the cultural revolution’s celebration of the individual’s right to choose even what is morally wrong, had led to that of Western contracts of governments. Both contracts have been at risk of fading to almost nothing, to a minimalist moral consensus limiting itself to the condemnation of torture, genocide, pedophilia, human trafficking... No longer is there now even a consensus on the condemnation of murder, given current Western laws on abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide. Genuine “democratic representation” became virtually impossible to reach in societies that had become deeply morally fragmented. No longer feeling represented, citizens lost interest in political participation. The crisis, combined with successive waves of immigration from the non-Western world in the Western countries most affected by the crisis, seriously jeopardized the survival of the nation-state.

Yet another factor was that by 1989, the global governance process stood at an advanced programmatic stage and was on the verge of a full-blown revolution that would durably change the paradigms of international cooperation. The fluidification of the core content of democracy and the crisis of Western liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War favored the steady and fast advancement of global governance’s new political paradigms as alternatives and remedies to the Western democratic crisis. By *Our Global Neighborhood*’s own admission:

“The widening signs of alienation from the political process call for the reform of governance [our emphasis] within societies, for decentralization, for *new forms of participation* [Ib.], and for the *wider* [Ib.] involvement of people than traditional democratic systems have allowed”¹¹⁷⁹.

This thesis has shown what global governance concretely meant by “governance”, “new forms of participation” and the “widening” or “enlargement” of people’s involvement: the direct political participation of transnational non-state and non-governmental actors in sustainable development.

How the new politics allegedly responded to the Western democratic crisis

The new politics celebrates as virtually equally valuable the diversity of opinions, life forms, cultures, forms of democracy, families, partners, the diversity of social, cultural, political, sexual lifestyle choices people can make within a given society. It promotes the value of tolerance of all choices and components of this “diversity” as a defining component of its ethics. Diversity is a holistic, *transformative* paradigm that is more than the sum of its individual parts: the celebration of diversity alters the identity of these parts. The new politics sought to resolve the problems engendered by the fragmentation of Western societies through strategically combining its “diversity” and “tolerance” paradigms (which, as a reminder, were both to be found in

¹¹⁷⁷ Visible in the virtual monopoly of the Left over the mainstream media, for example.

¹¹⁷⁸ In the observation of the Commission on Global Governance: “More generally, attitudes towards governments are changing. Tensions between the government of the day and opposition groups are a vital part of any democracy. But there is now greater disenchantment with the political process itself; both government and opposition parties and politicians of all hues have been losing credibility. This may partly derive from the increasing demands of electors and the growing inability of politicians to deliver results, as in an increasingly interdependent world, individual states are constrained in what they can achieve”. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

¹¹⁷⁹ Ib., p. 37.

Gorbachev's UN speech). The new and global social contract (i.e. the global consensus) provided an apparently unifying alternative to moribund national social contracts. The new global ethic filled the vacuum left by the disintegration of the West's traditional moral framework, its clear distinction between good and evil and "universal values". The new global mandate superimposed itself to some extent on the authority that national governments and institutions used to enjoy. The participatory democracy paradigm appeared a palliative solution, or altogether the cure to the predicament of Western democracies. The transnational NGOs participating in global policy-making offered a new form of "representation" for "the people".

Meanwhile the new politics' paradigms entailed a postmodern *reinterpretation* of democracy's fundamental principles.

8.1.3. Blending democracy and the new partnerships politics

Democracy amalgamated with partnerships: condition to achieve the global goals

At the Copenhagen Second World Conference on Women in 1980 (incidentally, the year the Solidarność trade union was founded in Poland, expressing the Polish people's aspiration for reclaiming the democratic power that naturally belonged to them and provoking a concatenation of events that would lead to the fall of the Berlin wall), one commentator had opined that democracy would be the "system most conducive to the achievement"¹¹⁸⁰ of women's equality (as interpreted by the global governance revolutionary process). This affirmation prefigured the linkage that the revolution would establish a decade later between democracy and global governance's agendas. The 1991 globalist report of the Stockholm Initiative, reflecting the immediate post-Cold War "consensus" on democracy while also advocating the new politics (NGO participation, global governance and sustainable development), established democracy as a condition for development (which was in the process of becoming *sustainable* development): "Democracy and human rights are essential to the prospects of development"¹¹⁸¹.

As mentioned, the second wave conferences promoted democracy and democratization as specific goals, emphasizing commitment to democracy as an "essential", "indispensable" or *sine qua non* condition for the realization of their respective *global* goals¹¹⁸². At the same time, they pushed for partnerships and the political participation and empowerment of non-state, non-governmental actors. These two processes tended to merge, amalgamating traditional modern democracy and postmodern "participatory democracy" – a process whereby the latter would quietly transform and fundamentally alter the former from within.

Let us provide examples of the surreptitious blending. Agenda 21 stated: "Experience has shown that sustainable development requires a commitment to ... progress towards democratic government... which allows for full participation of all parties concerned" (par. 2.6). Agenda 21

¹¹⁸⁰ Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, development and peace. Copenhagen, July 14 - 30, 1980. A/CONF.94/35, par. 37. View of Anker Jorgensen, Prime Minister of Denmark.

¹¹⁸¹ The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 32.

¹¹⁸² Copenhagen Progr. of Action, par. 23: "The eradication of poverty cannot be accomplished through anti-poverty programmes alone but will require democratic participation". *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 131: "An environment that maintains world peace and promotes and protects human rights, democracy and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the principles of non-threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence and of respect for sovereignty as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, is an important factor for the advancement of women". *Istanbul Report*, Chapter 1, preamble, par. 4: "Democracy, respect for human rights, transparent, representative and accountable government and administration in all sectors of society, as well as effective participation by civil society, are indispensable foundations for the realization of sustainable development".

deemed such a commitment “essential” for the fulfilment of its policy directions and objectives (par. 2.6). By “full participation of all parties concerned”, Agenda 21 alluded – as the entire document made clear – not to the participation of national citizens but to the participation of all transnational partners, state and non-state, and of its Major Groups in particular. Cairo, interestingly, linked democracy to the goals of the sexual revolution. The population conference insisted on the democratic requirement to achieve “attitudinal and behavioural change” (*Progr. of Action*, par. 11.12) in favor of its sexual and reproductive health agenda. Reproductive health differed from the top-down population control policies then applied in undemocratic, dictatorial regimes such as China. The Cairo “ethos”¹¹⁸³ rested on the Western cultural revolution’s ideological interpretation of *choice, consent* and *freedom*, a foundational democratic value. It amalgamated democratic freedom with the revolution’s interpretation of the “freedom to choose” - outside the traditional good and evil moral framework.

Copenhagen affirmed the need for both democracy and the empowerment of what it called “civil society” (a concept the new politics redefined, as seen¹¹⁸⁴) so as to achieve its “quality of life for all” global goal:

“The ultimate goal of social development is to improve and enhance the quality of life of all people. It requires democratic institutions, ... and an active involvement of civil society. Empowerment and participation are essential for democracy, harmony and social development” (*Copenhagen Progr. of Action*, par. 7).

Reflecting a latent and recurring will to provide global governance with teeth, Istanbul went further than all preceding conferences by recommending *institutionalizing* the “processes of participation... and capacity-building mechanisms” so as to ensure a “working democracy” capable of delivering its sustainable human settlements agenda¹¹⁸⁵. In all of the examples we just provided, the conferences interwove the global agenda and democracy.

The second wave conferences’ frequent juxtaposition of democracy and the new political paradigms (governance, empowerment, partnerships, civil society participation...) amalgamated the modern and postmodern concepts and failed to clarify the relationship between the two¹¹⁸⁶.

¹¹⁸³ This also appears in a statement by Gro Harlem Brundtland at Cairo: “In order to achieve a sustainable balance between the number of people and the amount of natural resources that can be consumed, both the peoples of the industrialized countries and the rich in the South have a special obligation to reduce their ecological impact. Changes are needed, both in the North and in the South, but these changes will not happen unless they stand the test of democracy. Only when people have the right to take part in the shaping of society by participating in democratic political processes will changes be politically sustainable. Only then can we fulfil the hopes and aspirations of generations yet unborn”. *Cairo Report*, p. 173.

¹¹⁸⁴ Just a couple of days after the fall of the Berlin wall, on November 11-12, 1989, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor presented a paper entitled *Invoking Civil Society* at the Center Forum for Psychosocial Studies that was published in N° 31 of the Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies (eds. Greg Urban and Benjamin Lee). Taylor studied the different strands of thought regarding the civil society concept (English, German, Scottish).

¹¹⁸⁵ *Istanbul Report*, par. 135: “Therefore, conditions for liveable human settlements presuppose a working democracy in which processes of participation, civic engagement and capacity-building mechanisms are *institutionalized* [our emphasis]”. Rome was no exception to promoting a coexistence of democracy and the new participatory polities: “Democracy, promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, and the full and equal participation of men and women are essential for achieving sustainable food security for all” (*Rome Decl.*).

¹¹⁸⁶ In Copenhagen for example, participating UN member states affirmed: “We are convinced that *democracy* [our emphasis] and transparent and accountable *governance* [Ib.] and administration in all sectors of society are indispensable foundations for the realization of social and people-centered sustainable development” (*Copenhagen*

The conferences steered democracy and the new politics *together* towards the common realization of global governance's platform.

Global governance as content and process would enhance democracy by “widening” it

The overwhelming majority of scholars who have been unquestioning, indiscriminate supporters of global governance adhered to the view that its processes enhanced democracy¹¹⁸⁷. The second wave conferences viewed global governance, both as content and as process, as contributing to the reinforcement of democracy¹¹⁸⁸. The new political paradigms would “enlarge” democracy, and this enlargement (as all of global governance's “holistic enlargements”) would be a qualitative jump towards democratization. The conferences' assertion was neither debated nor challenged.

As mentioned in the previous section, some of the first wave international conferences had started connecting the emerging global agenda – primarily the feminist agenda - to democracy¹¹⁸⁹. Not only did they view democracy as a condition for the realization of this agenda, but they also saw the degree of implementation of the feminist agenda as a democratic indicator. The first International Women's Conference held in Mexico in 1975, for instance, viewed women's “emancipation and equality” as “an important indicator of the extent of … political democracy in any society” (*Plan of Action*, par. 72). While remaining strongest in the area of feminism, the logic soon extended after 1989 to all the agendas making up global governance as content: the achievement not only of women's rights and empowerment, gender equality, sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights, but of quality of life for all, education and health for all, children's rights, sustainable development, social development, the new social contract, food security… became an indicator of a country's degree of democratic health.

Analysis reveals again, confirming a dominant pattern characterizing the global governance revolution, that the heavier a conference's ideological load, the greater its insistence on how strong commitment to its agenda would enhance democracy. Beijing argued that gender equality was “critical” to the “consolidation” and “proper functioning” of democracy” and to

Decl., par. 4). Another example of juxtaposition is from *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 3.2: “An effective strategy for tackling the problems of poverty, development and environment simultaneously … should cover demographic issues, enhanced health care and education, the rights of women, *the role of youth and of indigenous people and local communities and a democratic participation process in association with improved governance* [our emphasis].”

¹¹⁸⁷ See for instance how Finkelstein related Boutros-Ghali's argument: “In the first issue of this [Global Governance] journal… UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the internationalization of the problems of human rights and democracy, previously thought of as issues for states to deal with within their own boundaries. He also demonstrated how the pursuit of democracy as an international goal involves the cooperation of a range of international agencies and also of many nongovernmental actors – including ‘political internationals,’ which he saw as ‘the first signs of an emerging transnational democratic politics.’” Finkelstein, Lawrence S. *What is Global Governance?*, op. cit., p. 367, quoting Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative*. Global Governance 1, No. 1 (winter 1995). Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 8.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.2: “In the spirit of reform and revitalization of the United Nations system, implementation of Agenda 21 … shall be …consistent with the principles of universality, democracy, transparency…” Partnerships are an explicit and substantial part of Agenda 21.

¹¹⁸⁹ Appearances of “democra-” in first wave UN conferences: Tehran (0); Stockholm (0); Bucharest (1: “In the democratic formulation of national population goals and policies”, plan of action B-14 j); Mexico (55, mainly naming countries and organizations, but also connecting democracy to women's emancipation and their socioeconomic and political enhancement); Copenhagen (114, Ib.); Mexico (35, Ib.); Nairobi (2).

democratization¹¹⁹⁰. Cairo¹¹⁹¹ even suggested that commitment to reproductive health would be conducive to “genuine [our emphasis] democracy”¹¹⁹². Such an allusion to what makes up a “genuine democracy” was predictive of what would become the new global doxa: those countries not committing to sexual liberalism, even if democracies, would not be considered *genuine* democracies¹¹⁹³.

Gro Harlem Brundtland unequivocally amalgamated the strengthening of democracy and reproductive health at Cairo: “This Conference is really about the future of democracy, how we *widen* [our emphasis] and *deepen* [Ib.] its forces and scope”¹¹⁹⁴ through people’s empowerment and population stabilization (both of which went for her through universal access to reproductive health). Brundtland’s use of the verb “widen” gave evidence, once again, of how the partners birthed the new politics and its paradigms by way of “enlarging” established institutions and universally accepted concepts (as democracy tended to be at the end of the Cold War).

In another strong statement, Brundtland revealingly connected the Cairo agenda to building what she called a “*global* [our emphasis] democracy”: “The items and issues of this Conference are ... not merely items and issues, but building blocks in our global democracy”¹¹⁹⁵. Apart from tying democracy to an nonexistent global *demos*, Brundtland’s global democracy construct linked democracy to an ideologically divisive and globalist agenda that was fruit of the Western sexual revolution (reproductive health as a “building block” of the new global democracy). Brundtland forewarned that this global democracy would be endowed with accountability mechanisms: “The final Programme of Action must embody irreversible commitments towards strengthening the role and status of women. We must all be prepared to be held accountable. That is how democracy works”¹¹⁹⁶. Brundtland used dogmatic language (“must”, “irreversible commitments”, “held accountable”). Her wishful building of a “global democracy”¹¹⁹⁷ was to serve the *enforcement* of the global reproductive health agenda while, in an eminently undemocratic fashion, circumventing a genuine *national* debate on the controversial *global* agenda. The revolution thus

¹¹⁹⁰ Examples from Beijing are: “Equal rights, opportunities and access to resources, equal sharing of responsibilities for the family by men and women, and a harmonious partnership between them are critical to their well-being and that of their families as well as to the consolidation of democracy” (*Beijing Decl.*, par. 15). Or *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 181: “Achieving the goal of equal participation of women and men in decision-making will provide a balance that more accurately reflects the composition of society and is needed in order to strengthen democracy and promote its proper functioning”. Or: “Despite the widespread movement towards democratization in most countries, women are largely underrepresented at most levels of government, especially in ministerial and other executive bodies, and have made little progress in attaining political power in legislative bodies or in achieving the target endorsed by the Economic and Social Council of having 30 per cent women in positions at decision-making levels by 1995” (*Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 182).

¹¹⁹¹ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.12: “Greater public knowledge and commitment in a democratic setting... pave the way for democratic public discussion and thereby make possible strong political commitment and popular support for needed action at the local, national and international levels”.

¹¹⁹² *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 11.2: “The reduction of fertility, morbidity and mortality rates, the empowerment of women... and the promotion of genuine democracy are largely assisted by progress in education”.

¹¹⁹³ This pattern could be related with the way the European Union has treated countries such as Poland and Hungary.

¹¹⁹⁴ *Cairo Report*, p. 169. Statement by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway.

¹¹⁹⁵ Among all the documents used in this thesis to analyze the unfolding of the global governance process, the *Cairo Report* was the only one that used the “global democracy” phrase.

¹¹⁹⁶ *Cairo Report*, p. 170. Statement by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway.

¹¹⁹⁷ Jacques Attali, for one, promoted the idea of a “democracy without borders” (“démocratie sans frontières”) that would develop around Jerusalem. Attali, J. *Dictionnaire du XXI^e Siècle*. Fayard. 1998.

sowed the seeds of a new and global form of totalitarianism moving forward under the guise of “democracy”¹¹⁹⁸.

The partnership principle seen as “the most democratic way” to implement the conferences’ global platform

In their Istanbul Declaration, Heads of State or Government and country delegations committed to adopt “the enabling strategy and the principles of partnership [our emphasis] and participation as the most democratic [Ib.] and effective approach for the realization of [their] commitments” (par. 12)¹¹⁹⁹. For the first time in terms that explicit, at the height of the revolution, UN member states then recognized partnerships not only as the most effective, but as *the most democratic* approach to implementing the *global* goals they “committed” to achieve at all levels (those of Habitat II being themselves inclusive of the integrated sustainable development goals of all previous UN conferences)¹²⁰⁰. The implicit rationale for such a claim was that the principle of partnership made “global civil society” *participate*. “Participatory democracy” was another name global governance gave the new global partnership because the strategic intent of the revolution’s agents was to present the participation of NGOs in global governance as a qualitative plus for democracy.

Global governance’s partnerships-democracy nexus, however, contradicted democracy’s most fundamental principles. It was blatantly inadequate, if not premonitory of a historical entry in a post-democratic era. Democracies get their mandate bottom-up from their respective national peoples and function in an ascendant way. Partnerships, by contradistinction, get their “mandate” top-down from the global elite. They function from the global to the local levels, in a descendant way patently transgressing if not reversing the subsidiarity principle, as per which decisions should always be taken at the lowest possible level. Nothing was more contrary to the spirit of democracy than the submission of sovereign governments and their national citizens to a “global framework”¹²⁰¹. The transcending, globally normative “framework” was grossly antithetical to national government by the national people for the national people.

¹¹⁹⁸ Jacob Leib Talmon famously used the phrases *totalitarian democracy* and *messianic democracy* in his 1952 book *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. Talmon’s view was that you could not be both a citizen and a Christian, as the loyalties clashed.

¹¹⁹⁹ Istanbul contained another reference to partnerships as a principle, in a recommendation of the World Business Forum: “The partnership principle and its beneficial effects should be disseminated to the public and private sectors and other members of civil society”. *Istanbul Report*, p. 148.

¹²⁰⁰ “Habitat II will be the culmination of all the United Nations Conferences that have preceded it. It will deal with every dimension of human settlements, including children, the environment, human rights, population, social development and women. In short, it will be an all-encompassing and comprehensive conference on humankind and the challenges we face in this rapidly changing world. It will reinforce the components of sustainable development. It will reaffirm that the human being, as confirmed by the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, is the central subject of our efforts for development, around which all our actions must revolve. We have to come to terms with the fact that we inhabit Mother Earth together, we all share equally the responsibilities associated with our planet. Failure in one part of the Earth should be understood as collective failure”. Statement by Süleyman Demirel, President of Turkey and President of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. *Istanbul Report*, op. cit., page 210.

¹²⁰¹ *Rio Agenda 21* exposed how global governance framed (and therefore reversed) the subsidiarity principle, making local decision-making entirely dependent on global governance’s sustainable development framework: “To support a more integrated approach to decision-making, the data systems and analytical methods used to support such decision-making processes may need to be improved. Governments, in collaboration, where appropriate, with national and international organizations, should review the status of the planning and management system and, where necessary, modify and strengthen procedures so as to facilitate the integrated consideration of social, economic and environmental issues. Countries will develop their own priorities in accordance with their national plans, policies and programmes for the following activities: ... g. Delegating planning and management responsibilities to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective action; in particular the advantages of effective and equitable

In addition, and as already noted at the end of chapter seven dealing with global governance's *transgressions*, the framework violated the democratic freedom principle – freedom of expression (the press now used as a propaganda tool), freedom of conscience, freedom of association, freedom of religion. The second wave conferences requested from all individuals, social bodies, school curricula, ethical codes, business behavior, governmental policies a general alignment on the new global ethos. The celebration of diversity holistic paradigm, belonging to the framework and operating within it, contributed to deepening the crisis of the multi-party democratic system. The Western cultural revolution and the global governance revolution reversed democracy's majority rule/minority rights principle: the agents of the Western counter-culture, who used to be the minority vis-à-vis the modern and Judeo-Christian Western civilization, have grabbed power at the "global level". These revolutions "reconstructed" democracy at the "global" level, from a perspective foreign to democracy's basic tenets, after having deconstructed the latter from within. The "mechanisms" have allowed transnational actors to wield power at the national and local levels while circumventing democratic control of the global norms that were to be nationally and locally implemented.

Notwithstanding the paradoxes inherent to the partnerships-democracy linkage, the nexus became a *political imperative* at Istanbul. Partnering with the holders of transnational soft power to realize the global goals became an indicator of alleged democratic health. In practice, it quickly became not only operational, but globally normative. Even if the partnership principle ostensibly transgressed democracy's basic tenets as we just observed it, the new politics claimed it enhanced democracy and democratization¹²⁰². It thereby radically altered democracy's content at the very hour democracy had become the apparent "end of history".

Emergence of a new transformative symbiosis

Over the course of the revolution, it became tacitly accepted that the new politics and its paradigms, let us underscore it, qualitatively enhanced democracy. A new *symbiosis*¹²⁰³ appeared, inextricably interlinking democracy and the global agendas in a dynamic interrelationship. UN member states affirmed this symbiosis in their own terms in the Istanbul Declaration:

"Recent United Nations world conferences, including, in particular, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, have given us a comprehensive agenda for the equitable attainment of peace, justice and *democracy* [our emphasis] built on economic development, social development and environmental protection as *interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development* [Ib.]. We have sought to integrate the outcomes of these conferences into the Habitat Agenda" (par. 3)¹²⁰⁴.

opportunities for participation by women should be discussed" (par. 8.5). It is clear that the margin of liberty left governments is *within* the new global partnership for sustainable development *framework*.

¹²⁰² Already *Common Responsibility in the 1990s*, the 1991 report of the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, noting that there were "many ways to give specially directed support to a democratic development", encouraged strengthening "non-governmental organizations in developing countries" (p. 33). The post-Cold War rationale tied the global democratization movement to NGO empowerment, and both of these processes to the new global agenda.

¹²⁰³ The Commission on Global Governance significantly used the term: "There is a symbiotic relationship between state, civil society, individual citizens, and democratic structures; together they set the framework and provide the substance of democratic governance." Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 62.

¹²⁰⁴ *Our Global Neighborhood* expressed the symbiosis in similar terms: "The enormous growth in people's concern for human rights, equity, democracy, meeting basic material needs, environmental protection, and demilitarization has today produced a multitude of new actors who can contribute to governance". Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 3. In a similar vein, the participants in the Dialogue on citizenship

The “comprehensive agenda”, which *Our Global Neighborhood* called the “global framework”¹²⁰⁵, cemented the linkage the revolution had achieved between democracy and global governance as content and as process.

The symbiosis was not a mere linkage whereby components maintain their independence and specific identity. It was a mutually integrating, holistic, *transforming* process. It strategically blurred the line distinctly separating the basic tenets of modern liberal democracy and the processes, platform, paradigms and ethics of the revolution’s new participatory democracy paradigm. The core content of democracy – its actors, principles, values and processes – surreptitiously *muted* under the impact of the globalist dynamic driving the other players in the new system. It fell under the rule of the global centaur regime.

Transforming the nature of democracy

The symbiosis quietly transformed the nature of democracy by moving it away from the liberal democracy that was assumed to have won the day in 1989, away from power by the national people for the national people, away from subsidiarity, away from the power and participation of the national people, away from national sovereignty, away from the separation of powers, away from representation by elected representatives (even parliamentarians were coopted as partners in global governance¹²⁰⁶), away from pluralism, away from the “autonomy” of non-governmental organizations, away, yet further, from classical philosophy and the Judeo-Christian ethos of the Western civilization in which modern democracy had developed, and away from the latter’s freedom-truth nexus.

The transformative symbiosis made “democracy” move *towards* globally-set agendas, towards the new global partnership for sustainable development, towards the empowerment of transnational NGOs, towards the governmental institution of NGO empowerment mechanisms, towards youth participation in political decision-making, towards the global adoption of the sexual and gender revolution objectives, towards the new global ethos and the “global” social contract – towards global governance and therefore towards a post-democracy horizon. The fact is that the product of the symbiosis, hailed as celebrating democracy, *no longer was democratic*.

The double movement, away from/towards, did not lead to a total substitution of modern democracy by the revolutionary postmodern politics. Even if, at the end of the revolution, some opined “it was time to advance from representative democracy to participatory democracy”¹²⁰⁷ at

and democracy in Istanbul stressed the need for three key commitments amalgamating democracy with the conferences’ new social contract, in other words, with global governance’s platform: to consolidate democracy; to exercise citizenship; and to shape a new social contract. Report of the participants in the Dialogue on Citizenship and Democracy. *Istanbul Report*, op. cit., p. 177.

¹²⁰⁵ By the end of the revolution, *Our Global Neighborhood* stated: “The creation of adequate governance mechanisms will be complicated because these must be more inclusive and participatory - that is, more democratic - than in the past... There must be an agreed *global framework* [our emphasis] for actions and policies to be carried out at appropriate levels. A multifaceted strategy for global governance is required”. Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 5.

¹²⁰⁶ Especially in the *Cairo Progr. of Action* (for example par. 11.13, 13.4 b, 13.5, 13.6, 16.10) and the *Istanbul Report* (for example Decl., par 12, and *parliamentarians* mentioned 32 times in the Report). The *Istanbul Report* integrated the summary of Committee II’s Chairperson on “the role and contribution of the Parliamentarians Forum” (*Istanbul Report*, p. 150). Parliamentarians who had intervened at the Forum were globalists and representatives of organizations such as the Global Forum of Parliamentarians on Habitat II, Global Parliamentarians on Habitat II, or Parliamentarians for Global Action.

¹²⁰⁷ The participants in the Dialogue on Citizenship and Democracy, a side event of the Istanbul Summit. *Istanbul Report*, p. 177.

the global level, the revolution rather ensued in an ambivalent *coexistence* profoundly destabilizing the former order.

One practical consequence of the revolution's transformative symbiosis was that anyone disputing the global platform in any of its aspects would now be threatened to be regarded as anti-democratic and anti-human rights. Individuals and organizations standing against global governance's anthropological paradigms have tended to be styled as extremists or religious fundamentalists¹²⁰⁸. Advocating gender equality, promoting youth participation in "decisions affecting their lives", celebrating the diversity of sexual lifestyles, conforming to environmental "best practices", engaging in "partnerships with civil society" or climate change mitigation, implementing the SDGs... have transnationally imposed themselves as "soft categorical imperatives" of good citizenship, of good democratic, civic and ethical behavior.

UN member states never organized a democratic debate at the national level on global governance's "imperatives". The absence of democratic debate on "global norms" which directly impacted their respective national citizens in multifarious ways was a blatant transgression of democratic principles. The new symbiosis submitted national democracies, including their local authorities, top-down to the norms, language, political priorities and ethic of global governance that UN member states adhered to when they joined the conferences' "consensuses" - and now the SDGs. Sovereign governments never reopened the "consensus" on the novel paradigms forged primarily by the global elite, neither at international nor at the national level – that of democracy. Operating in the name of democracy, let us insist, the revolution transferred effective power from the national peoples and their governments to the global elite. It politically reversed the democratic process by stealth and by the same token, destroyed it.

Given the "transcendence" that the global elite arbitrarily attributed to what it qualified as "global", this elite has abusively sought to exercise its power *over* the democratically elected representatives of national peoples. It was successful in so doing to the extent the latter, bowing in respect before the global consensus, passively consented. At various degrees, it has tied consenting national democracies (and even authoritarian regimes¹²⁰⁹) to its normative ideological framework. We have just said it: it stole from the national peoples the sovereign freedom to hold an independent political debate reopening the "global consensus". In the name of democracy and democratization, the new politics, global governance, the new global partnership, participatory democracy considerably contributed to further weaken an already debilitated modern, liberal, constitutional and representative democracy. The fuzzy contours of the global regime, containing the seeds of a new, distinctively global form of totalitarianism claiming to have an influence on all social spheres at all levels, has henceforth coexisted with modern liberal democracy. The hegemony it has incrementally gained does not bode well for the stability of the coming world "order".

Redefining democracy's basic tenets

The revolution transferred to the "global level" a striking number of features belonging to the political framework of a modern democratic government: it applied concepts such as *the people*, the *mandate* given the instituted authority governing "the people", *civil society*, *constituencies*, the *social contract*, *participation*, *representation*, *legitimacy*, *accountability*, *transparency*,

¹²⁰⁸ To give but one example, such styling marked the June 2021 report of the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights, written by its Secretary, Neil Datta: *The Tip of the Iceberg. Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights for Sexual and Reproductive Health in Europe*.

¹²⁰⁹ Even the Chinese government has been using the novel global language and global governance's conceptual framework for over two decades.

responsibility, the *rule of law*... to the implementation of agendas that were adopted at the “global” level, were never subjected to national democratic debates, and to actors who were neither national citizens nor national governments. These transfers occurred “softly”, almost imperceptibly. They conferred on global governance’s political processes a semblance of legitimacy.

The conferences built a new and global *social contract* resting on a corpus of mutually integrated values that *Our Global Neighborhood* called “a global civic ethic”, “needed to improve the quality of life in the global neighbourhood”¹²¹⁰. The *social contract* no longer only meant the values binding a nation together (if fact national social contracts do not appear even once in any of the documents that we have analyzed), but now primarily the new global agenda and its ethic which superimposed itself on national social contracts, transforming them from within by feeding them from above, in ways uncontrolled by national peoples.

The conferences extended *participation* and *representation* to non-elected actors engaged at the “global level”. The meaning of democratic *participation* muted into global governance’s participatory democracy paradigm, to the participation of transnational non-governmental actors in global governance. In the course of this process, individual national citizens’ democratic participation was itself now quickly framed to a significant extent by the policies, norms and priorities of global governance.

The new politics *enlarged* the democratic concept of “representation” - from elected representatives to Major Groups, women’s groups, youth, trade unions, NGOs etc. now considered to democratically “represent” their respective “constituencies” within “global civil society”. These “representatives” of transnational “bodies of citizens” would therefore enjoy, as it were, a *legitimacy* equivalent to that of elected bodies. They would likewise have *roles*, *responsibilities* and *duties*¹²¹¹. Some of the conferences’ reports requested NGOs to be

¹²¹⁰ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 67.

¹²¹¹ *Rio Agenda 21*, par 7.20 g: “Empower community groups, non-governmental organizations and individuals to assume the authority and responsibility for managing and enhancing their immediate environment”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 8.11: “Priority should be given to highlighting the responsibilities and potential contributions of different social groups.”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 25.12: “Children ... will inherit the responsibility of looking after the Earth”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 25.14 d: “Expand educational opportunities for children and youth, including education for environmental and developmental responsibility, with overriding attention to the education of the girl child”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 27.10: “Governments should take measures to: a. Establish or enhance an existing dialogue with non-governmental organizations and their self-organized networks representing various sectors, which could serve to: ... (i) consider the rights and responsibilities of these organizations”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 30.14: “Industry and business associations should encourage individual companies to undertake programmes for improved environmental awareness and responsibility at all levels”. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 32.5: “The following objectives are proposed: a. To encourage a decentralized decision-making process through the creation and strengthening of local and village organizations that would delegate power and responsibility to primary users of natural resources.” *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 36.8: “There is still a considerable lack of awareness of the interrelated nature of all human activities and the environment, due to inaccurate or insufficient information. Developing countries in particular lack relevant technologies and expertise. There is a need to increase public sensitivity to environment and development problems and involvement in their solutions and foster a sense of personal environmental responsibility and greater motivation and commitment towards sustainable development.” Cairo opening statement by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations: “The Cairo Conference also represents a decisive stage in the assumption of our collective responsibility towards future generations” (*Cairo Report*, p. 160). And *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 1.14: “The present Programme of Action recognizes that over the next 20 years Governments are not expected to meet the goals and objectives of the International Conference on Population and Development single-handedly. All members of and groups in society have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to play an active part in efforts to reach those goals.”

accountable and *transparent*¹²¹² in their delivery of sustainable development, education and quality of life for all, reproductive health and gender equality among other global agendas. By relating the democratic concept of representation to the new and global “social contract”, the revolution *divorced* representation from the values binding national societies, and political groups within these national societies, together.

The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* envisioned a form of political “representation” at the level of a “global civil society” that would grant the latter the “democratic” legitimacy to exercise political leadership at the “global level”. They significantly used the term “enlightened leadership”¹²¹³ to characterize a “leadership of a different character”¹²¹⁴ than that exercised by the UN founding member states in 1945, when “few delegates in San Francisco questioned the state as such”¹²¹⁵. The report called for an “urgently needed”¹²¹⁶ leadership that would “represent all the world’s countries and people”¹²¹⁷ (people in the singular). Global governance’s enlightened leadership would find its

“reserves of commitment to public service... not only among politicians and civil servants but also in the voluntary sector, in private enterprise, and indeed throughout global civil society: leadership that *represents* [our emphasis] all the world’s countries and people, not simply the most powerful”¹²¹⁸.

Our Global Neighborhood surreptitiously redefined democratic representation by altering the identity of those represented (now the “global people”), and those representing (now unelected agents of global governance). It transferred “democratic” representation to the global level. It is additionally to be noted that the “representative” function it granted “global civil society” was a myth in the sense that the leading NGOs partnering with the UN, while operating transnationally, were Western-led and “represented” their special interests, not those of the world’s peoples.

Rio and Cairo introduced a reinterpreted concept of “constituencies”¹²¹⁹. In the modern political framework, this term referred to “a body of citizens entitled to elect a representative (as to a legislative or executive position)”¹²²⁰. The global governance process at its revolutionary stage semantically “enlarged” the concept by applying it, not only to national elected officials, but to NGOs (national or transnational): “Non-governmental organizations and their networks and local

¹²¹² See for instance the *Cairo Progr. of Action*, stipulating that NGOs had to be just as “accountable for their actions” as governments and to “offer transparency with respect to their services and evaluation procedures” (par. 15.6).

¹²¹³ *Our Global Neighborhood* used the phrase “enlightened leadership” four times, for example in the co-chairman’s foreword: “In the final chapter of this report, we draw attention to what has been a pre-eminent strand in the thinking of the Commission: the world’s need for enlightened leadership that can inspire people to acknowledge their responsibilities to each other, and to future generations.” Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. xvii.

¹²¹⁴ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 38.

¹²¹⁵ Ib., p. 38.

¹²¹⁶ Ib., p. 38.

¹²¹⁷ Ib., p. 38.

¹²¹⁸ Ib., p. 38.

¹²¹⁹ Constituencies appears three times in *Rio Agenda 21* and three times in the *Cairo Report* (in Chapter XV on partnership with the non-governmental sector). One of these appearances in *Rio Agenda 21* already specifically concerned demographic issues: “Constituencies and institutional conditions to facilitate the implementation of demographic activities should, as appropriate, be fostered. This requires support and commitment from political, indigenous, religious and traditional authorities, the private sector and the national scientific community. In developing these appropriate institutional conditions, countries should closely involve established national machinery for women” (par. 5.53).

¹²²⁰ See <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constituency> (retrieved February 12, 2022).

communities should strengthen their interaction with their constituencies” (*Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 15.12). This semantic “enlargement” was another strategic way to grant the political power wielded by NGOs a semblance of democratic legitimacy. The conferences considered NGOs to be, as Cairo put it, “important voices of the people” (*Progr. of Action*, par. 15.3), in other words, representative of the people.

The application of the term “constituency” to NGOs illustrates the fundamental shift at the core of the global governance revolution - from the peoples as nations to the people as transnational non-governmental actors and good global citizens. The conferences as of Rio proactively reached out to the widest possible spectrum of formal organizations and informal processes so as to attain the greatest number of “constituencies” implementing the global agenda. Bella Abzug abundantly used the term “constituencies”¹²²¹, applying it to the activist movements rallying “citizens” ideologically aligned with the Women’s Caucus.

Our Global Neighborhood connected global governance to the *rule of law* which, read the report, “distinguishes a democratic from a tyrannical society”¹²²²: respect for the rule of law would be “at least as essential to the global neighbourhood as to the national one. Global governance without law would be a contradiction in terms. Its primacy is a precondition of effective global governance”¹²²³. In a typical soft-hard amalgam, the report related the soft *governance* concept to hard law. It dogmatically affirmed the inadequacy of restricting both democracy and the rule of law to the national level:

“In the past, *governance* and *law* [our emphasis] used to be almost entirely national concerns. Democracy was defined primarily in terms of the role of national and regional governments, and the enforcement of the rule of law was seen as the responsibility of national courts. Today, this is no longer adequate”¹²²⁴.

The very document that denied global governance was a global government implicitly promoted building the capacity of global governance to rule by law¹²²⁵.

Democratic governments are accountable to the people who elected them and gave them a mandate. They are not, nor is any government, whether democratic or not, accountable to transnational NGOs, to the UN Secretariat or any other actor operating at a level qualified as “global”. The nexus the revolution established between global governance and democracy

¹²²¹ It is likely through her agency that the term “constituency” entered the language of UN conferences in which she participated as an influential actor.

¹²²² Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²²³ Ib., p. 67.

¹²²⁴ Ib., p. 66.

¹²²⁵ In several of his publications, Jacques Attali advocated setting up a planetary rule of law: “La crise des subprimes, première véritable crise de la mondialisation, pourrait accélérer considérablement la prise de conscience de la nécessité de mettre en place, un jour, une socialisation de l’essentiel des fonctions monétaires, instruments de la souveraineté, un accès égal au savoir, une demande mondiale stable, un salaire mondial minimal, un Etat de droit mondial, prélude, à terme, à un gouvernement mondial.” Attali, Jacques. *La Crise, et Après ?* Collection Livre de Poche. 2009, p. 16. And : “Tout ce qui précède démontre aussi qu’un tel programme doit être fondé sur la mise en place d’un état de droit planétaire.” Attali, Jacques. *Vivement Après-Demain!* Fayard. 2016, p. 202. The Commission on Global Governance insisted on the distinction between global governance and global government: “As this report makes clear, global governance is not global government. No misunderstanding should arise from the similarity of the terms. We are not proposing movement towards world government, for were we to travel in that direction we could find ourselves in an even less democratic world than we have - one more accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather than the rights of people”. Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., foreword p. xvi.

marked a dramatic historical step in the further weakening of national democracies and in further disempowering the national “people”. This paradox seemed to have remained undiscovered, even if the nexus consolidated itself in the revolution’s aftermath, and seems to govern us today more than ever.

The revolution’s manipulative “enlargement” of democratic concepts to the “global level” contributed to their devaluation at the only level where they are legitimately implemented: the national level. This “enlargement” drastically altered or dissolved the nature of democracy. The democracy-global governance symbiosis rendered the core content of democracy’s basic tenets instable. It furthermore allowed the revolution to forge ahead under the delusory guise of democracy. If global governance’s amalgams are not challenged, people will become increasingly manipulable.

“Democratizing” international cooperation

No democracy-like system was invented for entities larger than the nation-state. International organizations are democratic insofar as they are formed by representatives of democratically elected governments. A last manifestation of the post-Cold War pro-democracy Zeitgeist, however, was the will, explicit in some of the documents this thesis used to analyze the global governance revolution, to “democratize” the international system in a way that would abusively treat this system as some kind of independent supra-national body politic, of which national governments would be, as it were, the constituents or “equal citizens”. Already in 1987, *Our Common Future* had advocated “greater democracy in international decision making”¹²²⁶. Gorbachev in his 1988 UN speech likewise called for the “democratization of international relations”¹²²⁷.

The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* pursued utilitarian objectives in their extension of “democracy” to the “global level”, in their goal of “democratizing” the UN. They sought to grant “legitimacy” to global governance and thereby render it politically effective, make it *more efficient* in delivering the global governance agenda:

“As at the national level, so in the global neighbourhood: the democratic principle must be ascendant. The need for greater democracy arises out of the close linkage between legitimacy and effectiveness. Institutions that lack legitimacy are seldom effective over the long run. Hence, as the role of international institutions in global governance grows, the need to ensure that they are democratic also increases”¹²²⁸.

Our Global Neighborhood presented two ways to “democratize” international relations. The first was to honor what the UN Charter had called the “sovereign equality” (Art. 2 and 78)¹²²⁹ of UN member states (in an ambivalent expression seeming to somehow grant sovereignty to “equality”, not to nations) and to give them all an effectively equal political weight. *Our Global*

¹²²⁶ World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., par. 28: “Meeting essential needs requires ... an assurance that those poor get their fair share of the resources required to sustain that growth. Such equity would be aided by political systems that secure effective citizen participation in decision making and by greater democracy in international decision making”.

¹²²⁷ Gorbachev understood the “democratization of international relations” as the “maximum internationalization of the solution of problems by all members of the world community” as well as a “humanization of those relations”. Gorbachev, Michael. *UN speech*, op. cit.

¹²²⁸ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²²⁹ The absence of the phrase *national sovereignty* from the Charter, let us recall, betrays the UN leading founders’ internationalist mindset.

Neighborhood, transposing “democracy” and what it called its “principle” or “ethic” of “equality” to a “global” level, that of the “new world order”, formulated this objective as follows:

“It is time to make a larger reality of that ‘sovereign equality’ of states that the UN Charter spoke of in 1945, but that it compromised in a later article in allowing a superior status to a few nations. Particularly in the context of the moral underpinnings of a new world order, nation-states and their people cannot but question the double standards that demand democracy at the national level but uphold its curtailment at the international level. There will always be differences of size and strength between countries, as there are between individuals within countries. But the principle of equality of status as members of the body politic is as important in the community of states as it is in any national or local community. The ethic of equality before the law is essential to guard against the temptation to authoritarianism - the predilection of the strong to impose their will and exercise dominion over the weak”¹²³⁰.

Implicit in this *Our Global Neighborhood* statement, which carries Willy Brandt’s ideological legacy, is a dialectical opposition between the dominance of the Western/American model (classical, modern/liberal and Judeo-Christian) and the new world order’s global governance model (postmodern new global ethic). The report’s socialist or social democratic authors interpreted “equality” in a neo-Marxist egalitarian way. A multilateral and pro-global governance approach has historically been the way many Western European countries and the European Union have adopted to contain American global dominance at the end of the Cold War (often out of anti-American sentiment).

The second way in which the authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* promoted the enhancement of democracy - a political concept with clear content - at the level of the “global neighborhood” – a vague and nonexistent political notion – was by advocating the construction of a “democratic” system of global governance through, *inter alia*, the empowerment of what they called a “global civil society”. They believed that the emergence of such a “global civil society” was “an important precondition of democracy at the global level”¹²³¹. This global civil society, they pursued, needed a global ethic, which they considered to be “the cornerstone of global governance”¹²³².

The sense of the post-Cold War conferences was that the new global partnership, which had opened up the UN to the political involvement of transnational non-state actors, would play an important role in the “democratization” of multilateralism. Boutros Boutros-Ghali plainly asserted this view in his opening statement at Istanbul: “The active participation of non-State actors in the work of the United Nations is an essential aspect of the democratization of the international system”¹²³³.

¹²³⁰ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²³¹ Ib., p. 62. *Our Global Neighborhood* suggested the role of the information technology revolution, concomitant with the global governance revolution, in the rise of a “global civil society”: “More and more people are making connections across borders and developing relationships based on common concerns and issues: the environment, human rights, peace, women’s roles, and many others. Advances in communications have greatly facilitated the process. The information and communication revolutions are helping to diffuse power throughout society, often transferring it from hierarchical structures to small groups, and increasing the ability of dispersed groups to communicate. Indeed, computer-based networking capabilities are giving new form and strength to civil society and facilitating partnerships with intergovernmental institutions.” Ib., pp. 62-63.

¹²³² Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 47.

¹²³³ *Istanbul Report*, p. 206.

A condition for “global democracy” to emerge would be that all actors at all levels submit to global governance’s centripetal force and function from within the global “framework”: a process that would blatantly contradict and transgress the fundamental democratic principle of freedom. *Our Global Neighborhood* considered what it called “centrifugal forces”¹²³⁴ - by which it implicitly meant forces acting in a direction away from global governance’s axis - as “hazards for democracy”¹²³⁵. To prevent such forces from proceeding, the report recommended, *inter alia*, that regional organizations “become an integral part of a more democratic system of global governance”¹²³⁶ – that regional organizations align themselves along the global ethos.

The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* denied the “need at the global level for a carbon copy of national democratic systems”¹²³⁷, acknowledging the “differences between the two levels”¹²³⁸ (as if a “global level” juridically existed, and as if democracy was transposable to an inexistent “global level”). They however stressed that “the norms of democracy must be pursued in both”¹²³⁹. They specified that the “democratic principle” – “as at the national level, so in the global neighbourhood” – had to be “ascendant”¹²⁴⁰. The “global civil society” or “global demos” construct strategically conveyed the impression that global governance applied democracy’s “ascendancy norm”. *Our Global Neighborhood*, however, applied an eminently *descendant* form of “enlightened leadership” (in its own wording) functioning from the global level to the local one. As a matter of principle, global governance has pursued a preferential option for the political empowerment of a transnational elite over national sovereignty and democracy.

8.2. The revolution within installed a ruling global coexistence regime

8.2.1. In the name of the UN Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Fifty years separated the adoption of the UN Charter and the peak of the global governance revolution, symbolically marked by the publication of *Our Global Neighborhood* which incorporated the revolution’s language and overall objectives. By 1995, the seeds of the novel agendas that had originally been thrown in the UN foundational document had grown into a fully developed and robust tree, of a magnitude and extension that were totally unforeseeable in 1945. The tree’s branches ended up largely overshadowing the original nature of the United Nations Organization as an international and intergovernmental organization respectful of national sovereignty and connected to the source of universality through its UDHR. At the end of the revolution, the mandate of the UN had become unrecognizable. The last section of chapter seven recapitulated the various ways in which the global governance revolution transgressed the UN’s foundational documents. We will now address the agents of the revolution’s manipulative denial of any break, with a view to demonstrating the emergence of a *coexistence* regime.

Denial of global governance’s break from spirit of foundational UN documents

Conference upon conference, the revolution moved forward as if its perspective plainly concurred with the purposes of the Charter¹²⁴¹. Instead of acknowledging a fundamental break with the spirit

¹²³⁴ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*, op. cit., p. 60.

¹²³⁵ Ib., p. 60.

¹²³⁶ Ib., p. 25.

¹²³⁷ Ib., p. 66.

¹²³⁸ Ib., p. 66.

¹²³⁹ Ib., p. 66.

¹²⁴⁰ Ib., p. 66.

¹²⁴¹ *Rome Plan of Action*, par. 11: “The Plan of Action of the World Food Summit is in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law and strives to consolidate the results of other UN conferences since 1990 on subjects having a bearing on food security”. The conferences invoked the Charter to justify giving

of the UN's foundational documents, the conferences, quite the reverse, strategically claimed a continuum so as to legitimize the pursuit of their novel objectives. All the conferences as of Rio insisted that their respective goals¹²⁴² had been inspired by and fully conformed¹²⁴³ with the principles of the UN Charter, even when these objectives were not only absent from the Charter but ideologically broke away from its spirit. The conferences even went further by claiming that they would fulfill the goals of the UN Charter and of the UDHR.

The flawed assumption of a conceptual, political and ideological continuum between the UN foundational documents and the conferences outcome documents concretely translated in the conferences' reports in a textual juxtaposition and semantic assimilation of the language in the Charter with the novel language: of, for example, "gender" with "men and women"¹²⁴⁴, of "the people" (as global governance's non-state, non-governmental partners and transnational citizens)

ECOSOC the role of ensuring the coordinated follow-up and implementation of the new global platforms. See for instance *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.10: "The Economic and Social Council, in the context of its role under the Charter vis-à-vis the General Assembly and the ongoing restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields, would assist the General Assembly by overseeing system-wide coordination in the implementation of Agenda 21 and making recommendations in this regard... Appropriate steps should be taken to obtain regular reports from specialized agencies on their plans and programmes related to the implementation of Agenda 21, pursuant to Article 64 of the Charter of the United Nations." Or *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 16.23: "The Economic and Social Council, in the context of its role under the Charter, vis-à-vis the General Assembly and in accordance with Assembly resolutions 45/264, 46/235 and 48/162, should assist the General Assembly in promoting an integrated approach and in providing system-wide coordination and guidance in the monitoring of the implementation of the present Programme of Action and in making recommendations in this regard. Appropriate steps should be taken to request regular reports from the specialized agencies regarding their plans and programmes related to the implementation of this Programme of Action, pursuant to Article 64 of the Charter." And *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 313: "The Economic and Social Council, in the context of its role under the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 45/264, 46/235 and 48/162, would oversee system-wide coordination in the implementation of the Platform for Action and make recommendations in this regard". Or *Istanbul Report*, par. 219: "The Economic and Social Council, in accordance with its role under the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant General Assembly and Economic and Social Council resolutions and decisions, would oversee system-wide coordination in the implementation of the Habitat Agenda and make recommendations in this regard. The Economic and Social Council should be invited to review the follow-up of the Habitat Agenda at its substantive session of 1997". The conferences referred to UN Charter Art. 68 to create a Commission on Sustainable Development. *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.11: "In order to ensure the effective follow-up of the Conference, as well as to enhance international cooperation and rationalize the intergovernmental decision-making capacity for the integration of environment and development issues and to examine the progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 at the national, regional and international levels, a high-level Commission on Sustainable Development should be established in accordance with Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Commission would report to the Economic and Social Council in the context of the Council's role under the Charter vis-à-vis the General Assembly".

¹²⁴² *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 10: "We reaffirm and are guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by agreements reached at relevant international conferences".

¹²⁴³ For example, Jomtien founded its agenda on the 1948 UDHR's right to education (Art. 26). The Vienna Declaration referred abundantly to the UDHR and the UN Charter (while also referring to recent conventions, in particular CEDAW, and the CRC which in some aspects break from the spirit of the UDHR). Istanbul considered that "The objectives of the Habitat Agenda are in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law." *Istanbul Report*, par. 22.

¹²⁴⁴ *Rio Agenda 21*, par. 38.19: "Concrete organizational decisions fall within the competence of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, who is requested to report on the provisions to be made, covering staffing implications, as soon as practicable, taking into account gender balance as defined in Article 8 of the Charter of the United Nations." Gender is not in the Charter.

with “the peoples of the United Nations”¹²⁴⁵ (as individual nations), or of “quality of life”¹²⁴⁶, “partnership”, new partnerships¹²⁴⁷, the spirit of partnership¹²⁴⁸, the global partnership¹²⁴⁹, consensus¹²⁵⁰, women’s empowerment¹²⁵¹... with the principles of the Charter. Amalgamation served the primary partners’ strategy, not only to deny their “gains” break from the principles of the Charter, but to confer on them a juridical foundation. It was manipulative.

The denial concerned global governance both as content and as process. As regards *content*, there is no better illustration of the amalgamation we just evoked than UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s statement at the end of the Beijing conference: “I have given clear instructions that the goals of the Charter for gender equality in the United Nations itself should be strictly followed”¹²⁵². In reality, the Charter did not contain the word “gender”. By way of consequence, there were no “goals of the Charter for gender equality”, but for the “equal rights of men and women”¹²⁵³, whose content vastly differs from “gender equality”. The Secretary-General confused two very different agendas. Furthermore, while by mandate he was a mere “secretary”, he virtually posited himself as the UN’s “Executive”, ordering systemwide gender mainstreaming in the very name of the Charter.

Let us now provide an illustration of the Charter’s instrumentalization for the purposes of establishing global governance *as process*. The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood*, encouraging “a return to the spirit of the Charter”¹²⁵⁴ to reform the UN, affirmed:

“Global governance, *once viewed* [our emphasis] primarily as concerned with intergovernmental relationships, *now involves* [lb.] not only governments and

¹²⁴⁵ As Wally N’Dow put it at Habitat: “Finally, I am proud to assert that Habitat II has helped make the United Nations even more relevant to the people of the world, the people for whom it was created. The very first words of the preamble to the Charter are ‘We, the peoples ...’ Habitat II has reaffirmed that the United Nations belongs to them”. *Istanbul Report*, p. 225. Habitat, however, does not primarily interpret “the peoples” as nations.

¹²⁴⁶ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, chapter 2 on “Principles”: “International cooperation and universal solidarity, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in a spirit of partnership, are crucial in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world.” Neither *partnerships* nor *quality of life* are in the Charter.

¹²⁴⁷ *Istanbul Decl.*, par. 1: “Our deliberations on the two major themes of the Conference - adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world - have been inspired by the Charter of the United Nations and are aimed at reaffirming existing and forging new partnerships for action at the international, national and local levels to improve our living environment”.

¹²⁴⁸ *Istanbul Report*, chapter One preamble, par. 1: “International cooperation and universal solidarity, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in a spirit of partnership, are crucial to improving the quality of life of the peoples of the world”.

¹²⁴⁹ N’Dow’s closing statement in Istanbul: “For after you sound the gavel, Mr. President, you will not set it aside. You will, instead, hand it down to each and every one of us as a symbol of change. Together in these past two weeks we have forged an unprecedented global partnership to redeem the promise set out in the Charter of the United Nations of ‘better standards of life in larger freedom’”. *Istanbul Report*, p. 220. The global partnership contradicts the nature of the UN as defined in the Charter.

¹²⁵⁰ *Copenhagen Decl.*, par. 28: “Our global drive for social development and the recommendations for action contained in the Programme of Action are made in a spirit of consensus and international cooperation, in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. The Charter does not contain any “global” agenda, nor the word “consensus”.

¹²⁵¹ *Beijing Platf. for Action*, par. 9: “The objective of the Platform for Action, which is in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, is the empowerment of all women.” Women’s empowerment is not in the Charter.

¹²⁵² Opening Statement by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations. *Beijing Report*, p. 186.

¹²⁵³ *UN Charter Preamble*.

¹²⁵⁴ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 233 or p. 344.

intergovernmental institutions but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media”¹²⁵⁵.

Their implicit application of the phrase “global governance” to the UN as founded in 1945 was anachronistic: the concept of “global governance” was not in currency in 1945. The anachronistic characterization strategically served to try and abusively “demonstrate” the continuum that the report *constructed* between the Charter’s UN as an intergovernmentally-governed international organization and “global governance”. The report amalgamating the two, it was logical that in its perspective, building the architecture of global governance did not imply dismantling the UN nor drastically “amending the Charter”¹²⁵⁶. On the contrary, the UN of the 1945 Charter was to play “a vital role”¹²⁵⁷ as the hub of the new global governance system.

The post-Cold War conferences instrumentalized the Charter to legitimize the “new mandate” that they sought to give the UN. This instrumentalization clearly manifested the “from within” character of the global governance revolution (*within* the Charter and juridical instruments, *within* institutions): a key and conclusive point of our thesis. We also uncovered the cause to effect connection between the ideological load of a conference’s agenda and this conference’s manipulative amalgamation of the two distinctive language systems – that of the UN Charter and of the UDHR on the one hand, and that of global governance on the other.

In a dynamic continuum, the new paradigms would organically emanate from the Charter vision, in the sense of “enlargement”

The language of the conferences evoked a tacit assumption that the paradigms of global governance *organically emanated* from those of classic international cooperation: “global” from “international”; the new global partnership, from intergovernmental processes; governance, from government; participatory democracy, from democracy; sustainable development, from economic development¹²⁵⁸; couples and individuals, from parents; the family under all its forms, from the family; gender equality, from the equal rights of men and women; the new rights (sexual, reproductive, abortion, contraception, LGBTs, children, indigenous peoples...), from the rights declared “universal” in the UDHR and so forth.

The “natural emanation” we just identified, let us recall at the risk of a certain repetition, consisted in what the global enlightened despots strategically presented as a *qualitative enlargement* of the Charter and UDHR “standard” concepts into the paradigms of global governance. The *new global partnership* or *global governance* would “enlarge” the UN as an intergovernmental organization by integrating partnerships with non-state actors. *Governance* would “enlarge” government by linking it to “civil society” and “the private sector”. *Sustainable development* would conceptually and practically “enlarge” development as economic growth by integrating social and environmental parameters. *Couples and individuals* would enlarge “parents”, just as *families* or

¹²⁵⁵ And: “internationalism will be the stronger for the new roles that fall to global civil society. The UN system will still be at the centre of international action, as nation states will remain the main international actors, but two kinds of accommodation must now be made for global civil society. The first is facilitation of practical contributions by elements of civil society within a reformed UN system... The second is acknowledgement of the relevance of the roles that will be played by civil society outside the UN system”. Ib., pp. 229-230.

¹²⁵⁶ Yet the authors of the report contend that “some Charter amendments are necessary for better global governance, and those we propose will help to create an environment propitious to a return to the spirit of the Charter. UN reform must reflect the realities of change, including the new capacity of global civil society to contribute to global governance.” Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 344.

¹²⁵⁷ Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood*, op. cit., p. 336.

¹²⁵⁸ Art. 55 a of the Charter stipulates that the UN shall promote “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development”.

the *family under “various forms”* would enlarge the family, by adding, next to father and mother and children, next to the family based on marriage between a man and a woman, other forms of relationships (same sex, single parent, reconstituted families...). *Reproductive rights* would enlarge parents’ “basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children” (Tehran proclamation, Art. 16) by extending these rights to non-married couples and to the whole spectrum of contraceptive methods and to “safe abortion”. The *new rights*¹²⁵⁹ such as minority rights, women’s specific rights, children’s rights, the right to health, sexual rights, reproductive rights allegedly “enlarged” the rights already contained in the UDHR. *Gender equality* would offer an open-ended spectrum of “choices” in terms of “sexual identity” beyond what the revolution called “heterosexuality”. *Cultural diversity* would celebrate the diversity of cultures and of cultural choices beyond those inspired by a Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian ethos or abiding by what is universal. *Education for all* enlarged education as transmission of knowledge and as formal education to a broader concept integrating acquisition of life skills, global values and “responsible behaviors” or “lifestyles”, as well as informal and non-formal education. *Basic learning needs* (literacy) were enlarged by integrating programs in health, nutrition, population, agricultural techniques, environment, science, technology, fertility awareness... *Integrated programs* have enlarged individual projects throughout the UN system since the early 1990s.

The enlargement process went through a *holistic integration* of all components, standard and novel, resulting in a transformative symbiosis. It would be qualitative in two ways: first, by integrating a larger and potentially illimitable spectrum of “choices”, of political players, of development beneficiaries, of factors than the paradigms of the former order did – that of the Western modern synthesis as intermixed with the Judeo-Christian civilization; secondly, by integrating the novel, free choice ethos in all components, binding them together and transforming the identity of the traditional paradigms. The holistic enlargement process would establish the new paradigms in a position of transcending superiority vis-à-vis the former concepts.

The hybrid regime’s unclarified coexistence

The global governance revolution did not abolish international cooperation, the state, sovereign governments, modern democracy, existing institutions, existing rights, existing language, existing juridical instruments such as the UN Charter and UDHR. In the second wave conferences reports, the paradigms of the classic international order coexisted with those of global governance: international cooperation and sovereign governments with global goals; democratic institutions with good governance¹²⁶⁰; government with governance; pluralism with diversity¹²⁶¹; international¹²⁶² with global; “democracy” as understood according to the modern perspective with “participatory democracy” and “global democracy”; the UN as an international,

¹²⁵⁹ See interview with Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, WHO Director General, by Marguerite A. Peeters, in *Interactive Information Services*. Report 7 of October 13, 1995, op. cit., item 2. When asked: “The 1948 UDHR does not contain the ‘new rights’ that are in fact created by the WHO”, the WHO Director General replied: “No, but we have enlarged these rights. Of course, we need to have a global consensus. That’s the reason why I have always said that the global consensus must be translated into national cultures, traditions and policies.”

¹²⁶⁰ *Cairo Progr. of Action*, par. 3.21: “Job creation in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors should be facilitated by Governments and the private sector through the establishment of more favourable climates for expanded trade and investment on an environmentally sound basis, greater investment in human resource development and the development of democratic institutions and good governance”.

¹²⁶¹ *Copenhagen Decl.*, Commitment 4: “To this end, at the national level, we will: (a) Promote respect for democracy, the rule of law, pluralism and diversity, tolerance and responsibility, non-violence and solidarity by encouraging educational systems, communication media and local communities and organizations to raise people’s understanding and awareness of all aspects of social integration”.

¹²⁶² *Rio Agenda 21*, for example, mentioned “international cooperation” 52 times, and the adjective international, 1004 times while also being the conference that launched the new global partnership and the nine Major Groups.

intergovernmental organization with the UN as the hub of the new global partnership, of operational global governance; simple majority decision-making¹²⁶³ with consensus-building; recommendations with a globally normative framework; national citizens with “the people” (transnational individuals or global citizens); government accountability and transparency with non-state actors’ accountability and transparency; nations with global governance; rights recognized as universal in the UDHR with “new rights”; growth with sustainability; universal values as open to divine transcendence with a global secularistic ethics; the UN Charter and its Article 71 with the transgressional new politics; the traditional family with the gender agenda...

Two radically differing interpretations of international cooperation – according to the modern/Judeo-Christian synthesis or postmodern deconstructionism - have coexisted in an uneasy tension during the entire course of the global governance revolutionary process and up to this day. The ambivalent coexistence provoked a malaise which UN member states never openly confronted. Failing to issue a clarifying statement, they rather seemed to condone the ambivalence, allowing the revolution’s leading agents to steadily move forward unhindered in the realization of their goals.

Through global governance’s global-to-local mechanisms, the malaise, the unhealthy coexistence and ambivalence have extended to all societies at various degrees.

Coexistence as a necessary stage in the revolution’s planned “transition” towards the new world order

We recalled at the beginning of this chapter how Karl Marx spoke of his envisioned communist revolution as being a “transition” towards proletarian democracy. In an analogous fashion, *The Limits to Growth*, when launching the global governance process in 1972, had called for a “transition [our emphasis] from growth to global equilibrium”¹²⁶⁴. *Our Common Future* likewise advocated a “transition” towards sustainable development and its new paradigms¹²⁶⁵. In all revolutions, the “transition” implies a period of coexistence of the old and the new. The global governance revolution obeyed a ruling principle of all revolutions: coexistence was not meant to stay, but to be a stage in a great transition towards the vision of the revolutionaries.

The second wave conferences laid out the comprehensive program for achieving the envisioned “transition”. This transition implied a gradual departure from the modern political synthesis, from the international order as established in 1945 and from the modern and/or Judeo-Christian “universal values” system, moving towards the partners’ new world vision, holistically encompassing their anthropological, socioeconomic, environmental, cultural, ethical, political objectives - towards the hegemony of a *new world order* and its secularistic ethos.

¹²⁶³ The UN General Assembly adopts resolutions by a simple majority vote. Since the revolution and the “consensual” adoption of the conferences’ outcome documents, there has been increasing pressure on UN member states to adopt draft resolutions by consensus, that is, by unanimous endorsement rather than by majority vote (when one or more UN member states disagrees on the text). The revolution vastly contributed to the consolidation of a consensus culture at the UN and much beyond.

¹²⁶⁴ “We hope that this book will serve to interest other people, in many fields of study and in many countries of the world, to raise the space and time horizons of their concerns and to join us in understanding and preparing for a period of great transition, the transition from growth to global equilibrium”. Donnella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth*, op. cit., p. 24. The balance is a Masonic symbol.

¹²⁶⁵ *Our Common Future* considered “fundamental that the transition to sustainable development be managed jointly by all nations. The unity of human needs requires a functioning multilateral system that respects the democratic principle of consent and accepts that not only the Earth but also the world is one”. World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., par. 53.

We have evidenced how, even though deprived of juridical, legitimate, institutional identity, the new order rapidly succeeded in dominating the narrative and imposing itself as “the global framework” within which international cooperation was to operate in the 21st century. Of the former order, the revolution only left the façade standing: the façade of the Charter and the UDHR and at the national level, of democratic institutions. Behind the façade, its agents took over and occupied the rooms.

This thesis has demonstrated that the “transition” moved forward with distinctive velocity in the anthropological domain. The revolution’s leading agents as identified in chapters two and four attacked marriage between one man and one woman, the family founded on such a marriage, parents as mother and father, the unicity of the spousal relationship, children as sons and daughters, the human person’s given sexual identity as male or female, femininity and masculinity, the complementarity between the sexes, the sacrality of life from conception to natural death, parental educational rights... They considered these fundamental human realities, which have been recognized and celebrated in all cultures throughout history, as social constructs contrary to civic equality and liberty. As a consequence, these universal human realities quickly fell by the wayside in the UN conferences’ process, and the partners’ ideologically-driven anthropological paradigms occupied center stage. After the conferences, history witnessed the hardening of the conflict between identity politics (LGBTs...) on the one hand, and fundamental rights of free speech and freedom of religion on the other. Coexistence is not sustainable. The tenants of radical leftist agendas seek to eradicate the natural order as open to divine transcendence from the public sphere, from societies, politics and laws¹²⁶⁶. Global governance’s anthropological paradigms have counted among the priorities of the new global regime alongside environmental ones from which they are inextricable, and proved the real foundations of its political edifice. The new anthropology came along with a new politics¹²⁶⁷.

Since Aristotle, anthropology and politics have been indissolubly tied. “Man is, by nature, a political animal” (*ζῷον πολιτικόν*) famously stated Aristotle in *Politics*. By this Aristotle meant that the human being is a social animal who achieves happiness through living in a society governed by laws and customs. Man is naturally made for both the community and the “good life”, a life of virtue or happiness (eudomonia). Aristotle related life in the city-state to the search for some common good as its finality (telos): “We see that every city is some sort of community, and that every community is constituted for the sake of some good, since everyone does everything for the sake of what seems good”¹²⁶⁸. It was by involving oneself in the polis, by taking part in all aspects and activities of society (not just those we today call “political”), searching for a good common to all, that one would reach one’s end – happiness. Aristotle’s positive political philosophy rested on a positive anthropology and teleology. Virtue, happiness, the good, the common good, nature, finality are concepts that the Western cultural revolution violently rejected. They do not belong to global governance’s perspective.

¹²⁶⁶ The case of Finnish politician Paivi Rasanen, who was charged with hate speech for quoting a Bible verse on Twitter and writing a booklet explaining Christian theology about marriage between a man and a woman as the only union capable of procreating children has demonstrated the incompatibility between the novel ethos and the natural order as open to divine transcendence.

¹²⁶⁷ In his book *A Conflict of Visions – Ideological Origins of Political Struggles*, Thomas Sowell argued that all political conflicts derived from people’s different perspectives about human nature. The American economist identified two basic types of visions: the unconstrained vision (resting on a belief in the goodness of human nature), and the constrained vision (resting on a belief of the fundamental selfishness of the human being). See also Gierycz, Michał. European Dispute over the Concept of Man: A Study in Political Anthropology. Springer International Publishing. 2021. [European Dispute over the Concept of Man: A Study in Political Anthropology - Michał Gierycz - Google Livres](#)

¹²⁶⁸ Aristotle. *Politics*. 1.1.1252a.

Reinterpreting the Charter, not rewriting it, to give the UN a “new legitimacy”

At the end of the revolution, Wally N'Dow, the City Summit Secretary-General and as such a representative of the then ruling global elite, alluded to a need for UN member states to reinterpret, from the perspective of the global conferences, the *mandate* that the Charter had given the organization:

“More than half a century after it was founded, the United Nations needs to *reposition itself* [our emphasis] in terms of its mandate. It must seek a *new legitimacy* [Ib.] based on new needs and new demands, some of them not even contemplated when the Charter was written: New York and children; Rio and sustainable development; Vienna and human rights; Cairo and population; Copenhagen and poverty; Beijing and women... All make up the global agenda of work that every decision-maker and every citizen must face up to in the decades ahead”¹²⁶⁹.

N'Dow's statements call for several analytical comments. In N'Dow's mind, the UN's “new legitimacy” would come, not from the will of UN member states, but from the new global agenda: a global agenda not only absent from the Charter but which, as this thesis demonstrated, did not primarily originate from the sovereign governments making up the UN. In N'Dow's view, this agenda entailed, in order to be implemented, the cooptation of “every decision-maker and every citizen” far beyond UN member states. N'Dow disassociated the legitimacy concept from the authority granting it juridical grounding (hard, sovereign governments). He amalgamated what he called the “new needs and demands” which historically arose after 1945 with the post-Cold War conferences. While the former (concern for the environment or the status of women, for example) could have been ideologically neutral, the conferences proved to be heavily ideologically loaded. N'Dow implicitly suggested that the conferences' soft consensuses had provided the UN with a *new legitimacy*. The verb N'Dow used, “reposition”, equated, in our analysis, to “reinterpret”.

N'Dow's statements represented the global elite's postmodern mindset by the end of the revolution. This postmodern elite self-attributed a right to reinterpret the Charter, to transform the hard, legally binding foundational document into a text to be freely interpreted. It did so by mere fiat and without encountering any significant resistance. Reinterpretation provided the possibility to *link* the soft novel globalist platform to a binding international law instrument. It would thereby grant the former not only legitimacy but a semblance of juridical weight. Making of the Charter an object of free interpretation, the global governance revolution transgressively “liquefied” the core content of a hard law instrument. This postmodern liquefying process contributed to the devaluation or denaturation of what was hard, binding, juridical and to a matching hardening of its soft, informal, “consensual”, and ideologically-driven platform.

At the end of the revolution, by its own authority, the global elite gave *legitimacy* to its own agenda and disconnected the legitimacy concept from its juridical and moral sources: this quiet revolution contained the seeds of some new and global form of dictatorship.

8.2.2. New politics rules over former order from within

Two distinct types of coexistence: textual, and holistic

¹²⁶⁹ *Istanbul Report*, p. 217.

The coexistence, in the conferences' reports, of the paradigms of classic international cooperation with those of the new politics manifested itself in two distinct fashions: the already mentioned textual coexistence (externally visible); and the transformative coexistence of the old and the new within the new paradigms (internal and invisible).

The textual coexistence in the conferences' outcome documents of the Charter and UDHR language alongside the new, global governance paradigms suggested that the revolution did not completely take over the 1945-48 international order. The paradigms of the former order were textually included in the documents, where they seemed to maintain their conceptual integrity and independence. This reassured UN member states cherishing their sovereignty and any defender of "universal values". However, textual coexistence in the reports also put the former paradigms in relation with those of the new politics. It *linked* sovereign governments and international cooperation to global governance' political priorities and partnership politics and was quietly transformational.

Regarding the second type of coexistence, internal to the new paradigms, we here refer to the global governance's already-analyzed *enlargement dynamic*, which consisted in creating a whole (governance for example) juxtaposing, next to a classic concept (government), new components (civil society and the private sector). The new paradigms supposedly contained the old ones. They were in that sense "hybrid". But the new "whole" received a name differing from that of the old paradigms, which semantically disappeared in the process. We will now analyze how the enlargement dynamic *transformed* the former paradigms within the new ones, how global governance's holism altered their conceptual integrity.

The holistic process' debilitating effect on old paradigms and transgressional hierarchical reversal

In chapter five, we observed how constructed holistic paradigms were more than the sum of their individual parts, and how they were so because an inner logic or drive, following purposes of its own, bound all the components together, mutually integrating them in a transformative fashion and interlinking them within a compact system. We then highlighted the ideological nature of the drive of global governance's holistic process. The primary partners who took leadership in engineering the linkages through which the new paradigms and the global framework itself were constructed shared a postmodern perspective.

The primary partners' ideological drive was geared towards a power redistribution (a redistribution of political, cultural, moral or ethical influence, weight or focus) from the dominant categories or groups (the "oppressor" always being the old paradigms included in the new paradigms) to the minorities and dominated categories (the "oppressed" always being the new components juxtaposed to the old paradigms within the new paradigms). Thus the new global partnership redistributed power from sovereign governments to transnational non-governmental actors and lobbies; cultural diversity¹²⁷⁰, from the Western classical and Judeo-Christian

¹²⁷⁰ Cultural diversity is a postmodern global governance paradigm resting on the belief that cultures are entirely socially constructed, fluid processes of constant change, and are therefore deprived of any stable identity. Global governance celebrates cultural diversity exclusively within the sustainable development framework. UNESCO produced a *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity – A Vision, A Conceptual Framework, A Pool of Ideas for Implementation, a New Paradigm* (2002). UNESCO's new paradigm relates cultures to sustainability, transforming cultural diversity into what it calls "sustainable diversity" which it considers a "unified framework" (*Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, p. 10). Prior to the declaration, UNESCO had issued a cultural diversity report – *Our Creative Diversity – Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development* (July 1996). Cultural diversity, like all other global governance paradigms, hijacked a universal human aspiration to respect the unique and specific value and contribution of each single culture.

civilization to indigenous cultures, multiculturalism¹²⁷¹ and liquid cultural choices¹²⁷²; sustainable development, from economic growth to socioenvironmental concerns, zero growth and a biocentric focus on life forms; various forms of the family, from the traditional family to rainbow “families”; the new global ethic, from classical and biblical moral categories to non-Western religions and spiritualities and to various forms of secularism... To achieve its power redistribution (the new paradigms’ very purpose), the holistic process put the traditional order (considered hegemonic, contrary to equality) in the balance against the novel order, with a view to equalizing both, abolishing the hierarchical relationship and deconstructing the essence of what granted the former order its authority.

The holistic process’ balancing act powerfully transformed the relationship between the old and the novel paradigms. It redefined and destabilized what was conceptually clear (the old paradigms). It softened, dissolved, or disintegrated what was hard (Ib.). It devalued, denatured or weakened what was strong (Ib.). It liquified what was institutionally, democratically, juridically, nationally or intergovernmentally established, what was binding, what was morally or politically legitimate (Ib.)¹²⁷³. Bearing all the recognizable features of the postmodern logic, the revolution’s holistic dynamic *deconstructed* the institutional, cultural and moral pillars ensuring stability and order in any society.

In a remarkable self-destructive fashion, global governance’s Western postmodern liquifying process has critically jeopardized the content, identity, integrity, conceptual stability and power of the values and basic tenets of the Western classical, modern (liberal), and Judeo-Christian civilization all at once. Surely, the revolution can be credited for attempting to deconstruct Western modernity’s hard, domineering “power-reason coalition”: the coalition with power of a reason that had, in modern times, divorced itself from God, in particular since the Enlightenment, a coalition that had produced a series of negative practical effects, such as modernity’s environmental, social and anthropological abuses and ideological deviations. However, postmodernity’s deconstruction dynamic also targeted the truth about the human person, inviolable human dignity as universally recognizable by the conscience, reason and heart of all human beings, whether Westerners or non-Westerners. It did so in unprecedently aggressive fashion and, as seen in this chapter, in the very name of democracy. The revolution then became tyrannical, in ways reminiscent of the passage in Plato’s Republic where Socrates warned his friends that tyranny was probably established out of no other regime than democracy.

¹²⁷¹ Bock-Côté explored the connection between the New Left’s diversity paradigm and multiculturalism: « Dans la mesure où la culture est désormais le principal domaine de formation de la subjectivité, il faudra transformer l’action publique pour l’amener à la reconstruire dans une perspective égalitaire, la sociologie des marges se reformulant à la manière d’une sociologie victimale. C’est le multiculturalisme qui se dessine comme nouvelle figure de la communauté politique et avec lui, des revendications identitaires de plus en plus nombreuses qui veulent être prises en charge dans la communauté politique ». Bock-Côté, Matthieu. *Le Multilatéralisme comme Religion Politique*, op. cit., p. 116. We also refer to John Paul II’s message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace on January 1st, 2001 on *Dialogue Between Cultures For A Civilization Of Love And Peace*.

¹²⁷² UNDP’s 2004 *Human Development Report – Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World* - introduced yet another new paradigm: *cultural liberty*, resting on the belief that individuals have multiple identities which they either develop or change out of their own free choice. UNDP advocated the non-discrimination of people who choose to change their identity/ies. “Cultural liberty” means liberty to be recognized, respected, and not discriminated against because of one’s cultural identity (whether ethnic identity, religious identity, linguistic identity, lifestyles/sexual).

¹²⁷³ Nations, governments and their sovereignty, national democracies, the traditional family based on marriage between a man and a woman, cultural identity, growth, the law of nature, reason and conscience open to divine transcendence, life from conception to natural death, freedom of conscience and religion...

Global governance's holistic balancing act, by contradistinction, hardened what was soft (its new paradigms)¹²⁷⁴. It rendered *normative* what was "consensual" (Ib.). It politically empowered what was informal, unelected (Ib.). It gave a false "moral authority" to what was ideologically-driven (Ib.). It conferred a political "legitimacy" on what was undemocratic or rogue: democratically unaccountable non-governmental power-grabbers, special interest groups and lobbyists operating transnationally and advocating the "family under various forms", same sex "marriage" and other divisive agendas.

This thesis now comes to the conclusion that there was a winner and there was a loser at the end of global governance's holistic process. Equalization was a neo-Marxist myth and a useful propaganda tool. The "balancing act" often resulted in practice in a reversed hierarchy. Global governance's ambivalent coexistence regime, or hybrid regime, frequently ended up *transcending* and effectively *ruling over* international cooperation, and transnational non-governmental actors over sovereign national governments.

The holistic process bore an "inclusion" mask that hid a ferocious exclusionist intent. The supposedly holistic "family in its various forms" paradigm, to take just this example, allegedly included same sex couples (with or without children) among other "choices" or sociological situations next to the traditional family. In reality however, the "holistic" paradigm hosted fiercely opposed and even incompatible visions, whose coexistence was unsustainable. The agents of the gender revolution had coined this paradigm in order to destroy the family institution, which they regarded as "discriminatory". Their "family in its various forms" paradigm hegemonically imposed a new family construct taking its roots, not in what was ontologically transcendent and universal, but in secularism. The global governance revolution gave the Western competition between "secularistic transcendence" and divine transcendence a global dimension, and it clearly sided with the former.

To conclude our analysis of the holistic process, let us emphasize that the new paradigms as hybrid coexistence regimes did not maintain the conceptual identity of the former paradigms intact. They had on them a *dissolutive* effect which came about imperceptibly. We also want to highlight that deconstruction of the former order facilitated power grab to impose the new order. Within the new systemic paradigms, the category of the "oppressed" as per the old order quietly became hegemonic over the category that used to be considered the "oppressor".

The textual appearance of the paradigms of classic international cooperation in the conferences' reports is proof that the global governance revolution did leave the former order's façade intact. In a Trojan horse fashion, the global elite has governed debilitated institutions from *within* them. It has used soft, informal, parallel means to instrumentalize their hard, formal, institutional power. It imposed a new global ethic from within "universal values" that had been voided of their moral substance. Behind the standing façade of the modern international order, the deconstruction of the paradigms of the Western Judeo-Christian civilization left a heap of rubbles.

¹²⁷⁴ Already *Our Common Future* reflected the revolution's devaluation of the law, incapable on its own to *enforce* what it called "the common interest", by which it meant its global sustainable development agenda: "The law alone cannot enforce the common interest. It principally needs community knowledge and support, which entails greater public participation in the decisions that affect the environment... It will also require promoting citizens' initiatives, empowering people's organizations, and strengthening local democracy". World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*, op. cit., par. 77. The new politics considers that both the law and participatory democracy are necessary to "enforce" the global agenda. It implicitly grants participatory democracy a hard enforcement capacity.

This thesis has retraced the history of the revolution that has transformed *from within* the mandates, policies, priorities, conceptual and semantic framework, ideological and ethical perspective and *modus operandi* of the UN and international cooperation. The achievement of such an inner transformation as well as the global spread of the new paradigms have testified to the governing capacity of the global governance revolution's processes and agents. The postmodern ethos spread globally. The internal character of the revolution made it possible to manipulatively present its achievements as being in a continuum with the Charter and the UDHR, as simple conceptual enlargements of what these documents contained, camouflaging the fundamental break.

Global governance's constructed “new universality” and new “legitimacy”

At what he called the Beijing “global” conference, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali introduced the concept of a “new universality”. Global governance’s conceptual framework will not formally retain Boutros-Ghali’s “new universality” as a paradigm. But the Secretary-General’s rationale illustrated the effective state of affairs at the nearly conclusive point the revolution had reached by the time of the Beijing conference. It is therefore useful to expose and analyze this rationale. As usual, the revolution in this case proceeded by stealth, wearing a mask.

Beijing, contended Boutros-Ghali, brought “*a new universality [our emphasis], and therefore a new legitimacy* [Ib.], to the deliberations of the international community”¹²⁷⁵. By “new universality” Boutros-Ghali meant the “*deep and rich representation* [Ib.] of Governments, of women’s groups and of the organizations of civil society”¹²⁷⁶. In his mind, Beijing evidenced “the *new partnership* [Ib.] in international life that has been forged between governmental and non-governmental organizations” in “all its diversity and vibrancy”¹²⁷⁷. Such a “diversity and vibrancy”, he asserted, procured “the *new legitimacy* [Ib.] of the organizations of civil society as actors on the international scene”¹²⁷⁸. Boutros-Ghali here amalgamated the classic concepts of universality, legitimacy and representation on the one hand with the new paradigms of partnership, Beijing’s gender agenda and the “diversity” and “vibrancy” of NGOs on the other. Incidentally and in conformity with the new politics, he extended the democratic principle of *representation* (which he interestingly qualified as *deep*) to non-state groups and organizations. His statements exemplified, once again, what had been the UN Secretariat’s entire support for global governance all along its process.

Let us dissect the Secretary-General’s reasoning. Boutros-Ghali related the new global partnership and its agendas to universality. Universality is a morally loaded notion for the reasons evoked earlier – because of its connection to the law of nature, self-evident truths and its openness to divine transcendence. *Universal* is semantically stronger than *global*, which is deprived of moral authority and had tended to be restricted to a *geographical* dimension until global governance gave it a politically “transcending” character. The Secretary-General’s choice of the word “universality” was purposeful. The strategic goal was to confer upon global governance processes the moral *legitimacy* deriving from universality, to render *universal* what had been constructed and posited itself as *global*, and at the end of the process to grant the global ethic the authority that universal values had used to enjoy.

The strategy we just evoked was manipulative. Boutros-Ghali’s universality was “new” precisely because it differed from universality as the UN, an international organization, understood it in

¹²⁷⁵ *Beijing Report*, p. 183.

¹²⁷⁶ Ib., p. 183.

¹²⁷⁷ Ib., p. 184.

¹²⁷⁸ Ib., p. 184.

1948. The new universality incorporated, next to this “former” universality (modern “universal values” and/or the biblical universal law written on our hearts), the global ethic of the transnational “organizations of civil society” (postmodern new global ethic underpinning global governance’s new social contract). Following the new politics’ pattern, the new universality paradigm holistically “enlarged” traditional universality. Such an alleged “enlargement” hid what was in reality a *break*: of a postmodern perspective from the modern one, and of the secularistic ethic from the biblical revealed law. The revolution’s political *enlargement* of the UN as an international organization into the UN as the hub of a partnerships system (as global governance) came along with a related supposed “enlargement”, of a moral or ethical nature. Conversely, the attempt to grant the postmodern *ethos* moral authority, universality and legitimacy reflected the power-grab characteristic of global governance’s political revolution.

Also noteworthy is Boutros-Ghali’s transfer of the legitimacy inherent in international and democratic processes – a legitimacy coming from the peoples and national sovereignty – over to (or his enlargement to) global governance’s processes. His *new legitimacy* derived from the subjective notion of the “diversity and vibrancy” of “the people”, understood as transnational non-governmental actors. This thesis identified “diversity” as a new paradigm substituting pluralism. Pluralism, as opposed to now “diversity”, used to guarantee “freedom” to citizens and social actors and their independence from “the framework”.

Obtained by way of “enlargement”, global governance’s “new universality” and “new legitimacy” paradigms, as all other new paradigms, were supposedly “holistic”. This means that they were not only “broader” than the concepts used in the UN Charter and the UDHR, but allegedly all-encompassing. As such, they “transcended” the UN’s former “universality” and “legitimacy”. Global governance’s “transcending process”, characteristic of all its holistic paradigms, implied an effective *rule* of the new paradigms *over* the former paradigms. Following the pattern already described in this chapter, the relationship between the classic paradigm of universality and the postmodern dynamic animating the new universality paradigm was one of deconstruction or destabilization of the former by the latter. The new global and secularistic ethic surreptitiously was, as per the revolution’s intent, to become the source of the “new universality” and to “transcend” a universality open to divine transcendence.

Boutros-Ghali insinuated the “new universality’s” qualitative superiority over that of classic (intergovernmentally-governed) international cooperation. In his view, one of the merits of the new universality would be to *rejuvenate* international cooperation through global civil society’s “vibrancy”: precisely what needed to be done according to a majority of world leaders at the end of the Cold War.

Along with the rise of a redefined universality came another subtle semantic shift. Global governance presented the promotion and protection of universal human rights as a “global task” and tended to subtly shift the attribution of their “universality” from their core content to their horizontal enjoyment¹²⁷⁹. It thereby effectively transferred some degree of “authority” from what is vertical in the sense of transcendent to what it has horizontally or geographically “globalized”.

Our last analytical remark concerning Boutros-Ghali’s new universality and new legitimacy regards his qualification of the “rich representation of Governments, of women’s groups and of the organizations of civil society” as “deep”. A comparison can indeed be drawn between the new

¹²⁷⁹ Vienna Decl.: “Invoking the spirit of our age and the realities of our time which call upon the peoples of the world and all States members of the United Nations to rededicate themselves to the global task of promoting and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms so as to secure full and universal enjoyment of these rights”.

global partnership and the international/global equivalent of the “deep state”, the state *within* a state (κράτος ἐν κράτει). In a striking convergence, the new global partnership has, as would the deep state at the national level, pursued its programmatic special interests and exercised its influence *within* governmental (and intergovernmental) institutions, independently of the latter’s political leadership (UN member states, sovereign governments). It has behaved as a virtual shadow governing authority, which was not *for the people* but for ideological agendas. As the deep state, it has effectively governed within international organizations and national governments, *inter alia* through the use of a manipulative language. As the deep state, it has moved forward through rogue civil servants within the UN Secretariat, who betrayed the secretarial mandate they had received from UN member states by substantially cooperating with NGOs in setting the intergovernmental agenda. As the deep state, the new global partnership has vied for political power. This thesis assumes, however, that the Secretary-General did not intend to give “deep” a meaning relating to that of κράτος ἐν κράτει, as such a depiction would have been a self-defeating betrayal.

Global governance’s neo-absolutist, neo-Hobbesian and pyramidal characters

In its state at the end of the revolution, in 1996, global governance, not established as a global government (therefore deprived of executive, judicial and legislative branches¹²⁸⁰) exercised its governing power *above*, *within*, *through* as well as *beyond* international, national and local institutions and organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental. Its regime presented neo-absolutist characters. It was deprived of mechanisms allowing for a pluralistic perspective, for controlling its globally governing power and for challenging its top-down norms and global framework. The global power was not to rule “by the grace of God”, but by the pseudo “authority” of the global ethics, a secular quasi-religion. Its partnership system extended to all actors, including religions and spiritualities. It ambitioned to exercise its power within and through both temporal and spiritual affairs of church and state.

The global governance system also presented neo-Hobbesian characters. Its mechanisms abolished all forms of intermediaries between the absolute sovereign (the autocratic global ruling elite in our case¹²⁸¹) and “the people”. The enlightened global experts unified all political powers in their own centralizing hands (in ways veering towards dictatorship), knew what the people wanted and needed better than the people themselves and guaranteed, in a Messianic fashion,

¹²⁸⁰ The German scholar Otfried Höffe argued that for sovereign states joining the UN, “The recognition of human rights amounts to a self-limitation of their domestic sovereignty; the renouncement of violence limits the external sovereignty. Chapter VII [of the Charter] even gives the Security Council the authority to take measures against states that are either a threat to peace or who committed [sic] aggression against another state. Article 25 obliges the member states to contribute to such measures by offering military support.” Höffe, Otfried. *A subsidiary and federal world republic: Thoughts on democracy in the age of globalization*, op. cit., p. 200. Höffe then spelled out how difficult the transformation of the UN into a global federal republic would be: “Because only one of its organs is really a (public) power, the United Nations does not reach a high degree of statehood. Even if one would reinforce its statehood, it could not achieve the level of even a rudimentary world republic” (Ib., p. 201). And: “In one more aspect the United Nations diverges from the ideal of a world republic: it has only an upper house – the General Assembly – and no lower house. There is an Economic and Social Council (chapter X of the Charter), but its members are elected by the General Assembly, which does not make it a second independent house. Thus, the United Nations fits only to the dimension of the law of nations, not to the dimension of cosmopolitan law. This may have been wise at the time of the foundation of the United Nations, because – among other reasons – peace had priority and there was no global civic opinion. Yet a global democracy would be needed, especially with respect to the goals declared by Article 1,3 ad by chapter IX of the Charter, i.e. international cooperation in economic, cultural, and humanitarian matters” (Ib., pp. 201-202).

¹²⁸¹ Talking about the mythical hope of an imminent and autocratic paradise that a divine State would provide, Joseph Ratzinger affirmed: « Ces promesses... se trouvent en totale contradiction avec la vérité de l’homme et avec sa liberté, parce qu’elles réduisent l’homme à ce qu’il peut faire par lui-même. » Ratzinger. *Libérer la Liberté. Foi et Politique*, op. cit., p. 80.

quality of life for all. Operating *through* national and local governments, through schools, NGOs, trade unions and so on, the “mechanisms” ensured the global-to-local transmission of the ruling elite’s norms *in their conceptual integrity*. Global governance’s “sovereign”, ruling by mere fiat, was absolute. The revolution replaced the individuals-national citizens making up Leviathan’s body with the tripartite “partners” in the new global partnership for sustainable development (governments, civil society and the people being fundamentally “equal” in this partnership). Under the threats against the survival of humanity and the Planet brandished by the global elite, and “enlightened” by this elite, the “global partners” (not the national citizens of UN member states) constructed a global social contract. This global social contract implied that the partners renounced the right to think and function independently. The tripartite partners imbued global experts – the global elite - with the power to instigate the creation of *mechanisms* for “enforcing” the global social contract.

The global governance structure as standing in 1996 was also *pyramidal*. The new global partnership appeared to have installed a horizontal, flat regime whereby learners and teachers, children and parents and/or educators, NGOs and governments, peoples and governments, developing countries and Western countries, the traditional family and “families”, migrants and nations, women and men, individuals and international organizations... would have become *equal partners*. The global regime seemed to have abolished all the hierarchies governing both Western modern and non-Western traditional societies. This thesis has however demonstrated that a self-attributed “power” governed the new global partnership. This governance power was intolerant of political and ideological opposition to the alleged “consensus” it had built. At the top of global governance’s pyramid were the authors and advocates of the ideologically-driven globally normative paradigms: what *Our Global Neighborhood* called “enlightened leadership” – an expression suggesting a parallel with the “eye” surrounded by an array of light at the top of the pyramid on the one-dollar bill.

Below the numerically few “enlightened despots” and *separated* from them as the “eye” is, significantly, separated from the pyramid’s lower strata, were different layers of increasingly numerous implementing partners, increasingly remote from the despots’ perspective. The higher up in the pyramid were the state and non-state actors politically and ideologically aligned with the global elite and wielding the most power; the lower down, the reverse, most numerous at the basis of the pyramid, the ordinary people from all countries following the elite’s marching orders. Those explicitly refusing to enter the framework, as clearly already observed, remained outsiders. The revolution, having flattened the hierarchy between what is governmental and what is non-governmental, established a new hierarchy, governed not by institutional, legitimate, juridical criteria, but by ideological and political ones: adherence to the enlightened despots’ globalist perspective and power wielded in that exclusive perspective.

8.3. Destabilizing democracy and the international order

8.3.1. The partnership principle turns the tables on modern democracy’s freedom of association principle

Reversal of democratic logic: bottom-up freedom of association vs. top-down partnerships

Chapter one established the tension, within modern democracy, between the social contract and the freedom of association as a fundamental determinant of this thesis. We now come to a conclusion about the role that the modern freedom of association principle has played in the advent of postmodern global governance - of the new global partnership, its new and global social contract and postmodern ethos - and in the corresponding debilitation of modern democracy.

Embodied in Article 20 of the UDHR¹²⁸² and the object of two ILO conventions¹²⁸³, the freedom of association principle has traditionally been regarded as one of the basic tenets of modern democracy, supposed to guard against potential state tyranny and dictatorship, alongside the freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. The principle stipulates a bottom-up process, whereby individuals freely decide to group themselves in the pursuit of common objectives and around shared values or a joint ideological perspective. The freedom of association is supposed to warrant respect for pluralism within a given society and to ensure non-governmental associations' independence from national governments, provided these associations respect national laws: in that sense, the modern principle respected the authority of governments over NGOs. The principle historically permitted the birth and development of non-governmental organizations, and by extension the phenomenal growth of transnational NGOs and their participation in international cooperation during the period spanned by this thesis. By way of consequence, the democratic freedom of association principle paved the way for the development of global governance's partnership principle.

This thesis has exposed the irremediable destabilization that global governance's partnership principle has provoked in modern democracy's hierarchy between governmental and non-governmental actors. Those non-governmental actors set to achieve the global norms and goals that they themselves had forged, empowered by "enabling governments" but "autonomous" from them, ended up normatively ruling over sovereign governments within the framework of a "global partnership" in which these governments consented to belong, though not being its primary authors¹²⁸⁴. The revolution instrumentalized a principle of modern democracy – the freedom of association - to deconstruct the sovereign authority that democratically-elected governments had legitimately received from their respective peoples. The freedom of association principle thus ended up turning the tables against its historical origin, in an eloquent illustration of liberal modern democracy's self-destruction, and ushering in postmodern global governance. The global governance revolution resolved the initial modern tension between the social contract and the freedom of association with a clear victory of the (global) social contract over democratic freedom.

The partnership principle reversed the democratic logic animating the freedom of association principle in yet another way, this time affecting NGOs themselves. Its pyramidal functioning implied the assignment, to all implementing non-governmental partners, of a common, unique, exclusive and "transcending" global mandate, as well as of corresponding "roles" and "responsibilities" within that "mandate". This top-down process interfered in and jeopardized the self-government and therefore the freedom of private associations: the global elite assigned them a mandate that did not come from the people who constituted them; it empowered them for the exclusive purpose of implementing the global goals that it had set for all. By framing the participation of NGOs, by instrumentalizing them and restricting the exercise of their "freedom" and "autonomy" to the global framework's boundaries, the partnership principle excluded political and ideological opposition to the global agenda and sounded pluralism's death knell.

¹²⁸² This article stipulates, first, that "everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association" and secondly, that "no one may be compelled to belong to an association".

¹²⁸³ The 1948 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87) and the 1949 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 6 (No. 98). In 1951, the ILO set up the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) for the purpose of examining complaints of violations of freedom of association, whether or not the country concerned had ratified the relevant conventions.

¹²⁸⁴ Sovereign governments obviously maintain their sovereignty outside of the framework.

Global governance genuinely applied its *autonomy rule* only to its primary, agenda-setting partners. Implementing non-governmental actors were “autonomous” only within the framework’s boundaries: in other words, the proclamation of their “autonomy” was manipulative and their autonomy, a myth. Global governance’s partnership principle implied confinement of all partners within the framework. This “confinement” violated the right of national peoples to freely associate in the pursuit of common objectives, independently from the “global framework”. Just as it transgressed the UN Charter, so too did the partnership principle transgress democracy and the freedom of association principle.

The partnership principle offers no guarantee against dictatorship and totalitarianism

This thesis has demonstrated that global governance as process was at the exclusive service of global governance as content and vice versa, within a sealed but dynamic and forward-moving political system. The new political paradigms (the partnership principle, participatory democracy, good governance, facilitation, best practices, consensus-building, empowerment, autonomy etc.) all empowered non-governmental actors to the detriment of governmental ones. The revolution largely succeeded in tying a *critical mass* of state (including local authorities) and non-state actors (including nationally-undifferentiated individuals and youth) to the global elite’s normative framework. By dealing pluralism a fatal blow, it irreversibly compromised the freedom of association principle’s original guarantee against tyranny, dictatorship, totalitarianism or fascism¹²⁸⁵, with now such threats coming from the “global level”.

The diversity paradigm appeared to celebrate free choice, but it prohibited opposition to the framework within which these “choices” were supposed to take place. In the very name of free choice, “diversity” then represented a threat to liberty, and this menace was unprecedented in its “global” scope. The “new global social contract” imposed the “celebration of diversity” as the new universality. Such a “celebration” would be the source of a new “transcendence” supposed to resolve the social conflicts caused both by the breakdown of the modern social contract at the national level and by the rejection of what is genuinely universal and therefore capable of unifying humanity, in other words by radical secularism and secularization.

It is interesting that the conceptualizer of “governance”, James N. Rosenau, would connect his paradigm to the crisis of formal or institutional authority and to the proliferation of diverse individual choices:

“There is no dearth of governance on a global scale today... There are innumerable centers of authority because the world has moved into an era in which individuals have become paramount and are heeding their own values and impulses, thus serving as their own authority and rendering centralized governance more difficult. More accurately, the emergent era is marked by a wide disaggregation of authority, with networked individuals who think and act in conjunction with others apart from the constraints of formal governmental structures centrally located”¹²⁸⁶.

What Rosenau does not integrate in his reflection are the all-encompassing and “unifying” propaganda campaigns in favor of global governance’s agendas that have swept the world during the revolution and in its aftermath. Through its partnership with the media and education sector,

¹²⁸⁵ Benito Mussolini’s definition of fascism - “Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state” - remains an enduring depiction of totalitarianism.

¹²⁸⁶ James N. Rosenau, in 2009 article *Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, addressed the “mechanisms of global governance” independently from what the post-Cold UN conferences had provided for. See Whitman, Jim, Ed. *Global Governance*, op. cit., p.1.

the global elite transnationally submitted national peoples, national health and education institutions, banks, the mainstream media, associations, trade unions, the entertainment industry... to relentless awareness-raising, education and mass-mobilization campaigns, inciting them to jump on global governance's bandwagon. Propaganda has been defeatingly efficient in taming a critical mass and transforming them as enthusiastic serfs of mechanisms under the global elite's control.

By the end of the revolution in 1996, the transformation of classic intergovernmental, international cooperation into a global governance-dominated coexistence regime had reached a point of no return. Doctrinaire intransigence (such as that displayed by the Women's Caucus), the imposition of an exclusive ethos, the bypassing of intermediary bodies, propaganda campaigns, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms¹²⁸⁷, the absence of toleration for political pluralism and for media independent from its ideological perspective are trademarks of a dictatorship. Could this global governance eventually tumble into a form of dictatorship, bending the will of "the people" – the "global people", transnational individuals, the "global citizens" - to the agenda of the secularistic elite few at its helm?

The global governance regime was, as we have seen, founded on Western modern democracy's historical divorce between freedom and truth. Installed in the name of democracy, the global regime's democratic claims were delusory. The new politics was in essence post- or anti-democratic. Within its system, it granted absolute power not to a state but to self-appointed global technocrats. It has operated globally (not nationally) to locally. It was deprived of institutional and juridical "teeth" ("liquid" and postmodern), yet endowed itself with a real enforcement and ruling capacity. Arguably, the global hybrid regime still governing us today has contained the seeds of a global "totalitarian democracy", of what the International Theological Commission called *political monophysitism*¹²⁸⁸, of an authoritarian or dictatorial regime of a new sort, ruling over nationally-undifferentiated citizens, themselves made easily manipulable by the postmodern revolution which culturally deconstructed reality and truth¹²⁸⁹. As Hannah Arendt observed it:

¹²⁸⁷ The conferences provided for indicators of progress and other surveillance mechanisms ensuring the implementation of the global goals. The global surveillance state that some observe developing in the 21st century thanks to the new technologies and A.I. would build on and abide by global governance's postmodern ethos.

¹²⁸⁸ The global governance revolution represented a historic drift towards what the International Theological Commission called *political monophysitism* in its March 21, 2019 document entitled *Religious Freedom for the Good of All. Theological Approaches and Contemporary Challenges*: "The city of God lives and grows 'inside' the city of man. Therefore, the social doctrine of the Church recognises as a blessing the commitment of those who promote the common good in everyday life. The Christian doctrine of the two cities affirms a distinction rather than an opposition between temporal and spiritual realities. God does not impose a specific form of government. Understood theologically, earthly authority over others derives ultimately from God and is dependent upon his authority. Despite this ultimate foundation upon God's authority, social ties and political government remain a human enterprise. Since this authority is dependent upon God's judgement, there exists a precise limit to the power conferred on the ability of earthly authority to govern people and communities. One might describe a 'theocratic State', as analogous to an 'atheistic State'. Both seek in different ways to impose an ideology of substitution of God's power for the power of the State. Consequently, this ideology distorts both religion and politics. One can identify a certain political analogy of Christological monophysitism in these models. Monophysitism confounds and ultimately cancels any distinction between Christ's human and divine nature, achieved in the Incarnation. This heresy destroys the harmony between their unity. Today there exists a type of 'political monophysitism' (known previously in Christian history) that is emerging again more clearly in certain radical currents of non-Christian religious traditions" (par. 61). https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_20190426_liberata-religiosa_en.html (retrieved May 2, 2022).

¹²⁸⁹ Pope John-Paul II in his 1991 *Centesimus Annus* encyclical stated the conditions for democracy to be *authentic* according to the Catholic Church: "The Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate. Thus she

“The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist”¹²⁹⁰.

The global regime’s Trojan Horse way of proceeding (within institutions endowed with a hard mandate, political and juridical legitimacy and enforcement power) did grant global governance a decisive amount of “hard” power. We have seen that the UN adopted the global platform virtually as its new “mandate”. The Trojan Horse quietly constructed the global Leviathan, with state and non-state members incrementally acquiescing to the global social contract. Hegemonic and operational networks of like-minded partners spread globally. They became so powerful as to keep on functioning even independently from (inter)governmental processes, surviving the ideological opposition of even the most powerful governments¹²⁹¹. Once the balance between actors coopted in the global partnership and outsiders (mainly governments affirming their sovereignty over global governance) decisively tilts in favor of the former, the regime is on its way to becoming totalitarian.

A “totalitarian” feature of the global governance regime has been the all-encompassing logic of both its platform, including its ethos, and of the new global partnership. Global governance’s platform holistically comprised all its paradigms, each of them individually themselves claiming to be holistic in their respective domains. The new global partnership coopted all categories of possible actors, globally. At the end of the revolution this thesis analyzed, the partnership principle was applicable to, and in effect applied at, all levels – the artificially constructed

cannot encourage the formation of narrow ruling groups which usurp the power of the State for individual interests or for ideological ends. Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person. It requires that the necessary conditions be present for the advancement both of the individual through education and formation in true ideals, and of the ‘subjectivity’ of society through the creation of structures of participation and shared responsibility. Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and sceptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism. Nor does the Church close her eyes to the danger of fanaticism or fundamentalism among those who, in the name of an ideology which purports to be scientific or religious, claim the right to impose on others their own concept of what is true and good. *Christian truth* is not of this kind. Since it is not an ideology, the Christian faith does not presume to imprison changing socio-political realities in a rigid schema, and it recognizes that human life is realized in history in conditions that are diverse and imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming the transcendent dignity of the person, the Church’s method is always that of respect for freedom. But freedom attains its full development only by accepting the truth. In a world without truth, freedom loses its foundation and man is exposed to the violence of passion and to manipulation, both open and hidden. The Christian upholds freedom and serves it, constantly offering to others the truth which he has known (cf. Jn 8:31-32), in accordance with the missionary nature of his vocation. While paying heed to every fragment of truth which he encounters in the life experience and in the culture of individuals and of nations, he will not fail to affirm in dialogue with others all that his faith and the correct use of reason have enabled him to understand” (par. 46).

¹²⁹⁰ See <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/8110811-the-ideal-subject-of-totalitarian-rule-is-not-the-convinced> (retrieved October 20, 2021).

¹²⁹¹ Such as the US government under President Trump, for instance.

“global” level, and the international, national¹²⁹² and local¹²⁹³ ones -, to all actors - governmental and non-governmental -, between and among similar actors (“between and among local authorities”¹²⁹⁴ for example, or South-South), and to all stages of the political process – from policy- and decision-making to surveillance. All coopted actors, at all levels, had to be involved in all steps of the political process in view of achieving an allegedly all-inclusive, comprehensive, systemic, “total” agenda. This agenda was set to achieve the Messianic or utopian objectives of eradicating poverty in all its forms globally and providing quality of life for all. As if global governance were a transposition at “the global level” of the “divine State”, the revolution mythically claimed to address the *totum* of human aspirations¹²⁹⁵. It obeyed a totalizing drive. It left no space for alternative platforms nor for political processes other than the global partnership.

Transgressional yet ruling global governance

The totalizing or “totalitarian” features of global governance that we just listed broke from and transgressed the three first purposes and principles of the UN as defined in Article 1 of the Charter. These principles insisted on the UN’s *international* character and on *nations’ self-determination*. They were the following: first, to “maintain *international* [our emphasis] peace and security”, secondly, to “develop friendly relations among *nations* [Ib.] based on respect for the principle of equal rights and *self-determination of peoples* [Ib.]” and thirdly to “achieve *international co-operation* [Ib.] in solving *international* [Ib.] problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”. This thesis has shown that the transgressions committed by the agents of the global governance revolution ended up crystallizing into globally *normative* concepts and installing a ruling regime.

The role that the conferences assigned governments as partners in global governance alienated them from their real mandate, all the more so than the content of the global “mandate” may well have been at odds with what national peoples self-determinedly would have wanted. The agents of the revolution had little concern for the global agenda’s conformity to the national people’s will. The goal was, in reverse, the implementation of their agenda by the world’s “people” globally. Global governance’s gross transgression of the primordial subsidiarity principle and of people’s democratic rights was never efficiently denounced nor was it ever openly addressed.

While the conferences specifically promoted democracy and democratization as their goals, they did not provide for a mechanism through which the global agenda that they constructed and was meant to be implemented at all levels would be submitted to national peoples’ careful and independent examination. Most people have remained ignorant of the origin of the supposed “global mandate”, of the history of its development, of the ideological identity and intent of those who forged it, of the political forces at play. Never during the revolution was the global agenda,

¹²⁹² An Istanbul recommendation typically started as follows: “Governments at the appropriate levels, including local authorities, in partnership with the private sector, non-governmental youth organizations and other non-governmental organizations as well as community-based organizations, should...” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 120).

¹²⁹³ The partnership principle has applied to local authorities. Habitat II, referring to the “framework” of Rio’s *Local Agenda 21*, emphasizes the “need” for local authorities to “work in cooperation with all interested parties, including individuals, social groups and the private sector, to promote and implement effective strategies for sustainable development” (*Istanbul Report*, par. 103).

¹²⁹⁴ *Istanbul Report*, par. 198.

¹²⁹⁵ These comments are inspired by Joseph Ratzinger’s 1981 homily before the Catholic members of the German Parliament: « L’Etat romain était faux et anti-chrétien parce qu’il voulait justement être le totum des possibilités et espérances humaines. Il prétendait ainsi être ce qu’il ne pouvait réaliser, ce en quoi il trompait et appauvrissait l’homme... Mais quand la foi chrétienne, la foi en une espérance supérieure à l’homme, perd de sa force, le mythe de l’Etat divin réapparaît, car l’homme ne peut renoncer à la plénitude de l’espérance. » Ratzinger, Joseph. *Libérer la Liberté. Foi et Politique*, op. cit., p. 80.

neither as a whole nor in any of its constitutive parts, the object of an open, properly informed and democratic parliamentary debate, tolerant of opposition, in any of the UN member states. The partnerships' regime has been the *modus operandi* of international cooperation since the revolution, yet never did a democratic audit of global governance and its mechanisms ever take place.

The changes that the global governance regime has operated to the nature of international cooperation have been fundamental. The exigencies of the new global partnership for sustainable development acquired ethical and political supremacy over the UN's juridical foundations and over the moral authority that the UDHR had endowed the UN with. "Authority" was largely transferred from its universal source to the "global consensus". The valuing of informality, of soft power techniques and of in particular of consensus, and of the novel postmodern ethos was concomitant with a devaluing of the authority of governments, international law, and universal moral standards. A profound and pervasive malaise has ensued from global governance's enduring transgressional character. Ever since the revolution this thesis exposed, ambivalence has spoiled the exercise of international cooperation rotten.

The revolution was a historic, pivotal moment in sovereign governments' surrender to a transnational governing elite and in the ensuing destabilization of the international order. Sovereign governments failed to make a clarifying statement openly addressing this unhealthy situation. They never rescinded what became the instruments of their weakening or self-destruction. Nothing then could stop the new global partnership's rapidly overruling dynamic.

The global spread of the new paradigms was not the only achievement of the global governance revolution. The fundamental destabilization of the international order has equally belonged its legacy. This destabilization came about through a radical *reinterpretation* of a critical number of the former order's conceptual pillars, such as "we the peoples of the United Nations", security, development, international cooperation, the family, marriage, human dignity, human rights, freedom, equality. This conclusive remark brings us to this thesis' last point: the central role that language has played in destabilizing the world order and therefore in jeopardizing international peace.

8.3.2. Semantic ambivalence of global governance's paradigms: the ruling global postmodern framework rests on quicksand

A strategic use of language for manipulative purposes is common in revolutions as it is in totalitarian regimes¹²⁹⁶. This thesis has employed the emergence and progressive dominance, in the language of international cooperation, of a new language coined by a handful of experts as an indicator that a revolutionary process was unfolding. It has exposed how these words and expressions were interdependent within a new semantic system, bound together by a postmodern logic, and textually coexisted in the conferences' reports with the language of the UN foundational documents¹²⁹⁷. It demonstrated that the new paradigms, products of linkages,

¹²⁹⁶ American and Dutch psychiatrist Joost Abraham Maurits Meerloo (1903-1976), in his 1956 book *Rape of the Mind, The Psychology of Thought, Control, Menticide and Brainwashing*, studied the brainwashing techniques efficiently used by totalitarian regimes. He pointed out how "He who dictates and formulates the words and phrases we use, he who is master of the press and radio, is master of the mind. Repeat mechanically your assumptions and suggestions, diminish the opportunity for communicating dissent and opposition. This is the formula for political conditioning of the masses". https://web.archive.org/web/20070513044831/http://quotes.zaadz.com/Joost_Meerloo (retrieved April 27, 2022).

¹²⁹⁷ See Appendix B on global governance's semantic system.

holistically integrated the paradigms of the former semantic system – that of the UN Charter and of the UDHR, transforming them from within. These points have been amply made. It is not necessary to revisit them now, nor is it within this thesis’ purview to engage in a deeper analysis of the novel semantic system.

We have also highlighted the destabilizing effect of two types of semantic coexistence: textual coexistence, and coexistence within the new paradigms. Next to these two categories, we now need to point to a third type of coexistence: that of multiple, ideologically diverging, interpretations for global governance’s paradigms, making these paradigms radically *ambivalent* semantically. As this semantic ambivalence critically contributed to the destabilization of the international order, one of our thesis’ main conclusions, we need to evoke this theme at the end of this thesis.

New paradigms’ strategic liquidity

The global governance revolution was historically concomitant with the years when the coiner of the deep ecology concept Arne Naess had developed a theory about *semantic fluidity* and *vagueness*¹²⁹⁸, Jacques Derrida elaborated his *deconstruction* discourse¹²⁹⁹, Richard Rorty dogmatic affirmed that knowledge was a sole linguistic affair and that truths were human constructs¹³⁰⁰, Judith Butler promoted *performative* language to stir up gender trouble¹³⁰¹ and Zygmunt Bauman’s postmodern narrative¹³⁰². These thinkers’ ideas were then winning the day in Western intellectual circles. By the end of the revolution, public discourses started being made about the West’s shift to postmodernity. This thesis endorses the view, exposed in chapter five, that the Western postmodern revolution had transformed reality into a text to be interpreted, into a *process of change* deprived of fixed and substantial content. Its efforts consisted in disconnecting language (whose universal function is to *name reality as it is*) from reality, destabilizing words’ core content, replacing this stable content with man’s Promethean power to make as many subjective interpretative choices as it pleases. The postmodern process used language to grant man the ability to *perform* the identity of one’s choice (the most eloquent example being to perform a gender identity). *Travelling* from one choice to the next has been the postmodern individual’s way of life. Travelling expresses a decision to perpetually shun personal engagement.

There is no clearer indicator of the global governance revolution’s postmodern drive than the irremediable semantic ambivalence of the new paradigms that it produced and successfully globally spread. A common feature of these paradigms - whether political, socioeconomic and

¹²⁹⁸ In his early philosophical work (“Interpretation and Preciseness”, 1947-51). Næss broke new ground in affirming the potential for any given utterance to be variously interpreted depending on context and circumstance.

¹²⁹⁹ In his 1967 book *Of Grammatology*, Jacques Derrida introduced the majority of ideas that would become influential within his deconstruction perspective. Derrida was inspired by the work of Ferdinand de Saussure who related *meaning* exclusively to the *contrast* between the signs and words constituting language (a perspective opposing itself to the Aristotelian, metaphysical one). Derrida claimed concepts had to be understood only in the context of their opposites.

¹³⁰⁰ Rorty also endorsed de Saussure’s claim and related knowledge exclusively to our language, constituted by our man-made, temporary and changing vocabularies. Rorty advanced that truths were equally man-made.

¹³⁰¹ Butler asserted that discourse was all there was, that there was no reality, only representation.

¹³⁰² The mid- to late 1990s corresponded to the years when Zygmunt Bauman qualified the shift that he observed had been occurring within modern society in the second half of the 20th century - from a society of producers to one of consumers, trading off security against more liberty (consumption, pleasure) - as a shift from modernity to postmodernity. As of 2000, Bauman distanced himself from the postmodernity concept, replacing it with that of “liquid modernity” as opposed to the former “solid modernity”. See for instance Bauman, Zygmunt. *Liquid Modernity*. Polity. 2000. He then wrote a series of books applying his liquidity concept to love, life, fear, times, surveillance...

environmental, cultural, anthropological or relating to security - was their conceptual fluidity, their lack of clear, stable content and definition. Definitions, when they existed, were either so loose, vague or inclusive as to possibly host the whole spectrum of interpretative choices¹³⁰³. They were, in other words, “non-definitions”. Non-definition was a principle of global governance’s postmodern politics. Prolific about processes of change, global governance’s revolution has been in misery when it came to contents. To use a Marxist concept, the new global language has expressed a *permanent revolution*¹³⁰⁴: a revolution that will remain unfinished until power is in the hands of its agents.

To illustrate our point, let us see what Finkelstein had to say about the global governance concept in 1995: “Ambiguity affects not only what is meant by *global* but also what is meant by *governance*”¹³⁰⁵. Finkelstein added: “The term *governance* has been applied to international matters in a variety of ways that have been at best disorderly and perhaps confusing”¹³⁰⁶ and: “We say ‘governance’ because we don’t really know what to call what is going on”¹³⁰⁷. The main theoretical accounts of global governance have interpreted the concept vastly differently: a diversity of interpretations that is in itself symptomatic of the concept’s postmodern liquidity. As regards the definition of an NGO, Lewis had this to say: “Precise definitions vary as to what constitutes an NGO, and the challenge of analyzing the phenomenon of NGOs remains surprisingly difficult... NGOs as an analytical category remains complex and unclear”¹³⁰⁸.

From the diversity of interpretative choices to the imposition of the global elite’s choices

Let us now see how semantic ambivalence has empowered the agents of global governance. The *performative* Promethean revolution¹³⁰⁹ celebrated the *diversity* of semantic interpretations as allegedly equally valuable, be they ontologically, morally, semantically contradictory. The celebration of diversity dynamic has kept global governance’s holistic paradigms standing. It replaced the former order’s language-reality nexus. This celebration was closely akin to the holistic process’ balancing act analyzed earlier in this chapter: not only has it quietly dissolved, destabilized or deconstructed the core content of traditional concepts, of the old paradigms, but it has operated a power transfer from the old to the new. For a while the celebration of diversity appeared reassuring to those who stucked to the traditional content of words. But ambivalence is unsustainable in the long run. There ended up being a winner and a loser among all interpretations vying for semantic dominance.

¹³⁰³ This thesis provided some of the “definitions” of the new terms contained in the global governance documents it has used (see for example *Our Common Future*’s definition of sustainable development on p. 72, Cairo’s definition of reproductive health in footnote 628 on p. 149, UNDP’s definition of governance on p. 240, and *Our Global Neighborhood*’s definition of governance on p. 245). Let us additionally reproduce the *Rome Plan of Action*’s definition of “food security”: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (par. 1).

¹³⁰⁴ “While the democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible... it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power...” Marx, Karl. *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*. March 1850.

¹³⁰⁵ Finkelstein, Lawrence S. *What is Global Governance?*, op. cit. p. 367.

¹³⁰⁶ Ib., p. 371.

¹³⁰⁷ Ib., p. 368.

¹³⁰⁸ Lewis, David. *Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History*. The London School of Economics and Political Science. January 2010.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302391474_Nongovernmental_Organizations_Definition_and_History (retrieved July 3, 2021).

¹³⁰⁹ Judith Butler applied John L. Austin’s performative language to gender identity. See Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge. 1990.

The new paradigms' absence of clear definitions resulted from a strategic decision on the part of the global elite to leave room for all interpretations, including first and foremost their own. It allowed them to interpret the new paradigms, that they themselves had forged, in the light of their own ideological goals¹³¹⁰ which the ambivalent paradigms hid in their semantic fog. This fog was a *semantic manipulation* and *power-grab* strategy with a view to, in the name of "diversity", gradually but hegemonically imposing a single interpretation as globally normative. The "semantic fog for power-grab" strategy was particularly striking in the areas that proved the most ideologically divisive during the second wave conferences, i.e. anthropology and sexuality. The "definitions" the agents of global governance provided for "holistic paradigms" such as "reproductive health", "sexual health", "reproductive rights", "family in its various forms", or "gender" were notably fuzzy. They allegedly included conservative views on life, marriage and the family as an interpretative "possibility". The proven intent of the actual power holders in global governance was to impose their postmodern interpretation on the greatest number - on "all". Let a thousand flowers bloom, said Mao Tse Tung, until only one interpretation of the new paradigms, one value system, would win the day and be allowed.

Semantic fog was a strategy to avoid controversies prior to the adoption of a "global consensus" on the new paradigms. Had clear definitions been provided, UN member states as sovereign governments and peoples would have discovered the radical agendas hidden in the new language – in particular in its anthropological paradigms¹³¹¹. Opposition would have built up. The "interpretative choice" that the absence of definition seemed to grant people facilitated the adoption of a "global consensus" on the new paradigms. The "consensus" was seemingly satisfactory to every party. But when it came to implementing the new paradigms, the conceptualizers' ideological interpretation quickly prevailed and imposed itself on all as global governance's priority and normative framework. Holism, inclusion, diversity, freedom to choose were the revolution's interconnected myths and manipulative dominance tools.

The postmodern freedom to choose governing global governance's ethos procured no secure foundation to the post-Cold War new world order. Global governance's conceptual *pillars* were semantically *unstable*. Liquid paradigms made up the pillars of the framework. The new regime

¹³¹⁰ Doctor Hammad, who headed the WHO delegation to Beijing responded the following to this author who interviewed her about "sexual rights" and their definition, or lack thereof: "-- Some delegations here in Beijing expressed satisfaction that "sexual rights" in the Beijing text were replaced by "human rights". Dr. H: I think the issue of wording is not important, because I think that what we managed to get is that all the components of sexual rights are there, and that's what we want: that the components of sexual rights, in all their dimensions, be in the text. -- Single parent families, lesbians...? Dr. H: I don't think that we want to define them because it leaves room to all the possibilities that you need. Sexual rights have not been watered-down, I am sure. As the head of the WHO delegation, I can assure you that all the components of sexual rights, as we had envisioned them, are there." See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 7 of October 13, 1995, op. cit., item 3.

¹³¹¹ Patricia Licuanan, who chaired the main committee in Beijing, responded who follows in an exchange with this author on September 2, 1995: "--How do you explain that the gender issue remains unresolved? PL: It was actually resolved. --It was resolved, yes, but by a lack of definition. How do you explain it? PL: A definition, no matter how good, would just generate more controversy. The point is that it is understood that the term "gender" is a sociological term; it is a UN term; it has been used for the past 30 years; it is in every major document. All we are saying is that we are using it in exactly the same way as it has been used in the past. To attempt a definition, even though we have one, we see, from experience, just causes more problems. --What is the UN definition? PL: Again, I don't want to define it. But basically, we want to move beyond the differences based on biological differences - sex. In many ways the differences between men and women are socially defined, and that is really what we are talking about. We are not talking about the biological differences. --So that's the UN definition? PL: In a sense, yes. It is the socially constructed roles." See Peeters, Marguerite A. *Interactive Information Services*. Report 9 of October 18, 1995, op. cit., item 3.

has been resting on quicksand¹³¹². Semantic liquidity made it virtually impossible for UN member states to govern the new regime. By contradistinction, it made it very easy for the elite few to manipulate all actors in the “new global partnership” into accepting agendas they would otherwise not accept. Informal arrangements, cooptation and parallel mechanisms took over, governed as they were by an ideologically-driven global elite hegemonically intent on enforcing its own interpretation.

Finally, this thesis also observes a connection between the postmodern sacrosanct freedom to choose ethics and the birth of the new governance politics. This conclusion can be deduced from Rosenau’s argument:

“There are innumerable centers of authority because the world has moved into an era in which individuals have become paramount and are heeding their own values and impulses, thus serving as their own authority and rendering centralized governance more difficult. More accurately, the emergent era is marked by a wide disaggregation of authority, with networked individuals who think and act in conjunction with others apart from the constraints of formal governmental structures centrally located”¹³¹³.

Destabilizing the former order by multiplying expressions signifying similar processes: example of civil society

Apart from the absence of clear definitions, another way the revolution used language to destabilize the former order was by multiplying novel or reinterpreted expressions signifying similar processes, indifferently shifting from one expression to another without specifying what semantically distinguished them. Let us take the example of “civil society” to illustrate our point. The Social Summit, the conference that, let us recall, had introduced the concept in the language of global governance, did not define the term (just as Rio had defined neither “participatory democracy” nor “governance”). In 1945, the UN Charter used one expression (novel at the time) to describe the non-governmental actors it would have a relationship with: non-governmental organizations. A plethora of other expressions emerged over the course of the revolutionary process to describe the non-UN member states actors that the partnership politics coopted: as a reminder and as examples, not only civil society, but global civil society, non-state actors, Major Groups, community organizations, community-based organizations, civic groups, informal groups, civil society organizations¹³¹⁴, voluntary associations, partners, partnerships... The

¹³¹² Zygmunt Bauman also used the quicksand metaphor to describe the postmodern revolution. In an online interview dated September 6, 2011, Bauman stated: “It seems that we are living on quicksand. Every movement which you want to make to stabilize your position may have quite the opposite consequences like in quicksand. You may sink even deeper than before... Where does it come from, this feeling of absence of control? Not just that we are not in control – no one seems to be in control. Things seem to be happening at random... Well, I suggest to you that there is one essential reason from which other reasons are derivative. The one reason is the separation, coming very close to divorce, between power and politics. Power is the ability to have things done. And politics is the ability to decide which things are to be done. Now both abilities – the power and the politics – were until quite recently, until less than a century ago, were united in one place. That place was called “nation-state” or state-government had both the power to do things and to the political institutions to decide which things are to be done.... It is no longer the case because power has evaporated from the level of the nation-state up there into the cyberspace or... the space of “flows” (finances, capital, trade, information, terrorism, drug trafficking... everything which ignores the boundaries of national sovereignty), and politics remains where it has been for a number of centuries already, namely on the local level.” Bauman, Zygmunt. *No One is in Control. That is the major cause of contemporary fear*. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73NmV-4jvSc> (retrieved April 30, 2002).

¹³¹³ Rosenau, James N. *Global governance or global governances?* In Global Governance. Whitman, Jim, Ed. Palgrave MacMillan. 2009, p.1.

¹³¹⁴ The phrase “civil society organization” started appearing at Istanbul (8) and Rome (1).

multiplication would continue after the revolution, with the appearance of words and expressions such as “stakeholders” (interestingly introduced by Klaus Schwab)¹³¹⁵ and “multi-stakeholder”.

The content of the new words and expressions broke from the definition that ECOSOC had given NGOs in 1950, limiting the identity of groups entitled to enter a consultative relationship with ECOSOC to those that were both international and constituted as an organization. Such limitations were unacceptable to the agents of the revolution, who unscrupulously transgressed them. One way for them to hide their transgressions was by drowning potential whistleblowers in a proliferation of novel expressions, and celebrating this “diversity” as progress.

The example of global governance’s civil society paradigm illustrates the imprecision of its language and the instability of its concepts. Since the mid-1990s, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has issued a number of publications¹³¹⁶ on governance, civil society and partnerships. In one of them from 2006, the UNDP described the evolution of its political vocabulary and in particular when it came to shift from *non-governmental organizations* to *civil society organizations*: “Until 1993” - that is, until just after Rio - “UNDP used the term non-governmental organization (NGO) to describe all the non-state/non-business organizations it worked with. The term civil society organizations is now the term of choice.”¹³¹⁷ It is revealing that after the UNCED, UNDP - a UN body that has considered itself globally normative in the area of “governance” - unabashedly felt confident to abandon a term inscribed in the UN Charter (NGOs) and to normatively replace it, by mere fiat, with a term absent from the Charter (CSOs). UNDP’s confident act of transgression vis-à-vis the Charter occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Rio revolution and is indicative of the historic turning point this revolution represented¹³¹⁸.

In its just mentioned 2006 publication, UNDP laid out its rationale justifying the semantic shift it operated after 1993: civil society

“encompasses a *wider* [our emphasis] variety of organizations engaged in development work. CSOs comprise the *full range of formal and informal* [lb.] organizations within civil society: NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), indigenous peoples’

¹³¹⁵ Klaus Schwab introduced the distinction between *shareholder* and *stakeholder* in his 1971 book, *Modern Company Management in Mechanical Engineering*, in which he argued that “a company must serve not only shareholders but all stakeholders to achieve long-term growth and prosperity. To promote the stakeholder concept, he founded the World Economic Forum the same year.” *Covid-19: The Great Reset*, op. cit. p. 5. Stakeholder is, like comparative advantage, an economic term and conveys the idea of a political economy. “If I look at our stakeholders, we have business, of course, as a very important audience, then we have politics, we have continuous partnerships with many governments around the world, then of course we have NGOs, we have trade unions, [inaudible] we have media of course, and very important, experts and scientists, and academia... Because if we are looking at the future, I think we should look at new solutions, and the new solutions will be very much driven by technological developments. We have religious leaders, we have social entrepreneurs – very important social entrepreneurs...” Schwab, Klaus on the record (video). February 9, 2022. <https://odysee.com/@NiQo:5/83ab7b99221c2240:9> (retrieved February 10, 2022).

¹³¹⁶ Such as *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*. UNDP. 1997; *Reconceptualising Governance*. Discussion Paper 2. Management Development and Governance Division. Bureau for Policy and Programme Support. UNDP. 1997; *UNDP and civil society organizations. A toolkit for strengthening partnerships*. UNDP. 2006; Discussion Paper. *Governance for Sustainable Development. Integrating Governance in the post-2015 Framework*. UNDP. 2014; *Final Report on illustrative work to pilot governance in the context of the SDGs*. UNDP. 2016; *Institutional and Coordination Mechanisms. Guidance Note on Facilitating Integration and Coherence for SDG Implementation*. UNDP. 2017...

¹³¹⁷ *UNDP and Civil Society Organizations. A Toolkit for Strengthening Partnerships*. UNDP. 2006.

¹³¹⁸ Incidentally, it is also to be noted that the 2006 UNDP publication clearly and “normatively” excluded business from civil society – an exclusion that Copenhagen was moving in the direction of but had not finalized.

organizations (IPOs), academia, journalist associations, faith-based organizations, trade unions, and trade associations, *for example* [Ib.].”

UNDP’s illustrative, non-exhaustive and potentially illimited list of CSO types incorporated the revolution’s “gains”, in particular the political upgrading of *informal* processes. UNDP’s rationale depicted the revolution’s holistic enlargement process. Global governance’s holistic paradigms were considered *more than*, qualitatively superior to, the sum of their individual constitutive parts and “transcending” the former order, thereby destabilizing it and destroying its identity – even if the latter was juridically binding while the former, soft and often informal.

The fact is, however, that global governance’s “holistic” civil society paradigm *excludes* from its system the business enterprise, the family based on marriage between one man and one woman as the basic cell of society and the Church. Global governance has not perceived marriage, the family, religion, nations as human communities essential for human happiness, development and international peace. Its holism is a myth to be debunked: excluding basic human communities and openness to a transcendental dimension, global governance has been drastically reductionistic.

The global elite proceeded forward wearing a mask

A final remark about the agents of the revolution’s instrumentalization of language concerns their strategically rare use of the expressions most accurately reflecting their political and ideological intent in the documents consensually endorsed by UN member states. This thesis has observed that expressions such as global governance¹³¹⁹, new global partnership¹³²⁰, global civil society, global citizen/ship, global democracy, new and global social contract, global framework, normative framework, participatory democracy, new global ethic, new universality, watchdog, agents of change, family in its various forms, safe abortion, stereotype, cultural diversity... - seldom appeared in the documents of the gestational and revolutionary stages of the global governance process that we founded our analysis upon. These expressions’ infrequent textual appearances betray the global elite’s strategy to avoid using terminology that would actually name what the revolution did quietly and concretely achieve in practice. The global elite proceeded forward wearing a mask.

One observes that the rarely used expressions tended to make their first appearance and/or to come up more frequently in the reports of the independent commissions¹³²¹, directly authored by the global enlightened leaders, than in those of the UN conferences, where these expressions’ textual advances were always proportionate to what was susceptible of passing the test of intergovernmental negotiations. Often containing the adjective “global” (“global citizens”, “global civil society”, “global social contract”, “global democracy”, “global governance”...), these expressions suggested the globalist ambition of moving towards the creation of a global governance/government by a supra-international power – an outlook which was, in theory, unacceptable for sovereign governments. How could the governments of UN member states, even those historically most sympathetic to NGOs such as the Nordic and Scandinavian countries,

¹³¹⁹ *Global governance* appeared once in the Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing and Istanbul conferences, but only because a representative of the Commission on Global Governance made a statement at these respective conferences.

¹³²⁰ *New global partnership* appeared twice in Agenda 21 and once in Cairo.

¹³²¹ The expressions “global governance”, “global citizen” (1), “global citizenship” (1), “global civil society” (14) and “global ethic” (6) do appear, however, in OGN issued in the aftermath of the Cairo conference, for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995. OGN uses “global” 374 times, applying the adjective variously to diversity, affairs, organization, system, implication, neighbours, level, impact, community, decisions-making, framework, actors, society, economy, media, governance...

formally endorse a political system signifying massive power transfers from their national authority to a phantasmagoric “global” entity threatening their sovereignty?

By 1996, however, not only had UN member states failed to formally reject the new partnerships politics, not only did they tolerate it, but they formally endorsed it, acting as if they were unaware of the sovereignty loss this politics - global governance without it being explicitly named as such in the conferences’ reports - entailed for them. A plethora of less threatening phrases, naming the “partners” and the participatory processes and mechanisms empowering them, did pass the test of intergovernmental negotiations. Sovereign governments either failed to discern that these phrases manifested the effective installment of the soft, informal yet operative new global political system of partnerships, or were complicit.

The phrases that seldom appeared in the language of global governance during the first two phases of its process would keep on appearing in its language¹³²² during its implementation phase, and up to this day. This not only evokes the endurance and consistency of the revolutionary process, its watch over the integrity of its globalist agenda all along, but historically comes along with a significant advancement and hardening of this agenda.

Let us provide one conclusive illustration of the global elite’s intent to harden and further empower the revolutionary processes we have analyzed in this thesis. On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Charter, UN Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted the need for “an effective multilateralism that can function as an instrument of global governance”¹³²³. In his predecessors’ footsteps, the Secretary-General abusively amalgamated the Charter and global governance. Addressing himself to “*we the peoples* [our emphasis]” (Charter’s opening words) and to the “millions of young activists and *global citizens* [Ib.]”¹³²⁴ (new global language), Guterres revealed his undivided endorsement of the global governance revolution also by noting that governments were “only part of today’s *political* [Ib.] realities. Civil society, cities, the private sector and young people are essential voices in shaping the world we want”¹³²⁵. But the Secretary-General now identified “the problem” as being multilateralism’s *lack of teeth* and underlined the need to give teeth to multilateralism (which he equated to global governance) so as to “ensure that *effective global governance* [Ib.] is a reality when it is needed”¹³²⁶. In the same spirit, he advocated what he called “shared sovereignty”¹³²⁷: after redefining civil society, “the

¹³²² UN agencies and influential experts have kept on occasionally using the phrase “global governance” ever since its appearance. For example, in 2013, the UN System Task Team that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had established in September 2011 on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda issued a “Thematic Think Piece” entitled *Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the Global Partnership for Development Beyond 2015*. The Task Team, led by the UN Secretariat’s DESA and UNDP, was “to support UN system-wide preparations to the post-2015 UN development agenda in consultation with all stakeholders”. It brought together “senior experts from over 60 UN entities and international organizations”. Klaus Schwab advocated a “new social contract” for all countries, that would “all share some common features and principles”. He emphasized the role of young activists in shaping this new social contract in areas “as diverse as climate change, economic reforms, gender equality and LGBTQ rights”. Schwab, Klaus and Malleret, Thierry. *Covid 19: The Great Reset*, op. cit., p. 97 and p. 103 respectively.

¹³²³ Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at United Nations Headquarters. June 25, 2020. SG/SM/20142.

¹³²⁴ June 26, 2020. Secretary-General’s video message marking the 75th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-06-26/secretary-generals-video-message-marking-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-adoption-of-the-charter-of-the-united-nations-scroll-down-for-french-version> (retrieved February 17, 2022).

¹³²⁵ Ib.

¹³²⁶ Ib.

¹³²⁷ Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at United Nations Headquarters. June 25, 2020, op. cit.

people”, democratic participation, representation, legitimacy, the global governance revolutionary process would, in its implementation phase, would also manipulatively redefine “sovereignty”.

The “global reset” that has been much spoken about since the 2020 publication of Klaus Schwab’s *Covid-19: The Great Reset*, far exceeds the scope of the book of the World Economic Forum’s founder and current executive chairman. An intent to re-found the world order against the backdrop of “the end of Christendom” has abundantly and diversely manifested itself in the current discourse of the global elite¹³²⁸. The envisioned reset would build on and develop within the global framework constructed by the global elite and endorsed by the world’s governments during the global governance revolution between 1990 and 1996. It is nothing more than the will to abruptly step up the transition towards the goals then set, away from an ethos founded on what all human beings can universally recognize as true and good in their conscience, reason and heart, away from a Christian ethos towards the secularistic ethos, away from sovereign nations towards global governance. It therefore mattered to research the historical outfolding of the revolution that has led humanity to the critical juncture it now stands at.

¹³²⁸ French President Emmanuel Macron frequently uses the word “refoundation”. In his January 19, 2022 speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, referring to the promise of democracy born, reinvented, “re-founded” and revitalized on the European continent, stated: « La tâche qui est la nôtre et sans doute celle de notre génération est de répondre en profondeur à la refondation de ces promesses. Promesses de démocratie... Nous sommes cette génération qui redécouvre la précarité de l’Etat de droit et des valeurs démocratiques. D’abord, la démocratie libérale au sens politique du terme, ces dernières années, on disait ce régime que l’Europe a inventé, devenu fatigué, incapable de faire face aux grands défis du siècle.” After qualifying the rule of law as Europe’s « treasure », Macron expressed the wish to update the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: “notamment pour être plus explicite sur la protection de l’environnement ou la reconnaissance du droit à l’avortement. Ouvrons ce débat librement avec nos concitoyens de grandes consciences européennes pour donner un nouveau souffle à notre socle de droits qui forge cette Europe forte de ses valeurs qui est le seul avenir de notre projet politique commun... L’Europe est le lieu où, à Paris, en 2015, s’est levée une conscience climatique universelle. » After alluding as he often does to the spirit of the Enlightenment, Macron again used the word « re-foundation » : « Nos générations ont aujourd’hui à refonder notre Europe pour faire face à ses promesses de démocratie, de progrès et de paix. » Emmanuel. European Parliament speech. January 19, 2022. <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2022/01/19/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-devant-le-parlement-europeen> (retrieved April 30, 2022).

CONCLUSION

This thesis demonstrated that between 1945 and 1996, the United Nations, an international organization primarily mandated to maintain peace and security, quietly transformed itself into the practical hub of a global partnerships' regime - global governance -, which a limited number of non-state actors pursuing globalist, special interests progressively endowed with both a systemic platform and new political mechanisms. Global governance's socioeconomic and environmental platform - sustainable development as an integrated, all-encompassing agenda - was constructed as the *framework* for 21st century international cooperation. It expressed itself by means of a language largely absent from the UN Charter and diverted the UN away from its foundational priorities. It has become the UN's practical mandate, not in the sense that a new Charter was adopted, but in the sense that it has effectively governed UN policies and activities systemwide ever since the revolution. Its ideological drive, mainly springing from the Western New Left, broke from the spirit of the UDHR. Its operational mechanisms - a tripartite new global partnership coopting states, non-state actors and "the people" - transgressed the UN Charter by shifting power from those legitimately holding it, nations and sovereign governments, over to self-appointed experts exercising their normative influence at a "global level" that they themselves constructed by mere fiat.

We have found that the global governance revolutionary process distinctively occurred *within* and *through* an existing institution, the UN, and had not, by 1996, formally abolished the international order as established by the UN Charter. UN member states as sovereign governments did juridically remain in power. But they consented to become partners in global governance and to enter the new regime's overall *normative framework*, in control by the global elite. They thereby fell under this elite's rule. The *revolution within* was therefore also a *revolution over*, operating critical amounts of power transfers at a particular time in history. We showcased the global elite's use of *soft power* to make sovereign governments and all "partners" consent to the global agenda. "Consensus-building", "constructive dialogue", awareness-raising, capacity-building, education reform, gender training, the construction of a categorically imperative new global ethics, partnerships, semantic manipulation, proved efficient techniques and mechanisms to effectively rule from within, and also to rule way *beyond* international cooperation, achieving the practical global enforcement of the agenda down to the local level – a form of globalization historically unprecedented in its proportions and efficiency.

The *revolution within* ushered in an ambivalent and unhealthy coexistence: of the UN as juridically established with operational global governance. As per the own, textually stated, admission of the elite at global governance's helm, governance *transcends* government and global governance therefore transcends the sovereign governments making up the UN. This thesis debunked the myth as per which partnerships would be innocuously "equal" and horizontal and evidenced their top-down *modus operandi*. We also exposed coexistence's profoundly *transformative* character, denaturing, destabilizing or deconstructing the former order's authority and propelling this order away from its path, in a drifting direction. Coexistence of two essentially incompatible systems is unsustainable and this unsustainability has not been openly confronted. If the situation persists, global governance will inevitably continue its march forward. The

eventuality that coexistence might one day give way to some kind of complete take-over by a power deprived of any form of legitimate authority cannot be excluded.

Our research found that a handful of individuals and NGOs with an internationalist mindset threw the thematic, ideological and juridical seeds of global governance in the UN Charter. The UN's transformation then mainly occurred over the course of its two major waves of conferences (1968-85 and 1990-96). The first wave unfolded in the shade of the Cold War and historically coincided with the West's swing towards postmodernity, and the second, in the immediate post-Cold War moment, when humanity was in need of a compelling moral vision for the new era. A few independent reports and commissions in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s also contributed in a defining way to the conceptual elaboration of global governance as new world order and of the globalist perspective that historically imposed itself at and through the UN at the end of the Cold War - even if still at various degrees of coexistence with regional, national and local policies and values.

We were surprised by the degree of cooptation characterizing the way the commissions chose their members, and the UN Secretariat, its privileged non-state collaborators in establishing the conferences' agendas. We found a definite common allegiance to leftist internationalism or globalism, to Marxism or to the West' New Left, neo-Marxism and postmodern deconstruction that had been lashing Western societies since the 1960s. We also uncovered the crushing influence of a few NGOs and caucuses (IUCN, IPPF, Population Council, WEDO, Women's Caucus), foundations (Ford, MacArthur, Rockefeller), individuals (David and John Rockefeller, Maurice Strong, Bella Abzug), think tanks, institutes and clubs (Carnegie, Club of Rome, WRI) over the construction of the new system's platform. These actors wielded defeating power and led the linkages process through which, with unwavering tenacity, they wove their divisive interests into each other and in the fabric of international cooperation during the UN conference process and thereby constituted global governance as content. Our thesis also evidenced how over the five decades during which global governance's seminal, gestational and revolutionary stages unfolded (1945-1996), the UN Secretariat, supposed to serve the interests of UN member states, has consistently sided with "the partners" and built with them a solid collaborative alliance grounded in a common strategic and ideological perspective.

Our research allowed us to pin the nexus between the degree of ideological load of the non-state actors' agendas and the level of these actors' advocacy for the new partnerships' politics. We have found that the most aggressive advocates of radical agendas (biocentric, spiritualistic, neo-Darwinian, neo-Malthusian, population control, "sexual liberation", radical feminist, eco-feminist, gender feminist, globalist, secularistic...) have adamantly demanded the integration of partnerships – that is, of their own political empowerment - in the intergovernmental conferences' documents. A veritable coup of a novel character (not formally substituting legitimate power holders, and happening at a "global" or supranational level) historically took place in the immediate post-Berlin wall fall moment.

Global governance presented its platform as people-centered. Analysis of the UN's population and women's conferences in particular led us to conclude that the Western New Left's Promethean anthropological agenda stood at the heart of the global governance regime. This agenda consisted in "liberating" the human being from his or her given nature, which is universal,

so as to live for itself and by its own choices, independently from, and even against the universal law written on the human heart. The new man, an absolute citizen divorced from the person he is, nationally- and sexually-undifferentiated, was both an easy prey to globalist projects and an efficient agent in their realization. Paradoxically, global governance's "people-centeredness" also proved radically pessimistic, as is manifest in the new regime's original and indissoluble nexus between population control and sustainability, and in environmental ethics' dominant, biocentric trend. This thesis uncovered a cause to effect relationship between global governance's anthropology on the one hand and on the other, partnerships as a postmodern political system empowering the non-state transnational proponents of its secularistic world vision.

The global governance revolution fully broke out at the 1989 lynchpin moment. This thesis made it clear that humanity then stood ready for a historic liberation act from the concatenation of modern ideologies that had alienated it from the good common to all for over two centuries. In other words, our stance was neither reactionary, nor neo-conservative, nor liberalistic, but one siding with humanity's perennial and truly universal aspirations and with any development or change that would historically become necessary to realize these aspirations. Our finding, however, was that the partners in global governance, strategically positioned after two decades of privileged collaboration with the UN Secretariat, hijacked a Kairos that could have been used to redress the social, environmental, ideological and anthropological abuses of modernity.

1989 was a pro-democracy moment. Our analysis of the second wave conferences' reports led us to discover that UN member states adopted partnership between governmental and transnational non-governmental actors and the new paradigms constituting global governance's platform - sustainable development, quality of life for all, sexual and reproductive health, gender equality, partnerships, a new global ethic etc. – as ways to allegedly enhance democracy. They even adopted the partnership principle as the "most democratic way" to implement the now set global platform. As spelled out in the second wave UN conferences, the new partnerships' politics redefined, according to its globalist perspective, a number of notions belonging to the modern democratic synthesis that had claimed to have won the day in 1989: the people (now transnational non-state actors as well as an artificial global demos), the social contract (now the global platform), human rights (now inclusive of divisive new rights), participation and representation (now applied to a "global civil society"), accountability (now redirected towards the implementation of the global goals), mandate (now the "obligation" to enforce these goals), democracy itself (now global). These conferences blended the new political paradigms (participatory democracy, governance, empowerment, diversity, partnerships, consensus, facilitation, enabling environment, gender equality, reproductive rights...) with what it now considered to be "genuine democracy". The global governance revolution occurred *in the very name of democracy*. It heavily contributed to weaken, redefine and distort democracy's core content, propelling it away from the "universal values" synthesis to which it was originally linked. It inextricably and dangerously blended what has since been referred to as "democracy" with eminently anti-democratic political processes containing the seeds of some new and global form of "totalitarian democratic" regime, an absolutized democracy cut from the freedom-truth alliance necessary to its very existence and survival.

We have called global governance a *regime* in virtue both of its proven ruling and delivering capacity and of its operational reorganization of the relation between governmental and non-

governmental actors. Our analysis of the post-Cold war UN conferences' reports revealed the new politics' redefinition and redistribution of these actors' roles. Governments were now to enable change towards the global platform. To that end, they were to facilitate the empowerment of the most performing non-state actors, to which the new politics now granted, no longer a mere consulting role as provided for in the UN Charter, but a full political function, from policy- and decision-making to monitoring implementation. To ensure the national and local implementation of the global goals, the new politics established *global-to-local* mechanisms allowing transnational pressure groups to wield power at the national and local levels in ways bypassing the national peoples' democratic checks (such as Local Agenda 21, partnership with the United Cities and Local Governments umbrella organization, direct partnership with schools and local communities ...).

We have found that without exception, the new paradigms constituting global governance as content were irremediably fuzzy, unstable and ambivalent, due to a strategic and consistent refusal to clearly define them. This refusal evidences global governance's connection to postmodernity. Its paradigms transform reality into a text to be interpreted as per one's constantly changing choices. Global governance's apparently "soft", liquid, "phantasmagoric" or "virtual" character has made it appear as non-threatening. It explains why it has often not been taken seriously nor appropriately studied. The anti-institution, anti-authority, anti-system, anti-government global governance regime established neither a global government nor global institutions.

The second wave conferences' reports made explicit, however, that the new global agenda did win the day. Paradoxically this agenda, the result of the partners' linkages enterprise, ended up as a tightly-knit and all-inclusive system making grand, global, Messianic promises such as the delivery of poverty eradication, quality of life for all, health and education for all, all human rights for all, global gender equality, the global celebration of diversity, among scores of other utopian promises. Paradoxically also, global governance, which would have stalled in its march forward without institutions, operated through institutions. It has ambitioned to subdue all issues and all actors to the ruling partners' globally normative framework - in other words *to govern*. Our analysis of the conferences' reports has demonstrated that the global regime dynamically sought to coopt all possible actors, whether state or non-state, leaving none out, not even the Church. It invited "the peoples" (national and indigenous) and "the people" (all "global citizens") to sing in the global governance chorus. We have likewise showcased the holistic character of sustainable development, made to encompass all of global governance's agendas, including its most ideologically divisive ones – a fact ignored by many who jumped on the "sustainable development" bandwagon.

The global governance revolution historically occurred through the UN conference process: there and then. This explains why we have methodologically chosen to proceed chiefly through the analysis of the UN conferences' reports and of their language evolution, and to refer only to the academic studies that related these conferences' historical unfolding. The conferences' reports are foundational to global governance as we have defined it and remain the text at the source of the semantic, conceptual, political and ideological framework governing international cooperation in our current times. No matter how fastidious it may have been to track, in the conferences' reports, the steps through which global governance forged forward, it mattered to demonstrate that global governance was real and operative, that it had a concrete history,

established operational mechanisms endorsed by UN member states, that real individuals and organizations led the process, and that it destabilized from within both the international order and democracy. An uncontrollable ocean of academic literature has followed the revolution since the 2000s, elaborating theories about global governance and the emergence of a “global civil society”, but this literature has been overwhelmingly supportive of these developments, in the plain denial that a revolution had taken place.

This thesis will have helped explain the sudden global spread at all levels – of a neo-colonizing nature for former colonies - of phenomena such as the deconstruction of gender stereotypes taught already in kindergarten, the destabilization of the ontological hierarchy between man and the rest of creation, the great leap forward in the dramatic internal weakening of national sovereignty since 1989, the power-grab of the transnational LGBT lobby, the governing capacity of power-wielding multi-stakeholder partnerships such as the World Economic Forum, the attempt to coopt the Church as a partner in global governance and its secularistic ethics, young people’s street demonstrations appealing for climate change countermeasures, the practical obligation to conform to a semantic, conceptual, ethical, ideologically-driven “framework” for fear of becoming an outsider, the loss of pluralism and liberty that has seemed to be ever on the rise since the global governance revolution.

It is important to list what this study left aside in its analysis of global governance. Its strict focus was to retrace the trail blazed by globalist non-state actors leading to the emergence of global governance as content and as process. We were exclusively interested in analyzing these actors’ ideological and political achievements as contained in the intergovernmentally-endorsed conferences’ reports. The reports objectively ascertained the global governance agents’ so-called “gains” over what the UDHR declared to be universal, over what is universally recognizable as true and good, over human nature on the one hand, and over the intergovernmental processes belonging to the UN’s international nature on the other. The reports, however, also contained elements representing the spirit of the Charter and of the UDHR: they reflected the *coexistence* that we identified. Our analysis of these documents did not integrate anything that was not conducive to the constitution of global governance, whether it be the intergovernmental negotiations process or the attempts of opposition NGOs to prevent the partners’ gains.

In our effort to retrace the global governance trail, we laid no claim to exhaustivity, whether as concerns those we named “the partners”, or the new paradigms, or the partnership politics’ soft political mechanisms. Our purpose was to identify the new politics’ framework, which we achieved by selecting the few partners that proved the most influential and representative of the global ethos, the framework’s pillar paradigms, unto which a plethora of other new paradigms grafted themselves, and those soft political mechanisms defining how global governance has exercised its power.

This thesis did not involve in its analysis the UN organs that were not on the frontline of the global governance revolutionary process: the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and a number of specialized bodies. The institutional stalemate of the main UN organ, the Security Council, almost since the UN’s foundation is all too well-known. Its poor performance in achieving its peace and security mandate contrasts with ECOSOC’s operational and institutional development over the course of global governance’s gestational and

revolutionary phase – a development that UN founders could not have expected, and with ECOSOC's efficient delivery of the novel global socioeconomic and environmental agendas. We furthermore demonstrated that the security concept itself was not impervious to the global governance revolution, in the course of which the partners redefined and supposedly “enlarged” it, integrating their own new agendas within it.

Our thesis studied the two first stages of the global governance revolutionary process (seminal/gestational period and revolution itself), leaving out the analysis of its third stage, that of implementation. This opens vast horizons for further investigation. Based on the conclusion of our research, and in particular on our finding regarding the ideological drive that has animated the conceptualizers and advocates of global governance's new paradigms and framework, case studies could be conducted to examine the concrete effects that entry in the global semantic, ideological and political framework have produced on institutions, political processes, communities and cultures at all levels and to identify the extents to which they got entangled with divisive globalist goals and with partnerships compromising or transgressing their original mandate and mission. If the demos is to remain in power, or to regain the power that belongs to the people, a general audit of partnerships is in order, clarifying which actors, which NGOs, which trade unions, which foundations, which “experts” have exercised their influence over the content of policies, education, laws etc. in ways escaping the people's control. The consequences of the current drifting, if peoples and sovereign governments do not retake control, also need to be assessed.

The UN has been acting on the alleged “new mandate” that the global governance revolution gave the organization in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Political scientists should consider openly confronting how the partnerships' regime, operating within the UN, has transgressed the UN Charter. They could launch work on how the establishment of “soft” mechanisms ensuring governmental empowerment of global governance's non-state partners operating at the national level transgresses democratic principles.

This thesis evidenced the performing, transformational and manipulative capacity of global governance's soft power techniques. The *revolution within* escaped the discernment of many politicians because they disregarded or drastically underestimated this capacity and continued to apply mental frameworks of the past to their analysis of political developments, only taking seriously what is institutional, hard, formal, legal, governmental, or intergovernmental. Their anachronistic attitude has blinded them to realizing what the UN has concretely become – the hub of a global partnerships' regime. It furthermore allowed social engineers to move forward unchecked in their power grab. An area for political science research could therefore be to analyze and challenge politicians' anachronistic attitude and point to the need for a change of outlook on the UN.

The coexistence we identified between two incompatible regimes (globalist vs. international) and between contradictory interpretations of the new paradigms (ideological vs. more consensual), with the globalist regime tending to overrule sovereign governments and what is universal, has remained undiscerned, undenounced and unclarified up to this day. Even major democracies have ignored the *revolution within*'s scope and depth. Many have confused the new paradigms with humanity's truly universal aspirations, ignoring the ideological intent of those who conceived and

developed them, and who currently hold the rudder of global governance, thereby imposing their interpretation as dominant. Many, framed to consent to this dominant interpretation, vaguely experience a malaise vis-à-vis the new paradigms. A clarifying statement has been long overdue.

Lastly, studies are needed to formulate a way out of “the framework” without throwing the baby (humanity’s universal aspirations) with the bath water (the way these aspirations were hijacked), a political way back to the source of universality, to an appropriate response to what has been hijacked at a critical point in history. A lesson to be learned from the global governance revolution is that while integral human development does require legitimate changes and adaptation to evolving historical circumstances, a certain number of perennial values have to be maintained in the process, as the bedrock of any society. Nationhood and nations’ sovereignty, the freedom, inviolability and sovereignty of conscience, the human capacity to attain reality through reason, our created identity as man and woman, marriage between one man and one woman, the family based on such a marriage, the primary right of parents to educate their children, the sacredness of life from conception to natural death, the ontological hierarchy between man and the rest of creation, a universal declaration of what all can recognize as real, good, true, just and conducive to happiness, the moral distinction between good and evil, the truth-freedom inherent nexus, an openness to divine transcendence, an anthropology grounded in all of what precedes cannot be sacrificed on the altar of globalist secularism and its alarmist survival narrative.

Our thesis highlighted the ways in which entry in “the framework” threatened our freedom and independence. Yet such entry has been pervasive, with health and education institutions, governments and their ministries, associations, the media and all social actors broadly using the global language and the new paradigms it expresses, and thereby partnering with the global elite, consciously or not. The world’s religions and the Catholic Church, its institutions and the Holy See were no exemption. A question, arising from our research, would need to be further investigated: how does the new politics’ partnership principle and the Church’s partnership with global governance transgress the principle of separation guaranteeing the independence of the Church that is necessary for the accomplishment of her salvific mission?

One generation has passed since 1996. The concreteness of global governance’s destructive achievements – not least among them the fast, neo-colonizing post-Cold War globalization of the Western sexual, feminist and cultural revolution educating the new generation - sharply contrasts with the utopian character of its grand narrative, proclaiming to all its implementing partners a saving global ethic. Both the realness of the destruction and the utopianism of the global agendas ought to be equally denounced.

It would be irresponsible to ignore the possibility of a hardening of the revolutionary mechanisms, historically established in the early 1990s, granting power to a global elite adamant at installing the Promethean man, negating who he was given to be, on top of the world, while dramatically weakening peoples’ sovereignty and democracy. The GAFAM, wielding a power unconceivable in 1996, have demonstrated being ideologically aligned with global governance and putting some of their artificial intelligence and surveillance strategies at the service of its secularistic goals.

Some would argue that, in spite of the radical ambivalence and ideological load of its agendas, the global governance system has become too big to fail and must be maintained, lest humanity

faces catastrophic consequences. The unresolved issue then becomes how to limit the damage, and whether trying and steering the system in a better direction is in any way a realistic prospect. Others might also advance the hypothesis that, the system being built on sand, it will sooner or later collapse by itself. Yet others might see the need for establishing a counter-power competing with the global system built over the course of the revolution studied in this thesis. In the absence of such a counter-power, global governance has a free rein to continue entrenching and hardening its agendas and processes. The UN, now wanting to subdue sovereign nations to a centralized (“global”) power deprived of checks and balances, has stopped acting as a mediator among sovereign governments that would be negotiating international cooperation. By and large, sovereign governments have themselves become partners in global governance. Who, then, could build a counter-power?

At the time of the pagan Roman empire, the Pax Romana had unified the Mediterranean world, ensured peace, established the rule of law and facilitated the Church’s first evangelization¹³²⁹. Could it be that a “global order” would in our day produce the same positive effects? As global governance concretely stands and as things are observable today more than ever, the UN has failed miserably in its mission to prevent barbarous acts from happening again after World War II. Its “ethics” specifically targets Christendom, which gave the Western civilization its identity. In fundamental ways, the Dum Mundanae does not compare with the Pax Romana.

The global governance revolution hijacked a promising moment in human history, when the fall of the Berlin wall had opened wide horizons of hope before humanity. For all the destruction it did operate and for all of its claims, it will never have the power to “deconstruct” human nature nor to suffocate the semipernal aspiration of humanity to happiness, grounded in the reality of who man and woman are. This aspiration will always be resurfacing as a powerful force. It is the basis on which any politics should be built. It is always time for humanity to honor it.

¹³²⁹ In a famous statement, Church father Eusebius of Caesaria (early 4th century) praised the Pax Romana as a consequence of Christ’s redemption and as making global evangelization possible: “When that instrument of our redemption, the thrice holy body of Christ, which proved itself superior to all Satanic fraud, and free from evil both in word and deed, was raised, at once for the abolition of ancient evils, and in token of his victory over the powers of darkness; the energy of these evil spirits was at once destroyed. The manifold forms of government, the tyrannies and republics, the siege of cities, and devastation of countries caused thereby, were now no more, and one God was proclaimed to all mankind. At the same time one universal power, the Roman empire, arose and flourished, while the enduring and implacable hatred of nation against nation was now removed: and as the knowledge of one God, and one way of religion and salvation, even the doctrine of Christ, was made known to all mankind; so at the self-same period, the entire dominion of the Roman empire being vested in a single sovereign, profound peace reigned throughout the world. And thus, by the express appointment of the same God, two roots of blessing, the Roman empire, and the doctrine of Christian piety, sprang up together for the benefit of men.” *Oration in Praise of the Emperor Constantine Pronounced on the Thirtieth Anniversary of His Reign*.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LISTING OF TERMS AND THEIR HISTORICAL APPEARANCE IN UN DOCUMENTS

Appendix A1 - UN foundational documents

Appendix A2 - First wave UN conferences

Appendix A3 - Independent reports and commissions

Appendix A4 - Second wave UN conferences

The following charts, each comprising a list of 200 words or expressions (the same in each four charts), indicate the number of appearances of these terms in the documents that this thesis has used to analyze the emergence of global governance as a political revolution: the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Appendix A1); the reports of the first wave UN conferences -Tehran, Stockholm, Bucharest, Mexico, Copenhagen, Mexico and Nairobi (Appendix A2); *The Limits to Growth*, the reports of the independent commissions of the 1980s and early 1990s, and Gorbachev's 1988 UN speech (Appendix A3); and the reports of the second wave UN conferences - Jomtien, New-York, Rio (Agenda 21, Declaration, Forest Principles), Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing, Istanbul, Rome (Appendix A4).

Most of the terms listed belong to global governance's novel language, but some of them are proper to the language of the UN foundational documents. The charts enable us to track the evolution of language over the course of global governance's revolutionary process. They show for example when a specific new term started appearing first (or disappearing) and which documents or types of documents contained the greatest load of the new terminology.

The numbers indicated in the columns come from our search in these documents' soft copies. When available, we have always used the copies on the UN's official website. There may exist different soft copies for these documents, with slight variations in their content (some may, for instance, as opposed to others, include the document's contents, a greater number of titles, or the countries' reservations at a specific conference etc.). As a result, the count may vary to some slight degree between different copies of a same document.

In cases when a phrase did not appear as such in a document, but a close semantic equivalent did, we decided to count that equivalent in. As an example, the expression "human dignity" is absent in the UN Charter in which, however, the phrase "dignity and worth of the human person" appears. By contradistinction, we have not counted the Charter's, or the UDHR's inclusion of the "equal rights of men and women" as corresponding to "women's rights" because of the semantic break that occurred in the interpretation of women's rights since the second wave feminist revolution.

To be noted finally is that, lacking a soft copy for two documents - the 1982 Palme Commission report (*Common Security. A Programme for Disarmament*) and the 1991 Stockholm Initiative report (*Common responsibility in the 1990s*) – we could not include them in Appendix A3.

APPENDIX A1
UN FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS

	1945	1948
	UN Charter	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Abortion	0	0
Accelerate	0	0
Accountab-le/ility	0	0
Agenda	1	0
Agenda-setting	0	0
Agents of change	0	0
All forms	0	0
At all levels	0	0
Authority	17	1
Autonomy	0	0
Balance	0	0
Basic education	0	0
Best practices	0	0
Capacity-building	0	0
Catalyst	0	0
Change	0	2
Children's rights/rights of the child	0	0
Choice	1	1
Civil society	0	0
Climate change	0	0
Commit-ment	0	0
Common	2	3
Common good	1	0
Common interest	1	0
Community-based organization	0	0
Comparative advantage	0	0
Complementar-y/ity	0	0
Comprehensive	0	0
Conscience	0	3
Consensus	0	0
Constituenc-y/ies	0	0
Constructive dialogue	0	0
Consulta-tion/tive	5	0
Couples and individuals	0	0
Cultural diversity	0	0
Cultural identity	0	0
Daughter	0	0
Decision-making	0	0
Democra-cy/tization	0	1
Dialogue	0	0
Diversity	0	0
Earth	0	0
Education for all	0	0

	1945	1948
	UN Charter	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Effective-ly	2	2
Efficient	1	0
Empower-ment	0	0
Enabling environment	0	0
Enforce	7	0
Enlarge or broaden	0	0
Environment	0	0
Equal-ity	11	13
Equilibrium	0	0
Equit-y/able	1	0
Eradicat-ion/e	0	0
Essential	1	2
Ethic-al	0	0
Evil	0	0
Expert-	0	0
Faith	3	1
Family	0	6
Family in its various forms/all its forms	0	0
Family planning	0	0
Father	0	0
Follow-up	0	0
Food security	0	0
For all	8	1
Framework	0	0
Free-/dom/ly	8	30
Freedom of choice	0	0
Future generations	0	0
Gender	0	0
Global	0	0
Global citizen	0	0
Global civil society	0	0
Global community	0	0
Global conference	0	0
Global consensus	0	0
Global democracy	0	0
Global environment	0	0
Global ethic	0	0
Global framework	0	0
Global governance	0	0
Global level	0	0
Global partnership	0	0
Global peace	0	0
Global platform	0	0
Global social order	0	0
Good practices	0	0
Governance	0	0
Green	0	0

	1945	1948
	UN Charter	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Health for all	0	0
Holistic/ally	0	0
Human dignity	1	1
Husband	0	0
Immediate	5	0
Implement-ation	0	0
Inclus-ion/ive	0	0
Indicator	0	0
Individuals	0	0
Informal	0	0
Integrat-e/ion	0	0
Intergovernmental-ly	1	0
International	74	5
International community	0	0
International cooperation (co-operation)	3	0
Leader-ship	0	0
Like-minded	0	0
Link-age	0	0
Machinery	1	0
Mainstream	0	0
Major groups	0	0
Mandate	3	0
Marriage	0	3
Mechanisms	0	0
Monitor-ing	0	0
Moral-ity	0	2
Mother-hood	0	1
Multilateral	0	0
Multi-stakeholder	0	0
Must	1	0
Nations (other than "United")	5	3
Nation-state	0	0
Natur-e/al	7	1
Network	0	0
New paradigm	0	0
Non-discriminat-ion/ory	0	0
Non-formal	0	0
Non-governmental organization/NGOs	1	0
Non-governmental sector	0	0
Non-state (without actors)	0	0
Non-state actor	0	0
Normative framework	0	0
Oblig-e/ation	12	1
Parents	0	1
Participat-e/ion	10	1
Participatory democracy	0	0
Partner	0	0

	1945	1948
	UN Charter	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Partnership	0	0
People	1	2
People-centred	0	0
Peoples	12	4
Pluralis-m/tic	0	0
Primary responsibility	1	0
Private sector	0	0
Public-private	0	0
Quality of life	0	0
Recommend-ation	30	0
Represent-ation/ative	10	1
Representative democracy	0	0
Reproductive health	0	0
Reproductive rights	0	0
Reproduct-ive/ion	0	0
Responsib-le/ly/ility	18	0
Role	0	0
Rule of law	0	1
Safe abortion	0	0
Sector	0	0
Self-determination	2	0
Sexual health	0	0
Sexual rights	0	0
Should	5	2
Skill	0	0
Social contract	0	0
Son	0	0
Sovereign-ty	2	1
Spouse	0	1
Stabiliz-ation	0	0
Stereotyp-e/ing	0	0
Strengthen	1	1
Surveillance	0	0
Surviv-al	0	0
Sustain-able	0	0
Sustainable development	0	0
System-ic	15	0
Target	0	0
The Planet	0	0
Toleran-t/ce	1	1
Transcend	0	0
Transformat-ion/ive	0	0
Transition-al	1	0
Transnational	0	0
Transparen-t/cy	0	0
Truth	0	0
UN Charter/Charter of the UN	38	1

	1945	1948
	UN Charter	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Universal	2	5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights	0	2
Universal values	0	0
Unmet need	0	0
Urgen-t/cy	1	0
Values	0	0
Vital	0	0
Watchdogs	0	0
Wife	0	0
Women's rights/rights of women	0	0
Zero	0	0

APPENDIX A2
FIRST WAVE OF UN CONFERENCES

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Abortion	0	0	1	2	1	27	0
Accelerate	0	2	4	4	11	3	6
Accountab-le/ility	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Agenda	0	21	0	29	29	12	3
Agenda-setting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agents of change	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
All forms	1	1	0	22	41	0	11
At all levels	1	2	0	22	35	1	29
Authority	0	3	0	2	2	1	4
Autonom-y/ous	0	0	0	2	1	0	2
Balance	0	14	6	11	14	14	8
Basic education	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Best practices	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capacity-building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catalyst	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Change	1	67	18	117	50	47	51
Children's rights/rights of (the) child-ren	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Choice	0	2	2	12	8	3	11
Civil society	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commit-ment	0	140	0	249	229	93	25
Common	1	30	0	12	11	6	3
Common good	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Common interest	0	3	0	1	1	1	1

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Community-based organization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comparative advantage	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Complementarity	0	1	2	0	3	1	1
Comprehensive	0	8	5	14	19	7	14
Conscience	2	0	0	1	3	0	1
Consensus	0	12	0	1	15	41	3
Constituency/ies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Constructive dialogue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Consultation/tive	0	32	1	39	30	14	16
Couples and individuals	0	0	2	0	0	13	1
Cultural diversity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cultural identity	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Daughter	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Decision-making	0	1	1	33	27	5	36
Democracy/tization	0	0	1	55	114	35	2
Dialogue	0	1	0	1	3	2	4
Diversity	0	2	3	5	0	3	0
Earth	1	24	0	1	1	3	0
Education for all	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Effective-ly	3	27	14	71	62	53	80
Efficient-ly	0	8	1	4	2	3	1
Empower-ment	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Enabling environment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enforce-ment	1	1	0	8	4	1	10
Enlarge or broaden	0	0 + 6	0	0 + 4	1 + 2	1 + 1	1
Environment	0	592	13	7	20	34	22
Equal-ity	0	7	9	303	330	25	195
Equilibrium	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Equity/able	0	4	7	37	24	8	29

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Eradication/e	3	1	2	9	8	5	8
Essential	0	24	3	28	21	20	13
Ethic-al	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
Evil	2	0	0	0	3	0	1
Expert-	0	25	0	10	13	8	7
Faith	1	1	0	5	3	1	0
Family	2	8	44	164	99	125	40
Family in its various forms/all its forms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Family planning	0	5	11	28	19	66	5
Father	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Follow-up	0	1	0	5	2	2	1
Food security	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
For all	2	8	1	13	10	1	10
Framework	0	21	3	10	19	11	13
Free-/dom/ly	15	9	9	64	46	39	29
Freedom of choice	0	0	0	2	0	1	1
Future generations	0	11	0	1	3	2	1
Gender	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
Global	0	28	2	9	28	36	9
Global citizen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global civil society	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global community	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global consensus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global democracy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global environment	0	3	0	0	0	1	0
Global ethic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global framework	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Global level	0	0	0	0	5	8	1
Global partnership	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global peace	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global platform	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global social order	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Good practices	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Health for all	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Holistic/ally	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Human dignity	0	0	0	11	3	2	4
Husband	0	1	0	3	1	0	2
Immediate	0	11	0	12	5	6	12
Implement-ation	4	35	15	141	204	88	85
Inclus-ion/ive	0	2	0	3	5	1	3
Indicator	0	3	1	15	10	1	6
Individuals	1	9	7	23	5	32	7
Informal	0	2	1	7	14	0	16
Integrat-ion	0	21	11	184	100	40	61
Intergovernmental-ly	1	33	2	15	22	24	4
International	23	356	90	482	466	285	221
International community	8	5	6	23	19	17	18
International cooperation	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Leader-ship	0	0	1	14	12	2	8
Like-minded	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link-age	0	1	1	11	24	7	11
Machinery	0	10	0	23	31	0	19
Mainstream	0	0	0	1	2	0	6
Major groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Mandate	0	1	0	2	12	2	0
Marriage	0	0	5	47	1	6	2
Mechanism-s	0	12	0	8	16	2	15
Monitor-ing	0	35	5	14	22	19	30
Moral-ity	0	4	0	7	5	3	7
Mother	0	0	1	27	14	15	4
Multilateral	0	4	3	4	6	8	7
Multi-stakeholder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Must	5	76	15	43	25	26	37
Nations (other than United)	0	37	3	32	39	34	8
Nation-state	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Natur-e/al	0	80	8	16	20	16	11
Network	0	13	3	6	8	3	8
New paradigm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-discriminat-ion/ory	1	0	0	5	0	0	1
Non-formal	0	0	1	12	8	0	1
Non-governmental organization/NGOs	0	7	5	51	41	37	31
Non-governmental sector	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-state (without actors)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-state actor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Normative framework	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oblig-e/ation	4	8	0	2	8	2	2
Parents	1	0	0	10	6	10	6
Participat-e/ion	2	30	10	233	205	27	136
Participatory democracy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partner	0	1	1	25	2	1	4
Partnership	0	0	0	4	1	0	1
People	0	17	10	55	105	41	21
People-centred	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Peoples	6	20	3	45	5	4	11
Pluralis-m/tic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Primary responsibility	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Private sector	0	0	0	2	1	0	5
Public-private	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quality of life	0	2	5	10	1	14	0
Recommend-ation	0	515	34	113	130	241	22
Represent-ation/ative	0	118	0	192	266	105	19
Representative democracy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reproductive health	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reproductive rights	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reproduct-ive/ion	0	7	7	6	5	15	6
Responsib-le/ly/ility	1	49	14	99	78	29	43
Role	0	11	14	182	125	33	72
Rule of law	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safe abortion	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Sector	0	9	5	27	96	10	49
Self-determination	0	0	1	15	12	0	9
Sexual health	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual rights	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Should	5	284	106	595	510	223	752
Skill-	0	3	10	26	32	8	14
Social contract	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Son	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sovereign-ty	0	11	5	34	7	12	10
Spouse	0	0	3	14	0	2	4
Stabiliz-ation	0	3	1	0	2	6	3
Stereotyp-e/ing	0	0	0	11	19	0	14
Strengthen	0	25	5	69	83	21	54

	1968 Human Rights <i>Tehran</i>	1972 Environment <i>Stockholm</i>	1974 Population <i>Bucharest</i>	1975 Women <i>Mexico</i>	1980 Women <i>Copenhagen</i>	1984 Population <i>Mexico</i>	1985 Women <i>Nairobi</i>
Surveillance	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
Surviv-e/al	0	1	1	5	7	8	6
Sustain-able	0	0	1	6	9	5	15
Sustainable development	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
System-ic	0	103	20	84	119	27	78
Target	0	2	1	18	32	11	10
The Planet	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Toleran-t/ce	1	0	0	0	1	0	3
Transcend	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Transformat-ion/ive	0	0	1	8	5	3	2
Transition-al	0	2	0	1	2	1	1
Transnational	0	0	0	1	9	0	2
Transparen-t/cy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Truth	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
UN Charter/Charter of the UN	4	8	4	25	4	1	14
Universal	9	10	7	13	16	11	5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights	8	1	4	8	7	2	2
Universal values	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unmet need	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Urgen-t/cy	3	13	6	22	12	10	10
Values	0	5	4	17	11	15	5
Vital-	0	5	8	10	6	4	12
Watchdogs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wife	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
Women's rights/rights of women	0	0	0	18	11	0	7
Zero	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX A3

INDEPENDENT REPORTS AND COMMISSIONS, SPEECHES

Abbreviations

LG	The Limits to Growth
WCS	World Conservation Strategy
NS	North-South: A Program for Survival
CS	Common Security: A Program for Disarmament
OCF	Our Common Future
Gorb.	Gorbachev's 1988 UN speech
CR	Common Responsibility in the 1990s
OGN	Our Global Neighborhood

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Abortion	1	0	0		0	0		0
Accelerat-e/ion	8	10	17		25	0		5
Accountab-le/ility	0	0	4		5	0		8
Agenda	0	1	10		21	3		11
Agenda-setting	0	0	0		0	0		0
Agents of change	0	0	1		0	0		3
All forms	1	0	0		0	0		1
At all levels	1	0	3		3	0		8
Authority	0	5	6		9	0		17
Autonom-y/ous	0	0	1		1	0		3
Balance	19	6	100		36	4		29
Basic education	0	1	0		0	0		0
Best practices	0	0	0		0	0		0
Capacity-building	0	0	0		0	0		0
Catalyst	0	1	2		0	0		2
Change	97	37	230		250	15		108

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Children's rights/rights of the child	0	0	0		0	0		0
Choice	13	5	12		33	0		4
Civil society	0	0	0		0	0		59
Climate change	0	1	0		10	0		5
Commit-ment	2	9	34		20	1		43
Common	10	18	80		146	7		68
Common good	0	0	1		1	0		2
Common interest	0	0	13		18	1		3
Community-based organization	0	0	0		0	0		0
Comparative advantage	0	0	3		5	0		0
Complementar-y/ity	0	1	13		4	0		2
Comprehensive	4	12	10		11	2		20
Conscience	0	0	0		0	1		0
Consensus	0	1	16		14	1		16
Constituenc-y/ies	1	1	0		1	1		6
Constructive dialogue	0	0	0		1	0		0
Consulta-tion/tive	0	11	26		32	1		11
Couples and individuals	0	0	0		0	0		0
Cultural diversity	0	0	0		0	0		1
Cultural identity	0	0	3		1	0		0
Daughter	0	0	0		0	0		0
Decision-making	0	1	15		6	0		13
Democra-cy/tization	0	1	5		8	9		107
Dialogue	0	0	25		7	7		1
Diversity	0	52	3		22	2		13
Earth	45	9	6		85	1		16
Education for all	0	0	1		0	0		0
Effective-ly	20	42	94		112	0		67
Efficient	4	10	27		44	0		8
Empower-ment	0	0	0		5	0		15

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Enabling environment	0	0	0		0	0		0
Enforce-ment	0	12	3		22	0		46
Enlarge or broaden	0	0	16 + 3		6 + 12	0		14 + 5
Environment	73	140	78		1003	2		74
Equal-ity	45	7	68		38	0		36
Equilibrium	75	3	3		3	0		0
Equit-y/able	5	4	37		44	2		30
Eradicat-e/ion	0	1	8		2	0		2
Essential	10	52	83		70	2		0
Ethic-al	4	8	5		7	0		30
Evil	1	0	1		3	0		2
Expert-	3	16	31		42	0		10
Faith	2	0	2		4	0		4
Family	37	7	22		22	0		5
Family in its various forms/all its forms	0	0	0		0	0		0
Family planning	6	0	14		10	0		0
Father (and grandfather)	1	0	1		0	0		0
Follow-up	0	1	2		10	0		0
Food security	0	0	7		39	0		0
For all	7	10	28		21	2		13
Framework	0	8	32		31	5		20
Free-/dom	13	5	46		25	4		49
Freedom of choice	0	0	0		0	4		0
Future generations	1	3	4		23	0		14
Gender	0	0	0		1	0		7
Global	97	28	93		236	3		374
Global citizen	0	0	0		0	0		2
Global civil society	0	0	0		0	0		14
Global community	0	0	2		0	0		4
Global conference	0	0	0		0	0		1

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Global consensus	0	0	1		0	0		3
Global democracy	0	0	0		0	0		0
Global environment	4	0	2		15	0		1
Global ethic	0	0	0		1	0		6
Global framework	0	0	0		0	0		1
Global governance	0	0	0		0	0		79
Global level	1	0	1		6	0		10
Global partnership	2	0	0		0	0		0
Global peace	0	0	0		0	0		0
Global platform	0	0	0		0	0		0
Global social order	0	0	0		0	0		0
Good practices	0	0	0		0	0		0
Governance	0	0	0		1	0		78
Green	19	3	2		64	0		3
Health for all	0	1	0		3	0		0
Holism/tic/ally	0	0	0		2	0		0
Human dignity	0	0	3		0	0		2
Husband	0	0	2		5	0		0
Immediate	6	7	32		21	2		17
Implementation	3	40	24		52	3		20
Inclusive	0	2	1		0	0		2
Indicator	0	5	0		5	0		2
Individuals	3	8	4		24	0		21
Informal	2	1	12		7	0		8
Integration	2	33	27		46	0		29
Intergovernmentally	1	5	4		13	0		14
International	18	139	658		550	42		399
International community	0	3	27		19	0		49
International cooperation	0	3	22		52	0		1
Leadership	2	1	42		29	3		72

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Like-minded	0	0	0		0	0		0
Link-age	11	6	39		64	3		23
Machinery	1	0	18		4	0		7
Mainstream	0	0	0		0	0		0
Major groups	0	0	0		0	0		0
Mandate	0	11	4		37	1		8
Marriage	0	0	1		1	0		0
Mechanism	4	14	29		14	3		27
Monitor-ing	1	23	26		42	2		10
Moral-ity	8	4	12		7	1		11
Mother	3	1	2		2	0		0
Multilateral	0	12	46		42	2		17
Multi-stakeholder	0	0	0		0	0		0
Must	60	24	230		250	11		143
Nations (other than United)	27	27	76		232	2		51
Nation-state	0	0	1		2	0		3
Natur-e/al	74	90	36		199	18		32
Network	2	14	3		22	0		7
New paradigm	0	0	0		0	0		0
Non-discriminat-ion/ory	0	0	4		1	0		0
Non-formal	0	0	0		0	0		0
Non-governmental organization/NGOs	0	8 + 2	1		11 + 43	0		2 + 27
Non-governmental sector	0	0	0		0	0		0
Non-state (without actors)	0	0	0		0	0		0
Non-state actor	0	0	0		0	0		0
Normative framework	0	0	0		0	0		0
Oblig-e/ation	0	10	12		20	0		18
Parents	4	1	0		5	0		2
Participat-e/ion	0	26	86		57	4		28
Participatory democracy	0	0	0		0	0		0

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Partner	0	0	7		5	2		1
Partnership	0	1	14		2	0		2
People	87	63	163		231	15		242
People-centred	0	1	0		0	0		0
Peoples	2	2	6		19	8		19
Pluralis-m/tic	0	0	1		0	0		2
Primary responsibility	0	0	1		2	0		1
Private sector	0	2	1		4	0		11
Public-private	0	0	0		0	0		0
Quality of life	4	2	1		8	0		6
Recommend-ation	1	24	42		54	0		0
Representa-tion/tive	28	21	43		47	3		22
Representative democracy	0	0	0		0	0		0
Reproductive health	0	0	0		0	0		0
Reproductive rights	0	0	0		0	0		0
Reproduct-ive/ion	2	1	0		2	0		0
Responsib-le/ly/ility	4	45	71		96	3		61
Role	2	3	64		80	6		59
Rule of law	0	0	0		0	0		25
Safe abortion	0	0	0		0	0		0
Sector-al	11	49	65		73	0		36
Self-determination	0	0	0		3	0		0
Sexual health	0	0	0		0	0		0
Sexual rights	0	0	0		0	0		0
Should	18	294	483		332	14		230
Skill	1	7	31		19	0		8
Social contract	0	0	0		0	0		0
Son	0	0	0		0	0		0
Sovereign-ty	0	1	8		17	0		53
Spouse	0	0	0		0	0		0

	1972 LG	1980 WCS	1980 NS	1982 CS	1987 OCF	1988 Gorb.	1991 CR	1995 OGN
Stabiliz-e/ation	25	2	62		17	0		7
Stereotyp-e/ing	0	0	0		0	2		1
Strengthen	1	10	48		66	2		32
Surveillance	0	1	9		3	0		1
Surviv-e/al	6	27	37		61	2		15
Sustain-able	12	100	25		401	0		44
Sustainable development	0	17	0		205	0		11
System-ic	222	273	234		340	9		167
Target-	0	10	42		8	1		3
The Planet	4	6	3		38	1		22
Toleran-t/ce	0	3	2		2	1		9
Transcend	0	0	0		4	0		3
Transformat-ion/ive	1	0	12		8	2		18
Transition-al	9	1	16		25	0		5
Transnational	0	1	49		29	0		10
Transparen-t/cy	0	0	0		0	0		6
Truth	0	0	0		2	0		0
UN Charter/Charter of the UN	0	0	0		0	1		85?
Universal	5	1	40		17	7		19
Universal Declaration of Human Rights	0	0	2		0	1		0
Universal values	0	0	0		0	0		0
Unmet need	0	0	12		0	0		0
Urgen-t/cy	3	16	54		38	1		11
Values	34	4	14		16	5		50
Vital	5	8	15		16	1		22
Watchdogs	0	0	0		1	0		0
Wife	0	0	1		0	0		0
Women's rights/rights of women	0	0	0		1	0		1
Zero	7	0	1		3	0		1

APPENDIX A4
SECOND WAVE OF UN CONFERENCES

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Abortion	0	0	0	0	97	4	57	10	0
Accelerat-e/ion	2	2	31; 0; 0	0	6	3	4	5	1
Accountab-le/ility	0	0	6; 0; 0	1	9	9	13	24	1
Agenda	0	2	205; 0; 1	1	32	26	39	283	5
Agenda-setting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Agents of change	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
All forms	0	1	4; 0; 1	13	14	15	52	6	0
At all levels	1	2	53; 0; 0	1	41	13	53	46	7
Authority	0	0	14; 1; 1	0	1	3	4	15	1
Autonom-y/ous	4	0	3; 0; 0	0	4	1	8	6	0
Balance	2	0	30; 0; 3	2	26	7	26	27	0
Basic education	75	9	8; 0; 0	1	8	8	6	3	2
Best practices	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	0	0	0	36	1
Capacity-building	0	0	154; 1; 0	0	10	9	0	29	1
Cataly-st/ze	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	1	0	7	3	1
Change	0	1	252; 0; 0	3	66	31	66	86	10
Charter (of the UN)	0	0	6; 2; 1	19	8	14	27	10	4
Children's rights/rights of the child	1	10	1; 0; 0	12	9	14	27	6	1
Choice	1	0	15; 0; 0	0	39	4	16	4	0
Civil society	0	0	0	2	0	27	20	36	30
Climate change	0	0	33; 0; 0	0	2	0	0	1	4
Commit-ment	20	14	38; 0; 1	16	151	118	248	225	19

* Agenda 21 / Declaration / Forest Principles.

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Common	9	3	22; 1; 0	2	21	16	27	43	5
Common good	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0
Common interest	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Community-based organization	0	0	4; 0; 0	0	1	0	7	27	0
Comparative advantage	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	3	0	0	2	0
Complementar-y/ity	3	1	7; 0; 1	0	5	5	3	8	0
Comprehensive	0	1	44; 0; 2	9	17	9	20	26	0
Conscience	0	0	0	1	5	0	6	1	0
Consensus	4	1	12; 1; 2	0	45	0	26	11	1
Constituenc-y/ies	3	0	3; 0; 0	0	3	0	0	4	0
Constructive dialogue	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Consulta-tion/tive	14	0	46; 1; 0	2	26	7	19	34	4
Couples and individuals	0	0	0	0	13	0	5	0	0
Cultural diversity	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	2	0
Cultural identity	1	0	0; 0; 1	0	0	1	0	2	0
Daughter	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	0
Decision-making	0	0	92; 1; 1	4	20	11	78	45	3
Democra-cy/tization	0	0	5; 0; 0	17	26	27	24	33	3
Dialogue	1	2	20; 0; 0	3	20	6	7	70	1
Diversity	0	1	103; 0; 2	2	7	20	20	33	12
Earth	0	0	47; 2; 0	0	8	3	4	14	0
Education for all	22	1	3; 0; 0	0	5	0	7	3	0
Effective-ly	0	8	231; 5; 1	38	89	54	92	132	29
Efficient-ly	1	0	96; 0; 0	3	12	7	6	56	9
Empower-ment	0	1	11; 0; 0	0	25	19	59	19	4
Enabling environment	0	0	3; 0; 0	0	2	3	5	3	5
Enforce-ment	0	0	37; 0; 0	6	8	5	27	13	1
Enlarge or broaden	0 + 3	0 + 1	6; 0; 1	0	0 + 2	0 + 6	0 + 2	0 + 1	0 + 2

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Environment	2	22	1363; 45; 15	5	119	68	136	371	43
Equal-ity	3	5	29; 0; 2	24	61	96	364	94	23
Equilibrium	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Equit-y/able	13	2	34; 2; 2	3	46	44	20	45	11
Eradicat-ion/e	0	2	16; 1; 1	6	17	49	23	24	21
Essential	8	6	71; 2; 3	4	33	16	33	37	16
Ethic-al	2	0	25; 0; 0	1	24	12	20	11	1
Evil	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	0
Expert-ise	1	1	55; 0; 0	5	7	8	9	23	1
Faith	0	0	0; 0; 2	1	9	1	1	3	0
Family	0	18	14; 0; 0	2	274	47	129	50	3
Family in its various forms/all its forms	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Family planning	0	4	0	1	140	7	25	11	1
Father	0	0	0	0	3	0	4	0	0
Follow-up	0	4	31; 0; 0	2	23	13	18	22	18
Food security	0	1	23; 0; 1	0	2	3	4	4	134
For all	29	5	33; 2; 0	8	23	33	41	118	29
Framework	1	1	103; 0; 1	13	17	23	19	78	18
Free-/dom	0	1	28; 0; 1	44	54	42	98	34	6
Freedom of choice	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Future generations	0	0	5; 1; 1	1	18	3	4	13	0
Gender	1	2	19; 0; 0	5	55	33	272	60	9
Global	7	2	228; 7; 4	4	44	45	78	140	17
Global citizen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global civil society	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Global community	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	3	0
Global conference	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	3	3	11	7	0
Global consensus	0	0	3; 0; 2	0	1	0	2	1	0

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Global democracy	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Global environment	0	0	16; 4; 0	0	1	2	4	4	1
Global ethic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global framework	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	1	0	4	0	1
Global governance	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Global level	2	0	29; 0; 2	0	5	1	2	4	4
Global partnership	0	0	5; 3; 0	0	2	0	0	2	0
Global peace	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Global platform	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Global social order	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Good practices	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Governance (good...)	0	0	7; 0; 0	0	5	4	2	8	1
Green	0	0	16; 0; 1	0	0	0	0	12	0
Health for all	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Holistic/ally	0	0	9; 0; 1	0	4	0	5	5	1
Human dignity	0	0	0	2	4	12	4	3	1
Husband	0	0	4; 0; 0	0	2	4	6	3	0
Immediate	1	1	12; 1; 0	8	4	2	8	5	3
Implement-ation	19	16	746; 0; 4	29	127	146	226	245	61
Inclus-ion/ive	0	0	10; 0; 0	0	6	3	3	6	0
Indicator	0	3	34; 0; 0	1	7	9	6	22	1
Individuals	3	0	21; 0; 1	3	49	0	18	18	4
Informal	0	0	20; 0; 0	0	13	15	31	36	0
Integrat-ion	3	0	347; 0; 3	5	52	96	62	99	10
Intergovernmental-ly	0	1	68; 0; 0	7	27	16	17	18	5
International (all incl.)	1	40	1004; 12; 19	114	351	250	382	321	101
International community	2	6	121; 1; 1	22	60	22	36	32	16
International cooperation	0	0	52; 0; 4	10	20	25	13	33	0

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Leader-ship	0	3	9; 0; 0	0	34	3	35	21	0
Like-minded	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link-age	4	1	74; 0; 0	1	25	10	24	39	5
Machinery	0	0	7; 0; 0	5	1	0	8	0	0
Mainstream	0	0	0	1	1	0	40	7	0
Major groups	0	0	9; 0; 0	0	2	2	0	1	0
Mandate	0	2	15; 0; 0	13	8	2	46	26	8
Marriage	0	0	0	0	22	3	28	6	0
Mechanism-s	8	3	221; 0; 2	11	32	31	75	73	19
Monitor-ing	5	8	144; 0; 0	7	42	19	62	39	17
Moral-ity	1	0	1; 0; 0	0	19	5	17	6	0
Mother-	1	4	2; 0; 0	0	37	3	27	3	0
Multilateral	0	1	79; 0; 1	1	14	30	19	14	2
Multi-stakeholder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Must	20	20	45; 1; 0	11	95	27	113	103	8
Nations minus United nations	4	4	10; 0; 0	5	22	73	16	8	2
Nation-state	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Natur-e/al	0	6	152; 4; 3	3	38	21	46	73	39
Network	0	0	118; 0; 0	0	15	8	30	42	1
New paradigm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-discriminat-ion/ory	0	0	5; 0; 1	5	1	12	16	9	0
Non-formal	0	0	11; 0; 0	1	7	4	5	1	0
Non-governmental organization/NGOs	5	6	167; 0; 1	10	98 + 2	25	116	105 + 36	3 + 1
Non-governmental sector	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	5	0	2	1	0
Non-state (without actors)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-state actor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Normative framework	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oblig-e/ation	0	0	18; 0; 1	7	2	6	13	7	0

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Parents	1	5	1; 0; 0	0	35	8	25	4	0
Participat-e/ion	0	5	195; 5; 2	17	68	91	155	152	23
Participatory democracy	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Partner	2	0	10; 0; 0	0	20	6	10	77	5
Partnership	9	1	40; 4; 0	1	25	28	18	133	22
People	14	3	193; 7; 4	22	193	188	101	236	26
People-centred	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	4	1
Peoples	1	1	10; 0; 0	9	18	13	13	5	0
Pluralis-m/tic	0	0	0	2	0	7	0	0	0
Primary responsibility	0	1	0	1	0	3	4	6	2
Private sector	2	1	65; 0; 2	0	43	18	33	99	7
Public-private	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Quality of life	0	3	13; 1; 0	0	34	6	6	21	0
Recommend-ation	1	0	41; 0; 0	32	54	21	65	45	3
Representat-ion/tive	0	0	35; 0; 1	2	103	72	143	212	5
Representative democracy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Reproductive health	0	0	10; 0; 0	0	141	9	45	14	1
Reproductive rights	0	0	0	0	21	0	14	1	0
Reproduct-ive/ion	0	0	17; 0; 0	0	217	13	90	18	1
Responsib-le/ly/ility	9	7	93; 3; 3	9	146	62	128	79	16
Role	6	10	162; 3; 4	18	70	22	115	104	11
Rule of law	0	0	0	9	1	6	2	0	0
Safe abortion	0	0	0	0	13	0	12	0	0
Sector	16	6	279; 1; 5	1	88	55	96	209	18
Self-determination	0	0	0	5	3	2	3	0	0
Sexual health	0	0	0	0	32	0	9	4	0
Sexual rights	0	0	0	0	5	0	4	0	0
Should	49	35	1400; 13; 58	106	562	139	234	320	40

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Skill	11	2	48; 0; 0	0	24	24	37	27	8
Social contract	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Son	0	0	0	0	5	0	8	0	0
Sovereign-ty	0	0	6; 1; 3	1	9	2	8	6	2
Spouse	0	0	0	0	3	2	4	3	0
Stabiliz-ation	0	0	5; 0; 0	1	15	5	1	1	3
Stereotyp-e/ing	1	0	2; 0; 0	0	2	2	21	0	0
Strengthen	8	5	449; 1; 4	38	58	91	92	98	0
Surveillance	0	1	14; 0; 0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Surviv-e/al	2	21	9; 0; 0	3	21	2	10	3	0
Sustain-able	6	11	734; 13; 33	5	184	87	90	331	96
Sustainable development	0	2	331; 12; 15	3	95	37	41	65	10
System-ic	13	2	719; 3; 4	32	76	67	150	183	48
Target	15	2	56;0; 0	0	6	27	24	14	10
The Planet	0	0	2; 0; 0	0	1	2	1	1	0
Toleran-t/ce	0	1	6; 0; 0	13	12	18	8	4	2
Transcend-	0	0	1; 0; 0	0	1	0	4	0	0
Transformat-ion/ive	0	0	4; 0; 0	0	1	7	9	5	1
Transition-al	0	0	20; 0; 1	1	35	21	17	12	7
Transnational	0	0	26; 0; 0	0	0	1	4	2	0
Transparen-t/cy	0	0	13; 0; 1	3	5	14	5	37	3
Truth	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	0
Universal	1	10	15; 0; 0	36	34	24	51	20	0
Universal Declaration (of Human Rights)	0	0	1; 0; 0	9	4	4	10	4	0
Universal values	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unmet need	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Urgen-t/cy	6	6	25; 0; 0	3	16	10	11	15	5
Values	3	6	40; 0; 2	0	44	21	21	14	2

	1990	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1996	1996
	Education <i>Jomtien</i>	Children <i>New-York</i>	Environment <i>Rio</i> Ag. 21/Decl./F.P.*	Human Rights <i>Vienna</i>	Population <i>Cairo</i>	Social Development <i>Copenhagen</i>	Women <i>Beijing</i>	Housing <i>Istanbul</i>	Food <i>Rome</i>
Vital-ly (revitaliz-)	6	6	22; 2; 1	1	9	5	10	21	3
Watchdogs	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Wife	0	0	0	0	3	2	6	2	0
Women's rights/rights of women	0	1	4; 0; 0	10	6	4	76	6	0
Zero	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0

APPENDIX B

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE'S SEMANTIC SYSTEM

Appendix B's long but far from exhaustive list contains the corpus of words and phrases that, in their interconnectedness, makes up global governance's semantic system as developed during the revolution and in its aftermath until the 2015 adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This language expresses the perspective, themes and ethics of global governance. It is global in two ways: first, because it was produced by global governance's "experts" who control its interpretation in a centripetal way; secondly, because it has spread globally, in a centrifugal way, becoming locally ubiquitous: a *new global language* coexisting with the languages of national and local traditions, or superseding them as per global governance's hegemonic logic. Originally coined in the English language, the new terms are either translated into the world's principal languages or used in the English original.

The new global language came about through a semantic revolution. Newness manifested itself through the creation, not of neologisms, but of new combinations of words - frequently a substantive and an adjective¹³³⁰ - into codified phrases. Combinations such as sustainable development, green policies, participatory democracy, global agenda, capacity-building, consensus-building... would have been atypical of modernity, which would either not have qualified these given substantives, or used other adjectives to qualify them ("representative" for democracy or "international" for agenda). In addition, some words, such as holism, diversity, eradication, discrimination, quality, partnership, choice, people-centeredness or sustainability have become prominent elements in the new and global semantic system, while they were less frequently or seldom used before. While a good proportion of the new terms were forged prior to the 1990s, their coming together to form a new semantic system happened during the second wave UN conferences, when they integrated each other.

The new paradigms are new in two ways: in the themes they address, and in their perspective.

New themes. In contrast with modernity's "hard" themes (nuclear threat, international security, growth, identity, ideological divide, authority of government, institutional power, win-lose, majority vote, national identity and sovereignty...), the themes of global governance are "soft": environment, climate, women, social equity and inclusion, win-win, dialogue, gender balance, consensus, informal partnerships, cultural sensitivity, sustainability, quality of life, conflict prevention...

But global governance's soft agenda has a hard side: it imposes itself as globally normative and commands implementation, cultural adjustment, alignment of "all" actors – not only governments. All are "held accountable" and must be "transparent". Global governance excludes opponents or independent thinkers from participation in "agenda-setting" and "consensus-building". It establishes target dates for the realization of its objectives. It disposes of tight monitoring mechanisms. It frames all societies into the use of its language and paradigms. It gives countries "scorecards", and rewards its "good students" - the performers of "best practices". It transforms radical agendas into global norms. It places its watchdogs in strategic places at all levels. It controls the strengthening of national statistical capacities for its own purposes. It demands clear funding commitments for its objectives. It provided itself with indicators of progress that are normative for all countries. Its network of like-minded partnerships, in continuous expansion, has woven a world wide web with which most of the world's

¹³³⁰ The new language is composed of single words, or phrases which are either a substantive qualified by an adjective (equal access), a substantive object of a gerund (capacity-building), two substantives joined together by a preposition (agenda for change), a substantive followed by a participial adjective (result-oriented), slightly longer phrases (decisions that affect one's life). Some semantic roots are used in all their available forms (verb, noun, adjective, at times also adverb): to prevent, prevention, preventable.

powerful actors are now entangled. It has “zero tolerance” for what is, from its perspective, “discriminatory”. Global governance’s soft way of being hard and “totalitarian” is new.

New perspective. Global governance addresses the new themes from a perspective that is both postmodern and secularistic. The new themes and the new perspective challenge those of what used to be called the western “universal values” system, which was both modern and Judeo-Christian. They destabilize, in particular, faith in progress, growth as economic paradigm, national sovereignty, representative democracy, the authority of government and institutions, majority vote, cultural identity, the primacy of reason, natural law, social hierarchies, the authority of parents and educators, the family, man’s dominance over nature, traditions, religious doctrines... The new language is new also for non-western civilizations, be they Eurasian, Asian, Australian, Oceanic, African or Latin American, as it differs from the traditional language of these various cultures and, if they were colonies, from the language of their former colonizers.

Accelerate: accelerate progress/implementation/action/interventions...

Access: universal access; global access; full access; equal access; equitable access; confidential access; affordable access; safe access; right to access; access to choice, rights, safe drinking water, energy, food, education, healthcare, reproductive health, sanitation, cultural diversity, scientific knowledge, learning resources, data provision, justice, Internet, digital platforms, financial services, credit, environmentally sound technologies in all countries...

Accountability: accountable institutions; accountable government; business accountability; mutual accountability; fully accountable; accountability mechanisms; multiple accountability; accountable for progress; gender accountability; accountability arrangements; shared accountability framework...

Alliance: alliance of civilizations; scientific alliance; global alliance; alliance for action; broad alliance of people, governments, civil society and the private sector...

Awareness-raising: awareness-raising campaign; advocacy campaign; public information campaign; sensitization campaign; consciousness-raising; evidence-based advocacy; digital advocacy...

Balance/stabilization/neutrality: gender balance; environmental balance; work-family balance; zero demographic growth; land-degradation neutral world; gender neutral...

Capacity: capacity-building; capacity strengthening; capacity development; productive capacity; national/country/local capacity; statistical capacity; supportive statistical capacity building; adaptive capacity; technological capabilities; capable institutions...

Change: agenda for change; agenda-setting; process of change; new paradigm; paradigm shift; making a difference; fundamental shift; actionable agenda; positive social change; structural change; agents/drivers of change; force for change; game-changer; changing mindsets; change from within; adapting to change; changing dynamics; facilitator of change; group facilitator; facilitating role; action-oriented; result-oriented; harmonization; structural adjustment; cultural adjustment; culturally responsive; consolidating progress; social innovations; movement towards sustainable consumption; scaling up; quantum leap forward; enabling environment; conducive environment; supportive environment; participatory environment; enabler; global and local movement; iterative process; cultural and religious barriers; business as usual; revitalize; cost-effective...

Children/youth: children’s rights; child participation; children choices; child-friendly; child-sensitive; children’s empowerment; youth empowerment; child well-being; child poverty; child labor;

Children/Youth Parliament; children decision-making; vulnerable children; at-risk children; child welfare; best interest of the child; child-oriented programs; early childhood care; child rights-based approach to health; youth-led projects; young global leaders; youth-friendly reproductive health services; children as agents of change; youth-serving; child marriage; child soldier; Girl Summit...

Choice: freedom of choice; right to choose; informed choice; sustainable choices; life choices; diversity of choices; power to choose; healthy choices (choice of contraception); contraceptive choice; pro-choice; anti-choice opposition; sexual and reproductive health choices; sexuality and fertility choices; low-carbon investment choices...

Civil society: civil society organizations (CSOs); civil society movement; non-state actors; NGOs; umbrella organizations; community-based organizations (CBOs); faith-based organizations; civil society power; global associational revolution; stakeholder; multi-stakeholder; relevant stakeholder; appropriate stakeholders; private sector; public sector; public and private stakeholders; non-state actors involvement; relevant constituencies; multi-constituency process; global coalitions of constituencies; youth constituents; the technical community; global sexual and reproductive health community; eminent persons; High Level Panel; High Level Political Forum...

Climate change: global warming; emission limitation and reduction; environmental carbon footprint; greenhouse gases; greenhouse gas emissions; ozone-depleting substances; runaway climate change; climate change mitigation; climate change adaptation; climate justice; climate-smart agriculture; climate finance; smart climate change monitoring; climate sustainability; global/universal climate agreement; global average temperature; global limits (on carbon emissions); climate induced hazards and natural disasters; climate-related extreme events; extreme weather; impact reduction; early warning; decarbonization; tipping points; existential problem; climate event...

Consensus: new global consensus; consensus-building; multi-stakeholder consensus; Rio/Cairo/Beijing... consensus; broad political consensus; consensus science; consensual sexual relationships; informed consent; reservations; healthy compromises; flexible concepts; common ground; common future; common platform; common goals; shared goals; commonly shared values; negotiating skills; clarification of values; coalition-building; collective interests; informal discussions; informal informals; open-ended process; one voice; synergies; crowdsourcing; Chatman House rules; cross-cultural understanding; intercultural citizenship; jointly identified challenges; working as one; new social contract...

Consultation: broad-based consultation; thematic consultation; informal consultation; multi-stakeholder consultation; open-ended consultative process...

Collaboration/cooperation/coordination: collaborative innovation; collaborative approach; government-private sector collaboration; South-South collaboration; triangular cooperation; water cooperation; global cooperation; new forms of cooperation; coordinated action; coordinated policy-making framework; coordinated response; coordinated international action; globally coordinated solutions; global AIDS coordination; effective coordination mechanisms...

Crime: crime against humanity; war crimes; transnational organized crime; wildlife crime; global environmental crime; forest crime...

Democracy: inclusive democracy; participatory democracy, democratic governance; democratization (of Africa, of the Security Council, of the Church...); gender-inclusive democracy; direct democracy; democratic deficit...

Demography: overpopulation; population stabilization; ageing populations; demographic dividend; active ageing; maternal mortality...

Dialogue: constructive dialogue; inclusive dialogue; structured dialogue ; national dialogue; global dialogue; critical dialogue; civil dialogue; political dialogue; innovative mechanisms for dialogue; multi-stakeholder dialogue; dialogue across generations; plural dialogue...

Diplomacy: goodwill ambassador; collaborative diplomacy; preventive diplomacy; energy diplomacy; twitter diplomacy...

Discrimination/stigma: principle of non-discrimination; elimination of all forms of discrimination; fight against discrimination; gender discrimination; discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation; discrimination against minorities; discriminatory laws and policies; non-discriminatory governments; discriminatory practices; non-discriminatory trading system; discrimination against persons with albinism; triple discrimination of being female, indigenous and poor; non-judgmental approach; stigma; free from stigma; ...

Diversity: celebration of diversity; equality in diversity; cultural diversity; sexual diversity; gender diversity; human diversity; family diversity; religious diversity; creative diversity; human genome diversity; genetic diversity; bibliodiversity; biological diversity; agrodiversity; biodiversity; marine biodiversity; diverse environment; polymorphous diversity; linguistic diversity; developmental diversity; diverse religious and cultural settings; multi-polar world; complexity...

E-: e-discussions; e-democracy; e-government; e-governance...

Economy: green economy; blue economy; bio-economy; high/low-carbon economy; sustainable economy; productive lives...

Education: participatory education; non formal education; informal education; civic education; sexuality education; human rights education; sustainable development education; basic education; basic numeracy; life skills education; skills development; skills training; skills acquisition; vocational training; training modules; lifelong learning; shared learning; active listening...

Emerging: emerging information technology; emerging threats; emerging donors; emerging issues/challenges; emerging family structures...

Empowerment/autonomy: empowerment perspective; empowerment framework; women's empowerment; gender empowerment; people's empowerment; family empowerment; employee empowerment; empowerment of the elderly/youth/girl child...; empowerment of the poor; homosexual empowerment; countries' empowerment; disempowerment; economic/educational/psychological/political/legal/technological... empowerment; power of information technology; power of multi-stakeholder partnerships; power with; power within; integrative power; relational power; generative power; collective power; individual autonomy; sexual autonomy...

Energy: energy efficiency; clean energy; global energy mix; renewable energy; carbon-based energy...

Environment: environmental stewardship; environmental stability; environmental resilience; environmental stress; environmental account; environmental vulnerability; environmental damage; environmental commons; environmental footprint; environmental health; healthy

planet/seas/oceans/forests/cities...; internalization of environmental costs; environmental impact assessment; clean growth/technologies...; human-induced environmental devastation; negative human impact; Anthropocene; Mother Earth; the Earth; Earth prayer; Future Earth; Mother Nature; Earth's carrying capacity; shared planet; resilient planet; resilient agricultural practices; protected areas; protected species of flora and fauna; invasive alien species; endangered species; biodiversity loss; overfishing; marine degradation; land degradation; resource degradation; ecosystem degradation; ecosystem restoration; fragile ecosystems; terrestrial ecosystems; ecosystem services; desertification; drought monitoring; resource scarcity; water depletion; natural capital; planetary extinction; planetary boundaries; planetary health; eco-frontiers; renewable resources; limited resources; hazardous pesticides; hazardous chemicals; hydropower; biowaste; wasteful use; wastewater treatment; food waste; plastic waste; toxic waste; deforestation; reforestation; innovative technologies; precautionary approach; transboundary environmental effects; illegal wildlife trade; increasing recycling; bio products...

Equality/equity/poverty: equity/equality principle; equal opportunities; equal treatment; equal pay for equal work; substantive equality; equal futures; legal equality (of states); marriage equality; egalitarian marriage; domestic inequality; inequality within and between countries; social equity/inequity; equitable world; equitable growth; health equity; equitable partnerships; vulnerable/disadvantaged groups; vulnerable minorities; ending poverty and hunger; essential package of interventions; essential health care services; basic services; basic needs; basic sanitation; anti-poverty goals; extreme poverty; win-win; poverty alleviation; affordable quality education/housing/energy...; underserved populations; absolute poverty; absolute income poverty; full employment...

Eradication/abolition: eradication of tuberculosis, joblessness, colonialism, torture, slavery poverty, hunger; AIDS-free world...

Families/marriage: families; family under all its forms; single-parent families; reconstituted families; sustainable families; single mothers; female-headed households; child-headed households; dual-earner household; domestic partnerships; same sex couples/marriages/relationships/partners; civil unions/partnerships; early marriage; family perspective; family-centered/oriented policies; intergenerational/transgenerational solidarity; productive families; parental employment/unemployment; maternity/paternity/ parental leave; family caregiver; cross-generational community centers; multigenerational living; multigenerational perspective; intergenerational practices/initiatives; maternity protection; paternity benefits; work-family policies...

For all: quality of life for all; opportunities for all; education for all; health for all; marriage for all; life of dignity for all; productive lives for all; information for all; empowerment for all; accountable institutions for all; sustained prosperity/well-being for all; data for all; work for all; sustainable energy for all; positive change for all people in all countries; basic safety and justice for all; a better world for all; safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport for all; adequate housing for all; affordable basic health services for all; access for all; sexuality education for all; adequate sanitation and hygiene for all; legal identity for all; full and productive employment for all; decent work for all; equitable futures for all; access to essential medicines and vaccines for all; well-being for all at all ages; learning opportunities for all; water and sanitation for all ...

Forced: forcibly displaced; forced labor; forced pregnancy; forced marriage...

Friendly: environmentally friendly; youth-friendly; climate-friendly; eco-friendly; family-friendly; child-friendly schools; development-friendly trade; employment-friendly policies...

Gap/divide: delivery gaps; gender gap; gender pay gap; global gap (between rich and poor); accountability gap; health gap; bridge the gap; educational/digital divide...

Gender: gender perspective; gender equality/inequality; gender mainstreaming; gender role; gender stereotypes; gender role stereotypes; negative stereotypes; stereotypical views; social/cultural construction; deconstruction of stereotypes; gender differences; gender lens; gender analysis; gender bias; gender blind; gender specific; gender parity; gender norms; gender training; gender recognition; gender-disaggregated data; gender-differentiated impact; gendered impact; gender-based wage discrimination; gender dimension; gender power relations; gender division of labor; gender order; gendercide; gender specialist; gender issues; gender concerns; gender factors; gender research; gender guide; gender budgeting; gender approach; gender planning; gender policies; gender conformity; gender expression; gender-variant; preferred gender; transgender; post-gender; anti-gay; anti-LGBT; homophobia; transphobia; intersex; sexual orientation; sexual minorities; homosexuality; consensual same-sex relationships; men who have sex with men; same-sex sexual activity; LBGTQI community; gender variance; gender non-conformity;

Globalization: global agenda; global consensus; global agreement; global framework; global policy agreement; global forum; global platform; Global Compact; global development map; global development partnership; global system; global structures; global consultation process; global politics; global policy-makers; global leadership; world community; global village; global neighborhood; global alliance; global society; global community; global vision; new global architecture; global institutions of governance and development; global action plan; global discussion; global agents of change; global citizens; global concern; global mandate; global treaties; global debate; global rights; global priorities; global norms; global experts; global instrument; global convention; global guiding principle; global template; global regulatory regime; global values; global ethic; global social injustice; global equity; global solidarity; global peace; global intolerance; global sustainability; global harmony; global interdependence; global conversation; global commitments; global standards; global issues; global fishing; global water resources; global curricula; global youth; global commons; global public goods; global economic growth; global progress; global prosperity; global security; global health; global well-being; global education; global food security; global diet; global nutrition; global resource; global South; global North; global good challenge; global (scientific and technological) knowledge; global population; global solutions; comprehensive global response; global demands; global challenges; global biodiversity; global religious leaders; global anti-tobacco efforts; global births; global engagement; global history; global economic governance; global trade; global market; global environment; global information society; global environmental governance; global environmental policy; global chemicals and waste agenda; global performance and progress; global statistics; global disarmament; global age; global stakeholders; global support; global pause; global moratorium; global impact; global goal-setting; global labor force; global land use; global poverty line; enabling global environment; global trading system; global production chains; global environment; global catch; global ministerial environment forum; global forest health; global family planning agenda; global poverty issues; global food system; global road safety; global social issues; global foreign direct investment; global health institutions; global problems; global jeopardy; global menace; global urgency; global crises; global food loss; global drug use; global hardships; global poverty; global (youth) unemployment; global terrorism; global fight against drugs; global food/water crisis; global war on women/terror/poverty...; global job crisis; global threat; global arms trade; global epidemic (of youth unemployment); global sanitation crisis/goals; global bottlenecks; global environmental degradation; global financial crisis; global human trafficking...

Governance: global/national/local governance; good/bad governance; inclusive governance; institutional governance; responsive governance; urban governance; corporate governance;

international environmental governance; governance from below; internet governance; health governance; effective governance; fight against corruption; decentralization process...

Green: green growth; new/ever green revolution; green policies; green jobs; green cities; green development; green future; green consumption; green measures; green behavior; green marketing; green business; green industry; green products; green markets; green skilled labor; green trade; green entrepreneurship; green partnerships for growth...

Harmful: harmful gender norms; harmful gender stereotypes; harmful (traditional/religious) practices; harmful myths...

Holism/system/inter-/cross-/trans-/multi-: holistic approach; holistic agenda; holistic education; holistic health/medicine; holistic efforts; comprehensive approach; comprehensive sexuality education; comprehensive policy framework; comprehensive peace agreement; comprehensive response; comprehensive assessment; comprehensive human rights policy; whole-of-Government approach; interconnected challenges; interconnected cooperation; (increasingly) interconnected world; interlinked and mutually reinforcing; linkages; interrelated social, economic and environmental problems; interconnectivity; intercultural citizenship; cross-cutting priorities; cross-cutting themes; cross-cutting solutions; transversal values; multisectoral services; multidimensional integrated mission; systemic issues; global governance system; UN development system; systemic approach; system-wide coherence; system-wide youth plan; silos; silo fashion; siloed agenda; issue platform; sector specific; continuum of care (for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health); nexus...

Horizontal: horizontal leadership; horizontal dialogue...

Humanitarianism/solidarity: humanitarian accountability; humanitarian emergency; humanitarian neutrality; humanitarian assistance; humanitarian crisis; humanitarian ceasefire; human loss; disaster/crisis/tsunami preparedness; internally displaced; cruel and inhuman practice; disaster risk reduction; disaster preparedness; human trafficking...

Humanity: our common humanity; our shared humanity; our global human family...

Identity: gender identity; virtual identity; identity politics; terrestrial identity...

In all its forms: poverty in all its forms; child labor in all its forms; all forms of life; all forms of discrimination against all women and girls; corruption and bribery in all its forms; all forms of violence; poverty in all its dimensions; environment at all levels; marine pollution of all kinds; universally applicable to all countries...

Inclusion: inclusive approach; inclusive growth; inclusive consultation process; social and economic inclusion of all; inclusive solutions; the inclusive future we want; inclusive social protection policies; social exclusion/inclusion; inclusive economic development; inclusive green economy; inclusive cities; inclusive multilateralism; gender-inclusive environment; inclusive peace; inclusive language; inclusive dialogue; inclusive partnerships; inclusive marriage; inclusive food and agricultural systems; inclusive cooperation; inclusive global governance system; feeling of inclusiveness; all-inclusive multi-stakeholder approach; inclusive state of law and equality; inclusive business practices; inclusive processes; youth inclusion; father inclusive; inclusive regional administrations...

Innovative: innovative approach; innovative technologies; innovative science; innovative financing mechanisms...

Integrity/integration: territorial integrity; bodily integrity; physical integrity; integral nature of the Earth; integrity of the global environmental and developmental system; integrity of the Earth's ecosystems; integral justice; ecological/environmental integrity; integrative/integrated approach; integrated response; integrated institutions; integrated health care; integrated strategies; integrated reporting; intangible heritage...

Justice/fairness: social justice; economic justice; intergenerational justice; redistributive justice; gender justice; food justice; reproductive justice; environmental justice; global justice; fair trade; fair distribution of household duties...

Knowledge: knowledge-based; science-based; evidence-based; statistics-based; knowledge-building; knowledge sharing; knowledge network training; global knowledge commons; indigenous knowledge; technology bank; data revolution; timely data; tracking data; scientific and operational expertise; evidence-based migration policies; independent experts; science-policy; science-policy interface; scientific evidence; relevant experts; data literacy...

Life-saving/life-threatening: life-saving family planning; life-saving health supplies; life-saving services; life-saving drugs; life-saving HIV prevention; life-saving contraception; life-saving work; life-saving sexual and reproductive health services; life-threatening abuses...

M-: m-applications; m-health; m-learning; m-taxes; m-banking...

Mainstreaming: gender mainstreaming; streamlining; alignment...

Management: management techniques; conflict management; stress management; non-profit management; border management policies; biodiversity management; (solid) waste management; public management of religious diversity; sustainably-managed protected areas; manage work-family lives; natural resources assets management; sustainable forest management; (disaster) risk management; wildlife management; management of STDs; environmental management...

Meaningful: meaningful inclusion; meaningful engagement; meaningful negotiations; meaningful dialogue; meaningful metrics; meaningful participation; meaningful involvement of young people; meaningful goals; meaningful mitigation actions; meaningful transformation...

Networks: social networks; networks of interests; partnership network; informal networks; global network; global policy networks; networked governance; connectivity revolution...

Ownership: democratic ownership; ownership of development; locally owned; national/country ownership; global ownership (of a shared development agenda); ownership at all levels; African-owned development initiatives; country-led; country-based; appropriation; community leadership; community awareness; local champions; internalization...

Participation: participatory governance; right to participation; participatory consultative process; multistakeholder participation; broad-based participation; full and equal participation (of women...); women's economic participation; universal participation; youth participation; participation of older persons; participatory research; grass-roots participation; participatory medicine; participatory rights; participation of all concerned citizens; participation in decision-making processes...

Partnership: partnership principle; equal partners; equitable partnership; active partners; like-minded partners; transnational/global partnerships; multi-stakeholder partnerships; public-private partnerships; public-private-people partnerships; strategic partnership; enhanced partnership; partnership-building;

partner organizations; partner countries; partnering for health; sexual partners; social partners; trusted partners; dynamic partnerships; equal partnership of all stakeholders; partnership with indigenous people/religions; goal-specific partnership; sector-specific partnership; environmental partnership...

Peace: culture of peace; peace-building; peacekeeping; peace dividend; peace education; dispute settlement; post-conflict nations...

Peer: peer learning; South-South trade; peer review; peer education...

People-centeredness: bottom-up decision-making...

Potential: realization of one's potential; full physical and mental potential...

Prevention: culture of prevention; preventive measures; conflict prevention; crime prevention; prevention of cruelty; preventable human misery; preventable newborn, infant and under-five deaths; accident prevention; predictable financial systems; precautionary principle...

Quality/well-being: quality of life; quality infrastructure; quality education; quality living; (poor) quality jobs; quality food; quality health care services; quality learning; quality training; quality time; air quality; water quality; quality childcare services; quality population; qualitative progress; quality data; quality care in access to family planning; high quality safe abortion care; quality safe motherhood; quality of statistics; marital quality; soil quality; quality implementation; qualitative evaluations; quality assurance mechanisms; quality early childhood development programs; quality plans; regional well-being; community well-being; family well-being; economic well-being; collective well-being; human and societal well-being...

Responsibility: common but differentiated responsibilities; responsible environmental behavior; responsible environmental pollution; responsible businesses; environmental responsibility; corporate social responsibility; responsible business behavior; responsibility to protect; shared responsibility...

Responsive: responsive governments; responsive justice; responsive institutions; responsive partnerships; gender-responsive; gender-responsive budgeting, gender-responsive accountability measures...

Rights: rights-based approach (to development); right to information; right to confidentiality; right to health; sexual and reproductive rights; rights of future generations; rights of indigenous people; right to a voice in decisions that affect one's life; right to access; minority rights; right to die in dignity; right to sexual orientation; right to pleasure; environmental rights; environmental human rights; rights of nature; rights of Mother Earth; body rights...

Security/safety: human security; global security architecture; food security; water security; environmental security; economic security; job security; social security; land security; sustainable energy security; common security; cybersecurity; contraceptive security; reproductive health commodity security; safe employment; safe motherhood; safe childbirth; road safety; tenure security; democratic security; secure livelihoods; biosafety; nuclear-free world...

Self-: self-esteem; self-respect; self-confidence; self-awareness; self-reliance; self-expression; self-management; self-determination; self-actualization; self-enhancement; self-verification; self-fulfillment; self-enrichment; self-help; self-control; self-sufficiency; self-government; self-bank; self-ownership; self-health; self-education; self-transformation; non-self-governing territories; self-care; self-identity; ...

Sensitive: gender sensitive; planet-sensitive; culturally sensitive approaches; conflict-sensitive approaches; father-sensitive work family leave; gender sensitization...

Soft: soft law; soft policy decisions; soft diplomacy...

Surveillance/implementation: good/best practices; technical guidelines; monitoring framework; watchdogs; institutional framework; blueprint; accountability/normative/strategic framework; social accountability; framework for action; environmental standards; internationally agreed standards; global minimum standards; monitoring mechanisms; compliance mechanisms; feedback mechanisms; mutual accountability mechanisms; surveillance mechanisms; robust mechanism of implementation review; mandatory ‘comply or explain’ regime; performance review/contract; review process; full implementation; enforceable and monitorable legislation and policies; benchmark; goal-based development; goal-based process; measurable outcomes; measuring progress; substantive progress; indicators of progress; performance indicators; core indicators; composite indicators; measurable indicators; youth-specific indicators; gender-sensitive indicators; quantitative/qualitative data; target date; quantitative targets; anti-poverty targets; target-setting process; financial resource targets; contextualized national targets; progress towards the goals/targets; absolute target; time-bound targets; robust, numerical target; intended outcome; deadline; independent evaluations; information disclosure mechanism; statistical systems; expert units; finance mobilization; shared global metrics; social and environmental metrics; assessment campaigns/reports; shadow report; annual report; report cards; global score card; sexual and reproductive health and rights performance metrics; gender markers; gender audit; gender scorecards; gender equality assessment; data collection disaggregated by sex; quotas; business code of conduct; ethical charter; implementation matrix; health outcomes; roadmap; clear funding commitments; predictable aid; high level champions group; registry of commitments; results-based finance; results-oriented; participatory monitoring; mutual review; harmonization; implementation fidelity...

Sustainability: sustainable development; sustainable future; sustainable lifestyles; sustainable transport; sustainable public procurement; sustainable consumer; sustainable development technologies; sustainable tourism; sustainable livelihoods; sustainable growth; sustainable planet; sustainable peace; sustainable development goals; sustainable employment; sustainable diets; sustainable societies; sustainable agriculture; sustainable fishing; sustainable global trade; sustainable development indicators; sustainable development governance; sustainable management of natural resources; sustainable family planning programs; sustainable practices; sustainable health services; maximum sustainable yield; sustainable bank; corporate sustainability; sustainable urban infrastructure/development; predictable and sustainable investment; sustained prosperity; sustainable farming; sustainable patterns of consumption and production; sustainably developing societies; sustainability practices; sustainable poverty eradication; sustainable health financing; triple bottom line; future generations; Small Island Developing States; Landlocked Developing Countries...

Transformation: structural transformation; social transformation; transforming integration; transformative programming; transformative education; transformative technology; transformative plan/perspective; transformative force; transformative social policy; transformational agenda...

Transition: demographic transition; democratic transition; transitional justice; transition to sustainable development; global transition (to a more sustainable economy); gender transition...

Transparency: transparent process; transparency revolution; transparent accounting...

Universal: universal access; universal health coverage; universal primary education; universal schooling; universal learning; universal ratification (of international treaties); universal goals and targets; universally applicable approach; principle of universality; universally accepted principles; universal threats to health; universal endeavor; universal legal identity; universal targets; universal access to voluntary family planning; universal intergovernmental high-level political forum; ...

Violence: intimate partner violence; non-partner sexual violence; violence against women; femicide; domestic violence; gender-based violence; violence against children; homophobic violence; global pandemic of violence against women and girls; forced intercourse; dating violence; transphobic violence; ...

Virtual: virtual google+ hangouts; virtual relationships; virtual love...

Women/sexuality/family planning: advancement of women; women's rights; maternal health; family planning; reproductive and sexual health and rights; reproductive health continuum of care; safe/unsafe sex; protected sex; safe/unsafe abortion; medical abortion; medication abortion; post-abortion care; safe abortion care; unmet needs; wanted/unwanted child/pregnancy; planned parenthood; vital reproductive health supplies; contraceptive crisis; voluntary contraceptives; birth control; control over one's destiny; behavior change; risky behavior; HIV/AIDS awareness; marital rape; male involvement; cultural/religious taboos; sexualization of girls/children/women; sex worker; voluntary sex work; sexual liberty; sexual slavery; intimate encounters; ever-partnered women; healthy sexual lives; love without fear; commercial sexual exploitation; SRHR community; stigmatization; life-cycle approach (to contraceptive services); behavior change communication tool; feminization of poverty; sexting; sexual decision-making; personal boundaries; unwanted sexual attention; sexual consent; sexual limits; mutual monogamy ...

Zero: zero growth; zero goals; zero discrimination; zero tolerance approach; zero AIDS-related deaths; zero hunger world; zero poverty; zero stigma and discrimination; zero draft; zero-carbon energy sources...

Other languages being globalized:

Technospeak or technobabble

Artificial intelligence, virtual reality, virtual world, virtual relationships, virtual community, virtual learning environments, virtual training, virtual institutions, virtual tour, virtual globe, virtuality continuum, virtual reality modeling language, second life, avatar, online community, telepresence, navigation, human interface, cyberspace, simulated reality, metaverse, software agents, augmented reality, humanoids, mhealth...

Sexual democracy/LGBT language

Coming out; gay-straight alliance; loving relationships; cross-dressing; queer frontiers; identity borders/frontiers; pride parade; to reinvent oneself/one's life; travelling; to navigate; dialogical relationship; polyamorous relationships/sexuality; open marriage...

This document comes from Marguerite A. Peeters' archives.

APPENDIX C

WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS TENDING TO DISAPPEAR FROM THE LANGUAGE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The dynamic of global governance's semantic system, in lockstep with that of the Western cultural revolution, has quietly marginalized a substantial number of terms that used to form part of the public debate until recently. In so doing, it has proceeded with revolutionary velocity and throughout the world.

Words naming universal human realities, which have been part of the common semantic heritage of humanity for centuries, if not millennia, have tended to vanish from the novel global semantic synthesis. Let us give as examples terms such as man, woman, masculinity, femininity, father, mother, paternity/maternity (fatherhood and motherhood), son, daughter, husband, wife, spouse, parents, marriage, family, conception (of a child), complementarity, obedience, good, evil, truth, love, hatred, creation, reality, heart, reason, conscience, will, memory, intelligence, service, suffering, purity/impurity, virginity, chastity, fidelity/infidelity, fertility, morality, authority...

Words belonging to biblical language or to that of the Judeo-Christian civilization have tended to vanish from everyday vocabulary and are rarely found in the documents of international organizations, NGOs, the media and other social actors. Without pretending to offer an exhaustive list, let us give as examples: covenant, maternal bosom, paternal home, filial piety, flesh, blood, firstborn, widow, widower, descendants, ancestors, posterity, life and death, eternal life, light and darkness, earth, cultivate, gift, gratuitous gift, falsehood, communion, division, rational, reasonable, discernment, voice (of conscience), upright conscience, happiness, joy, sadness, solitude, hope, faith, charity, despair, law, modesty, marvel, sacrality, enemy, eternity, human act, interiority, pity, loyalty, sin, fault, concupiscence, perversity, covetousness, license, virtue, merit, force, temperance, prudence, malice, fear, mercy, pardon, praise, vocation, blessing, fruits, beauty and ugliness, vanity, perfection, plenitude, beatitude, salvation, kingdom, tenderness, gentleness, personality, judgement, mystery, wisdom, work, glory, splendor, sorrow, anguish, cross, sacrifice, offering, expiation, redemption, trial, government, sincerity, honesty, humility and pride, fervor, zeal, nation, people, incorruptibility, name, face, idol, dogma, hierarchy, commandment, sanctuary, doctrine, being, God...

The same semantic revolution has radically redefined words such as love, freedom, equality, choice, dignity, compassion, rights, marriage, peace...

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APPENDIX D

GLOBAL CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND PARADIGM SHIFTS

Postmodern existentialism prevailed in Western culture after the defeat of Marxism-Leninism, at the time when a new global ethic was being built: the new paradigms embody the long journey of the West towards postmodernity. Transformed into norms and values during the UN conference process, they have been surfing on the powerful and dramatically accelerating wave of globalization. They already imbibe the fabric of societies all over the world.

The cultural revolution did not leave intact any of the components of Western civilization. It can in fact be subdivided into a series of revolutions: semantic; ideological; geopolitical and political; juridical; security; health; education; socioeconomic; anthropological; sexual; feminist; cultural and societal; ethic; scientific; agriculture; industry...

The lists hereafter are obviously far from comprehensive. Their purpose is to provide a glimpse of the depth and scope of the global cultural revolution.

None of the paradigm shifts is self-evident. A serious study is in order for each single one of them, to allow each person, human community and nation to discern and determine themselves freely. Discernment is more needed than ever in the era of globalization.

Neither modernity nor postmodernity are the panacea. Analytical efforts must therefore proscribe from the start a simplistic, rapid and superficial approach.

Semantic revolution

Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms

Reality
Definition
Single meaning
Meaning

Postmodern paradigms

Text to be interpreted
Description, ambivalence, choice of interpretation
Plural, diverse meanings
Space of interpretation

Philosophical/ideological revolution

Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms

Modernity
What
Content
In itself
Reality - truth
Answers
Religions
Dogma
Reality
Matter/body/concrete

Postmodern paradigms

Postmodernity
How and why
Method
For oneself
Deconstruction, destabilization
Questions
Spiritualities, systems of religious belief
Tolerance, free choice
Dream, virtuality, potentiality
Immaterial, ethereal, abstract

Law of nature	Meta-ethic of the freedom to choose
Eternal	Sustainable
Generalization	Acknowledgment of “differences”
Ignorance, “obscurantism”	“Knowledge”
Objectivity	Interpretation
Abstract reasoning, meta theories	“Human realities”, experience
Capacity of the reason to access reality	Reasoning of negation, denial
Power - reason coalition	Power for social change
Binarism	Complexity
Common good	Collective interests
Stability	Change
Sacredness of human life	Equality of all life forms
Truth	Right to error
Certitudes	Uncertainty
Deism	Atheistic existentialism

Geopolitical and political revolution

Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms

International
Nation-state, national sovereignty
Colonialism
National interest
Bipolar world
Equal sovereign states
Intergovernmental
National citizenship
Western world
Cold war
Inter-state wars
Population control
Government
Representative democracy
State as sovereign
Decide-announce-defend
Institutional power
Hierarchies
Authority
National construction
Homogeneous states
Power over
Top-down
Imposition
Confrontation
Govern

Postmodern paradigms

Global
Global governance
Cultural sensitivity
Global priorities
Apolar world
Equal global governance partners
Multistakeholder
Global citizenship
Global world
Global culture of peace
Internal conflicts
Sexual and reproductive rights
Governance
Participatory democracy
State as facilitator
Consensus-building
Power of individuals, individual rights
Equal partners
Individual autonomy
Building transnational networks
Multiculturalism
Power with
Bottom-up
Facilitation, negotiation, mediation
Dialogue
Manage

Contract of society	Diversity of choices
State	Non-state actors
Majority – Minority	Consensus
Confrontation of ideas	Negotiations
Majority vote	Elimination of differences
Clear identities	Changing identities
Win-lose	Win-win
Hierarchical leadership	Horizontal leadership
Representation	Participation
Pluralism	Single thought
Service	Sum of particular interests
Centralization	Decentralization
Critical discussion	Opportunistic compromise
Interests of citizens	Interests of political parties
Extremism on the fringes	Extremism in the middle
Political culture	Mass of interest groups
Pluralism	Political correctness
Political debate	Political technology
Left and right	Fragments of identity

Juridical revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Hard	Soft
Formal	Informal
Hard law	Customary law
Binding	Consensual
Authority of law	Conviction power of the new ethic
Universal rights	Global right to choose
International law	Cosmopolitan law
Parental rights	Children rights
Human rights	Women's rights
Right to family planning	Reproductive and sexual rights

Security revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
International security	Human security: economic security, social security, food security, health security, environmental security...

Education revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Teacher/professor/director	Facilitator
Objective knowledge	Competence

Education	Sensitization
Education	Formation, training
Teacher's instructions	Student participation
Orders	Advice
Leadership of subordination	Leadership of integration
Top-down imposition	Bottom-up responsibility
Imposition	Internalization, ownership
Passive	Proactive, participatory
Docile	Criticizing

Health revolution

Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms	Postmodern paradigms
Absence of disease or infirmity	Holistic health
Health	Well-being, quality of life

Socioeconomic revolution

Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms	Postmodern paradigms
Development as growth	Sustainable development
Growth	Equilibrium, zero growth
Progress	Stabilization
Power of the market	Authority of the global ethic
Profit	Profit – Environmental protection – Social equity
Linear economic approach	“Creative” approaches
Competition	Convergence
GNP	Freedom of access to choice
Development in the South	Global sustainable development
Objective needs	Right to choose
Charity	Rights

Anthropological revolution

Modern/ judeo-christian paradigms	Postmodern paradigms
Happiness	Quality of life
Person, personality	Individual
Personal growth	Zero growth, regression
Spiritual growth	Nirvana
Moral/normal	Perverse/normal
Reason	Negation
Conscience	Analysis of motives, unconscious, imagination, sensuality
Heart	Emotions, feelings, affectivity
Disinterested love	Narcissism
Parental authority	Children’s autonomy
Interiority	Internalization

Traditional family	Family under all its forms
Human life	Life under all its forms
Personal development	Realization of one's potential
Life	Vitality
Touch	Massage

Sexual revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Spouse	Partner
Parents	Couples and individuals
Parents	Reproducers
Marriage	Free love
Heterosexual relations	Right to sexual orientation
Maternity/paternity	Contraceptive mentality
Sacredness of life	Right to choose/abortion
Communion	Fusion
Reality	Sensual gratification
Culture of silence, taboos	From private spaces to public spaces

Feminist revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Patriarchal structures	Gender equality order
Housewives	Women activists, development agents
Servile	Self-determining
Women in development	Gender and development
Complementarity of the sexes	Gender equality

Cultural and societal revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Modernity	Postmodernity
Universalism	Multiculturalism
Civilizations	(Global) "non-repressive civilization"
Traditions, customs	Cultural liberty
Cultural identity	Cultural diversity
Formal	Informal, non-formal
Separate cultures	Connected cultures
THE culture	Tensions and divergences
Western feeling of superiority	"Humility" of western development agents
From without	From within
Homogeneity	Heterogeneity, cracks in the system
Uniformity	Diversification, variation
Singular identity	Plural identities
Unchanging, fixed, stable	Innovating, changing, evolving

Static	Dynamic
Rigid	Flexible
Inferior/superior	Equal
Us and them	All different
Monolithic	Mosaic
Changing « the others »	Changing conventions
Elitism	For all, equality
Ready-made formulas	Contextual knowledge
Western cultural imperialism	Culturally sensitive approaches, multiculturalism
Norms	Openness to the unexpected
Foreseeable	Unforeseeable
Predetermined solutions	Knowledge relative programmation
Assumptions and ready-made ideas	Constructive dialogue
Exclusion	Inclusion
Assimilation without choice	Choice
Societal constraints	Individual choices

Ethical revolution

<i>Modern/ Judeo-Christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Universal values	Universally shared values
Universal values	Global ethic
Morality	Ethic
Obligation	Informed choice, informed consent
Justice	Equity
Human life	All forms of life
Meaning of suffering	Right to die
Good and evil	Right to choose

Scientific revolution

<i>Modern/ judeo-christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Facts	Consensus
Certitudes	Uncertainty, fuzziness
Objectivity	Individual or collective interpretation
Sectoral approach	Holistic integration
Fragmentation	Integration
Simplism	Complexity

Agriculture revolution

<i>Modern/ judeo-christian paradigms</i>	<i>Postmodern paradigms</i>
Intensive agriculture	Bio

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APPENDIX E

INTERVIEW WITH BELLA ABZUG BY MARGUERITE A. PEETERS

MARCH 6, 1995 (UNPUBLISHED)

Given Bella Abzug's crushing influence in the global governance revolution, we considered it useful to integrate the full text of one of our interviews with the leader of the Women's Caucus, done at the UN Social Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995, and to which we refer on several occasions in this thesis.

M. P.: What do you, WEDO, intend to accomplish in Beijing that you have not accomplished in the previous conferences?

B. A.: In the UN Decade for Women (1975-85), we did accomplish certain things: the creation of UNIFEM, the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. Since that time, we have had a greater participation directly in the actual official conferences. We are not part of the official – we are an NGO, WEDO. But we have had a greater impact to try to change document policies, and we have been very successful at that, since we are outsiders. We have successfully tried to get countries to see the importance of our contribution. In Beijing we have got to put a lot of this stuff which we put together, which talks big about empowerment of women, equality of women, the fundamental rights of women, we have got to put that into action. Some progress has been made since the formation of a global feminist movement during the Decade for Women, which has created changes in the lives of many women. But still millions of women have never had the icing on the cake. They still have no human rights, they have starvation, famine, exploitation, violence directed towards them, they are forced into prostitution... All that has to change!

M. P.: How will it change?

B. A.: First of all, women have to become decision-makers. I am convinced that no change will take place until women hold 50% of the places where decisions are made. And we have to demand that as a minimum out of the Beijing conference, as well as 50% of the resources needed to women's lives: education, reproductive rights, reproductive health, illiteracy, empowerment, changing their status, better housing, better environment... So we have to put together what we call a gender pledge for justice, which basically is a statement that we want governments to entertain seriously and to take specific initiative particularly in the areas of what they should do: are they going to take steps to really implement accountability, transparency, enforcement and integration? There are some governments that want to have, so to speak, a pledging conference at which governments come in and pledge what they are going to do: are they going to appoint women as their ambassador to the UN when they have a vacancy? Right now there are only six women out of 184 who are ambassadors to the UN. Can you believe that? Their missions are headed largely by males. When you have government delegations that come to the UN they are largely male (10% women). So we call on governments to make pledges, to meet with women's organizations before the end of 1995 to determine national plans and resources needed to implement the agenda for equality that is being acted upon and to assure that it is going to be committed and to commit women's programs 50% of resources to instigate a gender perspective into all policy-making, to reduce military spending. Then we are calling on the UN to honor its Charter commitment to equalize rights to men and women. That

hasn't happened at the UN, even in the employment of the people who run the UN agencies. The words are easy to put together.

M. P.: Are you implicitly criticizing the Cairo document, by saying it has not led to action?

B. A.: No, it is not that. We have a terrific document in the Cairo document. We changed the whole basis and thesis of how you deal with population. That came as a result of women and the pressure of the Women's Caucus. But we don't yet know how it is going to be implemented. They agreed on a holistic approach, for example. Not only are we going to get money for family planning but we are also going to get money for the social improvement of women which is related to how many children they are going to have or not: if they are better educated, they are not going to look for more children to have. We have good language. Now we want the music.

M. P.: And how will that happen?

B. A.: We have to get organized. We have more and more people getting organized in civil society and mobilize larger and larger groups that are participating and are becoming familiar with these documents that are coming out of the UN. We have for example the 180 days campaign – people on the ground all over the world to conduct particular activities related to Beijing, to expand their network, to be able to have the political power, to make the leaders responsive to their demands. The engagement of NGOs, especially women NGOs (I was responsible for putting together the first Women's Caucus) is almost more beneficial in organizing our constituencies than the changes that we create at these conferences. We build big constituencies that are organized, have a political drive and that will be able to exert pressure even in those countries that have traditional, cultural and social conditions which move in the opposite direction in giving women equality. There is a greater militancy, a greater demand, a greater determination to have things change so that societies function for people and not for institutions alone.

M. P.: How do you explain the fact that WEDO has so much influence on the Women's Caucus?

B. A.: I conceived the idea at the Rio conference. In 1990, two years before the conference, 55 people from all over the world (International Policy Action Committee) decided we were going to hold a congress (Congress for a Healthy Planet) in Florida in 1991. Since the UN agenda was called Agenda 21, we called ours Women's Agenda 21. We gathered 1,500 women from 83 countries and we had a consensus. We were from the North and from the South and we put together a consensus for gender that we live on even still today. Our definition of environment is very broad: it is not only the Earth, but also human rights, equal rights, economic justice, peace etc. When we had that agenda, we decided: what are we going to do with it? We have to get the UN conferences, the governments and delegates to include our provisions. So we began to form a Women's Caucus which has been present everyday at the PrepCom for international conferences and at international conferences. And the Women's Caucus has produced responsive documents: when they produce a document, we produce our documents with amendments and changes. We then go to the countries and to the UN Secretariat and say: "We want these provisions", and many of them accepted many of our provisions. That's how we have been facilitating it because we bring people from every part of the world and they co-chair and participate with us but we have to facilitate it.

M. P.: With whom has it been easy for you to negotiate?

B. A.: It varies. We have been negotiating with all countries: we negotiated with the G-77 which represents a large part of Africa, Latin America and countries in the developing world, with the European Union, with the Caribbean countries, with Canada, New Zealand and Australia, with our own US, with Norway, trying to get all countries to accept our ideas. We don't get them all, but some of them and we keep that kind of process going. We have come to be known, and people expect us to do this. They want our documents. They use them. We are in a partnership now, the NGOs with the governments in trying to create a meaningful policy.

M. P.: Was it originally your idea to establish a partnership between NGOs and governments?

B. A.: Well, once you come there, you become a big force: they can't ignore you – you are there!

M. P.: Yes, but what about the partnership which is so present in the documents?

B. A.: It is in the documents because we demanded it.

M. P.: You demanded it?

B. A.: Yes. We had the Women's Caucus. There are also other caucuses: an environment caucus, a health caucus... There are a lot of caucuses! But none of them are as large and as highly organized or as influential as the Women's Caucus. We have demanded this partnership. We have demanded the right to speak at the Plenary session on Wednesday. We have made those demands. We have demanded that we who are experts in many of the things they are talking about should be considered partners because we have much to offer.

M. P.: What kind of money do you hope to receive for the implementation of your agenda?

B. A.: Well, I discussed briefly 20/20 this morning. We are trying to press that, and we are trying to press that countries live up to the Overseas Development Assistance program of .7%. Only a couple of countries have done that. We are trying to make sure that most countries will meet that level. This is not a good time for that, I admit, because people are not doing as well in Europe and in the developing world, and the US is hung-up in political in-fighting between Republicans and Democrats. But we have to be vigilant and determined, and that's why we have that gender pledge and have placed a great emphasis on what initiatives the country is going to take. I think they are not going to be able to escape. I think they are finally going to be put to it, and we hope we played a part in getting that to happen.

M. P.: "Reproductive health" is present again in the Copenhagen document – with the same definition as in Cairo?

B. A.: What we are insisting upon is that what has been agreed to in Cairo cannot be undone. There was a consensus of 120 countries and we are fighting to see that in some places where they are attempting to change the language, that they have to be committed to the Cairo language. That's been our position, and I think many countries agree with us.

M. P.: What about the abortion issue?

B. A.: Well, we dealt with the question of how you have to address the complications which arise from unsafe abortion. For the first time it was really discussed as a public issue. All these

countries are committed and they can't just come up and say "we want to change it now". We are pushing very hard on that.

M. P.: For Bejing?

B. A.: The same thing. We are trying to make sure that the provisions which have been put together in all of these conferences are linked. They each have to be reaffirmed and they all link into each other. All these conferences (Human Rights, Population, Social Summit...) deal with women as a major force and so we insist that they all be carried over. They complement each other and we have to repeat the language which was satisfied with, and not have a whole re-discussion of the issues affecting women... It is only a small group of people and the Vatican that are trying to turn it around. And they don't have much support. God knows we had enough defeats in the past that we are now trying to live with, let alone take our advances and then try to overturn them.

M. P.: If I understand you correctly, one of Cairo's gains was its comprehensive approach?

B. A.: Yea, the holistic approach. Before you talk about population, you have to talk about women's rights, women's health, reproductive rights, sexual rights, the need to elevate women's social status through empowerment. Family planning is only a part of that – an important part, clearly because many women need it all over the world. Women have the right to choose and to have a voice. That's what Cairo really said.

M. P.: Where you have a holistic approach, you also have an underlying philosophy, which binds all these elements together. What is your philosophy of life?

B. A.: In general, my philosophy of life?

M. P.: Yes.

B. A.: That each of us care a lot about others. We have a lot of love for our children, for ourselves, for our countries. And we have to manifest that! By the actions that we take! We can't allow governments, or those who are more powerful than governments (the economic interests) to just live, or create the motives which basically oppress people. We have to create a people's civilization in which the right to health, to be clothed and housed and fed and have peace are recognized. None of that is going to happen until we change the nature of power, till women have 50% of the political space, of the resources needed for the programs they now don't have.

M. P.: Why do you believe so much in women to resolve the world's problems?

B. A.: Because they are not corrupted by the past, number one. Number two: they don't own oil wells, the defense plants, the uranium mines, they don't own big corporations: they are free! They are independent, and they have a collective experience which can enable them to think of what is useful, what works for families, for the people they love and so on, instead of being involved in all kinds of special interests which they don't have, or past policies which they didn't create. Their agenda for equality requires much change. We have given men a lot of years to do it and they haven't done it! That's why we have to do it ourselves.